Dedicated Skirmishers & Sharpshooters

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

I'm reading Earl Hess' The Rifle Musket In Civil War Combat. In addition to the 1st & 2nd US Sharpshooters, Hess lists numerous other Union volunteer battalions and independent companies that were formed to serve as sharpshooters and/or skirmisher specialists. However, in practice, they were almost never actually used for this purpose.

The Confederates are described as operating in a similiar manner. In some instances, they also apparently formed specialty units out of existing ones during the war that were often disbanded back to their regular units after a few months. In Lee's ANV in early 1864, each brigade was instructed to form a specialist sharpshooter/skirmisher unit.

Obviously, weapon availability could be difficult. The Confederates could probably never field a sharpshooter battalion with more than a handful of Whitworths, but it seems like Confederates found the Enfield satisfactory. On the Union side, I can see specialized equipment being difficult in 1861, but by 1862 it seems feasible to equip small specialty units - maybe not all with Sharps like Berdan's men had and certainly not the expensive Henry rifle, but at least with quality alternatives (perhaps also Enfields, but at least the best Springfields).

Given how standard the use of skirmishers, why was there so much reluctance on both sides to commit to having truly dedicated skirmisher/sharpshooter units? Give a large part of linear combat was about "mass" (both volume of fire, morale reassurance, and psychological intimidation) and the almost exclusive use of volunteer troops, having skirmisher specialists seems desirable.

 

[JeffFromSyracuse]

The problem with specialist skirmishes / "light troops" is that the more they are used, the less effective they are. Fatigue and casualties add up. It's a problem that plagued Burgoyne during the Saratoga campaign.

 

[RedRover]

Given how standard the use of skirmishers, why was there so much reluctance on both sides to commit to having truly dedicated skirmisher/sharpshooter units? Give a large part of linear combat was about "mass" (both volume of fire, morale reassurance, and psychological intimidation) and the almost exclusive use of volunteer troops, having skirmisher specialists seems desirable.

The simple answer is that dedicated rifle or light infantry units were a thing of the past, as all infantry by 1861 was to act as either line or light infantry, or even riflemen (if armed with rifles or rifle-muskets anyway), as necessary according to any situation.

In 1857 the War Department of the United States declared that all United States foot troops would thenceforth employ Hardee's "Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics" (1855) as their primary drill and exercise in garrison, camp, and field, in lieu of Scott's "Infantry tactics".

Scott's had included skirmish instruction, but was principally a "heavy" or line infantry system, with each regiment having two "flank" or "light" companies. Hardee's made no such distinction as all companies were to train to act as light infantry or riflemen, either in line of battle, or as skirmishers, etc., and the intent was to arm all with rifles or rifle-muskets.

By an act of Congress of 1820, still in effect, the militia of the US etc., were to employ the same tactics as the army. Consequently all "infantry" in the USA were to train by the new system and its emphasis on rifle and light infantry service. The Confederates employed Hardee's as standard as well.

here's a wartime photo with a unit in line of battle, with some companies deployed as a skirmish line in front. By Hardee's system, any one, or any group or number of the regiment's companies could be deployed as skirmishers, or even the whole regiment, as necessary.

In 1862 the USA adopted Casey's "Infantry Tactics" which were pretty much like Hardees. However he attempted to restore the pre-1850s status of the "flank companies" being permanently determined to act as skirmishers for the line principally, or in other words not to act in line of battle in action necessarily. This, however, was suppressed by the War Department on its adoption:

Gen. J.H. Patterson commented after the war this eliminated any distinction between heavy, or line infantry, and light infantry or riflemen. They were all now classed together as "infantry."

"Hardee's were practically the tactics of our army, and that of the Confederates also, during the Civil War, differing very little from General Casey's issue in 1863, both taken from the French Ordonnances of 1831 and 1845. The only changes of importance General Casey made, were deployments only to the front and a continuance from the system of 1815, and before and after, of the distinction between light and line infantry. This distinction was ordered by the War Department, when the tactics were issued, not to be observed, and disappears from our drill book forever after."

General Sherman consequently commented:

In Hardee's and Casey's, the troops could march, maneuver, or even fight in line of battle, or deployed as "skirmishers," as a skirmish line in which they formed various intervals between each man, or groups of four men, as necessary.

A skirmish line:

Considering nearly all were drilled as "light infantry" (regardless of their arms), the distinction even between line of battle and skirmish lines frequently blurred on the battlefields. When the ranks and files of the close-order line of battle was disordered, or even broken up, the men did not loose their cohesion, but could even fight in the extended order where necessary...

