General Dan Sickles, Revisited

[4065921]

Wait... what?

You realize that Longstreet was under orders from Lee to attack up the Emmitsburg Road? Is it your position that you think he would have just disobeyed orders ?

Aside from that...
They would not need Buford there to screen for them. They saw Longstreets move south via the signal station on LRT and had multiple regiments out as skirmishers to screen. The Union forces were in Pitzers woods engaging the confederates as they moved. You obviously know of the whole Warren/ signal station thingy...

I think it is quite a stretch to conclude that Longstreet would have rolled up/turned the Union Left if Sickles was where he was supposed to be.

Novelist Foote is not exactly the best source for info on Sickles at the burg. Maybe Coddington, Pfanz, Hessler, Gettysburg Mag, GDG discussions, LBG information would be more fruitful?

I think it has been well established that Lee's leadership style provided considerable latitude to his subordinates in carrying out his orders. He understood the necessity of allowing for unforeseen events that may require changes in his plans. At times this would be to his detriment such as his famous directive that Ewell should storm Cemetery Hill if he thought it practicable. Longstreet's orders were to obtain the left flank of the Union Army whether it extended along the Emittsburg Road or on Cemetery Ridge.

The signal station on LRT reported movement of enemy troops throughout the morning about enemy skirmishers ,rebels are in force, heavy colum of enemy infantry etc ... Meade seemed unconcerned about these reports. They did sight Longstreet's Corps main body however the movement they observed was during the retracing of the route back to the Black Horse Tavern, that message being:
ROUND TOP MOUNTAIN SIGNAL STATION, July 2, 1863-1. 30 p. m.
General BUTTERFIELD: A heavy column of enemy's infantry, about 10, 000 strong, is moving from opposite our extreme left toward our right. HALL. Captain, Signal Officer

Ironically the only officer that took the reports seriously was Sickles. As for me, I would rather have the Cavalry shouting and yelling with guns ablaze, they would get more notice than a few pieces of cloth billowing on a mountain top.

Codington, Guelzo, Sears, Longstreet, Alexander,

 

[FZ11]

I think it has been well established that Lee's leadership style provided considerable latitude to his subordinates in carrying out his orders. He understood the necessity of allowing for unforeseen events that may require changes in his plans. At times this would be to his detriment such as his famous directive that Ewell should storm Cemetery Hill if he thought it practicable. Longstreet's orders were to obtain the left flank of the Union Army whether it extended along the Emittsburg Road or on Cemetery Ridge.

The signal station on LRT reported movement of enemy troops throughout the morning about enemy skirmishers ,rebels are in force, heavy colum of enemy infantry etc ... Meade seemed unconcerned about these reports. They did sight Longstreet's Corps main body however the movement they observed was during the retracing of the route back to the Black Horse Tavern, that message being:
ROUND TOP MOUNTAIN SIGNAL STATION, July 2, 1863-1. 30 p. m.
General BUTTERFIELD: A heavy column of enemy's infantry, about 10, 000 strong, is moving from opposite our extreme left toward our right. HALL. Captain, Signal Officer

Ironically the only officer that took the reports seriously was Sickles. As for me, I would rather have the Cavalry shouting and yelling with guns ablaze, they would get more notice than a few pieces of cloth billowing on a mountain top.

Codington, Guelzo, Sears, Longstreet, Alexander,

"No,General Lee's orders are to attack up the Emmittsburg Road!"

 

[ole]

"No,General Lee's orders are to attack up the Emmittsburg Road!"

Exactly. It is generally agreed that Lee did not know that Sickles was assigned to anchor on (touch) LRT. If the plan was carried out (Longstreet's force marches up both sides of the Emmitsburg road), the left flank of Longstreet's force (Laws?) would have been aiming to hit Cemetery Ridge somewhere north of where Sickles ought to have been. So we have a division marching in front of and parallel to Sickles on the ridge. Vicious flank fire.

But the best laid plans, etc.

