Common Misconceptions/Myths

[dsheehan]

Just not all the time though. If the doc ran out of cloroform yipes!!
Leftyhunter

I believe they went to Whiskey if they ran out of chloroform!! Lol

 

[leftyhunter]

I believe they went to Whiskey if they ran out of chloroform!! Lol

No doubt but still not the most fun one can have with ones cloths on or off .
Leftyhunter

 

[Saphroneth]

It occurs to me that perhaps the very definition of "reserve" is something that is a common misconception.

"Reserves" does not mean "troops which are not currently fighting" or "fresh troops". Reserves are troops which are currently available to be sent anywhere, because they are currently not doing a job - if a problem comes up anywhere in their area of responsibility they can be sent there.

For example if a corps of three divisions is attacking, and two of the divisions are actively attacking while the third is hanging back ready to exploit success or fend off a counterattack then the third division is in (corps or army) reserve. However, if the third division is protecting against a flank attack, that third division is NOT in reserve because it is doing a job.

On the afternoon of the third day at Gettysburg Meade had no reserves left, because all of 6th Corps had been assigned to tasks and had marched over to join the front line. In the afternoon at Waterloo Napoleon DID have a reserve, because he still had the Guard; he threw them in in a final attack.


If you have troops in part of the front line (or just behind it as supports) which are not being attacked, you can turn them into reserves (if, that is, your enemy doesn't exploit the weakness that would be caused). But the process of turning them from deployed troops into reserves takes longer than it takes troops to go from being reserves to being in the front line, because when troops are reserves they're in quick communication and ready to move anywhere.

 

[A. Roy]

Reserves are troops which are currently available to be sent anywhere, because they are currently not doing a job - if a problem comes up anywhere in their area of responsibility they can be sent there.

This all makes sense, and is basically what I've always assumed. I'm curious: From what you know about battles, what might be the reasons for having no reserves? Depleted resources, bad planning? I would think a commander would always want to go into a battle with planned reserves, but are there cases where it just wasn't necessary?

Roy B.

 

[Saphroneth]

This all makes sense, and is basically what I've always assumed. I'm curious: From what you know about battles, what might be the reasons for having no reserves? Depleted resources, bad planning? I would think a commander would always want to go into a battle with planned reserves, but are there cases where it just wasn't necessary?

Roy B.

These situations can cause it:


1) You started with reserves, but have committed them all.

This is the most common reason for it to happen, because usually in any battle that gets won and lost at least one person is reduced to this situation. A huge part of the art of army command is managing and committing reserves, as well as drawing reserves back out of the line - if you can manage it then it's arguably better to have a weaker front line and a reserve instead of a stronger front line and no reserve - and in general if someone has committed all their reserves to manage a crisis they'd better hope their opponent is out of reserves.

To briefly touch on Antietam, as of the end of the day both commanders have a small but not quite zero amount of reserves. Lee has one fresh brigade that to the best of my knowledge hasn't been committed, and McClellan has two or three (Morell's division) though at one point McClellan actually committed Morell's division on his right but then cancelled that when Burnside broke.
At Gettysburg, meanwhile, Meade had no reserves on the afternoon of the third day because he had committed them all. If Pickett's Charge had reached the Federal line and broken into it then Meade would have been unable to effectively respond owing to his lack of reserves, and in hindsight that was basically what Lee was trying to do by getting Meade to commit his reserves.

Napoleon's way of fighting was often to get his enemy to commit their reserves and only then throw in his Guard (which were usually reserves, thus the name les immortals for being kept away from the fighting, or grognards - they grumbled about not getting to fight) to defeat his enemy with a strong attack to which the enemy could not respond.


2) You have reserves but they are in the wrong place.

This can happen if the battle space is large, and it's basically an error of positioning - the army commander has screwed up. This is why it's best to think in terms of reserves only really applying to the area which they can reach in good time - during the Fredericksburg fighting for example Union troops who have crossed the river in the north can't act as useful reserves in the southern theatre of the fighting (and vice versa) so it's best for the purposes of analyzing reserves to treat them as two separate theatres.

