Cleburne in Control

[larry_cockerham]

Eric, Forrest, as you know, did command infantry at the battle of the Cedars Dec 7, 1864 and at the battle of Sugar Creek on December 26, 1864 with mixed results. Still not bad for a man with no "formal" military training. Was Forrest a man that would have been chosen to formulate infantry strategy, not likely. My emotion tells me he was capable, but in the structure of the military system, even the Confederate version, it wasn't going to happen.

 

[whitworth]

Retrofitting What Existed

Again, the confederacy had a system of promoting commanders who had graduated from West Point. I think Jefferson Davis, was more accepting of names he knew when he was U.S. Secretary of War or at West Point.

It was easier for a Episcopal bishop and priest, long out of U.S. Army service, to get command positions than a Hampton, Cleburne or Forrest. It was the reality of the time.

 

[OpnDownfall]

I find it interesting that we, on this particular thread, are being asked if a gifted Divisional Commander (Cleburne) would have been a better Army Commander than anotheir Gifted Divisional Commander (Hood).
IMO, the record is not as clear on the subject as some seem to assume .

 

[ole]

I find it interesting that we, on this particular thread, are being asked if a gifted Divisional Commander (Cleburne) would have been a better Army Commander than anotheir Gifted Divisional Commander (Hood).
IMO, the record is not as clear on the subject as some seem to assume .

Will go out on a limb here by observing that Hood's only tool was a hammer. Cleburne at least had a few other tools.

It is clear (to me, at least) that Cleburne, Forrest, Cheatham and apparently capable others started a long way back from the pole position simply because they were not West Point. Lincoln wasn't West Point either, so he presumably did not hold the graduate in as high esteem as others.

Cleburne's recommendation to free and arm slaves might have done him no favors, but I suspect that, absent it, he would have gotten no further than he did.

Cheatham's drunk stain may have retarded his rise, but I suspect that, absent it, he would have gotten no further than he did. (Pause to consider that Grant's stain goes much further back than Cheatham's.)

Forrest is a different quantity. But his value as a raider was just too great to translate into a significant infantry command. I'll agree with his fans that he might well have translated his peculiar gift for non-USMA thinking into a dangerous CSA Division or Corps. But, not only was he not a graduate of West Point, he was barely literate. Shocking!

Any of these three, serving Lincoln and the Union, would have risen higher. Grant and Sherman leaned to the graduate, but they also recognized performance--Logan is but one example.

Just a thought while avoiding assigned tasks for the day.

ole

 

[OpnDownfall]

I do not want to press my knowledge of Hood or Cleburne very far, I am intrigued by the argument that Hood was only a hard fighter as opposed to other important qualities of a Divisional Commander that Cleburne had and Hood did not.
At Gettysburgh on the 2d Cay, When Hood discovered that Sickles' movement had blocked his advance, Hood sent a stream of courier's to Longstreet informing him of that fact and urging redirection of the attack to include the Round Tops to outflank the unexpected block to the original plan. Not the actions of merely (or only) a heads down commander.

 

[Nytram01]

It appears, having been just researching John Bell Hood, that Hood only got the command of the Army of Tennessee through his constant complaints to Richmond about Joe Johnstons conduct. Interestingly when Hood was chosen to replace Johnston, Robert E. Lee counciled Davis against it saying that Hood was "all lion, no fox".

Comparing Cleburne, with his only individual command, to Hood and his individual commands is probably impossible but lets try it for a time.

At Ringgold Gap Patrick Cleburne sucessfully caught the Union army by suprise and managed to predict Joe Hooker's movement following the early Confederate sucess and managed to hold off Hooker's attack, suistaning less casualties than his oponant and then managed to withdrawl without suffering anymore casualties then they had during the battle. Cleburne lost only 221 men while Hooker lost 507

Comparing that battle to Hood's battle at Peachtree Creek. Hood arrived too late to get to the prefered starting position and found Thomas' army on the high ground. Despite the Union armies advantagous position Hood still chose to attack in a full frontal assault. The Confederates managed to drive the Union line back but the Union regrouped and drove the Confederates off. Hood was forced to withdrawl. This battle cost Hood's army 4,796 men while Thomas' casualties were only 1,710.