A few Alabama regiments (see. something shiny!) chased a company of Federal sharpshooters through the saddle between the Round Tops. There they found the 20th Maine and became distracted with the line thrown together by Strong Vincent. Their distraction led other regiments in that brigade to head for LRT.

And then, there was Sickles.

Aft gang aglee.

 

[ole]

Sickles' bone-headed move might well have saved Meade's Army. Maybe not, but that's what we're talking about in this thread.

 

[JPK Huson 1863]

JPK, I appreciate your generosity toward Sickles about the creation of the park, but I would argue that it has less to due with conscience and more to do with Sickles' ego, after all, the whole park was his memorial, as he stated.

You're right of course. Honest. I think I'm living in hope. The evidence argues with you-look how many men's careers he slaughtered, does not speak much of conscience. Plus in all the arguments in 150 years no one has ever given him the benefit of the doubt- am guessing the wishful thinking of dizt from PA will break no new ground. Once in awhile I'll throw this out there because Gettysburg was saved from such hideous destruction by Sickles- that's when I get soft on this one, single aspect of him and think " y'know..., maybe ..... "

Of course maybe the ghosts of all the men he got killed kept him awake every night calling him names. Gettysburg was an act appeasement.

 

[JPK Huson 1863]

UOTE="JPK Huson 1863, post: 1200395, member: 6168"]" but, he respected and cared for his men, they responded positively to his leadership and he fought bravely in the face of the enemy "

Sickles knew exactly how exposed he was. This was no cautious creep. Drummer, bugles, skirmishers thrown out, flags,- observers said it was breathtaking, like something perfectly performed on a parade ground. Except it was a battlefield and he'd just ruptured the Union line. Sickles not only gave the enemy other men as gifts, creating flanks not there previously he exposed his own men in brand, new flanks. These soldiers were roadkill, Sickles just strung them out across the freeway with 2 way truck traffic. It may be tough building a defense claiming Sickles respected or cared for his men. Honestly am not picking at your academia, it just seems a massive challenge.
..

Thaks for your interest JPK,

I should point out the purpose of my research is not to exonerate Sickles in regards to the specific action he took at Gettysburg. In fact I am critical of his tactile acumen particularly in the deployment of his troops in the Peach Orchard. However I think the perceptions many have of Sickles as a shirker who wantonly disobeyed orders and callously caused the death of thousands for his own glorification are misplaced.

I have found no report that Sickles ever ill-treated or disrespected his men. On the contrary reports are that Sickles took every effort to win the good will of his men, "and so popular did he become, that no inducement, however strong, could have any effect toward turning them against him."

Thomas Keneally writes that "Sickles showed a daily enthusiasm for commanding and training his mass of young men, and did fear being intimately bound to them, he was able to exercise strong command without evoking resentment, and the daily routine of reveille, roll call, morning and afternoon drill, surgeon's call, guard mounting, evening parade, and retreat was insisted upon."

I have read several accounts of Sickles performance in battle and in every situation from the Seven Days battle through Fredericksburg and Charlottesville, there are no accounts of him being insubordinate and all reports are that he led his men well and fought bravely.

Bob[/QUOTE]


Same argument. I'm still not picking holes in your research or findings- it seems to have been glued together very well. In point of fact it sounds like you may be digging yourself a hole? Sickles would take pride in all the trappings of military display. Ever get a look at Pleasanton? Seperated at birth. The thing with building arguments is not looking for opinion with which to back up theory; it's finding evidence. Putting those men out there no matter how well he drilled them, no matter if he put them to bed every night with a glass of hot milk and a cookie, is just, plain not taking his men's lives seriously as the man in charge of them. Iverson rode a desk for the rest of the war, for some reason Kilpatrick did not- but boy do we remember both. Why? The trail of death associated with their names. War is death- better be able to justify the ones on your watch.

Of the lot of them maybe Kilpatrick is preferable. He at least did not pretend to regard anyone's life as valuable before throwing it away.

 

[Carronade]

"Putting those men out there no matter how well he drilled them, no matter if he put them to bed every night with a glass of hot milk and a cookie, is just, plain not taking his men's lives seriously as the man in charge of them."

