General Meade; Never Sent

[War Horse]

Those are the words Abraham Lincoln wrote on the envelope of a letter he wrote to Union General George Meade immediately following the battle of Gettysburg. The letter was basically a scolding of Meade's actions or lack of action following the battle. Lincoln felt Meade should have perused and destroyed General Robert E. Lee's army of Northern Virginia. Meade felt his army was in no condition after the battle to pursue Lee. Lincoln never sent the letter but promoted Ulysses S. Grant to Lt General of the Union Army. A rank not held since George Washington held it in the Revolutionary War. My question is Could Meade have pursued and destroyed the AONV as Lincoln felt? Could Meade have done more? Did Meade do everything practicable following the battle? We have spent a lot of time examining the battle, what about after the battle. It seems to me with a swollen Potomac at Lee's back he was in a very vulnerable predicament.

 

[theoldman]

Good question, but as with many other questions this has been discussed in previous threads. Eric Wittenberg has an excellent book that answers the question(s) in detail, One Continuous Fight. The short answer is to the question you pose is NO.

Some key points to consider:
1. Meade was under direct orders to keep his Army between Lee and DC/Baltimore.
2. AOP was beaten up badly and suffered causalities from Corps commanders on down.
3. Meade's logistical base was still at Westminster, MD, I think.
4. Buford and Kilpatrick's Cavalry Divisions did move out immediately on July 4th.
5. VI Corps moved out in a 'movement to contact' on July 6th.
6. Lee was moving toward his logistic base and had the inside lines.
7. Meade did have the AOP at Willamsport in 2 weeks but Lee had fortified the position and the river went down the next day then Lee crossed.

 

[War Horse]

All Very good points. I have Eric's book just haven't read it yet. What about during the retreat itself. Couldn't Meade have quickly organized every available man and struck while Lee was organizing his retreat? His wagon train extended 15 to 20 miles. I would think he would have been very vulnerable at that time. Lincoln seems convinced that more could have been done.

 

[Pat Answer]

Lincoln was sitting in a telegraph office in Washington.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Those are the words Abraham Lincoln wrote on the envelope of a letter he wrote to Union General George Meade immediately following the battle of Gettysburg. The letter was basically a scolding of Meade's actions or lack of action following the battle. Lincoln felt Meade should have perused and destroyed General Robert E. Lee's army of Northern Virginia. Meade felt his army was in no condition after the battle to pursue Lee. Lincoln never sent the letter but promoted Ulysses S. Grant to Lt General of the Union Army. A rank not held since George Washington held it in the Revolutionary War. My question is Could Meade have pursued and destroyed the AONV as Lincoln felt? Could Meade have done more? Did Meade do everything practicable following the battle? We have spent a lot of time examining the battle, what about after the battle. It seems to me with a swollen Potomac at Lee's back he was in a very vulnerable predicament.

My main complaint against Meade during the Pursuit Phase of the campaign, is that he did not really try to bring Lee to battle while still in Pa. It is obvious from his dispatches to the War dept. and orders to those under his command, that another battle was the last thing he wanted and that if the ANV could be escorted out of northern territory, he would be perfectly satisfied.

But, Lincoln was wise enough not to have sent the letter. It was really a way to vent his feelings of frustration of the outcome, of a significant victory. After writing it, he felt better and his normal good nature and wisdom concerning human nature reasserted itself as he himself noted 'a half a loaf was better than none at all'. Lincoln obviously knew that sending the letter could only do bad and no good.

During the 17th and 18th centuries, when Britain's Royal Navy was gaining ascendance, it was generally accepted that flogging was necessary to maintain discipline on naval vessels. Later there were many within and without the Navy who questioned the utility of flogging, contending that it, in fact, only ruined good seamen and made the bad seaman incorrigible..

 

[rhettbutler1865]

Good question, but as with many other questions this has been discussed in previous threads. Eric Wittenberg has an excellent book that answers the question(s) in detail, One Continuous Fight. The short answer is to the question you pose is NO.

Some key points to consider:
1. Meade was under direct orders to keep his Army between Lee and DC/Baltimore.
2. AOP was beaten up badly and suffered causalities from Corps commanders on down.
3. Meade's logistical base was still at Westminster, MD, I think.
4. Buford and Kilpatrick's Cavalry Divisions did move out immediately on July 4th.
5. VI Corps moved out in a 'movement to contact' on July 6th.
6. Lee was moving toward his logistic base and had the inside lines.
7. Meade did have the AOP at Willamsport in 2 weeks but Lee had fortified the position and the river went down the next day then Lee crossed.

I agree, theoldman (and Eric W.)---plus the fact that Lee's men would have turned around and fought again, tired and battered as they were.

