Cold Harbor Causualties

[Bryan_C]

I was just reading about Cold Harbor and the "7000 Federal casualties in 15-20 minutes" story. I have heard that this figure has been called into question, especially as the whole "Grant was a drunken butcher" thing has been discredited by some historians.

The battle of the Crater, which took place a month after Cold Harbor, resulted in 4000 Federal casualties. Grant called the failed attempt "the saddest affair I have witnessed in this war." But now I'm curious- I know the Crater was a complete disaster. But how could it be sadder than 7000 casualties in less than half an hour?

 

[Jamieva]

Well as you mentioned in your first paragraph the 7000 in less than 30 minutes has come into serious question. Best researched info on it is in Gordon Rhea's book on Cold Harbor.

 

[nitrofd]

The only thing we know about Cold Harbor is that Grant said it was the biggest mistake of his life.

 

[brass napoleon]

The battle of the Crater, which took place a month after Cold Harbor, resulted in 4000 Federal casualties. Grant called the failed attempt "the saddest affair I have witnessed in this war." But now I'm curious- I know the Crater was a complete disaster. But how could it be sadder than 7000 casualties in less than half an hour?

Well, for one thing, Grant didn't "witness" the Cold Harbor assault. Also, as others have said, the 7,000 figure appears to be grossly inflated. I believe the actual number was less than half that, but will defer to anybody who is up to posting a source.

 

[bdtex]

The only thing we know about Cold Harbor is that Grant said it was the biggest mistake of his life.

The fact that he said that proves it was bad regardless of what the actual number of casualties was. It was bad enough for him to single that out as the worst decision he made during the entire war.

 

[nitrofd]

The fact that he said that proves it was bad regardless of what the actual number of casualties was. It was bad enough for him to single that out as the worst decision he made during the entire war.

What the real casualties were we do know th=re was alot in a very short time.

 

[cash]

"Union casualties have been grossly exaggerated and probably did not exceed 3,500. Commentators have suggested numbers ranging from 7,500 to well above 12,000, all supposedly incurred during a few terrible minutes after dawn. (In reality the assault sputtered on for about an hour, not the eight minutes some writers have claimed.) The 12,000 estimate in fact reflects the official tally of all casualties for the entire Cold Harbor campaign--12,788, to be exact--embracing the cavalry battles of May 31 and June 1, the 6th and 18th Corps attacks at Cold Harbor on June 1, the 5th and 9th Corps fights around Bethesda Church from June 1 forward, and casualties in all Union corps for the remainder of their stay at Cold Harbor and during their movement across the Chickahominy and James Rivers toward Petersburg. The oft-quoted 7,500 figure derives from attempts by early postwar writers to estimate all Union losses for June 3, a day that included a great deal more fighting than just the grand assault." [Gordon C. Rhea, Cold Harbor: Grant and Lee, May 26-June 3, 1864, p. 359.]

Rhea later writes, "All things considered, the grand charge at Cold Harbor on June 3 produced about 3,500 Union casualties." [Ibid., p. 362.] This was over an hour, not 8 minutes.

More on the myths of Cold Harbor here: https://cwcrossroads.wordpress.com/2011/06/03/cold-harbor-myths/

 

[cash]

The only thing we know about Cold Harbor is that Grant said it was the biggest mistake of his life.

Well, the actual wording varies. In his memoirs he said, "I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever made. I might say the same thing of the assault of the 22d of May, 1863, at Vicksburg. At Cold Harbor no advantage whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained." Horace Porter claimed Grant said, "I regret this assault more than any one I have ever ordered. I regarded it as a stern necessity, and believed that it would bring compensating results; but, as it has proved, no advantages have been gained sufficient to justify the heavy losses suffered. The early assault at Vicksburg, while it was not successful, yet brought compensating advantages; for it taught the men that they cold not seize the much-coveted prize of that stronghold without a siege, and it was the means of making them work cheerfully and patiently afterward in the trenches, and of securing the capture of the place with but little more loss of life; whereas if the assault had not been made the men could not have been convinced that they could not have captured the city by making a dash upon it which might have saved them many months of arduous labor, sickness, and fatigue."

 

[cash]

The fact that he said that proves it was bad regardless of what the actual number of casualties was. It was bad enough for him to single that out as the worst decision he made during the entire war.

Not exactly what he said. And we have to remember that Grant didn't command the Army of the Potomac. He was responsible for overall strategy, but George Meade and his corps commanders were responsible for planning the assault and for the tactics used in the assault. Grant may have ordered the attacks, but Meade and his commanders decided how those attacks were made.

 

[cash]

"Grant had hoped to renew the offensive at Cold Harbor shortly after daylight [on June 2]. The schedule was manifestly impossible. Not only was Hancock in no condition to attack, but Smith was still complaining about deficiencies in manpower and ammunition. 'I think my line perfectly indefensible without more troops,' was Smith's bottom line. Meade had instructed Wright to give Smith ammunition, and until that happened, he felt obliged to direct Hancock to hold a division at Cold Harbor to assist the 18th Corps if necessary. 'The attack ordered for this morning shall take place at 5:00 o'clock this afternoon,' Meade notified his corps commanders, bowing to the inevitable." [Gordon C. Rhea, Cold Harbor: Grant and Lee, May 26-June 3, 1864, p. 280]

It was Meade's decision to back the attack off to 5 PM, and that was due to the condition of his army.

