General Meade; Never Sent

[Pat Answer]

Desperation is a great motivator. When you've been soundly beaten up and you are running away to keep from being completely destroyed, you can really move.

And even a head start of a day is nothing to sneeze at...

 

[Rob9641]

I would have to think that a retreating army with a wagon train 15 to 20 miles long, limbered artillery would have been fairly easy to catch up with.

The AOP caught up and did bring the ANV to fighting several times. The ANV fought back all along the retreat. The ANV was in the more desperate situation, and that surely made an impact on the way things turned out.

 

[KansasFreestater]

I never really understood why Meade didn't battle Lee again on the north side of the Potomac until I read this short little piece:
http://www.esquire.com/news-politics/news/a23903/lincoln-gettysburg-decision/
Though the author is an Army guy, he explains it in terms that even I, a rank amateur, can understand.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Desperation is a great motivator. When you've been soundly beaten up and you are running away to keep from being completely destroyed, you can really move.

very true. All the more necessary that the pursuer must march harder and faster if he is to have any hope of catching them...If, of course, that is what the pursuer wants.

 

[FarawayFriend]

All Very good points. I have Eric's book just haven't read it yet. What about during the retreat itself. Couldn't Meade have quickly organized every available man and struck while Lee was organizing his retreat? His wagon train extended 15 to 20 miles. I would think he would have been very vulnerable at that time. Lincoln seems convinced that more could have been done.

Of course I am in no position whatsoever to even discuss Eric Wittenberg 's conclusions, but I think the OP is well worth thinking twice about. All things already said are very good points. But I think most of us would agree that Lee was a very good if not brilliant tactician (maybe with the exception of Gettysburg, day three). And he expected Meade to follow and destroy what was left at that point of the ANV. So if Lee expected it and Lincoln expected it, the question why Meade did not do it is a very good one. And since I have begun to learn about Gettysburg it always seemed like a miracle to me - or as Lee probably has seen it as a sign that God was still on the side of the Confederacy, that this worn out and half destroyed army could cross the Potomac and gain strength again on their own territory.
As I have learned from this thread it was no miracle but the result of very worldly actions. But still also a lost opportunity to end the war in July 1863.

 

[War Horse]

I never really understood why Meade didn't battle Lee again on the north side of the Potomac until I read this short little piece:
http://www.esquire.com/news-politics/news/a23903/lincoln-gettysburg-decision/
Though the author is an Army guy, he explains it in terms that even I, a rank amateur, can understand.

Very interesting perspective. Thank you for sharing.

 

[War Horse]

So far it appears that the common consensus is: Meade did have the men and the desire, with the loss of so many officers he was unable to organize his army in the time he needed to in order to catch and dispose of Lee's ANV.

 

[Pat Answer]

More like, Meade had the men and the desire, re-organized on the move, and continually skirmished with an opposing commander who had the men and the desire to get out of Dodge and fight on better terms another day. And those better terms just might have been at Williamsport...

 

[PatW]

I think that expecting the AOP to destroy the ANV in pursuit was not realistic.

1). Meade had been in command only a few days. Meade performed well at Gettysburg essentially coming off the bench. Expecting him to win the war to follow it up was a bit much.

2). The Union first corps, third corps and eleventh corps were so badly savaged as to not be combat effective. Only the sixth corps was intact.

3). Meade had lost his three most aggressive corps commanders: Reynolds, Hancock and Sickles. Sykes was new. Sedgwick was solid. Howard was irrelevant having a shattered command. Slocum was not horribly aggressive and his corps had suffered significant casualties.

4). The ANV was retreating over the mountainous terrain of south mountain. That limited the avenues for pursuit and gave good defensive positions for the rear guard.

5). There was the notion that a defeated army could be destroyed if pursued, but it just did not seem to work out. Grant made a pretty quick attack of Pemberton's defeated army at Vicksburg and that was a big failure.

Thomas was not able to successfully pursue the Army of Tennessee after Nashville.

6). Another fact was that in taking casualties, a unit's offensive power degraded far faster than its defensive cohesion. The defense is easier. You set up your line. The troops take advantage of what cover they have. When the other side comes, you shoot at them.

On the offense, It is not easy to launch a coordinated assault. If you have a shot up command structure with newly promoted officers in key positions, making a coordinated assault is a **** shoot.

 

[Rob9641]

Actually, if you look at Lee's retreat from Gettysburg you can almost see that Longstreet had a point that had Lee opted for a defensive battle in the first place, the ANV would have been successful in PA. There's evidence there, anyway, but of course, we will never know for sure.

 

[Rob9641]

One other point to consider about the weather - the ANV got the first crack at the roads south and basically destroyed them in the rain, so the AOP would not have been able to move as fast on them as the ANV did. I can't remember why I think this, but I seem to remember that Meade had most of his troops who pursued the ANV following a different route with better roads, but farther to travel. The National Pike in MD, for example, was macadamized - maybe better in the rain than the dirt roads ruined by the retreating ANV.

 

[War Horse]

One other point to consider about the weather - the ANV got the first crack at the roads south and basically destroyed them in the rain, so the AOP would not have been able to move as fast on them as the ANV did. I can't remember why I think this, but I seem to remember that Meade had most of his troops who pursued the ANV following a different route with better roads, but farther to travel. The National Pike in MD, for example, was macadamized - maybe better in the rain than the dirt roads ruined by the retreating ANV.

