Could Stonewall Jackson Have Made Full General?

JPWalton

Sergeant
Joined
Apr 29, 2013
This is a supposition from Stonewall Goes West, the what if? novel.

In a nutshell, the author had Jackson lose his arm at Chancellorsville but not die of infection. That very small change meant Jackson survived, but didn't go to Gettysburg.

Historically, we know Davis didn't want to appoint Joe Johnston as Braxton Bragg's successor, but he had no other options. He hated Beauregard even more, Hardee had refused the job, and none of the other lieutenant generals were suitable for various reasons. Even most of the Cabinet was ambivalent about Johnston, but collectively Davis and his Cabinet didn't see any other options.

In the novel, Jackson's presence proves instrumental in turning Bristoe Station from a Confederate defeat into a victory. Riding on the back of that, Jackson becomes a serious contender for the Army of Tennessee command, one whom Davis seizes with glee.

So the question here is do you think that makes sense? Given the circumstances, would Davis have picked Jackson over Johnston, and could he have gotten Jackson promoted to full general in the Congress?
 
I wondered about this myself. He did exercise control over large bodies of troops that were sort of an independent command during the Valley Campaign. But I think his tactics and energies were better suited for corps sized command. Imagine him trying to push an army the way he pushed his corps. He also seemed to be a bit of a micro manager so I'm not sure full general would've suited him.
 
Considering his body of work I think it would be difficult to not give him the chance if he survived. The war saw a lot of people who exceeded positions they were good at to then fail (sometimes spectacularly). Who knows how Jackson would've fared? I think it would've been problematic, though, considering the way he drove his troops, his secrecy and the way he clashed with so many other generals.
 
It's hard to say with Jackson if he would have been like John Bell Hood - great where he was but disaster where he went. I've also thought a big factor missing with Hood was Lee. Lee had a real gift for getting the best out of people! I think he would have been wise enough to leave Jackson where he could do his best, at least as long as he could. That happened to Stuart. He had ambitions - corps commander to start - but he was too good at what he did. Lee had no one like him. He also had no one like Jackson. Jackson was that once in a blue moon military genius who arrived at just the right time. The arrival wasn't enough - he also coincided with a boss who knew gold when he had it in his hand and how to make of it what he needed.

All that said - and I think all the sugar in that gave me a cavity! - I agree that the argument that Jackson would have made a difference at Gettysburg or Bristoe Station or other future battles had he lived is a bit hollow. Jackson would not have been recovered enough. If he survived the pneumonia, the amputation, etc he would have been laid up for months. He would have missed these major battles anyway.

Of course, if you asked Jackson, he'd simply say he wasn't at Gettysburg, Bristoe Station or a full general because God decided he wouldn't be. And, the only way to stop him was to kill him off!
 
Isn't that a joke in Justified?

"You know what they're sayin' back in the office? That I disarmed him."

If he had no arm, how could he possibly be a FULL General? He certainly would have at least been a disarmed General.
:D :smile coffee:


Sorry - couldn't resist!
 
Lee wouldn't have had much say in the matter, and I think you misread him regardless. Would a man like Robert E. Lee really have stood in the way of the elevation of one of his chief lieutenants, however much Lee might have wanted to keep him? I think not. It goes against everything we know about the man, since it would mean Lee was putting his own personal interests ahead not just of Jackson's own career, but also potentially the needs of the country.

Yet even if he did, Lee would have no official standing to protest the matter. Imagine what would Lee have done if Longstreet hadn't been such a sulky d*uche during his own stint out West, and the government offered the job to Old Peter after Bragg's resignation? He might have suggested in a polite, subdued sort of way that Longstreet wasn't up to the task, as he did with Hood. But recall Lee only did that when asked, and also recall that Lee didn't protest having Hood, his best division commander and a man he was grooming for corps command, shipped out West either.

The same could be said of Jackson. At the bottom, when did Lee ever get in the way of the advancement of one of his subordinates for purely selfish motives?

If he was still alive would Lee have let him go? I think not.
 
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For one thing, I always find it interesting that so many are so eager to transfer a meaningful bulk of the credit for the Valley Campaign of 1862 away from Jackson and to Lee. Another poster in this thread did that too. Not even Jackson's harshest modern critic, Peter Cozzens, attempts to do the same. The reason is simple: it's not supported by the historical record. Lee offered what amounted to morale support for the campaign, but he wasn't Jackson's superior (Johnston was at that time), and in any case the record shows the whole thing was conceived, planned, and directed by the commander on the scene.

