Common Misconceptions/Myths

[Saphroneth]

Soundly beaten by Breckinridge's hastily put togather of independant combined forces including the kids from VMI at New Market. Although his Hunter was far from any improvement.

Yes, the CEV there isn't great - equal casualty % on both sides with a 3:2 ratio indicates a CEV of 0.66. It's his worst battle, and looking at the details it's a little hard to see a reason for the defeat on the tactical level - there's a Confederate attack that's repulsed, a Union attack that's repulsed, then a few hours later the Confederates mount a frontal attack and the Union line just kind of breaks. There's no particular mis-deployment causing it, he doesn't get flanked or anything (at least not in the sketch of the battle I've seen) and it honestly puzzles me how to rate his generalship there.
Sigel then mounts an effective rearguard action.

Certainly it can't have helped that Sigel was giving orders in German, but that is his native language and Rosecrans broke down rather more completely under stress too (to name but one). I suspect he'd have done better with the kind of scale of troops Hunter brought to his offensive.


As for Hunter being an improvement or not, well, Hunter was certainly more able to push an offensive (with his larger force) but then you come to what the priority is. Is it more important to prosecute an offensive, preserve the forces, or cover the Shenandoah?

 

[Stone in the wall]

Yes, the CEV there isn't great - equal casualty % on both sides with a 3:2 ratio indicates a CEV of 0.66. It's his worst battle, and looking at the details it's a little hard to see a reason for the defeat on the tactical level - there's a Confederate attack that's repulsed, a Union attack that's repulsed, then a few hours later the Confederates mount a frontal attack and the Union line just kind of breaks. There's no particular mis-deployment causing it, he doesn't get flanked or anything (at least not in the sketch of the battle I've seen) and it honestly puzzles me how to rate his generalship there.
Sigel then mounts an effective rearguard action.

Certainly it can't have helped that Sigel was giving orders in German, but that is his native language and Rosecrans broke down rather more completely under stress too (to name but one). I suspect he'd have done better with the kind of scale of troops Hunter brought to his offensive.


As for Hunter being an improvement or not, well, Hunter was certainly more able to push an offensive (with his larger force) but then you come to what the priority is. Is it more important to prosecute an offensive, preserve the forces, or cover the Shenandoah?

Hunter was able to move south because Breckenridge was recalled to reinforce Lee's army. Being on the defense one would think Jones really would have done better at Piedmont. But that's a down side to fighting with unframiler troops hurredly combined from several different commands. For Hunter preserving the forces would seem to have been the most important. Even though he outnumbered Early's force, when Early and the II Corps came calling he gave up his (at the time) defensive advantage and just left the Valley, leaving it wide open.

 

[Saphroneth]

Hunter was able to move south because Breckenridge was recalled to reinforce Lee's army. Being on the defense one would think Jones really would have done better at Piedmont. But that's a down side to fighting with unframiler troops hurredly combined from several different commands. For Hunter preserving the forces would seem to have been the most important. Even though he outnumbered Early's force, when Early and the II Corps came calling he gave up his (at the time) defensive advantage and just left the Valley, leaving it wide open.

Given the specific operational situation when Hunter switched over to retreat, I think his path of retreat was a reasonable one given that his mission was not a defensive one. Retiring into the mountains better preserves his command, something he was concerned about (and for good reason since Early had the "inside line" on getting to at least one junction point on the Valley retreat route - Staunton - as Hunter had to go back to a crossing he controlled).

In fact (in mission terms), Grant wrote to him repeatedly about Hunter joining Grant's army if possible, which is as strong a piece of evidence as anyone could want that Grant did not depend on Hunter defending the Shenandoah - that's simply impossible if Hunter has joined the Army of the Potomac, after all.

 

[Stone in the wall]

Given the specific operational situation when Hunter switched over to retreat, I think his path of retreat was a reasonable one given that his mission was not a defensive one. Retiring into the mountains better preserves his command, something he was concerned about (and for good reason since Early had the "inside line" on getting to at least one junction point on the Valley retreat route - Staunton - as Hunter had to go back to a crossing he controlled).

