Sheridan Stonewall Comparison with Jubal Early

[SSVilla]

While listening to the Great Courses "Robert E. Lee and his High Command" by Gary Gallagher
I came across his very favorable evaluation of Jubal Early, specially by comparing him to Jackson. He compared the scale of the battles Early fought with those of Jackson and specially the opponent he had in Sheridan (who Gallagher argued Early badly misjudged as cautious, while Sheridan was as aggressive as anyone during the civil war and he simply took time to get his campaign started due to the caution prescribed by Halleck and Stanton, who didn't want to risk a reverse).

Anyway Sheridan was anything but passive and once he got started he caught Early by surprise and unprepared first of all, then the superiority of Sheridan's army in numbers and cavalry, led by an aggressive commander such as he was, who didn't have all the petty squabbling with other political generals and was fully backed by his chief, was a very different situation from what Jackson had faced in the Valley in 1862.

Gallagher made a compelling point. Also, he pointed out when discussing Jackson specifically that early in the war things were blown out of proportion and that Jackson's victories in the valley in 1862 had come after such a huge series of reverses for the confederacy in the West and victories by the U.S. Navy that Jackson's Shenandoah campaign in 1862 was exaggerated in its scope. The casualties for the entire campaign in 1862 are just one of the battles that Early fought against Sheridan.

Its odd but in one stroke Gallagher took down Jackson a few notches, while raising Early to parity with him. Without even intending to do that, I am left convinced that Grant was actually quite right that the mythical Jackson wouldn't have been able to change anything had he lived to fight under the altered conditions of 1864/5 and that Jackson had actually made his name again subpar opponents.

Before I simply didn't know enough of either Jackson or Early, to have any kind of opinion on that. Now I probably still don't know enough but I see Jackson in a more realistic light.

 

[ETNConfederate]

General Early is one of the most misunderstood personalities of the 1860s. During the last year of the War, he participated in over 75 battles and skirmishes, commanded 2/3 of the Army of Northern Virginia, defeated three Union armies, ended the careers of three US Generals, crossed the Potomac several times ,took an army closer to Washington DC than any other Confederate leader, and came within an eyelash of defeating Sheridan twice.

General Early wasn't far off on his assessment of Sheridan. Sheridan had opportunities galore to conclusively defeat Early, yet the Army of the Valley District remained in existence. Winter of 1864 did much more to end military operations in the Valley than any Sheridan action or decision. For more details, see Eric Wittenberg's Little Phil. Eric makes a powerful case that Sheridan's place in the American pantheon is unjustified.

Alfred Burne called Early's 1864 Valley Campaign, "the most brilliant of the War," and an assertion that Early was Lee's best tactician and strategist after Gettysburg has much in its favor.

 

[rpkennedy]

I tend to agree that the Valley Campaign, while brilliant, is a bit exaggerated. Jackson definitely showed his chops as a strategic commander but it also demonstrated some of his weaknesses as a tactical commander (and demonstrated the tactical abilities of some of his subordinates like Richard Ewell).

Ryan

 

[SSVilla]

General Early is one of the most misunderstood personalities of the 1860s. During the last year of the War, he participated in over 75 battles and skirmishes, commanded 2/3 of the Army of Northern Virginia, defeated three Union armies, ended the careers of three US Generals, crossed the Potomac several times ,took an army closer to Washington DC than any other Confederate leader, and came within an eyelash of defeating Sheridan twice.

General Early wasn't far off on his assessment of Sheridan. Sheridan had opportunities galore to conclusively defeat Early, yet the Army of the Valley District remained in existence. Winter of 1864 did much more to end military operations in the Valley than any Sheridan action or decision. For more details, see Eric Wittenberg's Little Phil. Eric makes a powerful case that Sheridan's place in the American pantheon is unjustified.

Alfred Burne called Early's 1864 Valley Campaign, "the most brilliant of the War," and an assertion that Early was Lee's best tactician and strategist after Gettysburg has much in its favor.

One thing Gallagher stated several times about Early's personality is that he was an unpopular character during the war and after. He was neither charismatic nor beloved by his own people. Lee trusted him, and Gallagher thought aside from Jackson and Longstreet, Early had been the most successful of his lieutenants, and in independent command he had been superior to Longstreet.

