Grant Did the Confederates underestimate Grant?

[wausaubob]

The Youtube historian did a piece on the 1884 comments of Evander M. Law on the Confederate view of General Grant. In the comments Law stated that the Confederates were convinced that Grant's success in the west was solely due to the weakness of the opposition he faced. Law also stated that the Confederates believed the usual butcher evaluation of Grant.
If Law's after the war comments correctly describe the Confederate view of Grant in May and June of 1864, its not hard to see that they would have thought they had beaten him by the time of the futile Cold Harbor battles.
They may not have anticipated that Grant would reach the James River, with sufficient engineering capacity to build a pontoon bridge, and with the army's available transports, and with naval support. If they had thought the Grant's crossing of the Mississippi was only the result of Confederate negligence, then they had to be surprised that the US accomplished a similar crossing under more difficult circumstances.
I think the Confederates failed to understand that Grant's strategy also involved using the US advantage in cavalry until the Confederate cavalry was worn out. Grant wasn't producing the advantage in cavalry. That was the result of the work of others to buy better livestock, and equip the cavalry with better weaponry. But he was going to use the US cavalry to copy the type of tactics best employed by the Confederate general Nathan Forrest.
I think they underestimated Grant. To some extent they were whistling in the dark. Grant's army was suffering heavy casualties. But the Confederates were incurring losses too.

 

[Saruman]

The Youtube historian did a piece on the 1884 comments of Evander M. Law on the Confederate view of General Grant. In the comments Law stated that the Confederates were convinced that Grant's success in the west was solely due to the weakness of the opposition he faced. Law also stated that the Confederates believed the usual butcher evaluation of Grant.
If Law's after the war comments correctly describe the Confederate view of Grant in May and June of 1864, its not hard to see that they would have thought they had beaten him by the time of the futile Cold Harbor battles.
They may not have anticipated that Grant would reach the James River, with sufficient engineering capacity to build a pontoon bridge, and with the army's available transports, and with naval support. If they had thought the Grant's crossing of the Mississippi was only the result of Confederate negligence, then they had to be surprised that the US accomplished a similar crossing under more difficult circumstances.
I think the Confederates failed to understand that Grant's strategy also involved using the US advantage in cavalry until the Confederate cavalry was worn out. Grant wasn't producing the advantage in cavalry. That was the result of the work of others to buy better livestock, and equip the cavalry with better weaponry. But he was going to use the US cavalry to copy the type of tactics best employed by the Confederate general Nathan Forrest.
I think they underestimated Grant. To some extent they were whistling in the dark. Grant's army was suffering heavy casualties. But the Confederates were incurring losses too.

Gen. Simon B. Buckner's 1909 interview had similar sentiments to Law:

Interviewer: "What kind of a man was Grant personally? You know he was called the silent man. Was he talkative in private life?

Buckner: "Yes, he was. When you broke through the reserve which he had with strangers, he talked well. He was not much of a student, but had a good mind. He got along well in his class without much effort... He went into the army, showed a good deal of merit, and had luck, too. Take any of his predecessors in command of the Army of the Potomac - after some of the reverses that he had when he advanced on Lee - the other commanders would have withdrawn, but Grant's dogged perseverance, you know, kept him going. He wouldn't give up. And the government sustained him as it did not any of the others."

Interviewer: "Whom do you class as the best of the Federal generals during the Civil War?"

Buckner: "McClellan was one of the best that they had... He was very superior to Grant. McClellan formed the army that Grant commanded. When McClellan took it, it was a green army, not inured to hardship, and he maneuvered it handsomely. Grant had some admirable qualities as a general - great firmness of purpose, bulldog courage and tenacity. But he lost more men killed and wounded in his Virginia campaign than were in Lee's army. He described himself, I think, in a private letter he wrote to a friend in Baltimore - I think it was after the fight at the 'Crater' at Petersburg. He stated: 'It was a regular Kilkenny fight; my cat had the longest tail.' That describes it."

 

[dlofting]

I think the Confederates in the east did underestimate Grant. Regardless of what happened during a battle he kept his cool, he kept thinking. There was no moment of "Grant to the rear". Lee was a great commander and leader but he was overcome by his emotions on a couple of occasions. Grant never was.