Stonewall Jackson was not perfect, but he deserves full acknowledgement for running a very successful independent campaign.

In the novel, Jackson spends the summer recuperating in Lexington. Having read quite a few books about Civil War wounds, if you assume Jackson doesn't get pneumonia or suffer any other serious complications, three or four months would have been ample time for his arm to heal. Hood was coming back having an arm nearly shot off at Gettysburg and then having a leg amputated at the hip -- a procedure only a few who suffered it survived -- and he was back in the saddle after ... what, five or six months?

But from that last note, you would like one thing -- lots of that Presbyterian predestination talk in the book. God wills this and Divine Providence brings that. Apparently A.P. Stewart was also a Presbyterian, and he and Jackson hit it off and talk religion.

It's hard to say with Jackson if he would have been like John Bell Hood - great where he was but disaster where he went. I've also thought a big factor missing with Hood was Lee. Lee had a real gift for getting the best out of people! I think he would have been wise enough to leave Jackson where he could do his best, at least as long as he could. That happened to Stuart. He had ambitions - corps commander to start - but he was too good at what he did. Lee had no one like him. He also had no one like Jackson. Jackson was that once in a blue moon military genius who arrived at just the right time. The arrival wasn't enough - he also coincided with a boss who knew gold when he had it in his hand and how to make of it what he needed.

All that said - and I think all the sugar in that gave me a cavity! - I agree that the argument that Jackson would have made a difference at Gettysburg or Bristoe Station or other future battles had he lived is a bit hollow. Jackson would not have been recovered enough. If he survived the pneumonia, the amputation, etc he would have been laid up for months. He would have missed these major battles anyway.

Of course, if you asked Jackson, he'd simply say he wasn't at Gettysburg, Bristoe Station or a full general because God decided he wouldn't be. And, the only way to stop him was to kill him off!
 
For one thing, I always find it interesting that so many are so eager to transfer a meaningful bulk of the credit for the Valley Campaign of 1862 away from Jackson and to Lee. Another poster in this thread did that too. Not even Jackson's harshest modern critic, Peter Cozzens, attempts to do the same. The reason is simple: it's not supported by the historical record. Lee offered what amounted to morale support for the campaign, but he wasn't Jackson's superior (Johnston was at that time), and in any case the record shows the whole thing was conceived, planned, and directed by the commander on the scene.

Stonewall Jackson was not perfect, but he deserves full acknowledgement for running a very successful independent campaign.

In the novel, Jackson spends the summer recuperating in Lexington. Having read quite a few books about Civil War wounds, if you assume Jackson doesn't get pneumonia or suffer any other serious complications, three or four months would have been ample time for his arm to heal. Hood was coming back having an arm nearly shot off at Gettysburg and then having a leg amputated at the hip -- a procedure only a few who suffered it survived -- and he was back in the saddle after ... what, five or six months?

But from that last note, you would like one thing -- lots of that Presbyterian predestination talk in the book. God wills this and Divine Providence brings that. Apparently A.P. Stewart was also a Presbyterian, and he and Jackson hit it off and talk religion.

I think it's a mistake to give Lee too much credit for Jackson's work as well! Lee had a bright idea and, like a good manager, found the right person to carry it out. Jackson's Valley campaign was his work. Once he understood what his objectives were - and you had to be very clear - he would do it.

Stewart is one of those competent and talented characters in the war who are somehow completely overlooked. He was pretty good but the other people get the limelight!
 
For one thing, I always find it interesting that so many are so eager to transfer a meaningful bulk of the credit for the Valley Campaign of 1862 away from Jackson and to Lee. Another poster in this thread did that too. Not even Jackson's harshest modern critic, Peter Cozzens, attempts to do the same. The reason is simple: it's not supported by the historical record. Lee offered what amounted to morale support for the campaign, but he wasn't Jackson's superior (Johnston was at that time), and in any case the record shows the whole thing was conceived, planned, and directed by the commander on the scene.

Stonewall Jackson was not perfect, but he deserves full acknowledgement for running a very successful independent campaign.

I am a critic of Jackson. I dont think the praise ("once in a blue moon military genius") is supported by the historical record. The reason his valley campaign was successful was concentration of force -- he was allowed to absorb the neighboring commands of Ewell and Ed Johnson -- at at time when the command structure of the opposition was fractured and divided. The decision to allow Jackson to absorb these other commands came from Lee.
 
