General Meade; Never Sent

[diane]

Just my two cents worth - I think Lincoln was afraid he had yet another cautious general who would retreat. That's why he sent for a general who didn't retreat - Grant.

 

[War Horse]

Just my two cents worth - I think Lincoln was afraid he had yet another cautious general who would retreat. That's why he sent for a general who didn't retreat - Grant.

Exactly

 

[W. Richardson]

Lincoln was sitting in a telegraph office in Washington.

Yes he, as others, are masterful military strategist when not on the actual battlefield.................

Respectfully,

William

 

[W. Richardson]

Just my two cents worth - I think Lincoln was afraid he had yet another cautious general who would retreat. That's why he sent for a general who didn't retreat - Grant.

Yes Grant knew and understood the deal....................Press forward and attrition.

Respectfully,

William

 

[Eagle eye]

Just my two cents worth - I think Lincoln was afraid he had yet another cautious general who would retreat. That's why he sent for a general who didn't retreat - Grant.

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Lincoln didn't bring in Grant to replace Meade. He brought him in to command all of the Union armies. Grant choose to ride with the AoP because he didn't want to stay in Washington being besieged by all sorts of people. Grant liked Meade & decided to keep him commander even tho Meade offered to step aside. The 2 worked together pretty well for a short period of time but Grant eventually took command in effect.
Grant did order all Union armies to move toward their objective on May 1st but he found out who his fighting Generals were & who his "parade" Generals were.

 

[Rebforever]

There's a lot of stuff in this thread that I think is erroneous, beginning with Lincoln's opinion about what Meade should have done. Let's ask @Eric Wittenberg to clear up the mess? It's a "what if," but had Meade attacked the Army of Northern Virginia in its defensive and very well fortified position north of the Potomac, it's entirely possible that "the war would have ended" there, just not to Mr. Lincoln's liking.

Eric?

Yeah, everybody forgets Meade was beat up as much as Lee.

Just my two cents worth - I think Lincoln was afraid he had yet another cautious general who would retreat. That's why he sent for a general who didn't retreat - Grant.

Diane, I think Meade's retreat from Mine Run capped Lincoln's decision. Meade realized he could never move General Lee from those hills. Another thing against him was the winter weather.

 

[Rebforever]

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Lincoln didn't bring in Grant to replace Meade. He brought him in to command all of the Union armies. Grant choose to ride with the AoP because he didn't want to stay in Washington being besieged by all sorts of people. Grant liked Meade & decided to keep him commander even tho Meade offered to step aside. The 2 worked together pretty well for a short period of time but Grant eventually took command in effect.
Grant did order all Union armies to move toward their objective on May 1st but he found out who his fighting Generals were & who his "parade" Generals were.

And Lincoln probably figured out that Halleck was his problem also. That was the smart move.IMO

 

[diane]

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Lincoln didn't bring in Grant to replace Meade. He brought him in to command all of the Union armies. Grant choose to ride with the AoP because he didn't want to stay in Washington being besieged by all sorts of people. Grant liked Meade & decided to keep him commander even tho Meade offered to step aside. The 2 worked together pretty well for a short period of time but Grant eventually took command in effect.
Grant did order all Union armies to move toward their objective on May 1st but he found out who his fighting Generals were & who his "parade" Generals were.

Yes! I didn't mean to imply Meade was removed. In fact, it was good Lincoln did not accept his resignation - he continued to command the AoP to the end of the war. Grant's job was big - he was in command of everything everywhere, basically. But Grant's ideas of war were quite different from what had been the norm before - Lincoln recognized this and seized on him. Meade was warring the way he'd been taught, as was every other Union general before him. Lincoln knew doing it the old fashioned way wasn't getting the job done.

Yeah, everybody forgets Meade was beat up as much as Lee.

Diane, I think Meade's retreat from Mine Run capped Lincoln's decision. Meade realized he could never move General Lee from those hills. Another thing against him was the winter weather.