One of the things which made Wellington such a superb general was his adroit management not merely of his reserves but of the positions of his reserves. He made sure that there was a continuous flow of reinforcements to any threatened area, and ensured that his reserves in a given area were not depleted while also not overreacting and moving all his troops over there.

For example, if you have two areas - north and south - and two reserve divisions in each, and the enemy has made two attacks in the south (each of which meant you had to commit a reserve division to rescue the situation), you now have two reserve divisions in the north and none in the south.
If you shift no reserve divisions to the south, then the south is now weak and they can be broken by a third attack; if you shift both reserve divisions to the south, then the north is now weak. Your best option is to shift one reserve division south.
Multiply this by significant extra complexity.


3) You did not assign reserves.

This can and does happen, and the effects can be utterly catastrophic - this error, and this error alone, lost the French their country in WW2. Their individual armies all had small (army-appropriate) reserves, but there was no strategic-level reserve; it would have been more appropriate for the French armies to reduce the density of their lines, or for them to refuse to commit so heavily to defending Belgium (and thus shorten their lines) in order to free up enough troops to form a reserve.
This was actually the subject of an argument in France in the early war (Gamelin and Georges, I believe) but Gamelin refused to listen and in a very real sense this doomed his country to occupation.


It basically means that if the enemy succeeds in one specific place (and the enemy gets to pick where they will try this) then your line is broken and you have no way to effectively react - which points to what reserves let you do, which is react to what the enemy is doing. (This includes reacting to "the enemy is breaking", naturally.)

 

[Rio Bravo]

Was it a Myth that the northern lights were seen during the battle of Fredericksburg ?

 

[A. Roy]

One of the things which made Wellington such a superb general was his adroit management not merely of his reserves but of the positions of his reserves. He made sure that there was a continuous flow of reinforcements to any threatened area, and ensured that his reserves in a given area were not depleted while also not overreacting and moving all his troops over there.

Great explanation -- very clear. I'm most familiar with the Gettysburg and WW2 scenarios you mentioned, but I was intrigued by what you said here about Wellington. He seems like a case worth studying.

Roy B.

 

[Saphroneth]

Was it a Myth that the northern lights were seen during the battle of Fredericksburg ?

It seems that it was not a myth, because similar geomagnetic disturbances were also observed in Ireland on the same date (December 14).

 

[Saphroneth]

Great explanation -- very clear. I'm most familiar with the Gettysburg and WW2 scenarios you mentioned, but I was intrigued by what you said here about Wellington. He seems like a case worth studying.

Roy B.

I'd recommend the book Wellington in the Peninsula, which is an imperfect work (it focuses too heavily on the British use of musket fire and not enough on their use of short, sharp bayonet charges) but for Wellington's tactics, operations and strategy it's quite good.

 

[Saphroneth]

Loath as I am to generally take over this thread with McClellan stuff, I do think there's one that I should point to because I think it is a persistent misconception or myth and it is one that is fairly easy to disprove.

That is, of course, the Special Order 191 stuff.


There are two components to this. The first is the idea of an 18 hour delay, which is a myth; the second is the idea that SO191 offered the possibility to destroy Lee's army, which is a misconception.

To the myth, first.

The exact timing of when SO191 was captured is not quite clear, but the common story (i.e. a component of the myth) is that it was found around 10AM and already in McClellan's hands by noon, and the main evidence for this is the telegram he sent to Lincoln mentioning that he had the Rebel plans.
This telegram, however, does not say "12 noon", or "12 midday" or "12 Meridian". It says "12M", and in one copy "12 Midnight":

With the time of receipt 2:35 AM, as seen in the top left corner.

The commander of the 27th Indiana said that his unit's march did not end until "about noon" and that he was given the Lost Order shortly thereafter; it then took a while to work its way up the chain of command until McClellan recieved it, and we know he did have it by about 3PM because that is when he ordered his cavalry to verify the Lost Order from observations at the front. McClellan's cavalry had already taken the pass at Braddock Heights around 1PM and the other pass through the Catoctins, Jefferson Pass, was gained around 5:30 PM (the taking of the passes is referred to in the telegram McClellan sent to Lincoln).