Sherman on the USA:

For example, the 20th Maine at Gettysburg: the line of battle fought using cover, like skirmishers.

or 96th Illinois at Chickamauga:

Daniel Harvey Hill on the same conditions among the CSA:

For example, Kershaw's brigade on July 2nd at Gettysburg:

Law's division at Gettysburg on July 3:

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Daniel Harvey Hill on the same conditions among the CSA:

This sounds like Hill just repeating the "Southern men are superior to Northern men" trope from before the war.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

The problem with specialist skirmishes / "light troops" is that the more they are used, the less effective they are. Fatigue and casualties add up. It's a problem that plagued Burgoyne during the Saratoga campaign.

It depends how they're used too.

The US Army had the problem with Rangers in WW2 being wasted in normal fighting rather than being reserved for special duty.

An ACW brigade with three infantry regiments and one sharpshooter battalion always sends the sharpshooters out as skirmishers and never uses them as line infantry.

Thinking about it further I see a problem in the basic organization methods of the Union army. In WW1 or WW2, regiments that suffered permanent casualties simply got reinforcements and men could be transfered between units as needed. In the Union Army, the politics of recruiting and state organization of regiments meant wildly varied regimental sizes except among new units. Thus in practice keeping the appropriate ratio between line infantry and skirmisher-sharpshooters wouldn't be possible. Raising a new battalion that drew men from existing units was basically heresy.

 

[RedRover]

This sounds like Hill just repeating the "Southern men are superior to Northern men" trope from before the war.

Not quite. He's explaining why the lost the war. Here is his conclusion:

...

John William Draper, in 1868, comments on the issue that Hill has mentioned, which gave the Union armies some tactical advantage.

However, even Union veterans were stricken by the fighting of the Confederates:

The Southron's pre-war rhetoric of one reb whipping five yanks was exploded pretty early in the war. Sydney Lanier recalled:

Jeff Davis commented to Mary Chesnut in mid-1861:

Joseph E. Johnston also did not underestimate his opponents, and employed his troops to best advantage against Sherman, principally as skirmishers under cover...

General Hardee explains this change of tactics employed a fortified skirmish line:

 

[jepridgen]

Read Shock Troops of the Confederacy by Fred Ray. It gives a very good narrative of the ANV "sharpshooter" battalions formed in 1863. They were pulled from each regiment in a brigade and formed into a battalion to operate as dedicated skirmishers, etc. These ANV battalions generally remained in existence for the duration and were often quite effective. There's less info on the AOT, but they had at least some success in forming and using these particularly in Cleburne's Division.

 

[RedRover]

It seems odd to title a work on sharpshooters "shock troops" as they were the opposite of shock troops.

Shock troops would have been line infantry, particularly attacking with the bayonet:

From an 1860 description of the Battle of Guilford in the Revolution:

And of King's Mountain:

From 1816, regarding Waterloo the previous year:

From 1839:

Regarding the Napoleonic wars:

McClellan, bayonet drill, 1862:

Dufour, (France) 1864;

From 1870:

IN the US by the 1860s the particular "shock" troops were the line cavalry on the battlefield, at least where they could be so employed:

Dennis Hart Mahan, in one of his West Point texts, 1847 edition:

Infantry in close order delivers and recieves shock.

Cavalry:

But General Halleck's "Elements of Military Art and Science" (1862) states the cavalry was then the principal shock troops:

 

[Coonewah Creek]

Lee's Sharpshooters, out of copyright and obviously a bit dated, but is still a very good read on the topic...

 

[Bruce Vail]

"In Lee's ANV in early 1864, each brigade was instructed to form a specialist sharpshooter/skirmisher unit."

I never knew that. I'd be interested in more detail, if you have it at hand.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

"In Lee's ANV in early 1864, each brigade was instructed to form a specialist sharpshooter/skirmisher unit."

I never knew that. I'd be interested in more detail, if you have it at hand.

Hess, Rifle Musket, 136:
In the winter of 1863-1864, "an order went out to create one [a sharpshooter battalion] for each brigade. Cadmus M. Wilcox later claimed credit for this development. One of the chief rifle advocates before the war, Wilcox apparently petitioned Lee to move forward with this innovation." The units had been formed by April 1864.

Wilcox republished his prewar training material on range estimation to assist in this.

In 1863, Rodes had experimented with something like thus in his division, and thus may have also made recommendations to Lee.

However, Hess notes that if Lee issued a formal order the order has not survived in writing, nor does Lee otherwise address the subject in writing. So it seems like it's just Wilcox's claim plus the end result.

An alternative not stated by Hess us that other division commanders copied Wilcox and Rodes on their own initiative, and Lee didn't object.

Hess' citations for two paragraphs reference the book Lee's Sharpshooters, plus a bunch of primary sources.

 

[RedRover]

The Confederate Congress passed an act approved by Jeff Davis on April 26, 1862 "to organize battalions of sharpshooters."