That makes a lot of sense. All your points are excellent.

 

[Rob9641]

So far it appears that the common consensus is: Meade did have the men and the desire, with the loss of so many officers he was unable to organize his army in the time he needed to in order to catch and dispose of Lee's ANV.

I don't think it was just the loss of officers that made Meade unsuccessful in his pursuit. The loss of equipment and regular men, the weather, and the fact that the ANV had the desperation necessary to drive themselves extraordinarily hard, all had a place in it.

 

[Rob9641]

I never really understood why Meade didn't battle Lee again on the north side of the Potomac until I read this short little piece:
http://www.esquire.com/news-politics/news/a23903/lincoln-gettysburg-decision/
Though the author is an Army guy, he explains it in terms that even I, a rank amateur, can understand.

Really good article. Thanks for posting.

 

[MajGenl.Meade]

Meade did what could be done. Unlike under McClellan (or Hooker and Burnside come to that), all of the AoP fought at Gettysburg. After the battle, in addition to excellent reasons advanced above, Meade's army was almost entirely disabled by a lack of horses, without which no army could march. Lee's wagon train carried away from PA huge amounts of fodder that Meade could well have used (or at least his horses and mules could). They were dead, dying and utterly used up by the march to Gettysburg and the almost complete lack of grain and hay required to keep them moving. Unlike McClellan at Antietam, Meade's horses had indeed done something that fatigued them.

See "The Sacrifice of Horses", Civil War Times June 2015, James I Robertson, Jr.

 

[Drew]

There's a lot of stuff in this thread that I think is erroneous, beginning with Lincoln's opinion about what Meade should have done. Let's ask @Eric Wittenberg to clear up the mess? It's a "what if," but had Meade attacked the Army of Northern Virginia in its defensive and very well fortified position north of the Potomac, it's entirely possible that "the war would have ended" there, just not to Mr. Lincoln's liking.

Eric?

 

[Eagle eye]

I think that expecting the AOP to destroy the ANV in pursuit was not realistic.

1). Meade had been in command only a few days. Meade performed well at Gettysburg essentially coming off the bench. Expecting him to win the war to follow it up was a bit much.

2). The Union first corps, third corps and eleventh corps were so badly savaged as to not be combat effective. Only the sixth corps was intact.

3). Meade had lost his three most aggressive corps commanders: Reynolds, Hancock and Sickles. Sykes was new. Sedgwick was solid. Howard was irrelevant having a shattered command. Slocum was not horribly aggressive and his corps had suffered significant casualties.

4). The ANV was retreating over the mountainous terrain of south mountain. That limited the avenues for pursuit and gave good defensive positions for the rear guard.

5). There was the notion that a defeated army could be destroyed if pursued, but it just did not seem to work out. Grant made a pretty quick attack of Pemberton's defeated army at Vicksburg and that was a big failure.

Thomas was not able to successfully pursue the Army of Tennessee after Nashville.

6). Another fact was that in taking casualties, a unit's offensive power degraded far faster than its defensive cohesion. The defense is easier. You set up your line. The troops take advantage of what cover they have. When the other side comes, you shoot at them.

On the offense, It is not easy to launch a coordinated assault. If you have a shot up command structure with newly promoted officers in key positions, making a coordinated assault is a **** shoot.

---------------------
In regards to your 6th point Pat IIRC the ANV actually dug trenches & had their artillery set up to cover all approaches so the AOP would pay a heavy price attacking there. Keep in mind that Meade would have to get all his corps up & try to figure where to place them. Logistically he needed more artillery ammo & rifle ammo. I'm sure he would need chow also. IMO Meade did the correct thing by not attacking a dug in enemy that had every approach covered by small arms and artillery.
I like all your points Pat. They're very sound & realistic to me.
Eagle eye

 

[Eric Wittenberg]

There's a lot of stuff in this thread that I think is erroneous, beginning with Lincoln's opinion about what Meade should have done. Let's ask @Eric Wittenberg to clear up the mess? It's a "what if," but had Meade attacked the Army of Northern Virginia in its defensive and very well fortified position north of the Potomac, it's entirely possible that "the war would have ended" there, just not to Mr. Lincoln's liking.

Eric?

No, thanks. I don't do "what if's". There is enough that actually happened to keep me busy for the rest of my life.

All that I can and will say is that if you haven't seen the Confederate defensive position, you might think that Meade should have attacked. Go see it for yourself. You will change your mind. I guarantee it.

That's all I really have to say about this topic other than what's in the book I spent 18 years researching and another nearly two years writing.

 

[War Horse]

No, thanks. I don't do "what if's". There is enough that actually happened to keep me busy for the rest of my life.

All that I can and will say is that if you haven't seen the Confederate defensive position, you might think that Meade should have attacked. Go see it for yourself. You will change your mind. I guarantee it.

That's all I really have to say about this topic other than what's in the book I spent 18 years researching and another nearly two years writing.

And I will read it soon its in my car and I have only brought three books with me on this road trip. I really do need to get away from the what if's, I just cant seem to help myself.

 

[Eric Wittenberg]

And I will read it soon its in my car and I have only brought three books with me on this road trip. I really do need to get away from the what if's, I just cant seem to help myself.

There's nothing wrong with them if you enjoy them. I don't. That's why there are so many flavors of ice cream--everybody can find something that they like even if nobody else does. It's all good. I just choose not to engage in what-if's, as I view them as a waste of the limited time that I have available.