The first unit ordered forwards was 9th Corps; Cox said his division was marching out of Frederick around noon, and the 9th Corps as a whole was ordered forward around 3:30 PM. Part of 6th Corps began moving around 8PM in a two-hour night march (9th Corps also engaged in night marching) but the rest of the army was under orders to move at sunrise, because there was only one road through Frederick MD and it was currently a massive traffic jam.

1st Corps woke up at 3AM (to follow 9th Corps once they'd cleared the road), the advance by the main army began at dawn (around 6AM) and the attack on the Rebel rear-guard at South Mountain began around 9AM.

The idea that McClellan delayed by 18 hours is almost impossible. In the space of the 23 hours from 10AM on the 13th of September to 9AM on the 14th of September McClellan's army went from just entering Frederick to launching an attack at South Mountain, a distance of about 13 miles; it's not really plausible that they moved that far in just five hours (two of them at night), even before we consider all the evidence that the leading parts of the army were on the move well before the termination of any 18 hour delay.


Now for the misconception.

This is what the Lost Orders said, plus what Lee had actually done, and the opportunities that it opened for McClellan.

Note by the way that SO 191 was issued on Tuesday 9 September; consequently "Friday" is September 12. McClellan recieves the orders September 13.


Special Orders, No. 191
Hdqrs. Army of Northern Virginia
September 9, 1862

1. (missing)
2. (missing)
3. The army will resume its march tomorrow, taking the Hagerstown road. General Jackson's command will form the advance, and, after passing Middletown, with such portion as he may select, take the route toward Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac at the most convenient point, and by Friday morning take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, capture such of them as may be at Martinsburg, and intercept such as may attempt to escape from Harpers Ferry.
4. General Longstreet's command will pursue the same road as far as Boonsborough, where it will halt, with reserve, supply, and baggage trains of the army.
5. General McLaws, with his own division and that of General R. H. Anderson, will follow General Longstreet. On reaching Middletown will take the route to Harpers Ferry, and by Friday morning possess himself of the Maryland Heights and endeavor to capture the enemy at Harpers Ferry and vicinity.
6. General Walker, with his division, after accomplishing the object in which he is now engaged, will cross the Potomac at Cheek's Ford, ascend its right bank to Lovettsville, take possession of Loudoun Heights, if practicable, by Friday morning, Key's Ford on his left, and the road between the end of the mountain and the Potomac on his right. He will, as far as practicable, cooperate with General McLaws and Jackson, and intercept retreat of the enemy.
7. General D. H. Hill's division will form the rear guard of the army, pursuing the road taken by the main body. The reserve artillery, ordnance, and supply trains, &c., will precede General Hill.
8. General Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry to accompany the commands of Generals Longstreet, Jackson, and McLaws, and, with the main body of the cavalry, will cover the route of the army, bringing up all stragglers that may have been left behind.
9. The commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws, and Walker, after accomplishing the objects for which they have been detached, will join the main body of the army at Boonsborough or Hagerstown.
10. Each regiment on the march will habitually carry its axes in the regimental ordnance—wagons, for use of the men at their encampments, to procure wood &c.

(maps from the GCACW series, which show the roads quite well, with my own additions)




As of when the orders are captured, it's Saturday. The orders expired on Friday, but because Harpers Ferry has not yet fallen they are a fairly good predictor (though not perfect) of Confederate positions.
Given that McClellan knew DH Hill left Frederick on the 11th, and assuming that he knew there was no extra division or so knocking about not included in the orders, the below is what McClellan could reasonably predict Lee's positions to be in red (along with the true positions, which are slightly different and where different are in orange).

Note that while the cavalry is not marked on this map, this is because McClellan was actually in contact with it already - Stuart's cavalry was holding the Cactotin passes as of noon on the 13th, and Jefferson Pass is not taken until near sundown.

Before continuing, stop a moment and work out how you think there is an opportunity to destroy Lee's army.

As I see it:

Jackson's force and Walker's force (totalling 16 brigades all told) are impossible to catch as things stand. They have a free and clear escape route back south and to get at them means crossing the Potomac.

Longstreet's and DH Hill's forces (9 and 5 brigades respectively) are north of the Potomac and can be attacked, but they have a clear escape route to the west via Williamsport or Shepherdstown.

