General Meade; Never Sent

[Rob9641]

*** he had to do was push his army to its limit to catch up to and pass the ANV and place the AoP between the confederates and the Potomac, forcing Lee to attack against Meade's prepared defenses, even If he had to do it from the South Bank of that river(Meade had bridges across the river and Lee did not)."


No it was not and the mere assumption is pure silliness. Read the book. Moving an Army. any ARMY, in 1863 during the best of conditions was difficult at best. The ANV under Robert E. Lee had just been defeated but at a very high price in blood and supplies. The battlefield was cluttered with the detritus of war. Wounded by the thousands needed treatment. Soldiers and commanders had not slept in days and some had not eaten or had water. READ THE BOOK!!!

I agree, there was no way the AOP was going to catch up and pass the ANV. The ANV had a head start and still had the ability to force actions at the rear of its march (check out the Battle of Monterey Pass sometime).

The AOP was a bigger army than the ANV with a lot more wagons, etc. to move. Just to give you some idea, I used to work at Gettysburg and at one July 2 commemoration event we had to move 300 tourists from the parking area near the top of Big Round Top down to Devil's Den, less than half a mile down a path. Took us 45 minutes and we were only moving people.

The AOP had a lot of wounded to care for, and not all were there own. The ANV left a lot of wounded behind for the AOP to handle. The ANV also left a lot of broken wagons and the like along the road during the retreat for the AOP to have to deal with.

The ANV was taking the shortest routes to the Potomac. Where exactly was the AOP going to pass them? The AOP took other routes that should have been easier in the rain but were longer.

 

[Rebforever]

Thank you for sharing this. It looks to me like there is an argument that the battle should have been fought on other ground using a defensive strategy.

Remember, General Lee didn't have Longstreet with him at Mine Run.

 

[War Horse]

Remember, General Lee didn't have Longstreet with him at Mine Run.

Not sure what that means Reb?

 

[Rebforever]

Meade's strategy and tactics were sufficient for the job. The vital question has always been his willingness to execute them with force in a timely manner.
*** he had to do was push his army to its limit to catch up to and pass the ANV and place the AoP between the confederates and the Potomac, forcing Lee to attack against Meade's prepared defenses, even If he had to do it from the South Bank of that river(Meade had bridges across the river and Lee did not)
The pursuit phase was well planned and fairly well executed, what was lacking was the will to meet Lee again and force him battle.
As noted before, if not for the high water of the Potomac, Meade would never have seen the dust of Lee's retreat and he would have been just as satisfied for that, as he was when he let Lee got back into Va. without battle in reality..

Meade did send his Army after Lee. He held all the passes from the Potomac to Manassas Gap. Lee ended up in Luray Valley crossing the Blue Ridge at 2 fairly unknown (The names escape me.)to the Union Army and they had crossed before they found out. I thought Meade put on a fairly good chase from what I have read. He is one yankee I kinda like!

 

[Rebforever]

Not sure what that means Reb?

1st corp was not there.

 

[Eric Wittenberg]

Are there directions to these defensive postions in your book?

Yep, sure are. Including GPS coordinates.

 

[War Horse]

1st corp was not there.

During the retreat?

 

[Rebforever]

During the retreat?

No. At Mine Run.

 

[War Horse]

No. At Mine Run.

I need more info.

 

[War Horse]

I believe he had a presence read this

https://books.google.com/books?id=1...et during the retreat from gettysburg&f=false

 

[Tom Elmore]

Union cavalry did succeed in cutting into part of the Confederate wagon train at Monterrey Pass on July 5, but the Union Sixth Corps was kept at bay by the Confederate infantry rearguard. Meade could have launched an all-out assault upon the very strong Confederate position taken up in front of Williamsport, but it's a good bet he would have been as badly repulsed as the Confederate assault was on July 3, with nothing to show for it, except a considerable reduction in his already depleted force, besides awarding a propaganda victory to the Confederates.

I think the best chance to have routed the Confederate army would have been a strong counterattack by the bulk of the large and relatively unscathed Union Sixth Corps against the Confederate center immediately following the repulse of the Pickett/Pettigrew/Trimble charge on July 3 - at that moment the Confederate artillery was essentially out of ammunition, and only the relatively intact brigade of Mahone and battered brigade of Wright were left to defend the breach. It would have divided the Confederate army into two parts. It assumes Meade would have kept the Sixth Corps back as a reserve for this purpose, but this Corps had already been committed piecemeal on different parts of the line to shore up the weak spots in the defense. Having only held command for a few days, Meade would have been some kind of rare military genius to have accomplished this feat, especially considering he had been under great stress for three consecutive days with virtually no sleep.