Hood's style was to engage in totally offensive campaign that cost his side a good deal of men. While such a strategy may have been somewhat effective against the likes of McClellan it was only ever going to lead to the destruction of the Confederate forces against Sherman and Thomas.

Cleburne however seemed to be more of a Longstreet kind of commander, in that he was excedeingly good on the defensive and excedeingly good on the offensive ((at division level)) and, like Longstreet, he looked for weaknesses in the enemies army.

Of course much of this is speculation or gut reaction from me.

However, if we consider that Joe Johnston had, before Hood took command, whittled down the numerical superiority of Sherman's army from 2:1 down to 8:5 then there was no real reason to replace Johnston in the first place, especially considering he was preparing to counter-attack when he was relieved.

 

[ole]

At Gettysburgh on the 2d Cay, When Hood discovered that Sickles' movement had blocked his advance, Hood sent a stream of courier's to Longstreet informing him of that fact and urging redirection of the attack to include the Round Tops to outflank the unexpected block to the original plan. Not the actions of merely (or only) a heads down commander.

Even the lion in the wild knows how to weigh the expenditure of energy against the possible gain. But the lion thinks only of dinner; the fox anticipates dessert.

Comparing that battle to Hood's battle at Peachtree Creek. Hood arrived too late to get to the prefered starting position and found Thomas' army on the high ground. Despite the Union armies advantagous position Hood still chose to attack in a full frontal assault. The Confederates managed to drive the Union line back but the Union regrouped and drove the Confederates off.

Johnston's plan at Peachtree Creek was to assault Thomas' forces in the act of crossing. Hood planned to catch them after crossing and before they got organized. I suppose that might have been a good plan, but it required hair-fine timing that Hood didn't have.

From the moment Hood was elevated over JEJ, his defense was admirable. But it depended on reaction. He gave over to Sherman and Thomas the initiative. The initiative is not something Grant or Lee ever intentionally granted the other side.

ole

 

[OpnDownfall]

The only valid comparison to be made between Cleburne and Hood can only be made at the Division level.. The records of either man as Division Commanders is not well known to me, but from what little I know of them and their records, there is little choose between them except that one served mostly under Lee and the other mostly under Bragg.
Lee's less than full hearted support for Hood's being sent West can as easily be explained by Lee's notorious reluctance to reduce his command by as much as even one division commander, to help any other army or command outside Va. as by any deficiencies on Hood's part.


P.S. JEJ lost his job, specifically because he could not (OR Would Not) inform his Commander-In-Chief that he would or would not defend Atlanta.

 

[EricJacobson]

Lee NEVER said "all lion, no fox." I would suggest reading Richard McMurry's book on Hood to find out what Lee really said, or more specifically wrote.

As far as comparing Ringgold Gap and Peachtree Creek, I'm not sure what the point is. Cleburne is still a division commander and Hood is an army commander. I think even William Hardee's biographer Nat Hughes makes a compelling argument that Peachtree Creek was not Hardee's best day. That certainly doesn't help Hood. And to pick Cleburne's best day as a point of comparison is tough. How about comparing division to division and using Hood at Antietam. Who gives Hooker the kick back to help Jackson? None other than Hood.

But also check out Cleburne in temporary control of a corps at Jonesboro. You will not see anything stellar.

Cleburne is an excellent division commander. I just don't see anything that says he should have ever commanded the army. If he had been promoted to corps commanded in June 1864, maybe he could have taken the reins in Sept 1864. But no corps commander = no army command. Hood, love him or hate him, had been in corps command for five months before taking army command.