McLaws' force (10 brigades) is vulnerable so long as Harpers Ferry holds out, as this pins them in the Pleasant Valley if South Mountain can be forced. This is about a quarter of Lee's force and is the component that is actually vulnerable.

With this in mind, what McClellan actually does is:

There's only two suitable roads to use, with two thirds of McClellan's army trying to squeeze through Frederick (thus a lot of the delay) and the attack at South Mountain begins around 9AM on the 14th.

To my mind this is about as good as it gets in terms of being able to exploit Special Order 191. Lee reacts quickly to try and make the situation better, and what's more Lee actually gets really lucky with Harpers Ferry surrendering when it does (he'd ordered Jackson to abandon the siege, but Jackson ignored orders) but the simple fact is that 3/4 of Lee's army is either safe from McClellan's attack or has a clear line of retreat to safety.


That's why I say it's a misconception that McClellan could have exploited SO191 to destroy Lee's army.

 

[Mango Hill]

Basically, in linear warfare (which is most ACW warfare) then any gap in the line is a vulnerability - in this case, a vulnerability being exploited by McLaws and Walker as they follow up on a successful advance. Without 6th Corps there then there's nothing to plug the gap; deploying 6th Corps restores the situation because it plugs the gap and means the Union line is stable again.

In theory what you post makes sense but in practice things don't necessarily turn out that way. If I understand what you're saying correctly, there was supposed to be a gap after Sedgwick is defeated that both McLaw's and Walker would have exploited if not for the arrival of Smith and Slocum to plug that gap. But that is not what happened.

Sedgwick had been defeated by 9:45 AM by three of McLaw's brigades with an assist from Early and Start's artillery. The rebels then pursued the defeated Yankee brigades into the North Woods were the pursuit was stopped by the Iron Brigade with artillery support. The Rebs then retreated to the West Woods. Sumner, who was with Sedgwick's division, then frantically called for assistance from his own 2nd Corp division (French) and from Williams (12th Corp). French had gone to the right and was in the process of going to the assistance of Greene so the only help available came from two of William's regiments.

As the two 12th Corp regiments were about to reach the Hagerstown Turnpike just south of the cornfield, they were met by furious volleys from the newly arrived Ransom's brigade of Walker's division. Lee had called for Walker's division (that was on the extreme right) at 8:45 AM anticipating a threat to the center of the line. The two 12th Corp brigades were surprised and soon where heading back towards the East Woods.

Meanwhile, Greene (and Tompkins artillery) repulsed an attack from Kershaw's brigade (McLaw's division) with heavy losses for the Rebel brigade. At 10:00 AM Greene was again attacked by Manning's brigade (Walker division) and the rebs were torn to shreds. Greene then pursued the fleeing rebel brigade into the West Woods, 200 yards beyond the Dunker Church. Greene then called for reinforcements. While all this is going on Sumner's third division (Richardson) was in the process of moving to the battlefield after being held in reserve until relieved by Morell.

In response to a dispatch from Sumner, French sent his three brigades to attack D. H. Hill's troops at the Sunken Road (made up of an amalgamation of his two brigades of Rodes and George Anderson, and the fragments of Colquitt's and Garland's brigades after being routed earlier in heavy fighting around the Cornfield and the East Woods). Cobb's small brigade (McLaw's division) later joined the group. The Federal attack turned into a bloody affair and Hill's forces remained in the Sunken Road undented.

A bit past 10:30 AM Richardson arrived too late to coordinate his attack with that of French. In response Lee sent his last reserves, the division of Richard Anderson in support of D. H. Hill. Anderson did not arrive unscathed. His division suffered heavy casualties from French's troops and the reserve artillery from across Antietam Creek. Anderson became one of the casualties and turned his command over to the inexperience political general Pryor. Other rebel officer's became casualties and soon Anderson's division was in disarray. The Sunken Road was a great defensive position but it could not handle all the reinforcements and soon the Confederate line began to unravel.

At approximately noon the Sunken Road turned into the Bloody Lane for the rebels. Caldwell's brigade (Richardson Division) attacked from the right and the 29th Massachusetts of the Irish Brigade (French's division) attacked from the left. Soon, all three of Richard Anderson's brigades were skedaddling to the rear and suffering heavy casualties. Half of George Anderson's brigade and Rodes brigade soon joined in the retreat. Lee's center was broken. Richardson (along with the Irish Brigade) began a pursuit which carried his division to the Piper cornfield.