 

[67th Tigers]

Meade did what could be done. Unlike under McClellan (or Hooker and Burnside come to that), all of the AoP fought at Gettysburg.

Really? How many of Meades brigades made an attack? How come ten brigades have less than 5% casualties and were essentially completely unengaged?

After the battle, in addition to excellent reasons advanced above, Meade's army was almost entirely disabled by a lack of horses, without which no army could march. Lee's wagon train carried away from PA huge amounts of fodder that Meade could well have used (or at least his horses and mules could). They were dead, dying and utterly used up by the march to Gettysburg and the almost complete lack of grain and hay required to keep them moving. Unlike McClellan at Antietam, Meade's horses had indeed done something that fatigued them.

Indeed, but his logistics were actually in much better shape than McClellan's after Antietam, mainly as the QMG bureau had learnt from their failures to supply McClellan. The cavalry corps received a complete remount (at great cost) in May '63 to replace the broken down horses, whereas Lincoln could only make quips in October '62....

 

[Rebforever]

I believe he had a presence read this

https://books.google.com/books?id=1L9RtUE9LhwC&pg=PT329&lpg=PT329&dq=where was longstreet during the retreat from gettysburg&source=bl&ots=ryOamYo4Fz&sig=vT1pEpH5c0ziUNVc4ToEgVJa-PA&hl=en&sa=X&ei=aKtWVbmEAayCsQSdp4BQ&ved=0CD8Q6AEwBQ#v=onepage&q=where was longstreet during the retreat from gettysburg&f=false

I was getting ahead of myself. When Lee crossed the gaps to the Rapidan, Meade's chase was over. Sorry for my confusion.
Longstreet was there.

 

[rbasin]

Gee, only one post bad mouthing Halleck? Must have been a slow couple of days.

 

[Billy Yank]

All I can say is please try to put yourself in Meade's shoes. At the end of the battle he had been in command 6 maybe 7 days. He had lost Hancock and Sickles and his own replacement at corps command was brand new. Day 1 had been a foot race, literally and day 2 was not much different. The AoP held the field on Day 3 but was bloodied and exhausted. Lee knew where he was going. Lee controlled the key mountain passes. The weather impacted both forces but Imboden and the 'Wagon train of wounded' were on the road shortly after midnight on the 4th. I will also add that Lee's retreat and Stuarts covering were brilliant.

I Corps Cmdr. Reynolds lost, too, on Day 1.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Meade did send his Army after Lee. He held all the passes from the Potomac to Manassas Gap. Lee ended up in Luray Valley crossing the Blue Ridge at 2 fairly unknown (The names escape me.)to the Union Army and they had crossed before they found out. I thought Meade put on a fairly good chase from what I have read. He is one yankee I kinda like!

It is just curious to me that during the pursuit phase, Meade managed to keep a respectful 24 hrs distance between the two armies, except when he was nearly tripped up by the Potomac. Fortunately, he was able to call another Council of War, just in time.

 

[wilber6150]

That is the vital question. The answer is, we do not know, because Meade never really tried. In this regard I can only point to the history of the AoP. It was indifferently led, woefully slow on the march and clumsy in maneuver, etc., but one thing was clear with was stubborn and hard fighting. Gettysburg, was proof ofwhat they could do against straight ahead attacks, no matter how powerful.
As to the Weather, the rains fell on both armies equally, it hindered nor helped one over the other.
The flooded Potomac disrupted and hindered the plans of both Lee and Meade.

I wouldn't call how they marched into Penn after Lee as woefully slow, but rather as quick as any army had ever marched..

 

[wilber6150]

Yep, sure are. Including GPS coordinates.

Excellent, thanks

 

[OpnCoronet]

I wouldn't call how they marched into Penn after Lee as woefully slow, but rather as quick as any army had ever marched..

That is certainly descriptive of Lee. But Meade's forced march of the AoP to Gettysburg, argues that the same was not true from Gettysburg.