In fact (in mission terms), Grant wrote to him repeatedly about Hunter joining Grant's army if possible, which is as strong a piece of evidence as anyone could want that Grant did not depend on Hunter defending the Shenandoah - that's simply impossible if Hunter has joined the Army of the Potomac, after all.

When did Grant write that to Hunter, and how was Hunter to travel to Petersburg to join Grant if he didn't control the valley? After Hunter retreated West from Early Grant would not hear from Hunter. Grant had no idea that Hunter had dissappeared, or that Early himself was headed towards Washington. Hunter took himself and his force out of the valley and out of the war for the rest of the summer.

 

[Saphroneth]

When did Grant write that to Hunter, and how was Hunter to travel to Petersburg to join Grant if he didn't control the valley? After Hunter retreated West from Early Grant would not hear from Hunter. Grant had no idea that Hunter had dissappeared, or that Early himself was headed towards Washington. Hunter took himself and his force out of the valley and out of the war for the rest of the summer.

It's a repeated thread in Grant's instructions to Hunter. For example before Lynchburg he writes to Hunter telling him to link up with Sheridan and join Grant via White House Landing.

e.g.



WASHINGTON, June 12, 1864--9.30 p.m.
Major-General HUNTER,
Via Beverly, W. Va.:
It is understood that General Grant is about to move his army to the James River, at or near City Point, and that he will continue to hold the bridge across the Pamunkey, at the White House, to facilitate the junction of yourself and General Sheridan with the Army of the Potomac.
H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General and Chief of Staff.



And as for "if he didn't control the Valley", you're thinking about this the wrong way around. Since Grant wants Hunter to join him, after Hunter has joined Grant he cannot control the Valley. Thus Grant does not require Hunter to control the Valley - it is impossible for Hunter to do both at the same time, and by asking Hunter to join him Grant has made clear that controlling the Valley is not a requirement of Hunter's operations.
If Hunter had thrust to the east north of Lynchburg, linked up with Sheridan and joined Grant it would have been exactly in accordance with a concept of operations Grant sent Hunter, but it would have left the Valley exposed.


It's certainly possible to argue Hunter shouldn't have gone south of Staunton in the first place, but pretty much anything he does after reaching Staunton other than just staying there or retreating is going to expose the Valley; Grant's instructions are to act offensively and/or join him, and he does not list covering the Valley as a priority.

 

[Saphroneth]

Grant mentions the idea of Hunter joining him (or returning to his original base) after hitting Charlottesville and Lynchburg in a letter to Halleck of May 25.




June 6: Grant instructs Hunter to go to (ideally) Lynchburg, destroy the Virginia Central and the canal, and then proceed to join the Army of the Potomac. There's a bit about sending part of his force back to his department, but this does not specify the Valley. (Hunter's dept. is the whole of WV.)

(June 5, to Meade, restating the same basic points)

Note that as of when Hunter begins his retreat retiring into the Valley simply isn't possible without a high chance of being intercepted:

This is Hunter's historical route of retirement. Hunter could have crossed the James at Natural Bridge or Buchanan instead, but both routes still mean he has a longer journey to Staunton than Early does.



If Hunter commits an error, it's approaching Lynchburg from the south - but Lynchburg is, you know, sort of south of the James and so is the canal Hunter is meant to hit as a priority. If he'd approached from the north it's quite possible that he'd have been unable to fulfil the objectives Grant set (re the canal), then gone and joined Grant (per Grant's instructions), and the Valley would still have been uncovered.

 

[Stone in the wall]

All good points to support Hunter's claims of his correct and only option was to retreat West.
At the time Grant's letters (June 5th and 6th) were based on this: things were going good for Hunter, he had been in command for 2 weeks and was at this very time defeating Jones and the last defensive troops in the upper valley. As Breckenridge and his forces had been recalled from the Valley earlier it is safe to assume Grant felt he had Lee's army pinned down to where Lee could not possibly send a sizable force back into the valley. Once Early slips away undetected the whole playing field changes. Grant, Hunter, Sigel and even Lincoln know what can happen with the dangerous II Corps having escaped from Petersburg and being turned loose in the Valley.