One last thing. Joseph Johnston had done EVERYTHING necessary to get himself relieved. He hadn't stopped Sherman, he asked that Andersonville be evacuated (I wonder why?), and gave Davis no specific plan for how to deal with Sherman in mid-July. Don't do a good job with the competition and then start giving your boss vague answers when he presses and you just might find yourself out the door.

 

[ole]

Cleburne is an excellent division commander. I just don't see anything that says he should have ever commanded the army. If he had been promoted to corps commanded in June 1864, maybe he could have taken the reins in Sept 1864. But no corps commander = no army command. Hood, love him or hate him, had been in corps command for five months before taking army command.

On every board I've visited or on which I've participated, there is a faction that has a Cleburne shrine in the CW room. (And others with effigies of whatever prominent general you'd care to name hanging over an eternal flame.)

Don't do a good job with the competition and then start giving your boss vague answers when he presses and you just might find yourself out the door.

It didn't help much that Davis and JEJ had all but drawn swords over matters of seniority at the outset.

But this is a fine, exciting and informative discussion. Keep on trucking!

ole

 

[trice]

I find it interesting that we, on this particular thread, are being asked if a gifted Divisional Commander (Cleburne) would have been a better Army Commander than anotheir Gifted Divisional Commander (Hood).
IMO, the record is not as clear on the subject as some seem to assume .

Robert E. Lee had substantial experience with John Bell Hood.

Before the war, Hood had served in the 2nd Cavalry in Texas -- where Lt. Colonel Robert E. Lee was 2nd in command. (Trivia: Phil Sheridan got a transfer from an infantry regiment in Texas to the West Coast to replace Hood, who was being reassigned to the new 2nd Cavalry.)

During the war, Lee was in Richmond when Hood first began to gather noteriety in the Peninsula, and Hood was under Lee's command for Seven Days, 2nd Manassas, Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Gettysburg.

Yet when asked about promoting Hood, Lee was very reticent, describing Hood in less than glowing terms, and implying he was a good battlefield man but careless otherwise -- a very bad thing to say about a high commander. Such a man needs a great chief-of-staff and staff organization to succeed at very high command, the very things the Confederacy didn't have to support him.

In hindsight, Lee seems to have known very well that Hood was a poor choice, and the experience of Hood in high command shows exactly what Lee feared.

Regards,
Tim

 

[trice]

However, if we consider that Joe Johnston had, before Hood took command, whittled down the numerical superiority of Sherman's army from 2:1 down to 8:5 then there was no real reason to replace Johnston in the first place, especially considering he was preparing to counter-attack when he was relieved.

I liked the rest of your post, but this little bit doesn't seem quite right.

Immediately after the start of the campaign, reinforcements arrived to bring Johnston's strength up to about 75,000. At that point (a week into the campaign?) the ratio would be about 4:3. Johnston does nothing to reduce the ratio from that point on and -- if your 8:5 ratio around July 1 is accurate -- actually lost ground.

Also, there is very close to no evidence that Johnston was actually planning to attack -- other than statements by Johnston after he was relieved. I agree that he might very well have attacked at Peachtree Creek, but with Joe Johnston you just never know.

Regards,
Tim

 

[EricJacobson]

Tim,

Great points. I think reticent is the perfect word to use. Also, Hood's poor staff or choice thereof would haunt him both around Atlanta and in Tennessee.

Eric

 

[OpnDownfall]

Was Lee's damming with faint praise, a warning to Davis Or a clever ploy by Lee, trying to keep from sending help to any other command or theatre, outside of Va.?