Yet he was not popular and his campaign ended in disaster. The people wanted him removed. If he thought Sheridan was the equal of Franz Siegel, David Hunter, and Lew Wallace, then surely he underestimated him. Lew Wallace also delayed Early at the Monocacy with a tiny force of 100 days militia men, lightly trained … He couldn't have hoped to defeat him, only to stall him and that he did successfully. In fact, Grant said Lew Wallace accomplished much more by his defeat on that day than he did by participating in a victory the second day at Shiloh.

Gallagher thought Early simply judged Sheridan was the same as the other AoP commanders, and that he was not. Thanks for the reference to Wittenberg. He is on my radar (I have seen him mentioned before), I just have a lot of other areas I want to read about first and it may be a long time before I am interested in Little Phil's ranking in the Pantheon. I know what he did and what earned him his reputation in broad strokes, and that's good enough for me at the moment.

I would have to disagree with Burne's evaluation as it is a subjective opinion. I think Vicksburg is probably the most brilliant campaign and there are arguments to be made for Sherman's campaign and Grant's overall strategy for winning the war, because the entire war was Grant's campaign in the end. Lee probably has a claim over Early as well, when he repelled McClellan's invasion, specially considering the difficulty of his situation when he took command and how he turned things around. Heck, I'd even throw in there Rosecrans maneuvering Bragg out of Tennessee over the most difficult terrain in a brilliant campaign of maneuver. Compared to all that I am less impressed with Early. It seems Burne was among those who simply didn't pay attention to anything else but the war in Virginia. That's a mistake.

 

[ETNConfederate]

The biggest problem an 1864 Valley Campaign researcher has is relative paucity of Confederate primary documentation. Powee in Lee's Miserables makes a point of letter writers from the Valley saying they don't have time for longer letters, but there are some diarists and writers who thought Early did as well as anyone could have. Harding, Park, Hinrichs and a few others have good things to say about Early.

The idea that he was widely unpopular comes mostly from Edward Pollard, who conviently overlooked the Valley Campaign before Third Winchester. Pollard used Early to criticize President Davis, and Early's first public writing was, in part, a critical review of "The Lost Cause."

 

[SSVilla]

The biggest problem an 1864 Valley Campaign researcher has is relative paucity of Confederate primary documentation. Letter writers keep saying they don't have time for longer letters, but there are some diarists and writers who thought Early did as well as anyone could have. Harding, Park, Hinrichs and a few others have good things to say about Early.

The idea that he was widely unpopular comes mostly from Edward Pollard, who conviently overlooked the Valley Campaign before Third Winchester. Pollard used Early to criticize President Davis, and Early's first public writing was, in part, a critical review of "The Lost Cause."

My idea of his unpopularity is based on Gallagher. He seemed to say even Early admitted he was unpopular.

 

[Rebforever]

My idea of his unpopularity is based on Gallagher. He seemed to say even Early admitted he was unpopular.

He wasn't unpopular with his men . They fought for him.

 

[jackt62]

I wouldn't necessarily withhold credit from Jackson's 1862 Valley campaign just because overall troops strengths and casualties were comparatively low and the opponents that Jackson faced were indeed inferior. In that campaign, Jackson pioneered what was to become his signature doctrine consisting of swift maneuvers, attacking isolated enemy formations in detail, and employing subterfuge to achieve tactical surprise. Given the Confederacy's low ebb in the spring of 1862 (after the fall of many of its western positions), the success of the Valley campaign lifted southern morale and elevated Jackson to the position of much needed savior. Conditions in 1864 were radically different when Early conducted his own campaign in the Valley.

 

[gjpratt]

In Shenandoah Summer, Scott Patchan makes a strong case that Lee's orders to Early constrained his strategic and tactical options. Specifically, Early was tasked with offensive action. Patchan argues, persuasively in my opinion, that Early's best strategic option after he returned to the Valley following his DC raid, was to take a strong position on Fisher's Hill with his full force and invite Sheridan to attack. Strategically with the election approaching, time was to Early's advantage. Early did not consider this a viable option (if he ever considered it at all). His offensive-minded operations left his troops scattered when Sheridan struck the decisive blow at 3d Winchester, drained the Confederate manpower and Early essentially never recovered. Of course, Early's misinterpretation of Sheridan's relative inactivity as timidity contributed greatly to his division of troops around Winchester.

 

[SWS]

I've read before that the Fisher's Hill position presented the danger of being turned by the enemy on its right flank via the Luray Valley, which is why Jackson preferred to occupy Rude's Hill in 1862, closer to New Market Gap.