Let's not forget that Sickles thought he was protecting his men by securing high ground that he thought the Confederates might use to threaten his position, a la Hazel Grove. He knew he was in for a tough fight either way, something generals have to accept however much they care about their troops. I think his judgement was flawed, but that's not the same as being callous or careless.

 

[4065921]

[/QUOTE]Same argument. I'm still not picking holes in your research or findings- it seems to have been glued together very well. In point of fact it sounds like you may be digging yourself a hole? ... The thing with building arguments is not looking for opinion with which to back up theory; it's finding evidence .[/QUOTE]

And I need you, and anybody else, to keep picking, find the holes that I need to plug, if they can be plugged. The professors are well and good at giving general analysis and guidance ... and editing, they love to find that one misspelled word ... oh and don't ever leave the "e" off Meade. However here, in the trenches so to speak, I do get the critical analysis that tells me that either the "hole" is to big, or I just need more glue.

Chap 1 is going cover Sickles military career, his leadership style and battlefield experiences as they relate to that fateful day at Gettysburg. The "hole" - Sickles was a good general to his men, cared for his men, identified with them and led them into battle bravely. Got plenty of glue for this one. I do plan to throw a paragraph or two out to the forum to get feedback or start a new conversation.

Thanks for everybody's input and staying civil ... I am aware that Sickles is contentious subject . That is why I picked him.

Bob

 

[Carronade]

I have been reading Shelby Foote's epic 3 volume set on the Civil War for some time. There is a passage on page 507 of volume two in which he addresses the "what if" scenario of Sickles staying on Cemetery Ridge as directed by Meade. Foote states that Sickles position in the Peach Orchard discouraged Longstreet's Corps from marching up the Emmitsburg Road, which probably would have meant utter destruction if Sickles Corps had stayed back on the ridge to tear into their flank as they went by .

Standing on the Emmitsburg Road looking east towards Cemetery Ridge I can imagine Longstreet's Corps, 13,000 strong, slowly moving down Seminary Ridge getting into position for the attack on the Union Left flank. 2 or 3 regiments of confederate skirmishers are 100-200 feet ahead of the main body crossing the Emmitsburg Road forcing Union pickets back towards their line on Cemetery Ridge. Leading the skirmishers is a sharp eyed Confederate lieutenant who follows the movement of the Union Pickets back to the low end of the ridge 3/4 mile further east. He looks north up the road and sees nothing. The lieutenant sends a report up the chain of command informing his seniors of his observations.

I am fully cognizant of the fact that that I am only a 59 year old post grad student and Shelby is a world famous Historian but … there is no way that I can believe battlefield commanders as experienced as Longstreet, Mclaws and Hood would have marched their men due north up the Emmitsburg Road under those circumstances. Instead the entire Corps of Longstreet, supported by Alexander's artillery, would have marched unimpeded due east fully engaging the extreme left flank of the Union line. Buford had retired without relief so there is no cavalry screen to warn Sickles as to the full extent of what is coming. If you consider how far they got fighting **** near the entire Union Army that day it is not a stretch to conclude that had Sickles stayed on the ridge Longstreet would have succeeded in turning the Union left.

I certainly wouldn't expect the Confederates to keep blithely marching up Emmitsburg Road under enfilade fire, but they would be hastily reorienting their attack under Union observation and fire and then making a frontal assault on the enemy emplaced on Cemetary Ridge. I would submit that a frontal attack on the end of the line is not quite the same as a flank attack. Some of them might try to work their way around the Union flank, and they might even succeed if the Union neglected the Round Tops - or we might have a stand on LRT much as we did historically.

Sickles' corps would be occupying a shorter front and would have had time to prepare field fortifications. 5th Corps would be right behind them and other reinforcements nearer to hand. On the Confederate side, McLaws' division would be behind Hood's; it would take them longer to bring their full combat power to bear, and again it would all be under Union observation. Anderson's advance would likely fall directly against Hancock's 2nd Corps right from the start rather than adding to the pressure on Sickles.