At about the same time Longstreet put together a small group of under 1,000 under the command of Colonel Cooke and attacked Greene's position near the Dunker Church. By accident or luck, Ransom of Walker's division sent one of his regiments to attack Greene. Independently of each other two Confederate units achieved a coordinated attack on both of Greene's flanks. Within minutes Greene's troops fled from the West Woods.

Cooke continued Longstreet's counterattack, bringing along Cobb. The attack reached the flank of the Sunken Road but was heavily repulsed by a combination of Kimball's brigade of French's division, Pennsylvanians and New York regiments. Cooke retreated to the Hagerstown Turnpike, pledging to hold that position at all costs. Cooke didn't have long to wait to test his pledge. Here, some time past noon, Irwin's brigade was sent by Baldy Smith of Franklyn's corp to hold the position around the Mumma Farm. On his own accord Irwin decided to send three regiments to the Dunker Church. The attack was heavily repulsed by Cooke and Ransom.

More to come later after the Heat game.

 

[67th Tigers]

Sedgwick was fighting Early's brigade and was then prettymuch collapsed by 2 regiments, half of Barksdales brigade, hitting them in the flank around 0915. Everyone else involved got involved after the collapse and in the pursuit. Semmes, GT Anderson and Ransom pursued and came out of the West Woods. By 1000 Hancock was deploying his brigade in support of the now undefended Federal superbattery. This stabilised the situation (along with Greene rallying 4 regiments, all from different brigades, and getting them in line), and the pursuers were pushed back into the woods by artillery fire.

Richardson's attack was earlier than this, about 0930hrs. French's division came under fire from the DH Hill ca. 0830, and by 0930 were spent. Around 1030 Richardson was reinforced by one of the 6th Corps.

Lee had sent in his reserves about 0830, in response to Jackson's collapse, and they arrived in their positions before 0930.

Generally, when you dig into things they are far more compressed in time than Carman's maps showed. I suspect he was trying to deal with the long lull in fighting after the collapse of the Sunken Road, and so spaced things out a bit.

 

[67th Tigers]

At 1000 hours Hancock's brigade, and the rest of the division formed line and repelled a charge of Semmes', Kershaw's and Barksdale's Brigades, which is recorded in Kershaw's Brigade's history:

"...Under this storm, now Kershaw advanced his men. Through the open, on through the woods, with a solid step these brave men went, while the battery on their left swept their ranks with grape and canister." In the woods the brigade was moved to the left to evade this storm of shot and shell. The Mississippians on the left were now reforming their broken ranks. Colonel Aiken, of the Seventh, had fallen badly wounded in the first charge, and the command was given to Captain White. This was the first battle in a fair field in which the new commanders of the regiments had had an opportunity to show their mettle and ability, and well did they sustain themselves.

Savage Station and Maryland Heights were so crowded with underbrush and vision so obscured that they were almost battles in the dark.

Colonel Kennedy, of the Second, and Lieutenant Colonel Hoole, of the Eighth, were handling their men in splendid style, the Seventh changing its commander three times while in battle. Colonel Nance changed his front in the lull of battle, and moved under the friendly cover of a hill, on which was posted the battery that had been graping the field so desperately during the first advance. The brigade had now passed through the field of waving corn, over the rail fence, and driven Sedgwick from his position. Barksdale, who had been staggered by the first impact, was now moving up in beautiful harmony; the steady, elastic step of his men, the waving banners, the officers marching in the rear, their bright blades glittering in the sunlight, made a most imposing spectacle. Up the slope, among the straggling oaks, they bent their steps, while the grape, shell, and canister thinned their ranks to such an extent that when the enemy's infantry was met, their galling fire forced Barksdale to retire in great disorder. The enemy's troops [Smith's Division] were being hurried over the creek and forming in our front. Kershaw moved forward in line with those on the right to meet them, and swept everything from his front. The enemy had been massing along the whole line, and when Kershaw reached the farthest limit of the open field he was met by overwhelming numbers.