And from May, 1862:

Where brigades did not bother with sharpshooter battalions, there were cases of divisions forming sharpshooter detachments, like Bates' division in 1864 with a small number assigned from each unit, and also Cheatham's division. These had very long-range guns.

 

[jepridgen]

It seems odd to title a work on sharpshooters "shock troops" as they were the opposite of shock troops.

Shock troops would have been line infantry, particularly attacking with the bayonet:

From an 1860 description of the Battle of Guilford in the Revolution:

The title is interesting, but the author makes the point that these new battalions ended up often being used more along the lines of special assault troops to accomplish a difficult mission or attack. Since they had the best troops from within the brigade, these battalions generally had high esprit de corps and were very efficient fighters. He applied the term more as it would be applied today I think.

They were more of elite, light infantry who could be utilized to make a quick, hard hitting assault on a key position. They were also very effective at Petersburg. He actually makes the point that sometimes commanders utilized them too much outside the skirmish role due to their effectiveness which left the parent brigade without their skirmish specialists.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Sherman on the USA:

Hess addresses this quote on Rifle Musket, 173-174 and critcises it as "fraught with misapprehensions." (I wrote this comment immediately after reaching that page.)

However, elsewhere Hess does credit Sherman's army at Atlanta with performing the best sustained skirmishing of the entire war, by either side. Hess makes it clear this involved aggressive use of otherwise traditional skirmisher work, and not just a loose line of battle.

 

[RedRover]

Hess addresses this quote on Rifle Musket, 173-174 and critcises it as "fraught with misapprehensions." (I wrote this comment immediately after reaching that page.)

However, elsewhere Hess does credit Sherman's army at Atlanta with performing the best sustained skirmishing of the entire war, by either side. Hess makes it clear this involved aggressive use of otherwise traditional skirmisher work, and not just a loose line of battle.

Yes, I understand. Per Sherman, the units deployed in regular line, etc., but FOUGHT in strong "skirmish" lines, taking advantage of every cover etc. General Howard says the same in his memoir. It was clear by the drill that skirmishers were supposed to take cover, but lines of battle not necessarily so. But being instructed by "rifle and light infantry" tactics, the line frequently did.

All lines of battle essentially deployed skirmish lines in front, and throughout the war, and these skirmish lines could be light, as in widely scattered, or "strong," as in the men practically shoulder to shoulder. But it was frequently the case that the lines of battle themselves were practically skirmish lines, viz. extended files, taking cover, etc. Particularly over broken and wooded ground.

I understand the distinction between the skirmish line and line of battle is, that the former covers or clears the front of the later, and it is not intended to either take or hold ground but to "skirr" or "scour" it. They cannot contend generally against an enemy line of battle; cannot deliver or recieve the "shock" of battle. The line of battle holds or takes ground. Since all the infantry were trained by the rifle and light infantry tactics they don't seem to have had a problem forming their "line of battle" however they thought most efficient, and in wooded country, as on most of the battlefields, a looser order, like skirmishers, was frequently used in either attack or defense.

For example regarding defense, the 20th Maine at Gettysburg, July 2: whereby its Company B was first deployed as skirmishers in front:

While the line of battle behind them was formed by Chamberlain in less than a straight line: "I formed my regiment on the right into line, giving such direction to the line as should best secure the advantage of the rough, rocky, and straglingly wooded ground." and as noted above in post #3 with the men behind cover of the rocks and trees 3-5 paces apart...

Just like the skirmishers could rally into the line of battle, the line of battle in extended order could close up, shoulder to shoulder, when it had to...

From the Battle of Williamsburg in 1862:

And in attacking:

Alabamans attacking the 20th Maine at Gettysburg:

From Fort Donelson in 1862:

48th Pennsylvania at Second Manassas: advancing firing through a thick woods...

Many Western US units by Chickamauga were instructed in an informal mode of attack in line of battle called "advance firing" whereby every other file drops behind a neighboring one, making four ranks, and in the attack, the front rankers fire and drop or halt, and the others continue, with each rank firing reloading and advancing in succession.

This mode was credited to General August Willich, and his troops, and others including Harker's brigade at Chickamauga employed it. It was not dissimilar to the "fire advancing" drill of a skirmish line in Hardee's/Casey's whereby file partners alternately fire and take cover to reload as their partner advances and takes cover etc. ;but adapted for use by a line of battle for the purpose of attack. The 125th Ohio also employed this mode it at Chickamauga:

the history of the 124th Ohio notes on September 19 the attack of Johnson's division, McCook's corps; in column of regiments; the front regiment fired and fell to the ground to reload, "while the next regiment rushes over them only to repeat what those had done who had gone before." [Lewis, 1894, 59-60.]

