General Dan Sickles, Revisited

What could be done with mountain howitzers is impressive, but it must be noted if planning any positioning of artillery that there are none in the ANV.

That particular photograph was of captured Confederate weaponry after the fall of Richmond. Agreed I cannot confirm that there were any such weapons at Gettysburg, I just wanted to make the point that it could be done. My primary premise for stating that artillery could be brought up to RT's was based purely on my understanding of Alexander and the intense professionalism that motivates him to overcome challenges.
 
Hey guys, I am still plugging away at the thesis ... The content is going well and I do owe this board credit and thanks for providing references material and "critical" perspectives on my points. 3 weeks to go and still editing.

I do offer one piece of advice to anyone contemplating writing a large paper, friends and family are a great source for proofing however at this level it is worth it to hire a professional proofer … which I regret not doing. If anybody has used a website for this purpose I would love a reference or two for future work.
 
That particular photograph was of captured Confederate weaponry after the fall of Richmond. Agreed I cannot confirm that there were any such weapons at Gettysburg, I just wanted to make the point that it could be done. My primary premise for stating that artillery could be brought up to RT's was based purely on my understanding of Alexander and the intense professionalism that motivates him to overcome challenges.

Alexander was good, but even he had to accept geography.
 
My thesis has been returned with a score of 95, thus completing my Masters in US History. I do wish to thank everyone for participating in this thread and I did acknowledge that in my Paper;

“I would also like to thank members of the CivilWarTalk forum for engaging me in some very informative discussions.”

I supported issues that most on the board will agree with: Sickles was an adequate and brave brigade leader. However, his lack of strategic acumen was magnified as he gained command of larger forces. Simply put, the tactical mistakes he made at Chancellorsville at the division level, where made all the more worse at Gettysburg because there he commanded a whole Corps holding what would become a key portion of the battle line. His brash action to redeploy his troops against the orders of his commanding officer violated basic military protocol and he should have been court-martialed for that offense. Additionally his deployment was defensively unsound. He did not have adequate troops to occupy the intended position, he created the infamous salient allowing his troops to get caught in a horrific crossfire, he used artillery to extend his line without infantry support etc. …

I also think Meade’s leadership was suspect in a few key area’s as well. There are those that state the placement of Corps on Cemetery Ridge was matter of timing and that Mead placed the Corps on the ridge from North to South as they arrived on the field. This is not true, Sickles was on the field occupying the ridge next to the remnants of 11th and 1st Corps on the evening on July 1st. Meade knew this as he had inspected the line sometime around midnight on the 1st. Hancock’s 2nd Corps did not arrive on the field until the following morning. Meade placed 2th Corps on the ridge that was occupied by 3rd Corps and moved Sickles down to the end of the defensive line below the RT’s. Meade had seen Sickles in action several times and probably had developed an opinion of his abilities, or lack thereof. If there was any doubt about Sickles in his mind Meade should have left Sickles to his immediate front were he could keep an eye on him instead of putting out of sight and out of mind. Also, I think it worth pointing out that at Chancellorsville Hooker placed the suspect 11th Corps on the far end of his battle line, out of sight and out of mind.

The debate as to whether Sickles advanced position at Emmitsburg Road either placed the Army in dire peril, or saved it from eminent destruction will probably rage into the next century, at least I hope it does. Lee’s attack targeting the left flank of the Union Line on July 2nd caught Meade by surprise. I feel there is a sound argument that if Sickles had stayed on the ridge as Meade had intended, Longstreet’s Corps would have forced the Union Corps off the Ridge, at least from the ground immediately around the RT’s and subsequently occupied those hills. The threat posed to the whole of the Union Army would have forced Meade to withdraw south probably to his initial Pipe Creek defensive position. As it was, Sickles advanced position at the Emmitsburg Road disrupted the cohesiveness of the Confederate attack and provided Meade with the time he needed to organize the reinforcements that ultimately saved the day for the Union.

There are 100 plus pages of painstaking detail to support my position which I will not torture anyone with by posting it here. To be honest I am sure that the Professor’s did not buy into my entire premise, but I think they appreciated the argument.

Thanks Again

Bob
 
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How about Longstreet's order to withdraw Wofford's brigade once it had punched through the Wheat Field? They were approaching LRT and could have surrounded it but were stopped by a Longstreet that was no where near that part of the action.

Wofford's men were a group that never felt like they lost that battle.

It would have been a challenge for Wofford's scattered men to have defeated the fresh brigades of the Sixth Corps that were coming into action in the vicinity.
 
It would have been a challenge for Wofford's scattered men to have defeated the fresh brigades of the Sixth Corps that were coming into action in the vicinity.

(repost) - Wofford , with support from Kearny and Semmes sensed an opportunity for one more push that could get them into that flanking move. What Wofford could not see from his position in the low area below in Plum Run and the stony ridge was Crawfords 5th Corps massed along in front of them on Cemetery ridge. Sears states that Longstreet realized the Federals were pouring fresh troops into the battle at a rate he could no longer match, "To urge my men forward under those circumstances would have been madness."
 
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