Of course anything could happen, but I'm reluctant to take for granted that Longstreet would turn the Union left and win the battle.

 

[4065921]

l

"No,General Lee's orders are to attack up the Emmittsburg Road!"

- Longstreet's memoirs "General Lee's orders were to guide my left by the Emmitsburg Road."(312)
- E.P. Alexander's memoirs - mid morning on July 2nd - "In General Lee's presence Longstreet pointed out the enemy's position & said we would attack his left flank."(235)
- Sears - Lee marked a position on the map perpendicular to the Emmitsburg Road, south of the Peach Orchard, from to open an oblique attack against the enemy's Cemetery Ridge Line.(255)
- Coddington - Lee wanted McLaws Division perpendicular to the Emmitsburg Road. Longstreet indicated with his finger that McLaws position should be at right angles to the one lee wanted him to occupy. Lee corrected Longstreet.( 374-375)
- Coddington - In Lee's presence, Longstreet pointed out the enemy's position and said the Confederates would attack his left flank. (375)
- Mcpherson - Lee ordered Longstreet's two fresh divisions to attack the Union Left holding the Southern end of Cemetery Ridge. (656)
- Pfanz -Lee pointed to an area on the map where the Wheatfield Road is shown to cross the Seminary Ridge and to a line marked perpendicular to the Emmitsburg Road South of the Peach Orchard. General McLaws I wish you to place your division across this road. (110)
-LaFantasie - Lee's battle plan called for McLaws division supported by Hood, to form a battle line out of view of the enemy, behind s swale south of the Peach Orchard, and to drive up the road, in Lee's words, "partially envelope the enemy's left."(63)

I apologize for the preponderance of quotes here but it is to make a point. Lee wanted his divisions to use the Emmitsburg road as a guide however his primary goal was to find the enemy's left. I think Longstreet would have been completely within Lee's orders had he guided his Corps east to Cemetery Ridge instead of North up the Emmitsburg Road.

 

[virginiaworm]

I think it has been well established that Lee's leadership style provided considerable latitude to his subordinates in carrying out his orders. He understood the necessity of allowing for unforeseen events that may require changes in his plans. At times this would be to his detriment such as his famous directive that Ewell should storm Cemetery Hill if he thought it practicable. Longstreet's orders were to obtain the left flank of the Union Army whether it extended along the Emittsburg Road or on Cemetery Ridge.

The signal station on LRT reported movement of enemy troops throughout the morning about enemy skirmishers ,rebels are in force, heavy colum of enemy infantry etc ... Meade seemed unconcerned about these reports. They did sight Longstreet's Corps main body however the movement they observed was during the retracing of the route back to the Black Horse Tavern, that message being:
ROUND TOP MOUNTAIN SIGNAL STATION, July 2, 1863-1. 30 p. m.
General BUTTERFIELD: A heavy column of enemy's infantry, about 10, 000 strong, is moving from opposite our extreme left toward our right. HALL. Captain, Signal Officer

Ironically the only officer that took the reports seriously was Sickles. As for me, I would rather have the Cavalry shouting and yelling with guns ablaze, they would get more notice than a few pieces of cloth billowing on a mountain top.

Codington, Guelzo, Sears, Longstreet, Alexander,

Carronade really already addressed part this with his post, but I'll comment further.

Although Lee allowed some flexibility in his orders, Longstreet (no matter where he found the left flank at that time) was to 'drive it in ' - Pfanz 2nd day. Hill was coordinating with Longstreet with Anderson attacking the center. So Longstreet really didn't get much leeway (no pun intended) there.

I don't think you can say that Sickles was the only person in the AOP who was concerned about an attack on his front.
I don't think you should discount the wig-wagging of flags on LRT either. They were after all sending those msgs to HQ.

Meade (or you could say his staff) knew an attack was coming and was not overly concerned because he was supposed to have Sickles in position on Cemetery Ridge connected to 2nd Corps and with 5th Corps sitting 1,000 yds to the rear in support in close support. Meade of course thought he may be attacked right, left or center and prepared for all events. And he certainly didn't need 2,000 cavalrymen to sitting in Spanglers meadow to tell him an attack might be on that flank.