Now the fight waged hot and fierce, but the line on the right having retired left the right flank of the Third Regiment entirely exposed
both to the fire of the artillery and infantry, forcing the brigade to retire to its former ground, leaving, however, the second commander of the Seventh dead upon the field."

Essentially after they broke Sedgwick's Division, Semmes, Kershaw and Barksdale turned east and charged the gunline. Smith's arriving division ployed into line at 1000 hrs and defeated the charge, as Kershaw's report makes clear in his AAR:

"At the same time the brigades of Cobb and Barksdale, now on their left, advanced to their support. I then hurried up my three remaining regiments-the Eighth, Lieutenant Colonel [A. J.] Hoole; Seventh, Colonel [D. W.] Aiken, and Third, Colonel Nance-and conducted them to the right of Colonel Kennedy, who by this time had advanced beyond the wood and to the left of the church, driving the enemy. I then ordered Read's battery to a position on the hill to the right of the wood and sent in Colonel Manning, who reported to me on the field, with Walker's brigade, to the right of my brigade. Our troops made constant progress for some time along the whole line, driving in column after column of the enemy. Colonel Aiken's regiment approached within 30 yards of one of the batteries, driving the men from the guns, and only gave way when enfiladed by a new battery placed in position near them, leaving Major White dead and one-half their men killed or wounded upon the field.

About this time the enemy was heavily re-enforced, and our line fell back to the wood, which was never afterward taken from us. Read's battery, having suffered greatly in the loss of men and horses, was withdrawn, by my order, when the infantry fell back. The lines were reorganized behind the fences, near where they entered the fight, and their exhausted cartridge-boxes replenished."

Hence, they charged through the West Woods and kept going - they charged the batteries on the east of the pike, and the 7th South Carolina got to within 30 yards of the gunline. They withdrew when Smith's division formed.

Barksdale writes a similar story:

"About 10 o'clock I formed a line of battle in an open field, which was at that time being raked by a terrible fire of grape and canister from the enemy's artillery. Kershaw was on my right and Semmes on my left. I at once, in accordance with your orders, advanced upon the enemy, who occupied the woods immediately in front, and from which they had just driven a portion of our forces. In a few moments I engaged them, and, after firing several volleys into their ranks, drove them through the woods and into an open field beyond, and compelled them to abandon their artillery on the hill. At this point I discovered that a very large force of the enemy were attempting to flank me on the left. I therefore ordered the Eighteenth and Thirteenth to wheel in that direction, and not only succeeded in checking the movement they were making, but put them to flight, and pursued them for a considerable distance. As we advanced, the ground was covered with the dead and wounded of the enemy. I did not deem it prudent, however, without more support, to advance farther, and I therefore ordered these regiments to fall back to the woods in front of my first position. The Seventeenth and Twenty-first pursued the enemy across the open field, when, perceiving a very strong force moving to the right and attempting to flank them, and all of our forces having retired from that part of the field, they fell back, under protection of a stone fence, in good order. "

and Semmes notes they charged over a mile of open ground before being repelled:

"The enemy at first met our advance by a corresponding one. Our troops continued to press steadily forward, pouring a deadly fire into his ranks, and he, after advancing 100 yards, gave way; and we continued to drive him from position to position, through wood and field for a mile, expending not less than 40 rounds of ammunition. My brigade was thrown farther to the front than the troops on my right by about 300 yards, and for a time was exposed to a terrible front and enfilading fire, inflicting great loss. "

 

[Generic Username]

As @Saphroneth writes, the British could have intervened in the first two years of the war and forced an armistice and a separation.
Much as Lincoln and Seward wanted to hide it, the US administration was going to have to conform to British expectations. But that process was well under way in both US political parties by the time of the Buchanan administration. There was virtually no chance that a politician from Illinois or Wisconsin, in that era, would risk offending the British government and British and American investors working out of London.

One wonders why we had the Trent Affair then, and that it took Seward directly pleading to Lincoln to defuse that Crisis.