 

[rhettbutler1865]

My main complaint against Meade during the Pursuit Phase of the campaign, is that he did not really try to bring Lee to battle while still in Pa. It is obvious from his dispatches to the War dept. and orders to those under his command, that another battle was the last thing he wanted and that if the ANV could be escorted out of northern territory, he would be perfectly satisfied.

But, Lincoln was wise enough not to have sent the letter. It was really a way to vent his feelings of frustration of the outcome, of a significant victory. After writing it, he felt better and his normal good nature and wisdom concerning human nature reasserted itself as he himself noted 'a half a loaf was better than none at all'. Lincoln obviously knew that sending the letter could only do bad and no good.

During the 17th and 18th centuries, when Britain's Royal Navy was gaining ascendance, it was generally accepted that flogging was necessary to maintain discipline on naval vessels. Later there were many within and without the Navy who questioned the utility of flogging, contending that it, in fact, only ruined good seamen and made the bad seaman incorrigible..

I enjoy good "common sense" answers. (and I agree about the Royal Navy).

 

[theoldman]

All Very good points. I have Eric's book just haven't read it yet. What about during the retreat itself. Couldn't Meade have quickly organized every available man and struck while Lee was organizing his retreat? His wagon train extended 15 to 20 miles. I would think he would have been very vulnerable at that time. Lincoln seems convinced that more could have been done.

All I can say is please try to put yourself in Meade's shoes. At the end of the battle he had been in command 6 maybe 7 days. He had lost Hancock and Sickles and his own replacement at corps command was brand new. Day 1 had been a foot race, literally and day 2 was not much different. The AoP held the field on Day 3 but was bloodied and exhausted. Lee knew where he was going. Lee controlled the key mountain passes. The weather impacted both forces but Imboden and the 'Wagon train of wounded' were on the road shortly after midnight on the 4th. I will also add that Lee's retreat and Stuarts covering were brilliant.

 

[ole]

Only a perhaps. Meade was on the field and knew better than anyone what should and could be done. On the other hand, Lincoln saw the war ending in Pennsylvania that week and there was nothing he could do about it. A whole bunch of what ifs in there.

 

[War Horse]

All I can say is please try to put yourself in Meade's shoes. At the end of the battle he had been in command 6 maybe 7 days. He had lost Hancock and Sickles and his own replacement at corps command was brand new. Day 1 had been a foot race, literally and day 2 was not much different. The AoP held the field on Day 3 but was bloodied and exhausted. Lee knew where he was going. Lee controlled the key mountain passes. The weather impacted both forces but Imboden and the 'Wagon train of wounded' were on the road shortly after midnight on the 4th. I will also add that Lee's retreat and Stuarts covering were brilliant.

Not to mention the loss of Reynolds.

 

[War Horse]

Only a perhaps. Meade was on the field and knew better than anyone what should and could be done. On the other hand, Lincoln saw the war ending in Pennsylvania that week and there was nothing he could do about it. A whole bunch of what ifs in there.

Exactly, right or wrong Lincoln felt once again the AONV escaped destruction due to poor generalship on the side of the union.

 

[hanna260]

@KansasFreestater shared an interesting article about this. The article link itself is blocked for me right now but here

http://civilwartalk.com/threads/intersting-article-on-a-meade-counterattack.113442/#post-1119359

 

[War Horse]

@KansasFreestater shared an interesting article about this. The article link itself is blocked for me right now but here

http://civilwartalk.com/threads/intersting-article-on-a-meade-counterattack.113442/#post-1119359

Thank you.

 

[War Horse]

No way to know for sure or not but maybe Lincoln had Grant in the back of his mind all along and Meade never really got a fair shot. Up until Gettysburg Lincoln made the comment that only news from the west sustained him.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Reading through his dispatches and orders, does anyone, think Meade was really trying to bring Lee to battle North of the Potomac?(as I have noted on other threads, if the Potomac had not been at flood state, Meade would never have seen the ANV at all during his pursuit)

 

[Rob9641]

There were many smaller actions along the way from Gettysburg to Williamsport, but let's not forget the weather. Immediately after the battle, the skies opened up and it POURED. Travel was almost impossible for both armies.

 

[theoldman]

I would also recommend Retreat from Gettysburg by Kent Masterson Brown. I found it to be an excellent complement to Eric's book.

 

[OpnCoronet]

The rains fell equally on both armies, yet the ANV outran the AoP, all the way.

 

[War Horse]

I would have to think that a retreating army with a wagon train 15 to 20 miles long, limbered artillery would have been fairly easy to catch up with.

 

[Rob9641]

The rains fell equally on both armies, yet the ANV outran the AoP, all the way.

Desperation is a great motivator. When you've been soundly beaten up and you are running away to keep from being completely destroyed, you can really move.