 

[larry_cockerham]

Aside from his serious disagreement with Hardee, Hood 'lost' his chief of staff Francis A. Shoup who resigned in mid September while being questioned by a court about the loss of supplies when Atlanta was evacuated. Administration problems abounded after that, most of which Hood apparently ignored. He continued seemingly to ignore both Davis and Beauregard. Beauregard was just an 'advisor', apparently a condition imposed by Davis. Wheeler was ordered by Hood to stay after Sherman. Too few men, too late and he didn't return to Hood until October 8. W.H. Jackson had the only cavalry available to Hood. Beauregard ordered Forrest to join the command, otherwise Hood was lost in a strange new land. Hood seems to have paid little attention to the details of how or if his supplies were to arrive. Beauregard saw the lack of command detail, but was helpless without authority. Seems to me this was a general trying to run an army from a single notepad, without a staff. The results of his future efforts seem to bear that notion out? Without additional fresh southern manpower, I doubt the details made all that much difference.

 

[OpnDownfall]

Too true, Larry..., what Hood did or did not do as army commander, says nothing about what Cleburne would (or Could) have done differently if, by some miracle, he had been jumped to army command.
I repeat, IMO, the only comparison we have is both as Division Commanders. Hood's percieved failures as army commander, is not proof that Cleburne (or any other division commander) would have been any the more successful or fallible (either way), than Hood.
It appears from the record, Cleburne, as division commaner, did not exhibit any particular talents for army command not found in many other division commanders in the AoT, including Hood.

 

[trice]

Was Lee's damming with faint praise, a warning to Davis Or a clever ploy by Lee, trying to keep from sending help to any other command or theatre, outside of Va.?

On July 12, 1864, Jefferson Davis sends the following to Lee. At the time, Braxton Bragg is en route to Atlanta, arriving by the 13th, and Johnston is relieved very shortly after this.
=====
General Johnston has failed, and there are strong indications that he will abandon Atlanta. He urges that prisoners should be removed immediately from Andersonville. It seems necessary to relieve him at once. Who should succeed him? What think you of Hood for the position?
=====

Hood has been serving away from Lee's command since Chickamauga in 1863 at that point, and has been in command of a Corps in Joe Johnston's army for several months. Lee is not talking about losing a general or transferring forces out of his command when he replies the same day (8:15 PM on the 12th):
=====
"Telegram of today received. I regret the fact stated. It is a bad time to relieve the commander of an army situated as that of Tenne. We may lose Atlanta and the army too. Hood is a bold fighter. I am doubtful as to other qualities necessary."
=====

Later that night he sends:
=====

"I am distressed at the intelligence conveyed in your telegram of today. It is a grievous thing to change commander of an army situated as is that of the Tennessee. Still if necessary it ought to be done. I know nothing of the necessity. I had hoped that Johnston was strong enough to deliver battle. We must risk much to save Alabama, Mobile and communication with the Trans-Mississippi. It would be better to concentrate all the cavalry in Mississippi and Tennessee on Sherman's communications. If Johnston abandons Atlanta I suppose he will fall back on Augusta. This loses us Mississippi and communication with Trans-Mississippi. We had better therefore hazard that communication to retain the Country. Hood is a good commander, very industrious on the battlefield, careless off, and I have had no opportunity of judging of his action when the whole responsibility rested upon him. I have a high opinion of his gallantry, earnestness and zeal. General Hardee has more experience in managing an army.
"May God give you wisdom to decide in this momentous matter."
=====

Far from a ringing endorsement of Hood, even after the man has been out of Lee's command for quite a while.

Regards,
Tim

 

[OpnDownfall]

You are right Trice my comment in #34 was incorrect, I stand corrected.
Lee's comments were statements on the obvious; usually unwise to relieve a commander on active campaigning, Hardee had more army command experience, not being able to judge Hood's performance since leaving the ANV, etc, etc,.
It is my understanding that Hardee's military style was JEJ writ small. If JEJ was not fighting the war to Davis' satisfaction, Hardee would not be an improvement, from the CIC's viewpoint. Lee mentions no one else, certainly not Cleburne Or Forrest, for that matter.
It may be that Davis did not want the AoT 'managed' as much as he wanted it 'led' with gallantry, earnestness and zeal, whatever the other imperfections.