 

[wausaubob]

Gen. Simon B. Buckner's 1909 interview had similar sentiments to Law:

Interviewer: "What kind of a man was Grant personally? You know he was called the silent man. Was he talkative in private life?

Buckner: "Yes, he was. When you broke through the reserve which he had with strangers, he talked well. He was not much of a student, but had a good mind. He got along well in his class without much effort... He went into the army, showed a good deal of merit, and had luck, too. Take any of his predecessors in command of the Army of the Potomac - after some of the reverses that he had when he advanced on Lee - the other commanders would have withdrawn, but Grant's dogged perseverance, you know, kept him going. He wouldn't give up. And the government sustained him as it did not any of the others."

Interviewer: "Whom do you class as the best of the Federal generals during the Civil War?"

Buckner: "McClellan was one of the best that they had... He was very superior to Grant. McClellan formed the army that Grant commanded. When McClellan took it, it was a green army, not inured to hardship, and he maneuvered it handsomely. Grant had some admirable qualities as a general - great firmness of purpose, bulldog courage and tenacity. But he lost more men killed and wounded in his Virginia campaign than were in Lee's army. He described himself, I think, in a private letter he wrote to a friend in Baltimore - I think it was after the fight at the 'Crater' at Petersburg. He stated: 'It was a regular Kilkenny fight; my cat had the longest tail.' That describes it."

Buckner's comments make sense, and he accurately noted the administration sustained Grant. That's because in addition to the Virginia campaign, there were many more things happening. He wasn't trying to form policy, and he was willing to conform his strategies to the administrations political needs and political timetable.

 

[DanSBHawk]

But he lost more men killed and wounded in his Virginia campaign than were in Lee's army.

It's disappointing that Buckner would repeat that falsehood, but understandable considering the era.

 

[uaskme]

It's disappointing that Buckner would repeat that falsehood, but understandable considering the era.

It's still repeated.

Lincoln and his Awful Arithmetic. Washington fully embraced the War of attrition. Lincoln knew no President past Andy Jackson served a second term. He knew his timeline. Didn't care how many poor immigrants it took.

Found someone else that didn't care either. Grant

 

[DanSBHawk]

It's still repeated.

Lincoln and his Awful Arithmetic. Washington fully embraced the War of attrition. Lincoln knew no President past Andy Jackson served a second term. He knew his timeline. Didn't care how many poor immigrants it took.

Found someone else that didn't care either. Grant

Lincoln didn't start the war. The responsibility for every dead American on both sides can be laid at the feet of the fools that started shooting.

 

[J C J Barefoot]

Others in the CSA tried to talk down Grant , but when he came East there does not seem to be any record that Davis or any members of the Cabinet thought Grant was merely lucky. Also, there is little, perhaps no evidence, that Lee thought so. There is ample evidence that the AONV leadership in general and Lee specifically by spring 1864 should have developed serious respect for just whom they were facing:
First, when Grant made turned toward Spotsylvania instead of DC after the Wilderness. Second, when he slipped out of the trap at The North Anna and third, when his entire army disappeared from Cold Harbor and Lee or no one in the AONV had a clue where he was or where they went. Lee knew that if a seige was set by Grant, it was just a matter of running out the clock.

Lee knew Little Mac was exactly who he showed he was during the Seven Days and planned Antietam accordingly. Also, Lee had remarked at Gettysburg that Mead would make no mistakes and that if he (Lee) made one Mead would take advantage of it. All to say Lee was a smart realist in understanding his opponents. We can conclude then, he understood Grant.
Finally, for context, Grant being promoted to Lieutenant General by an act fo Congress while Lee had offered his own resignation to Davis after Gettysburg gives more cause for speculation.

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

It's disappointing that Buckner would repeat that falsehood, but understandable considering the era.

Grant lost over 55,000 men im the Overland Campaign. And another 45,000 at Petersburg. For about 100,000 losses. Lee probsbly didn't have 100,000 men counting the reinforcements he recieved through the campaign. So I wouldnt say Bickner was lying. If you just count the Overland Campaign. Its slightly less.