Yes, as so as Hunter turned west it did become his only choice to continue. Early kept him running west for 3 more days. No option of turning to face Early or even following as Early's troops are grabbing up any food to be found along on their way through the wasted valley.

 

[Rebforever]

Hunter wanted to have an escape route because he was afraid of Early. The closest way for that was Salem and the W.Va. mountains.
Your map doesn't show all of Hunters run.

 

[Saphroneth]

Once Early slips away undetected the whole playing field changes. Grant, Hunter, Sigel and even Lincoln know what can happen with the dangerous II Corps having escaped from Petersburg and being turned loose in the Valley.

Though I believe Grant didn't actually know a full corps had left Petersburg at the time. He certainly claims Early's corps is at Petersburg on 3rd July, though that could be because he thought they'd zipped out, zapped Hunter and retreated - but for that we'd want to know when Grant first detected Early wasn't there.

Yes, as so as Hunter turned west it did become his only choice to continue. Early kept him running west for 3 more days. No option of turning to face Early or even following as Early's troops are grabbing up any food to be found along on their way through the wasted valley.

Hunter simply can't reach Lynchburg without having come at it from the southwest, and with Early having arrived Hunter's only option is to retreat west - he can't have taken a different choice, there simply isn't a way to guarantee getting into the Valley.

Hunter wanted to have an escape route because he was afraid of Early. The closest way for that was Salem and the W.Va. mountains.
Your map doesn't show all of Hunters run.

Well, I didn't show the whole thing because the map would get less detailed, but what's the alternative for Hunter exactly? Early's stronger than his field force by some margin and his line of march is what let him break contact. He can't then go back into the Valley because he just ends up with Early able to trap him from getting supplies.

 

[Stone in the wall]

Though I believe Grant didn't actually know a full corps had left Petersburg at the time. He certainly claims Early's corps is at Petersburg on 3rd July, though that could be because he thought they'd zipped out, zapped Hunter and retreated - but for that we'd want to know when Grant first detected Early wasn't there.

Seems Lew Wallace was the first to figure this out. By July 5th he had arrived at Monocacy with troops. Grant still may not have known or was just becoming aware of it. Wallace fought Early and with only about 1/2 the number of troops available to Hunter. Wallace did a fine job at slowing Early's advance down.

 

[Saphroneth]

Seems Lew Wallace was the first to figure this out. By July 5th he had arrived at Monocacy with troops. Grant still may not have known or was just becoming aware of it. Wallace fought Early and with only about 1/2 the number of troops available to Hunter. Wallace did a fine job at slowing Early's advance down.

Well, what I think is that people knew something was going on, but Grant didn't. He states categorically that Early is at Petersburg weeks after Early left.

And sort of - Wallace delays Early for one day, which turns out to be key, but he maintains a line of retreat at all times. If Hunter had done that (i.e. maintain a line of retreat, specifically into the Shenandoah at all times) he'd have to not attack Lynchburg in the first place, not join Grant, and would in other words be violating his orders.

 

[Stone in the wall]

A this point Hunter has figured out he's not going to be able to join Grant. Although Hunter had no orders to defend the valley, he was there to occupy and destroy it. Surely before, or as Early and his smaller army chased him he could have found a defensive position to increase his odds. It could be said Hunter delayed Early much longer than Wallace by running, as Early chased for 3 days, 3 more days and a day of rest to return.

 

[Saphroneth]

A this point Hunter has figured out he's not going to be able to join Grant. Although Hunter had no orders to defend the valley, he was there to occupy and destroy it. Surely before, or as Early and his smaller army chased him he could have found a defensive position to increase his odds. It could be said Hunter delayed Early much longer than Wallace by running, as Early chased for 3 days, 3 more days and a day of rest to return.