Several of the aforementioned historians who looked at day2 will surmise that Longstreet would have had a tougher time of it had Sickles had not extended his line. BRT could have caused problems (as we saw) with launching a concise attack on that area. And Meade would then been able to bring the whole 5th Corps enmasse(sp?) to the point of attack...rather than piecemeal as actually happened.

(BRT was more wooded and steeper than anticipated. Confederate troops who did have to attack there had coordination issues. And fatigue issues. Oates passed out from heatstroke after his attack)

Even in the world of what ifs.... with 6th corp already approaching the Round Tops area... my opinion is Longstreet would not have had the ability to turn the Union left. Terrain, numbers and timing were not in his favor. They were in Meades.

 

[virginiaworm]

l


I apologize for the preponderance of quotes here but it is to make a point. Lee wanted his divisions to use the Emmitsburg road as a guide however his primary goal was to find the enemy's left. I think Longstreet would have been completely within Lee's orders had he guided his Corps east to Cemetery Ridge instead of North up the Emmitsburg Road.

It was Longstreet and AP Hill Attacking. Not Longstreet alone. That was why Longstreet couldn't just do what he wanted. He was expected to stay attached to Hill, just as Meade had expected Sickled to connect to Gibbon. Neither would want to unnecessarily expose flanks.

Longstreet already had to extend his attack South when he finally launched.

We know now in hindsight that on Day 2 Meade had plenty of troops on his right and left. And the center of his fishhook was the easiest to reinforce. He had the advantage of good ground.

Sickles move, as has been studied/discussed by many.... was not helpful. Only Historicus thought so.

 

[FZ11]

l

- Longstreet's memoirs "General Lee's orders were to guide my left by the Emmitsburg Road."(312)
- E.P. Alexander's memoirs - mid morning on July 2nd - "In General Lee's presence Longstreet pointed out the enemy's position & said we would attack his left flank."(235)
- Sears - Lee marked a position on the map perpendicular to the Emmitsburg Road, south of the Peach Orchard, from to open an oblique attack against the enemy's Cemetery Ridge Line.(255)
- Coddington - Lee wanted McLaws Division perpendicular to the Emmitsburg Road. Longstreet indicated with his finger that McLaws position should be at right angles to the one lee wanted him to occupy. Lee corrected Longstreet.( 374-375)
- Coddington - In Lee's presence, Longstreet pointed out the enemy's position and said the Confederates would attack his left flank. (375)
- Mcpherson - Lee ordered Longstreet's two fresh divisions to attack the Union Left holding the Southern end of Cemetery Ridge. (656)
- Pfanz -Lee pointed to an area on the map where the Wheatfield Road is shown to cross the Seminary Ridge and to a line marked perpendicular to the Emmitsburg Road South of the Peach Orchard. General McLaws I wish you to place your division across this road. (110)
-LaFantasie - Lee's battle plan called for McLaws division supported by Hood, to form a battle line out of view of the enemy, behind s swale south of the Peach Orchard, and to drive up the road, in Lee's words, "partially envelope the enemy's left."(63)

I apologize for the preponderance of quotes here but it is to make a point. Lee wanted his divisions to use the Emmitsburg road as a guide however his primary goal was to find the enemy's left. I think Longstreet would have been completely within Lee's orders had he guided his Corps east to Cemetery Ridge instead of North up the Emmitsburg Road.

"No,General Lee's orders are to attack up the Emmittsburg Road!" This is Longstreet to Hood. Lee and Longstreet already had that conversation.