 

[wausaubob]

Others in the CSA tried to talk down Grant , but when he came East there does not seem to be any record that Davis or any members of the Cabinet thought Grant was merely lucky. Also, there is little, perhaps no evidence, that Lee thought so. There is ample evidence that the AONV leadership in general and Lee specifically by spring 1864 should have developed serious respect for just whom they were facing:
First, when Grant made turned toward Spotsylvania instead of DC after the Wilderness. Second, when he slipped out of the trap at The North Anna and third, when his entire army disappeared from Cold Harbor and Lee or no one in the AONV had a clue where he was or where they went. Lee knew that if a seige was set by Grant, it was just a matter of running out the clock.

Lee knew Little Mac was exactly who he showed he was during the Seven Days and planned Antietam accordingly. Also, Lee had remarked at Gettysburg that Mead would make no mistakes and that if he (Lee) made one Mead would take advantage of it. All to say Lee was a smart realist in understanding his opponents. We can conclude then, he understood Grant.
Finally, for context, Grant being promoted to Lieutenant General by an act fo Congress while Lee had offered his own resignation to Davis after Gettysburg gives more cause for speculation.

So you think General Law's post war comments were incorrect? Or maybe they applied to other officers equal in rank to Law, but not to General Lee? I think James Longstreet and Richard Ewell had some prewar knowledge of Grant, so Law's assessment may have excluded those two men.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Grant lost over 55,000 men im the Overland Campaign. And another 45,000 at Petersburg. For about 100,000 losses. Lee probsbly didn't have 100,000 men counting the reinforcements he recieved through the campaign. So I wouldnt say Bickner was lying. If you just count the Overland Campaign. Its slightly less.

Grant suffered 55,000 casualties in the Overland campaign. Lee's army numbered 96,000 total for the Overland campaign.

Comparing casualties over time to a snapshot of an army's strength is misleading. It's like saying Lee suffered over 200,000 casualties in the war, which was more than the entire number of troops in the Army of the Potomac on such and such a date.

 

[wausaubob]

Grant lost over 55,000 men im the Overland Campaign. And another 45,000 at Petersburg. For about 100,000 losses. Lee probsbly didn't have 100,000 men counting the reinforcements he recieved through the campaign. So I wouldnt say Bickner was lying. If you just count the Overland Campaign. Its slightly less.

The two belligerents were counting their losses by completely different standards. And recall that the US had the logistics, and the human resources to transport and care for their wounded in a way the Confederates could not match. Still in the Overland Campaign, the US occurred heavy losses. But by December 1864 no US soldiers were walking into Confederate lines to get something to eat. And from that point on most battles ended with a large number of Confederates surrendering due to exhaustion. Funny thing about General Buckner, he ignored that General Grant was willing to accept casualties to gain the decisive result as when the Buckner had to surrender the garrison at Fort Donelson.
Whether it was the personal evaluation of Grant, or unwillingness to admit the US had overwhelming resources which Grant only needed to apply systematically, it amounts to the same thing. In eastern Virginia, the US army could maintain its logistics mainly by steamboat and steamship. It could build a port on the James River. It could build a military city complete with bakeries and hospitals. The US could buy horses and mules by the thousands. And consistent with the remarks attributed to William Sherman in pre war conversations, the US had inventors that could develop new weapons. There was a reason that the US war effort was like a locomotive hitting full throttle, which is a very apt metaphor.

 

[wausaubob]

Grant suffered 55,000 casualties in the Overland campaign. Lee's army numbered 96,000 total for the Overland campaign.

Comparing casualties over time to a snapshot of an army's strength is misleading. It's like saying Lee suffered over 200,000 casualties in the war, which was more than the entire number of troops in the Army of the Potomac on such and such a date.

And the count turned in favor of the US in all theaters as more Confederates deserted into federal lines and more were captured when the Confederate soldiers gave up. As I have noted, its who wins the last battle that counts most, a lesson that could be easily learned from the English/Prussian victory against Napoleon.

 

[SWS]

Lee wrote in July 1864, when it was reported XIX Corps had come to Virginia from Louisiana, that Grant's "talent & strategy consists in accumulating overwhelming numbers," especially compared to the more scattered and desultory Federal strategy practiced under Lincoln and Halleck from June 1862 until Grant's appointment to the office of general-in-chief.