I think "he was there to occupy and destroy it" is outside the scope of his orders. He was to hit the logistics routes into Richmond and/or join Grant.

As for finding a defensive position, depends on the point you're talking about. Hunter's force at Lynchburg is about the same size as Early's, but he's deep in Confederate territory - if Hunter finds a good defensive position and stands there, Early does not need to simply break through and can instead flank around him to cut him off.
The defensive position at Monocacy covered the routes by which Early could approach his primary objectives, which was why Early had to engage. The same isn't true if Hunter makes a stand at Buford's Gap or wherever, because Early can fix him (take up a defensive position opposite) and turn him - or just hang around waiting until Hunter gets moving again, Hunter can't stand in enemy territory indefinitely.

If Hunter's force is lost then the Valley's just as open as it was before.


Of course, the real aim of Early's raid was probably to provoke a withdrawal or diversion of Union troops from Richmond and Petersburg. It's what had been done before by Lee and it had worked then. (The fact Washington was threatened is just because the troops left actually defending the capital were far too low.)

 

[Rebforever]

It was a pitiful sight I'm sure , Hunters forced march through W.Va.
No shoes, no food, ragged clothing. He couldn't fight a nat with the way his men were. Hunter was an idiot.

 

[Saphroneth]

It was a pitiful sight I'm sure , Hunters forced march through W.Va.
No shoes, no food, ragged clothing. He couldn't fight a nat with the way his men were. Hunter was an idiot.

Well, calling him an idiot is a judgement which rather suggests there were superior options. What else is Hunter to do?

With hindsight we could say it would be better to thrust east between Lynchburg and Charlottesville, the only other option that substantially fulfils his orders from Grant? But that doesn't actually resolve the problem of leaving the Valley exposed, and indeed Hunter would probably just end up being sent back to Washington anyway.

 

[BuckPvt]

Seems Lew Wallace was the first to figure this out. By July 5th he had arrived at Monocacy with troops. Grant still may not have known or was just becoming aware of it. Wallace fought Early and with only about 1/2 the number of troops available to Hunter. Wallace did a fine job at slowing Early's advance down.

Sigel had been reporting to Halleck at least as early as June 28th that both Early and Breckinridge were moving down the valley towards his positions around Martinsburg and Harpers Ferry.

Actually, Sigel performed really well around this point. He only had what amounted to about two widely scattered brigades of 100-days men. But he was able to keep feeling out Early's locations and reporting them back to Halleck and Grant, and made some educated guesses about Breckinridge which later proved to be fairly accurate. He was able to coordinate with the B&O railroad and got most of the high value government stores removed from Harpers Ferry and then dug in on Maryland Heights. Early had originally planned to cross there but instead had to swing farther west and cross around Shepherdstown/Sharpsburg, which cost him about 3 extra days.

 

[Stone in the wall]

Sigel had been reporting to Halleck at least as early as June 28th that both Early and Breckinridge were moving down the valley towards his positions around Martinsburg and Harpers Ferry.

Actually, Sigel performed really well around this point. He only had what amounted to about two widely scattered brigades of 100-days men. But he was able to keep feeling out Early's locations and reporting them back to Halleck and Grant, and made some educated guesses about Breckinridge which later proved to be fairly accurate. He was able to coordinate with the B&O railroad and got most of the high value government stores removed from Harpers Ferry and then dug in on Maryland Heights. Early had originally planned to cross there but instead had to swing farther west and cross around Shepherdstown/Sharpsburg, which cost him about 3 extra days.

Yes, I remember something about that, but didn't Halleck just blow Sigel's reports off?

 

[BuckPvt]

Yes, I remember something about that, but didn't Halleck just blow Sigel's reports off?

Basically. Halleck told Sigel to report to Hunter for orders. And Hunter told Washington that Sigel had sufficient troops to drive the Confederates from Maryland.

 

[NedBaldwin]

... Hunter took himself and his force out of the valley and out of the war for the rest of the summer.

Hunter was back to the valley by the first week of July, missing Early by just a few days.