 

[Mango Hill]

The second one, about specific circumstances, is that there are places where you can see a pursuit phase nearly happen but it doesn't quite. Sometimes this is because nobody makes the mistake of burning through all their reserves (e.g. at Antietam - were it not for 6th Corps then Lee could have shattered 1st, 2nd and 12th, for example)

Before I continue with the next part of my post the purpose of the two post is to prove that the above in bold is a myth. None of these corps where ever in any danger of being shattered, even without the arrival of the 6th corp. The 1st Corp not only held their own and blunted the pursuit of Sedgwick's retreating division and then in the afternoon their artillery ended any hopes of Stuart flanking the Federal's northern front. Here's a brief summation of Hooker's and William's corps after Sedgwick was attacked and driven back and Hooker wounded and out of the field of battle:

"The Yankees of the First and Twelfth corps were holding their ground and awaiting reinforcements. Except for Patrick's brigade in the West Woods near the Miller barnyard and Gibbon's Black Hat men and other scattered commands in the North Woods, what was left of Hooker's corps was off to the north on the Joseph Poffenberger farm, back where it had been at dawn. Williams Twelfth Corps was spread from one end of the field to the other - one brigade (Goodrich) backing up Patrick on the Miller farm, Gordon's brigade in the East Woods, isolated regiments here and there in support of batteries, the new 125th Pennsylvania in the West Woods around the Dunker Church, and George Greene's two brigades at the edge of the plateau opposite the church from which it had driven Colonel Lee's Rebel artillery. All these lodgments were well and good, Williams thought, but he wondered how he could ever get his forces under any unified command". Sears, Landscape Turned Red; p 219

Both French's and Richardson's divisions of the 2nd Corps had combined to drive out several Rebel formations from the Sunken Road after suffering casualties themselves, most severe where from French's division. After the expulsion of the Rebels from the Sunken Road neither of these two divisions where in any danger of being shattered. In fact, as already stated, it was the Rebel center that was in danger of being shattered if Richardson's and French's division "were sorted out and resupplied with ammunition, and as soon as he received effective artillery support to clear the way, the assault would be renewed. No doubt he expected headquarters to order reinforcements from the army's reserve (Irwin's Brigade of Smith's division; 6th Corp?).....What General Richardson wanted was a battery or two of rifled guns (I'm sure two of the seven rifled batteries massed in the East Woods could have been spared) to supply on-the-spot counterbattery fire, but was informed that none could be spared".

That Richardson's attack would have succeeded is almost a certainty. According to Longstreet "We were badly whipped and were only holding our ground by sheer force of desperation". A light 6 pdr gun and 19 other guns of varying and unknown caliber were all that stood in the way of a determined Federal charge supported by counter-battery fire.

What stood in the way of the probable destruction of Lee's command was Sumner, then McClellan. I'll explain why. At 10:00 AM Smith of Franklyn's Corp reached Pry House for orders. According to Sears "In McClellan's original design the Sixth Corps would be thrown into the battle offensively, were opportunity offered. From their vantage point east of the Antietam the general and his advisers could see only crisis, however, and Smith was ordered to the right to shore up the demoralized Sumner. A little later when Richardson's division arrived he was told to wait until Morell's division of the 5th Corp relieved his division. Richardson was then sent to shore up Sumner's Corp.

"At about one o'clock, as the Bloody Lane fighting died out and General Burnside captured the bridge, both of Franklyn's Sixth Corp divisions were at the front. He (Franklyn) proposed an immediate attack on the West Woods by Smith and Slocum's 10,500 fresh men and notified Sumner of his plan". Sumner rejected Franklyn's plan, giving as an excuse that defeat would "entirely" rout the right. Franklyn hotly argued for his plan of attack and "sent a staff man hurrying off to the general commanding to plead his case".

Franklyn's staffer spoke to returned to Sumner with Wilson of HQ staff with McClellan's instructions "to get his men and hold his position at all hazards", but Sumner was in such a demoralized state that he failed to understand the instructions. Sumner thought that he was being ordered to "make a simultaneous advance with my whole line" thus risking his line if defeated. Wilson tried to explain the order was not for an advance but Sumner would not budge and again repeated that Wilson bring him an answer to his question.

Meanwhile, Franklyn's plan for an attack had energized McClellan. Again Wilson was sent back to Sumner with the instructions "to crowd every man and guns into ranks, and if he thinks it practicable (Sumner was not going to think it practicable), he may advance Franklyn to carry the woods in front, holding the rest of the line with his own command, assisted by those of Banks" - that is, the Twelfth Corps - and Hooker".