It's kind of peculiar that Longstreet was an excellent offensive commander but is remembered as a defensive commander, and Lee was a great defensive commander who is remembered as an offensive commander! Once Lee squirreled himself into a hole you'd need a nuke to get him out. Stuart and Imboden really did a good job protecting the retreat. Whatever Stuart might have done wrong elsewhere was redeemed then.

Didn't @1SGDan have a really good piece on the Mine Run campaign? I can't find it but then I can't use the search tool! I want to re-read it because it's really an excellent examination. Meade was right not to pursue. One characteristic of Lee, and his army for that matter, was being at his most dangerous when it seemed he was licked. Don't know if he could have pulled a rabbit out of his hat at this point but he'd been known to do it!

 

[FarawayFriend]

Yeah, everybody forgets Meade was beat up as much as Lee.

Indeed! I wonder how much the film "Gettysburg" has contributed to this image.

I really do need to get away from the what if's, I just cant seem to help myself.

No, please don't. As Eric Wittenberg said, not everybody likes toying with different possibilities, but I always find it fascinating to imagine a "what if" and becoming aware how little would have been needed to create a totally different outcome.

 

[diane]

Indeed! I wonder how much the film "Gettysburg" has contributed to this image.



No, please don't. As Eric Wittenberg said, not everybody likes toying with different possibilities, but I always find it fascinating to imagine a "what if" and becoming aware how little would have been needed to create a totally different outcome.

I like what-ifs, too, because sometimes it helps me understand what really happened and why other scenarios didn't or couldn't play out. Sometimes you wonder what those Three Sisters of Fate have been drinking before they sat down at their spinning wheel!

 

[wilber6150]

No, thanks. I don't do "what if's". There is enough that actually happened to keep me busy for the rest of my life.

All that I can and will say is that if you haven't seen the Confederate defensive position, you might think that Meade should have attacked. Go see it for yourself. You will change your mind. I guarantee it.

That's all I really have to say about this topic other than what's in the book I spent 18 years researching and another nearly two years writing.

Are there directions to these defensive postions in your book?

 

[Rebforever]

Yes! I didn't mean to imply Meade was removed. In fact, it was good Lincoln did not accept his resignation - he continued to command the AoP to the end of the war. Grant's job was big - he was in command of everything everywhere, basically. But Grant's ideas of war were quite different from what had been the norm before - Lincoln recognized this and seized on him. Meade was warring the way he'd been taught, as was every other Union general before him. Lincoln knew doing it the old fashioned way wasn't getting the job done.



It's kind of peculiar that Longstreet was an excellent offensive commander but is remembered as a defensive commander, and Lee was a great defensive commander who is remembered as an offensive commander! Once Lee squirreled himself into a hole you'd need a nuke to get him out. Stuart and Imboden really did a good job protecting the retreat. Whatever Stuart might have done wrong elsewhere was redeemed then.

Didn't @1SGDan have a really good piece on the Mine Run campaign? I can't find it but then I can't use the search tool! I want to re-read it because it's really an excellent examination. Meade was right not to pursue. One characteristic of Lee, and his army for that matter, was being at his most dangerous when it seemed he was licked. Don't know if he could have pulled a rabbit out of his hat at this point but he'd been known to do it!

A good look at the hills where General Lee was on the West side of mine run, one could see it was a natural fortress.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c2/Mine_Run_Campaign.png

 

[War Horse]

A good look at the hills where General Lee was on the West side of mine run, one could see it was a natural fortress.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c2/Mine_Run_Campaign.png

Thank you for sharing this. It looks to me like there is an argument that the battle should have been fought on other ground using a defensive strategy.

 

[OpnCoronet]

One other point to consider about the weather - the ANV got the first crack at the roads south and basically destroyed them in the rain, so the AOP would not have been able to move as fast on them as the ANV did. I can't remember why I think this, but I seem to remember that Meade had most of his troops who pursued the ANV following a different route with better roads, but farther to travel. The National Pike in MD, for example, was macadamized - maybe better in the rain than the dirt roads ruined by the retreating ANV.

