Saphroneth
Colonel
- Joined
- Feb 18, 2017
I think it's largely to do with three things. (ed: couldn't count)Thanks for taking the time with that explanation. This explains some things I've wondered about in reading about battles. What do you think might be some 'factors making pursuit operations less likely'? Characteristics of the commanders and their training and strategic orientation? Features of the American setting like terrain and logistics? Or did these battles just tend to become so unexpectedly fierce for the first few years of the war that the victors were too depleted?
- troop and officer quality
- specific circumstances
- cavalry
The first one, the issue of troop and officer quality, is that basically the men are not very high quality because the army has expanded so much (and the trained men haven't been broken up as cadre) - it was known at the time and had been for hundreds of years that lower quality troops were best used fighting in defensive positions (i.e. breastworks/entrenchments) but were much less able to manoeuvre.
This means that there's not a great deal of finesse to the attacks, and they become attritional firefights which wear on the nerves of attacker and defender evenly rather than being able to punch through (and thus have a short battle which leaves the attacker in good shape). You also have articulation problems with the commanders as almost nobody has the proper seasoning, so the concentrated blows which would break an enemy tend to misfire.
The second one, about specific circumstances, is that there are places where you can see a pursuit phase nearly happen but it doesn't quite. Sometimes this is because nobody makes the mistake of burning through all their reserves (e.g. at Antietam - were it not for 6th Corps then Lee could have shattered 1st, 2nd and 12th, for example) and sometimes the opposite where reserves are committed but things don't reach the point where the "target" breaks (e.g. at Gettysburg, where Meade has committed all his reserves in error on both Day Two and Day Three but inconvenient commander deaths on Day Two or issues with committing on Day Three result in the situation remaining stable). You also have situations where a broken enemy can withdraw across a river to safety (post-Gaines Mill) or behind friendly troops which were just arriving (post-Second Bull Run).
If Gettysburg had seen Meade keep 6th Corps concentrated, fend off the attacks without them, and then launch a pursuit, or if Second Bull Run had seen 6th and 2nd Corps another day's march away and Lee pursue and shatter the Army of Virginia, it wouldn't have been especially unusual by European standards.
And the third one is cavalry. Early on in the war the cavalry forces aren't very large, and so the needs of scouting and carrying messages and stuff take up a lot of the cavalry manpower; later on the cavalry forces are larger, but the dominant cavalry doctrine by that point is a strategic raid rather than keeping them nearby for decisive action.
Having a large cavalry force to hand makes a pursuit action much more feasible, and you can also use them to threaten the enemy flanks to draw off reserves more effectively.
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