 

[wausaubob]

Grant suffered 55,000 casualties in the Overland campaign. Lee's army numbered 96,000 total for the Overland campaign.

Comparing casualties over time to a snapshot of an army's strength is misleading. It's like saying Lee suffered over 200,000 casualties in the war, which was more than the entire number of troops in the Army of the Potomac on such and such a date.

Or another way to respond to the "whataboutism" discussion of the Overland Campaign casualties is to ask rhetorically, was the casualty percentage in General Lee's army from March 1, 1865 to approximately April 9, 1865?

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

Grant suffered 55,000 casualties in the Overland campaign. Lee's army numbered 96,000 total for the Overland campaign.

Comparing casualties over time to a snapshot of an army's strength is misleading. It's like saying Lee suffered over 200,000 casualties in the war, which was more than the entire number of troops in the Army of the Potomac on such and such a date.

Where are you getting 96,000 that's mostly likely double counting returned injured. Lee started with 66,000 and recidved Picketts and Hokes divisions. Or about 14,000 ment for about 80,000 men. I think Buckner was including the Siege of Petersburg. He says campaign in Virginia which i took as both Overland and Siege.

 

[wausaubob]

Lee wrote in July 1864, when it was reported XIX Corps had come to Virginia from Louisiana, that Grant's "talent & strategy consists in accumulating overwhelming numbers," especially compared to the more scattered and desultory Federal strategy practiced under Lincoln and Halleck from June 1862 until Grant's appointment to the office of general-in-chief.

That is not an accurate evaluation of General Grant. Grant maximized the use of the US army's water borne transports, and logistics that used water transport. That reduced the cost of conducting a siege. The enormous forward depot at City Point was similar to the logistics base on the Yazoo River in Mississippi and the sprawling logistics base built by Donaldson at Nashville. Grant was heavily involved in planning the railroad campaign in Tennessee and Georgia. He worked with McCallum and Meigs to build a faultless military railroad. And in Virginia, Grant built a siege railroad with engines, copying what it took some time for the British and French to achieve in Crimea. Finally Grant was a modernist. From his time in Chattanooga onward, he read his telegrams, and sent out his responses every evening/ Grant was using every modern element available to him to produce the best equipped and best fed army the world had seen up to that point.

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

The two belligerents were counting their losses by completely different standards. And recall that the US had the logistics, and the human resources to transport and care for their wounded in a way the Confederates could not match. Still in the Overland Campaign, the US occurred heavy losses. But by December 1864 no US soldiers were walking into Confederate lines to get something to eat. And from that point on most battles ended with a large number of Confederates surrendering due to exhaustion. Funny thing about General Buckner, he ignored that General Grant was willing to accept casualties to gain the decisive result as when the Buckner had to surrender the garrison at Fort Donelson.
Whether it was the personal evaluation of Grant, or unwillingness to admit the US had overwhelming resources which Grant only needed to apply systematically, it amounts to the same thing. In eastern Virginia, the US army could maintain its logistics mainly by steamboat and steamship. It could build a port on the James River. It could build a military city complete with bakeries and hospitals. The US could buy horses and mules by the thousands. And consistent with the remarks attributed to William Sherman in pre war conversations, the US had inventors that could develop knew weapons. There was a reason that the US war effort was like a locomotive hitting full throttle, which is a very apt metaphor.

Ok. Thats alot that has nothing to do with anything ive talked about.

 

[Wizard of Cozz]

Or another way to respond to the "whataboutism" discussion of the Overland Campaign casualties is to ask rhetorically, was the casualty percentage in General Lee's army from March 1, 1865 to approximately April 9, 1865?

Again doesnt really pertain to anything. Yes Lee's army was captured AFTER Sherman had wrecked their ability to get fed.

 

[jackt62]

A mild-mannered individual, Grant was so low key that he appeared unobtrusive to many. Consequently, he did not seek to draw attention to himself and could often be underestimated because of his silent demeanor. That being said, the Confederacy should have had sufficient familiarity with Grant's military expertise by mid 1863 to understand he was no pushover.