Meade's strategy and tactics were sufficient for the job. The vital question has always been his willingness to execute them with force in a timely manner.
*** he had to do was push his army to its limit to catch up to and pass the ANV and place the AoP between the confederates and the Potomac, forcing Lee to attack against Meade's prepared defenses, even If he had to do it from the South Bank of that river(Meade had bridges across the river and Lee did not)
The pursuit phase was well planned and fairly well executed, what was lacking was the will to meet Lee again and force him battle.
As noted before, if not for the high water of the Potomac, Meade would never have seen the dust of Lee's retreat and he would have been just as satisfied for that, as he was when he let Lee got back into Va. without battle in reality..

 

[War Horse]

Meade's strategy and tactics were sufficient for the job. The vital question has always been his willingness to execute them with force in a timely manner.
*** he had to do was push his army to its limit to catch up to and pass the ANV and place the AoP between the confederates and the Potomac, forcing Lee to attack against Meade's prepared defenses, even If he had to do it from the South Bank of that river(Meade had bridges across the river and Lee did not)
The pursuit phase was well planned and fairly well executed, what was lacking was the will to meet Lee again and force him battle.
As noted before, if not for the high water of the Potomac, Meade would never have seen the dust of Lee's retreat and he would have been just as satisfied for that, as he was when he let Lee got back into Va. without battle in reality..

Was it possible to catch Lee and pass him given the condition of the roads? The weather seems to have favored the confederacy as it had pretty much the entire war up to this point.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Was it possible to catch Lee and pass him given the condition of the roads? The weather seems to have favored the confederacy as it had pretty much the entire war up to this point.

That is the vital question. The answer is, we do not know, because Meade never really tried. In this regard I can only point to the history of the AoP. It was indifferently led, woefully slow on the march and clumsy in maneuver, etc., but one thing was clear with was stubborn and hard fighting. Gettysburg, was proof ofwhat they could do against straight ahead attacks, no matter how powerful.
As to the Weather, the rains fell on both armies equally, it hindered nor helped one over the other.
The flooded Potomac disrupted and hindered the plans of both Lee and Meade.

 

[War Horse]

That is the vital question. The answer is, we do not know, because Meade never really tried. In this regard I can only point to the history of the AoP. It was indifferently led, woefully slow on the march and clumsy in maneuver, etc., but one thing was clear with was stubborn and hard fighting. Gettysburg, was proof ofwhat they could do against straight ahead attacks, no matter how powerful.
As to the Weather, the rains fell on both armies equally, it hindered nor helped one over the other.
The flooded Potomac disrupted and hindered the plans of both Lee and Meade.

I agree and disagree with the weather issue. Many times the union was forced to delay offensives due to poor weather. Lee capitalized on the additional time afforded him.

 

[OpnCoronet]

I agree and disagree with the weather issue. Many times the union was forced to delay offensives due to poor weather. Lee capitalized on the additional time afforded him.

well it is true that Lee seldom missed an opportunity to capitalize on the tardiness of Union commanders, But the slowness and delays were mostly the results of Union commanders refusal to believe their men could march as confederates marched and fight as the confederates did, i.e., lack of confidence breeds inaction.

 

[ole]

I like what-ifs, too, because sometimes it helps me understand what really happened and why other scenarios didn't or couldn't play out. Sometimes you wonder what those Three Sisters of Fate have been drinking before they sat down at their spinning wheel!

With you, I appreciate "what ifs" because they help to understand the "what."

What if he had done this instead? There is a reason for the what; it is because of this. Or, he screwed up.

 

[theoldman]

Was it possible to catch Lee and pass him given the condition of the roads? The weather seems to have favored the confederacy as it had pretty much the entire war up to this point.

*** he had to do was push his army to its limit to catch up to and pass the ANV and place the AoP between the confederates and the Potomac, forcing Lee to attack against Meade's prepared defenses, even If he had to do it from the South Bank of that river(Meade had bridges across the river and Lee did not)."


No it was not. Moving an Army. any ARMY, in 1863 during the best of conditions was difficult . The ANV under Robert E. Lee had just been defeated but at a very high price in blood and supplies. The battlefield was cluttered with the detritus of war. Wounded by the thousands needed treatment. Soldiers and commanders had not slept in days and some had not eaten or had water. Read the book!!!