 

[BillO]

Durn now I'm going to try to defend an idiot and scoundrel like Sickles? Leaves a bad taste in my mouth but Sickles did a very good thing (moving up out of the hole he was supposed to defend) but he did it poorly. I've seen the argument in this thread and in others as well that if he had stayed in place he would have been able to take Longstreet in flank as Longstreet marched up the road across Sickles front. This is just smoke and mirrors or if you prefer total BS. Longstreet was supposed to guide his left on the road and if he hadn't allowed his attack to completely go off the rails ( he also did a very stupid thing) he would have struck Sickles line about midway and as he would have been coming from the higher ground and would have had much better artillery support he would have probably lost about as many men and most of his remnants would have been pushed right causing disruption in the lines which is the purpose of attacking in echelon anyway. The second day was supposed to be a giant pincers attack on the salient in the Federal lines and the object was to take control of Cemetary Hill.

 

[virginiaworm]

Durn now I'm going to try to defend an idiot and scoundrel like Sickles? Leaves a bad taste in my mouth but Sickles did a very good thing (moving up out of the hole he was supposed to defend) but he did it poorly.

The 'hole' was where Sickles camped. It was not where Meade asked him to position his Corps line. The line Meade wanted him on was previously occupied by Geary the night before. It is actually behind his camp site. It is almost as high as the Peach Orchard area and is behind a screen of trees in many places. It is 1500 yds shorter than his PO line and has no awkward bends and angles. It extends North from LRT towards 1st and 2nd Corps AOP.

I've seen the argument in this thread and in others as well that if he had stayed in place he would have been able to take Longstreet in flank as Longstreet marched up the road across Sickles front. This is just smoke and mirrors or if you prefer total BS. Longstreet was supposed to guide his left on the road and if he hadn't allowed his attack to completely go off the rails ( he also did a very stupid thing) he would have struck Sickles line about midway and as he would have been coming from the higher ground and would have had much better artillery support he would have probably lost about as many men and most of his remnants would have been pushed right causing disruption in the lines which is the purpose of attacking in echelon anyway. The second day was supposed to be a giant pincers attack on the salient in the Federal lines and the object was to take control of Cemetary Hill.

I think it is a hard sell to claim that Longstreet would not expose his flank if he indeed guided on the Emmitsburg Rd.
And again Sickles intended line was not significantly lower than the PO salient, thus Longstreet would not really be coming from 'significantly higher ground' at all. Matter of fact if he wanted to get to the Union line he would have to cross Plum run valley at some point and then Longstreet becomes the guy attacking from the lower ground.

In addition:
" Any Rebel battery they deployed along the Emmitsburg road was subject to converging fire from Union artillery ranged along the entire length of Cemetery Ridge and Little Round Top. The second was the presence of substantial wooded areas both along the intended line and down in the low ground of his campsites. This tree cover would have enabled Sickles to conceal much of his command from enemy observation and fire from the Peach Orchard, and give his skirmishers cover as they sniped at any enemy artillery deployed along in the open fields along Emmitsburg Road. More experienced officers saw the Peach Orchard for what it was; not a dominating position at all, but instead contested ground, that could be controlled by the Union artillery arrayed all along the Cemetery Ridge line." - Dave Powell Gettysburg Mag

My reply is merely cut and paste of his article from Advance to disaster.

"There is some strong evidence that Sickles' advance badly disrupted Meade's overall defensive scheme and significantly degraded Union combat effectiveness. "

Terrain was an issue as was timing, is my own comment.

 

[4065921]

Just a general comment on the thread, first thanks to all for the participation to date. I was mulling over the idea of making the "what if" scenario of General Sickles staying on Cemetery Ridge as directed by Meade a part of the paper. I am glad I floated the idea here and true to form the board rose to the occasion. It is obvious that there are just to many variables involved and lacking sound researchable support my version of the "what if" scenario becomes indefensible, this could open a serious paper up to harsh and deserved criticism, much as it got here. So the "what if" gets a

My research does hold up that General Sickles, despite his many personal flaws, was a good general, he performed well in combat, obeyed orders as they were given (Gettysburg excluded), his men respected him and respected his leadership. I am also in the camp that the PO position Sickles took up did prevent Longstreet from succeeding. There are plenty of first person accounts that can be resourced to demonstrate that basically Sickles did the wrong thing for the right reason.

