1SGDan
Major
- Joined
- Dec 13, 2009
- Location
- New Hampshire
Franklin's Crossing
The end of May 1863 found the opposing armies in northern Virginia still separated by the Rappahannock River. North of the river Major-General Joseph Hooker and the Army of the Potomac were collecting themselves after their defeat at Chancellorsville. They spent the last days of spring reorganizing, resupplying, and reinforcing in preparation for future movements. Contrary to his poor reputation Hooker was proving to be an adequate administrator. As the start of June approached morale had been restored and the army was again ready for action. Regular Engineer Timothy Hartshorn recorded on May 24th that "the army is in good spirits though we have been repulsed."[1] Lieutenant Folwell echoed that sentiment stating "I do not think the army in the least demoralized"[2] The feeling amongst most units was that as good weather arrived a new campaign was just around the corner. They were not to be disappointed.
South of the river the Confederates, flush with victory, but logistically desperate, beat Hooker to the offensive punch. The Army of Northern Virginia began moving north. Under these developing conditions the scenario at the river changed. The new situation called for Hooker to react and set the stage for a little regarded action at Franklin's Crossing. Despite its obscurity the action here had consequences far greater than the relatively small number of casualties recorded in its execution.
Despite Lee's desire for secrecy, the movements of his troops immediately sparked a flurry of reports and rumors in the Federal command. By 4 June it was impossible not to comprehend that the Army of Northern Virginia was moving away. But where they were going remained the question. Hooker writing to Halleck around noon on the 4th remarked;
"The movements of the enemy in our front do not indicate what their purpose or object may be…"[3]
By noon the following day Hooker was writing to President Lincoln that it was apparent that Lee meant to "move up the river"[4] to either cross the upper Potomac or "throw his army between mine and Washington."[5] Hooker proposed to "pitch into his rear"[6] by attacking south across the Rappahannock. Lincoln replied about four hours later that Halleck was in charge of overall military operations but offered his opinion on what should be done. He stated firmly that if Lee should move north of the Rappahannock that he was intentionally enticing Hooker to attack across the river. A rear guard force fighting from entrenchments would tie up a considerable portion of his force robbing him of his full maneuver capability. He suggested remaining on the same side of the river if Lee moved north of it. He was more adamant about a move to the south side of the river telling Hooker;
"I would by no means cross to the south of it (Rappahannock)."[7]
The President reminded Hooker that his were just "mere suggestions"[8] and that the ultimate authority concerning movements lay with the military authorities. Only forty minutes later Halleck addressed the question at the request of the President. Unfortunately for Hooker he also couched his guidance in the form of suggestion. Hooker was determined to act and without firm orders to the contrary he decided to proceed with his original proposal. He immediately set a plan in motion to cross the Rappahannock in force and challenge the Confederate position near Fredericksburg.
[1] Hartshorn Papers, 1814 – 1953, Rauner Special Collections Library Repository, Dartmouth Library, Archives and Manuscripts
[2] Folwell
[3] OR, Volume XXVII, Part 1, Hooker to Halleck, Page 29
[4] OR, Volume XXVII, Part 1, Hooker to Lincoln, Page 30
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] OR, Volume XXVII, Part 1, Lincoln to Hooker, Page 31
[8] Ibid.
The end of May 1863 found the opposing armies in northern Virginia still separated by the Rappahannock River. North of the river Major-General Joseph Hooker and the Army of the Potomac were collecting themselves after their defeat at Chancellorsville. They spent the last days of spring reorganizing, resupplying, and reinforcing in preparation for future movements. Contrary to his poor reputation Hooker was proving to be an adequate administrator. As the start of June approached morale had been restored and the army was again ready for action. Regular Engineer Timothy Hartshorn recorded on May 24th that "the army is in good spirits though we have been repulsed."[1] Lieutenant Folwell echoed that sentiment stating "I do not think the army in the least demoralized"[2] The feeling amongst most units was that as good weather arrived a new campaign was just around the corner. They were not to be disappointed.
South of the river the Confederates, flush with victory, but logistically desperate, beat Hooker to the offensive punch. The Army of Northern Virginia began moving north. Under these developing conditions the scenario at the river changed. The new situation called for Hooker to react and set the stage for a little regarded action at Franklin's Crossing. Despite its obscurity the action here had consequences far greater than the relatively small number of casualties recorded in its execution.
Despite Lee's desire for secrecy, the movements of his troops immediately sparked a flurry of reports and rumors in the Federal command. By 4 June it was impossible not to comprehend that the Army of Northern Virginia was moving away. But where they were going remained the question. Hooker writing to Halleck around noon on the 4th remarked;
"The movements of the enemy in our front do not indicate what their purpose or object may be…"[3]
By noon the following day Hooker was writing to President Lincoln that it was apparent that Lee meant to "move up the river"[4] to either cross the upper Potomac or "throw his army between mine and Washington."[5] Hooker proposed to "pitch into his rear"[6] by attacking south across the Rappahannock. Lincoln replied about four hours later that Halleck was in charge of overall military operations but offered his opinion on what should be done. He stated firmly that if Lee should move north of the Rappahannock that he was intentionally enticing Hooker to attack across the river. A rear guard force fighting from entrenchments would tie up a considerable portion of his force robbing him of his full maneuver capability. He suggested remaining on the same side of the river if Lee moved north of it. He was more adamant about a move to the south side of the river telling Hooker;
"I would by no means cross to the south of it (Rappahannock)."[7]
The President reminded Hooker that his were just "mere suggestions"[8] and that the ultimate authority concerning movements lay with the military authorities. Only forty minutes later Halleck addressed the question at the request of the President. Unfortunately for Hooker he also couched his guidance in the form of suggestion. Hooker was determined to act and without firm orders to the contrary he decided to proceed with his original proposal. He immediately set a plan in motion to cross the Rappahannock in force and challenge the Confederate position near Fredericksburg.
[1] Hartshorn Papers, 1814 – 1953, Rauner Special Collections Library Repository, Dartmouth Library, Archives and Manuscripts
[2] Folwell
[3] OR, Volume XXVII, Part 1, Hooker to Halleck, Page 29
[4] OR, Volume XXVII, Part 1, Hooker to Lincoln, Page 30
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] OR, Volume XXVII, Part 1, Lincoln to Hooker, Page 31
[8] Ibid.
Bringing the