"Grant had ordered the offensive. Meade, however, was responsible for deploying his corps, coordinating their movements, and posting reserves to exploit any gains. 'I had immediate and entire command of the field all day,' Meade wrote his wife. The Pennsylvanian still smarted from the humiliation of his subordinated position and thoroughly disapproved of Grant's hard-hitting, army-wide assaults. Facing a disagreeable assignment, he dealt with it by doing little. The record reveals no steps to reconnoiter the ground, coordinate the army's elements, or tend to the things that diligent generals ordinarily do before sending soldiers against fortified enemy lines." [Ibid., pp. 318-319]

"By midmorning Meade had lost control of the attack. In the face of Hancock's pessimistic reports, the army commander had allowed his subordinates to decide whether to renew the assault. Wright and Smith each argued that whether they would press forward would be up to the actions of the other corps commanders. Finally, Meade ordered Smith and Wright to attack without reference to each other; he instructed Hancock to try one more time. Hancock demurred; Wright and Smith remained in place. Finally Grant took charge." [Brooks D. Simpson, Triumph Over Adversity: Ulysses S. Grant, 1822-1865, p. 325]

 

[bdtex]

Not exactly what he said. And we have to remember that Grant didn't command the Army of the Potomac. He was responsible for overall strategy, but George Meade and his corps commanders were responsible for planning the assault and for the tactics used in the assault. Grant may have ordered the attacks, but Meade and his commanders decided how those attacks were made.

I was just paraphrasing. Didn't have the exact quote in front of me.

 

[bdtex]

"Grant had hoped to renew the offensive at Cold Harbor shortly after daylight [on June 2]. The schedule was manifestly impossible. Not only was Hancock in no condition to attack, but Smith was still complaining about deficiencies in manpower and ammunition. 'I think my line perfectly indefensible without more troops,' was Smith's bottom line. Meade had instructed Wright to give Smith ammunition, and until that happened, he felt obliged to direct Hancock to hold a division at Cold Harbor to assist the 18th Corps if necessary. 'The attack ordered for this morning shall take place at 5:00 o'clock this afternoon,' Meade notified his corps commanders, bowing to the inevitable." [Gordon C. Rhea, Cold Harbor: Grant and Lee, May 26-June 3, 1864, p. 280]

It was Meade's decision to back the attack off to 5 PM, and that was due to the condition of his army.

"Grant had ordered the offensive. Meade, however, was responsible for deploying his corps, coordinating their movements, and posting reserves to exploit any gains. 'I had immediate and entire command of the field all day,' Meade wrote his wife. The Pennsylvanian still smarted from the humiliation of his subordinated position and thoroughly disapproved of Grant's hard-hitting, army-wide assaults. Facing a disagreeable assignment, he dealt with it by doing little. The record reveals no steps to reconnoiter the ground, coordinate the army's elements, or tend to the things that diligent generals ordinarily do before sending soldiers against fortified enemy lines." [Ibid., pp. 318-319]

That book is in my cart. With all the others already in line in front of it,it may be awhile.

 

[AUG]

In comparison, Pickett's Charge produced around 6,500 Confederate casualties by most accounts in an hour or less (not counting the artillery barrage) and Franklin saw most of the Confederate casualties (6,252 recorded but likely more, possibly up to 7,000) take place within a couple hours, the whole battle being five hours total. Also to note, the June 3 attacks at Cold Harbor took place across a front much wider than Pickett's Charge or Franklin.

 

[Bryan_C]

Thinking about it some more and considering the relatively slow rate of fire of muskets and artillery, 7000 in 15-20 minutes seems more and more unlikely.

 

[bdtex]

Well, the actual wording varies. In his memoirs he said, "I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever made. I might say the same thing of the assault of the 22d of May, 1863, at Vicksburg. At Cold Harbor no advantage whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained." Horace Porter claimed Grant said, "I regret this assault more than any one I have ever ordered. I regarded it as a stern necessity, and believed that it would bring compensating results; but, as it has proved, no advantages have been gained sufficient to justify the heavy losses suffered. The early assault at Vicksburg, while it was not successful, yet brought compensating advantages; for it taught the men that they cold not seize the much-coveted prize of that stronghold without a siege, and it was the means of making them work cheerfully and patiently afterward in the trenches, and of securing the capture of the place with but little more loss of life; whereas if the assault had not been made the men could not have been convinced that they could not have captured the city by making a dash upon it which might have saved them many months of arduous labor, sickness, and fatigue."

Thanks. Glad you had the quotes handy for posting. Often times,when on this site and participating in discussions,memory is all I have to go on.

 

[Jamieva]

And not to help the cause of accuracy, there is a marker on the battlefield that mentions the 7000 figure.

 

[cash]

I was just paraphrasing. Didn't have the exact quote in front of me.

Understood. Just wanted to make sure what he actually said was clear.

 

[Dave Wilma]

Just a reminder that we want to rely on primary evidence as much as we can. It looks like researchers have whittled down the numbers for Cold Harbor. I will have to review Burns's The Civil War to see what that writer said. How about Catton?

 

[Jamieva]

Some authors (Catton, Esposito, Foote, McPherson, Grimsley) estimate the casualties for the major assault on June 3 and all agree on approximately 7,000 total Union casualties, 1,500 Confederate. Gordon Rhea, considered the preeminent modern historian of Grant's Overland campaign, has examined casualty lists in detail and has published a contrarian view in his 2002 book, Cold Harbor. For the morning assault on June 3, he can account for only 3,500 to 4,000 Union killed, wounded, and missing, and estimates that for the entire day the Union suffered about 6,000 casualties, compared to Lee's 1,000 to 1,500. Rhea noted that although this was a horrific loss, Grant's main attack on June 3 was dwarfed by Lee's daily losses at Antietam, Chancellorsville, and Pickett's Charge, and is comparable to Malvern Hill.[55]

Yes I know it's wiki

Foote tops them all and says 7000 casualties in 8 minutes. Good ole Shelby we know there's no footnote for that one.

 

[AndyHall]

And not to help the cause of accuracy, there is a marker on the battlefield that mentions the 7000 figure.

Don't get me started on problems with historical markers where I live.