Would a man like Robert E. Lee really have stood in the way of the elevation of one of his chief lieutenants, however much Lee might have wanted to keep him?
The same could be said of Jackson. At the bottom, when did Lee ever get in the way of the advancement of one of his subordinates for purely selfish motives?
He did it to the Willie Pegram. There was a move to make him a general (he went from private to colonel) but Lee liked him where he was in the artillery. So a colonel he stayed.
 
I am a critic of Jackson. I dont think the praise ("once in a blue moon military genius") is supported by the historical record. The reason his valley campaign was successful was concentration of force -- he was allowed to absorb the neighboring commands of Ewell and Ed Johnson -- at at time when the command structure of the opposition was fractured and divided. The decision to allow Jackson to absorb these other commands came from Lee.
He had his quirks, sure, and there's no excuse for his Seven Days performance, but his campaign in the Valley was masterful. To defeat three larger forces spread all over the Valley in detail takes a different kind of commander. Whether he was suited for command of an army, I can't say. But I don't believe there's a better Confederate corps commander. And I would say Jackson is second only to Hancock as far as both armies go.
 
I think there's a few excuses for Jackson's Seven Days debacle but it really doesn't matter why he couldn't or didn't do what he was expected to do - he didn't meet his mission objective period. But it was also an example of why Jackson needed Lee and Lee learned from this. His instructions were not crystal clear and Jackson followed orders to the letter. When in doubt, he did what he understood then sat down and waited for further instructions. That's another problem with his having a higher rank, by the way.
 
I think there's a few excuses for Jackson's Seven Days debacle but it really doesn't matter why he couldn't or didn't do what he was expected to do - he didn't meet his mission objective period. But it was also an example of why Jackson needed Lee and Lee learned from this. His instructions were not crystal clear and Jackson followed orders to the letter. When in doubt, he did what he understood then sat down and waited for further instructions. That's another problem with his having a higher rank, by the way.
What it seems to boil down to is this: the man was tired! Aggressiveness and determination are both important things to a commander, but so is the knowledge of the human condition. He should have known he was pushing too hard and starting to make bad decisions and taken a nap. Even an hour or two when you're awake for two days clears your head a bit. And when you look at him that way, it's another strike against him as an army commander. Any book you find on him has his men talking about his relentlessness in the movement to attack and his unwillingness to rest his men. One corps being tired is bad enough; imagine a whole army out on its feet.
 
He had his quirks, sure, and there's no excuse for his Seven Days performance, but his campaign in the Valley was masterful. To defeat three larger forces spread all over the Valley in detail takes a different kind of commander. Whether he was suited for command of an army, I can't say. But I don't believe there's a better Confederate corps commander. And I would say Jackson is second only to Hancock as far as both armies go.

I dont agree. He defeated forces in the valley because they were smaller and divided not because of any special talent on his part. I know that I am arguing against years of conventional wisdom, so I expect what I am saying will be dismissed, but I think it still needs to be said.
 
I dont agree. He defeated forces in the valley because they were smaller and divided not because of any special talent on his part. I know that I am arguing against years of conventional wisdom, so I expect what I am saying will be dismissed, but I think it still needs to be said.
I'm certainly not dismissing you at all. But the sizes of the forces aren't the real issue when we talk about that campaign; it's how Jackson got to them and beat them. You'd be hard pressed in this day and age to move men like that and keep them in fighting condition; to do so in 1862 without the benefit of motorized transport or helicopters is approaching miraculous. Like I said, he definitely had his foibles, (especially early in the war during Lee's earliest offensives around Richmond), but he was the most solid corps commander Lee had. His victories at Bull Run and Chancellorsville are some of the most important and decisive of the war.
 
What it seems to boil down to is this: the man was tired! Aggressiveness and determination are both important things to a commander, but so is the knowledge of the human condition. He should have known he was pushing too hard and starting to make bad decisions and taken a nap. Even an hour or two when you're awake for two days clears your head a bit. And when you look at him that way, it's another strike against him as an army commander. Any book you find on him has his men talking about his relentlessness in the movement to attack and his unwillingness to rest his men. One corps being tired is bad enough; imagine a whole army out on its feet.

That's true. When he met with Lee he was already exhausted enough to fall out but assured Lee he'd have his troops right there sooner than he could have had them there. Jackson expected no more of his men than he expected of himself but one of the problems was he expected superhuman feats. It was hard for him to realize the limitations.
 

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