"Once more Wilson spurred back to Second Corps headquarters behind the East Woods. He delivered his message, but old Sumner was adamant: 'Go back, young man, and tell General McClellan I have no command. Tell him my command (Sumner had no idea of the condition of his two other divisions more than a mile away). Bank's command (same here) and Hooker's command (ditto) are all cut up and demoralized. Tell him General Franklyn has the only organized command on this part of the field!. On hearing this, shortly after two o'clock, the Young Napoleon concluded it was time for him to go to the front and settle the matter in person.....The picture Sumner painted for him was gloomy, and it carried the day." McClellan wrote 'General Sumner expressed the most decided opinion against another attempt that day". According to Franklyn's testimony McClellan thought the ground gained so far in other parts of the field were not worth risking by an attack on the right. McClellan's plan to turn the Confederate left evaporated.

On the Confederate side, at around noon Lee asked Jackson "to devise a counterstroke to relieve the growing pressure on D. H. Hill's center and try to take control of events". At 12:30 PM Jackson Jackson found General Walker in the West Woods and requested from him "a regiment and a battery". Walker gave him the 48th North Carolina and two divisional batteries. With this tiny force Jackson was to advance from the West Woods in conjunction with Stuart's cavalry attack to the north. The problem for Jackson was that Gordon's brigade was in the East Woods. What made Jackson change his mind about attacking with his scratch force was the arrival of Franklyn's Sixth Corp which proved lucky for Jackson, for his desperate little offensive was spared a humiliating check from Gordon's brigade.

In summary, Franklyn's two divisions should have been used as McClellan had planned and not as a sedative to calm the nerves of what was once a proud and fearless general. Also, if I may, LET'S GO HEAT!

 

[Saphroneth]

I have to admit that I'm a little concerned about your reliance on Sears, here, because Sears is very much an anti-McClellan author. I mentioned the myth and misconception about SO 191; Sears claimed that the "idnight" on that telegram I displayed the image of earlier was a "later addition" because he was so wedded to the idea that the telegram was a midday one.

 

[Mango Hill]

As of the afternoon of the 17th, meanwhile, you have basically one Union division left in reserve - Morell - and Burnside is asking for reinforcements because he doesn't feel confident of defending himself. McClellan's choice at this point is either a death-or-glory attack with his last troops (which might succeed, but if it fails it'll destroy his own army as there'll be nothing left able to fight) or to wait until his troops have recovered and attack then.

Sumner should have been arrested for disobeying a direct order and immediately replaced by Franklyn.

 

[Saphroneth]

Sumner should have been arrested for disobeying a direct order and immediately replaced by Franklyn.

To make sure I am clear on this, which is the direct order he disobeyed? We are talking about a courts-martial offence with the death penalty attached as a possibility, so the case has to be pretty solid here.

Also, "Franklin". No Y.

 

[Mango Hill]

I have to admit that I'm a little concerned about your reliance on Sears, here, because Sears is very much an anti-McClellan author. I mentioned the myth and misconception about SO 191; Sears claimed that the "idnight" on that telegram I displayed the image of earlier was a "later addition" because he was so wedded to the idea that the telegram was a midday one.

I really could care less about what Sears thinks of S. O. 191. I was just bringing up some things that caught my eye that on the surface seemed to support Sears account but that video that 67th provided kind of sealed the deal for me. This doesn't change my mind about Sears books as I think they're terrific, especially the Civil War Papers of George McClellan. I actually get angry with both Little Mac and Halleck. Any book of history that brings out such emotions is worthy of being read. After reading that book I honestly don't know why anyone could have a shred of sympathy for that guy. Just my opinion though.

 

[Saphroneth]

I really could care less about what Sears thinks of S. O. 191.

My point is that if Sears has put together the account of the battle that you are using as your basis, then it is possible that where there are two interpretations in contention Sears may pick the one which is negative towards McClellan even if the one which is positive to McClellan is better or equally well supported by the evidence.

I think however that we should perhaps consider spinning this Antietam discussion off into a separate thread; it's taking over this one which is supposed to be a more general thread.