Essentially that is,what happened. Davis has mentioned tried different options but they failed. As others mentioned freeing or arming slaves early in the war was not an option. No evidence that arming slaves would of worked.
This situation is directly attributable to Jefferson Davis who, like Adolf Hitler eighty years later, refused to give up any territory regardless of the effect. I'm currently reading an excellent study of the Shiloh campaign and even as early as winter and spring of 1862 the problem arises. The appropriate military maxim is He who defends everything, defends nothing.
One major problem with concentrating troops in Virginia is the same concern
Basically the Confederacy tried all of the above strategies with the exception of emancipating the slaves.
On point One a lot of what if's. General Beauagard would of had to quickly reassemble his troops not easy to do after a major battle. Then he has to make sure they have enough food and ammo. Even if the Confederate forces somehow manage to take Washington DC that does not mean the war is over. More Union troops could arrive. More Union men might want to join the Union Army although they would have scant training. Loosing one's capitol does not mean ones side will have such a loss of morale that they will surrender or concede to secession.
How did the assassination of Lincoln by John Wilkes Booth almost guarantee Confederate independence?
My bad. Although how close we were to a war because of the Trent Affair has been the subject of at least a few threads.
I don't mean to speak for him but I believe he is referring to this Wilkes...
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Wilkes
Cheers,
USS ALASKA
I meant later in 1861, not straight after Bull Run. (It's actually mid September, when the CSA had about 130K troops total in Virginia - if they concentrated the lot for a decisive strike it could be a winner, the Union buildup lagged the Confederate one.)
It's not beyond the bounds of possibility, IMO. It's not likely, maybe, but impossible it is not.
Losing DC is a major problem for the Union, though, as it means they no longer have a foothold south of the Potomac and have to mount a major crossing of it. Among other things.
Not if it's mostly naval. Just crippling the Union blockade is an enormous boon for the Confederacy, and indeed without Union sealane control taking Richmond is basically impossible.
Assuming you believe the British when they said "this or war" meant it - and they'd sent conditional private war orders to their commanders, so they almost certainly did - then peace/war at Trent turns on the decision of one man, Abraham Lincoln. Historically it took about three days of constant argument to turn him away from the path that would have rejected the ultimatum.
Good points about the Trent Affair. I didn't know Lincoln was willing at least intialy to go to war with Great Britain .
Not really, at least not short term. Historically what held back Napoleon III (never exactly a long term thinker!) from getting involved on at least one occasion was that the British indicated they would object.
An interesting what if. On the other hand the Union Navy certainly could attack French shipping. The Union could sieze French Islands in the Carribean. The Union could arm the Mexican forces under Benito Juarez.
The Union Navy's not in the same size league as the French navy, which is only remotely rivalled by the RN. The French had over thirty screw battleships, the US had none.
Not for very long, see point about navy. And, of course, if the Union's just lost nearly half their entire army they're not likely to have much deployable manpower - they're likely to be busy either scrambling to redistribute forces from the West (if this happens around the Seven Days, Lee has an army every bit as big as the one which beat Pope and the Union has... well, Pope's army from Bull Run, only substantially smaller, and no strategic depth because the new levies aren't remotely even mustered) or scrambling even worse (if this happens late 1864, the two important Union field armies are simply gone).
Not very easily. The weapons would need to be taken west along a wagon train to California, then shipped hundreds of miles south... it's not exactly a very easy route. (Any other route either runs into the CSA or the French navy.)
It wouldn't need it. Napoleon III was something of an autocrat in practice, and the only people actually suffering in any sense would be the Navy. (Witness how popular support for the Mexican adventure didn't really matter one way or the other.)
Hypothetically true either Great Britain or France could of militarily intervened and insured independence for the Confederacy. Yet they did not do so. Instead they sold weapons to both sides and the British ( see my thread " Did the Union recruit overseas?") allowed the Union Army to recruit men on British soil.
At the time, it wasn't all that common. The Mexican Civil War didn't see foreign intervention, nor did the Taiping Rebellion, the Boshin War and so on. The ACW is not unique on these grounds.
Mainly that they didn't want to, or rather the British didn't want to and the French conformed to this.
Technically this is more "grudgingly tolerated", and the British had plenty of protests over crimping.
Actually the Mexican Civil War had French troops and the first Foreign Legionarires. Shortly after the Civil War the Johnson Administration made it quite clear that the French needed to go back home. Do no the Mexican Civil War of the mid 19th century had plenty of foreign involvement.
Bringing the