Next, from "Steedman and his men at Chickamauga" is mentioned that after Steedman's division attacked the Confederate far left at the Horseshoe Ridge on the afternoon of Sept. 20, the Confederates of Patton Anderson's brigade, and Bushrod Johnson's Division, etc. attacked in a not dissimilar mode, over the broken and wooded ground in loose columns, sometimes up to eight lines deep, and the front rank would fire, fall to the ground to reload, and the rear ranks would bound over them to fire and drop as they in turn were passed…

In the book "Gateway to the Confederacy" the authors state that after General Thomas assumed command of the Army of the Cumberland he ordered Willich's tactics abandoned (at least at drill), and Casey's regulation resorted to, etc., and in action, as Sherman notes, but fighting in strong-skirmish lines etc.

Per the manuals a "skirmish line" is never part of a "line of battle" no matter how identically or distinctly the regiment is formed upon them; the colors of a regiment remain on the line of battle with the reserve, no matter the strength of the reserve (as little as a single company), even if the majority of the regiment is advanced as skirmishers.

Where the line of battle itself was practically formed like skirmishers, the colors would have yet remained in the center, and the men able to simply dress on it to reform close-order or extend further, take cover, etc. if necessary. From Allen C. Redwood, 55th VA at Gettysburg.

Hampton's legion, Antietam;

46th Illinois at Shiloh:

11th Ohio at Buzzard Roost Gap, GA, Feb., 1864:

The Rebs at the Battle of Williamsburg, 1862: with lines of battle acting something like skirmishers...

....

At Nashville, General Bate's line of battle on Shy's Hill was formed like a skirmish line, with several feet between men in their breastworks. This line was broken by a stronger federal skirmish line, in front of their advancing line of battle. By this means, The flag of Bates' 4th Florida was captured by 1st Lt. Chas. H. McLeary, Co. C, 72nd OH Infantry who took the flag, "while in advance of his lines."

 

[Bruce Vail]

The "official" history of the 1st North Carolina Infantry Regiment notes the creation of a sharp shooter battalion in mid-1864. Col. Hamilton Brown of the 1st was assigned to command. It's unclear from the history whether this battalion was established at the brigade level (Ramseur's Brigade) or the divisional level (Rodes' Divisiion).

see https://civilwarintheeast.com/confe...arolina/1st-north-carolina-infantry-regiment/

 

[Sgt. Tyree]

Lesser known, but just as effective as 1st and 2nd USSS, was a unit known as "Birge's Western Sharpshooters."

That's an informal designation and the unit actually had a couple different regimental designations during the war.

They used a Dimick rifle, which was similar to the famous Hawken. Later, the Henry saw some use.

The Men Out Front; Birge's Western Sharpshooters a.k.a. the 66th Illinois

by Gordon Thorsby Sharpshooter regiments received fame in varying degrees. Hiram Berdan's Union eastern sharpshooters always come to mind, as do Confederate units like the Whitworth Sharpshooters. Skirmishers were a fundamental need of Civil War military tactics, whether identifying strengths...

www.westerntheatercivilwar.com

 

[rpkennedy]

There were a number of sharpshooter companies that were raised very early on in the war but after a year or so, most of them were folded into regiments from the same state that were in the same brigade. A couple of examples are Brady's Sharpshooters (joined the 16th Michigan), 1st Andrews' Sharpshooters (joined the 15th Massachusetts and later the 19th Massachusetts), and 2nd Andrews' Sharpshooters (joined the 22nd Massachusetts). Interestingly, the 1st Andrews' Sharpshooter Company was initially raised for Berdan's Sharpshooters but opted to remain independent when they learned that they would lose their state enlistment bonus if they joined a Federal unit.

Ryan

 

[Bruce Vail]

The "official" history of the 1st North Carolina Infantry Regiment notes the creation of a sharp shooter battalion in mid-1864. Col. Hamilton Brown of the 1st was assigned to command. It's unclear from the history whether this battalion was established at the brigade level (Ramseur's Brigade) or the divisional level (Rodes' Divisiion).

see https://civilwarintheeast.com/confe...arolina/1st-north-carolina-infantry-regiment/

CORRECTION: After checking some other sources it appears that in 1864 Col. Brown was assigned to command an existing sharpshooter battalion within Rodes' Division (ANV).

The always informative Tom Elmore had this post about sharpshooter battalions under Rodes' command https://civilwartalk.com/threads/ro...successes-and-a-failure-at-gettysburg.175217/

 

[Dan Kohli]

The 1861 U.S. Regulations do state that "Regiments serving on foot, being usually employed as light troops, will be habitually exercised in the system of U.S. Tactics for light infantry and riflemen adopted by the War Department, May 1, 1861." page 18.
The only designated rifle regiment prewar was the Regiment of Mounted Riflemen. Who were later converted and redesignated as the 3rd U.S. Cavalry.