 

[ETNConfederate]

I've read before that the Fisher's Hill position presented the danger of being turned by the enemy on its right flank via the Luray Valley, which is why Jackson preferred to occupy Rude's Hill in 1862, closer to New Market Gap.

The woods are too dense East of the Valley Pike for any kind of significant offensive operations. The Manassas Gap Railroad is an obstacle, as well. Tumbling Run serves as a moat in front.

Crook's plan, diversion in front and a flanking attack from Little North Mountain, is really the only workable alternative.

 

[Miles Krisman]

General Early is one of the most misunderstood personalities of the 1860s. During the last year of the War, he participated in over 75 battles and skirmishes, commanded 2/3 of the Army of Northern Virginia, defeated three Union armies, ended the careers of three US Generals, crossed the Potomac several times ,took an army closer to Washington DC than any other Confederate leader, and came within an eyelash of defeating Sheridan twice.

General Early wasn't far off on his assessment of Sheridan. Sheridan had opportunities galore to conclusively defeat Early, yet the Army of the Valley District remained in existence. Winter of 1864 did much more to end military operations in the Valley than any Sheridan action or decision. For more details, see Eric Wittenberg's Little Phil. Eric makes a powerful case that Sheridan's place in the American pantheon is unjustified.

Alfred Burne called Early's 1864 Valley Campaign, "the most brilliant of the War," and an assertion that Early was Lee's best tactician and strategist after Gettysburg has much in its favor.

General Early did have the advantage of having three of the hardest fighting Division commanders the Confederacy ever produce: John B. Gordon, Robert Rodes and Stephen Ramseur.

 

[General JJ]

General Early did have the advantage of having three of the hardest fighting Division commanders the Confederacy ever produce: John B. Gordon, Robert Rodes and Stephen Ramseur.

 

[General JJ]

Jokes aside I wouldn't put Ramseur on the same level as Rodes and Gordon - he arguably showed some improvement after Rutherford's Farm, but never shone IMO.

 

[TallTallMan]

While listening to the Great Courses "Robert E. Lee and his High Command" by Gary Gallagher
I came across his very favorable evaluation of Jubal Early, specially by comparing him to Jackson. He compared the scale of the battles Early fought with those of Jackson and specially the opponent he had in Sheridan (who Gallagher argued Early badly misjudged as cautious, while Sheridan was as aggressive as anyone during the civil war and he simply took time to get his campaign started due to the caution prescribed by Halleck and Stanton, who didn't want to risk a reverse).

Anyway Sheridan was anything but passive and once he got started he caught Early by surprise and unprepared first of all, then the superiority of Sheridan's army in numbers and cavalry, led by an aggressive commander such as he was, who didn't have all the petty squabbling with other political generals and was fully backed by his chief, was a very different situation from what Jackson had faced in the Valley in 1862.

Gallagher made a compelling point. Also, he pointed out when discussing Jackson specifically that early in the war things were blown out of proportion and that Jackson's victories in the valley in 1862 had come after such a huge series of reverses for the confederacy in the West and victories by the U.S. Navy that Jackson's Shenandoah campaign in 1862 was exaggerated in its scope. The casualties for the entire campaign in 1862 are just one of the battles that Early fought against Sheridan.

Its odd but in one stroke Gallagher took down Jackson a few notches, while raising Early to parity with him. Without even intending to do that, I am left convinced that Grant was actually quite right that the mythical Jackson wouldn't have been able to change anything had he lived to fight under the altered conditions of 1864/5 and that Jackson had actually made his name again subpar opponents.

Before I simply didn't know enough of either Jackson or Early, to have any kind of opinion on that. Now I probably still don't know enough but I see Jackson in a more realistic light.

Gallagher is probably right. He usually knows what he's talking about. I kind of think Jack is overrated. I think his boss was a lot better strategist and tactician. Jackson was a robot: attack!

 

[TallTallMan]

View attachment 532781

Accuracy incarnate.

 

[TallTallMan]

He wasn't unpopular with his men . They fought for him.

They fought for Bragg too.

 

[Jamieva]

Ramseur had potential but he had not been in division command for very long.

 

[SSVilla]

He wasn't unpopular with his men . They fought for him.

Hmm. We could stay here endlessly so I'll just pass on this bait.

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

View attachment 532781

Why you doing Ramsuer dirty like that!