getting back to work

Bob

 

[rpkennedy]

Just a general comment on the thread, first thanks to all for the participation to date. I was mulling over the idea of making the "what if" scenario of General Sickles staying on Cemetery Ridge as directed by Meade a part of the paper. I am glad I floated the idea here and true to form the board rose to the occasion. It is obvious that there are just to many variables involved and lacking sound researchable support my version of the "what if" scenario becomes indefensible, this could open a serious paper up to harsh and deserved criticism, much as it got here. So the "what if" gets a

My research does hold up that General Sickles, despite his many personal flaws, was a good general, he performed well in combat, obeyed orders as they were given (Gettysburg excluded), his men respected him and respected his leadership. I am also in the camp that the PO position Sickles took up did prevent Longstreet from succeeding. There are plenty of first person accounts that can be resourced to demonstrate that basically Sickles did the wrong thing for the right reason.

getting back to work

Bob

The problem with the argument that he somehow blunted Longstreet's attack is that, if he had stayed in position, there's no way to know how the Confederates would have changed their own plans. Would Longstreet have tried to find the flank, eating up precious daylight? Would he have ordered the attack as ordered, come he'll or high water? Would he have attacked due east?

There's just no way to know and the argument becomes just another what-if.

R

 

[4065921]

The problem with the argument that he somehow blunted Longstreet's attack is that, if he had stayed in position, there's no way to know how the Confederates would have changed their own plans. Would Longstreet have tried to find the flank, eating up precious daylight? Would he have ordered the attack as ordered, come he'll or high water? Would he have attacked due east?

There's just no way to know and the argument becomes just another what-if.

R

Right, I still believe that had Sickles followed Meade's orders Longstreet's Corps would have flanked or at least driven the Federals off the southern end of Cemetery Ridge and occupied the RT's. It was Sickles' advance to the Peach Orchard that prevented this from happening. We know that Sickles did move his Corps out to Emmitsburg Road in response to a proven threat that was developing on his front ... there was a method to his madness so to speak ... and it did stop Longstreet from turning the Union flank. I know many will disagree with that statement however this is a factual occurrence on which a conclusion can be made using first person reference material to substantiate the thesis statement.

What I realize now, primarily as a result of the discussion on this forum, is that my "hypothesis" as to what Longstreet would have done in the "Sickles obeys orders scenario" could not be credibly supported in a historical paper being submitted to a college review board. There are just to many "what if's to the "what if" ... if that makes any sense.

 

[rpkennedy]

Right, I still believe that had Sickles followed Meade's orders Longstreet's Corps would have flanked or at least driven the Federals off the southern end of Cemetery Ridge and occupied the RT's. It was Sickles' advance to the Peach Orchard that prevented this from happening. We know that Sickles did move his Corps out to Emmitsburg Road in response to a proven threat that was developing on his front ... there was a method to his madness so to speak ... and it did stop Longstreet from turning the Union flank. I know many will disagree with that statement however this is a factual occurrence on which a conclusion can be made using first person reference material to substantiate the thesis statement.

What I realize now, primarily as a result of the discussion on this forum, is that my "hypothesis" as to what Longstreet would have done in the "Sickles obeys orders scenario" could not be credibly supported in a historical paper being submitted to a college review board. There are just to many "what if's to the "what if" ... if that makes any sense.

Why do you think that Longstreet would have moved against the Round Tops? The only reason he went after the Round Tops was because Union troops (particularly the 2nd United States Sharpshooters) withdrew in that direction, drawing Law's and Robertson's Brigades towards the Round Tops and Devil's Den. It's very possible that Robertson, who had been ordered to keep his left aligned along Emmitsburg Road, would have continued along that axis of advance.

R

 

[13th Missouri Cavalry]

Believe me, I'm not as hard on Sickles as a lot of people, many of whom see no redeeming qualities for the man. His actions at Gettysburg are both understandable but nearly unjustifiable.

R

I have a hard time saying that murder is fine. After all , Sickles did murder Fracis Scott Key's son.