Cleburne in Control

[civilwarbuglertn]

What if Cleburne had been given control of the Army of Tennessee at Atlanta instead of Hood? What do you think would have happened.

 

[samgrant]

Might have given Sherman a different set of obstacles to overcome, and may have delayed the capture of Atlanta, but don't think it would have prevented the fall of that city. As to after Atlanta, ...........?????????????

(I hate this kind of question.)

 

[gary]

A. P. Hill proved very competent as a division commander but left a lot to be desired as a Corps Commander. We know what Lee did to Hill. Cleburne would be unprovened and Hardee or Cheatham would be more likely candidates.

Still, Ol Pat turned in a very credible performance as a division commander and as a trainer. I would expect that he would have done a lot more ambushes to wear out Sherman while being forced to retreat. Pat would have known that holding Atlanta was unfeasible in the face of a larger army and that a siege would end in capitulation (ala Vicksburg). Like Johnston, Pat would have skedaddled too. Johnston did have one big ambush planned, but Hood came along in time to prevent Uncle Joe from springing it.

 

[samgrant]

A. P. Hill proved very competent as a division commander but left a lot to be desired as a Corps Commander. We know what Lee did to Hill. Cleburne would be unprovened and Hardee or Cheatham would be more likely candidates.

Still, Ol Pat turned in a very credible performance as a division commander and as a trainer. I would expect that he would have done a lot more ambushes to wear out Sherman while being forced to retreat. Pat would have known that holding Atlanta was unfeasible in the face of a larger army and that a siege would end in capitulation (ala Vicksburg). Like Johnston, Pat would have skedaddled too. Johnston did have one big ambush planned, but Hood came along in time to prevent Uncle Joe from springing it.

G.

Can you enlighten us about that ambush plan?

S.

 

[gary]

OK, not really an ambush. Read on.

Johnston planned to fight at PeachTree Creek. The Union Army of the Cumberland had to cross the Chattahoochee River and this meant that Sherman's command would be divided during the moment of crossing. This is exactly the type of battle that Johnston wanted to fight at Seven Pines. (At Seven Pines, Johnston wanted Longstreet, Hill and Huger to concentrate against the III and IV Corps who were isolated from Franklin & Sumner who had the Chickahominy as a barrier to their reinforcing those two isolated Corps). Similarly, Johnston would refuse Hood on his right and in so doing, use Hood to delay Schofield and McPherson from advancing from Decatur. Using his other two Corps, Stewart & Hardee, Johnston would strike the isolated Army of the Cumberland.

It's based on Napoleon's strategy of fighting from the position in the center. Basically, you get between your opponents, defeat one contingent and rout them, then uniting your forces, turn on the other and defeat them too.

Hood denied that Johnston suggested the plan. Johnston at the time he met Hood stated that he would give Hood all the credit if it succeeded (and if it failed, Johnston would accept all the responsibility). Hardee however was present and post-war, was present when Johnston told this plan to a third party. Johnston then left the room and Hardee was practically in tears saying that the old man had it all planned out, that it would succeed, but Hood refused to listen. Sorry but I forgot which book I read that in.

 

[PINCKNEYUSMCRET]

Not as knowledgeable about all of this as you folks, but if I understand it, General Cleburne would probably have continued in the Johnston mode. It appears that Davis and some in the congress wanted a more aggressive operation, thus the choice of Hood. Did Johnson share this plan with Davis? If he did, it must have been rejected. All in all the outcome would not have changed.

 

[ole]

Hood denied that Johnston suggested the plan. Johnston at the time he met Hood stated that he would give Hood all the credit if it succeeded (and if it failed, Johnston would accept all the responsibility).

Johnston's plan, as noted was to strike the AotC as it was crossing Peachtree Creek. Hood's plan was to strike the AotC as it finished crossing and before it got entrenched. The difference? I'd guess Hood was aiming to get everybody at once rather than let those on the other side of the creek get away.

Johnston's plan was better. Hood's relied on very close timing -- after this and before that -- a commodity rarely reliably available. Timing is not so important in Johnston's plan -- hit them when they're partly across. They'll be attempting to reform and spacing out to make room; they'll be milling about and will have no time to organize and entrench -- easy pickings.

Did Johnson share this plan with Davis?

Highly unlikely a battle plan is shared with the CnC. A campaign, certainly; not a battle.
Ole

 

[gary]

Concur with Ole. Johnston never knew when he was going to fight and he always looked for a favorable opportunity when he could attack only a portion of the enemy's with the majority of his own. He tried it at Seven Pines and wanted to do it again at Bentonville. Peach Tree Creek would be no exception.

However, since Johnston didn't know when the opportunity would present itself, he couldn't tell Davis in advance. This is something that Davis couldn't stand since was the type that needed communication (no matter how useless it was).

 

[whitworth]

Confederate Provincialism

The Confederacy was too provincial to appoint General Cleburne to head an army. Foreign born, interesting politics, and the lack of a sheep skin from West Point would rule Cleburne out.
Once saw the sword of General Cleburne at the Atlanta History Center in Atlanta, Georgia.

 

[gunny]

As successful as Hood was in his leadership roles as brigade and division commander - as well as Cleburne - I think the only advantage Cleburne would have was his physical condition. And maybe not even that. He suffered severely from illnesses directly related to his gunshot wound before the war and never really recovered. He was somewhat frail. He wasn't present at Jonesborough and suffered regular illness.

I think the outcome would have remained the same. The loss of Atlanta.

 

[scone]

As successful as Hood was in his leadership roles as brigade and division commander - as well as Cleburne - I think the only advantage Cleburne would have was his physical condition. And maybe not even that. He suffered severely from illnesses directly related to his gunshot wound before the war and never really recovered. He was somewhat frail. He wasn't present at Jonesborough and suffered regular illness.

I think the outcome would have remained the same. The loss of Atlanta.

Gunny I dont recall him being shot before the war.. but do know about him being wounded at Richmond, Ky could you enlighten me on the other wound.

Missed you Saturday at the former Golf course

regards, steven

 

[gunny]

On May 24, 1856 Cleburne and Hindman were shot in a dispute with Dorsey Rice and James T. Marriot. The engagement resulted in the wounding of Hindman in the chest and Cleburne in the back. He was shot "just below the waist near the spine, the bullet traveling upward at a forty-five degree angle."

The wound was initially thought to be mortal, but after lingering in and out of danger after a week, he pulled through.

 

[scone]

Thank you for the Info.. Never new that, or at least I dont recall knowing of it..

regards,
Steven

 

[smug]

The loss of Atlanta--yes. But I believe Cleburne would not have headed to the north and then on to Tennesse. The fight where Sherman was. Sherman's march to the sea would not have been easy with Cleburne in command.

 

[Admiral_Porter]

He wasn't present at Jonesborough and suffered regular illness.

Cleburne was indeed at Jonesboro. He was commanding Hardee's corps.

 

[Nytram01]

I believe Cleburne's greatest strength lay in his ability to train and drill his men into excelence, something he no doubt learnt to do during his short time in the British Army.

The product of that drilling gave him perhaps the finest division in the Confederate forces, if not perhaps the finest division on either side.

He was also able read a battle well and react in a way beneficial to his army.

In the battles that I have seen that Cleburne was involved in, with the exception of Franklin, he won his own battle even if the Army he was figthing for lost.

The question would be whether or not he would be able to turn those individual victories for his division into overall victories for the Army.

Going on the Battle of Ringgold Gap, which is the only time Ceburne had an individual command that I know of, Cleburne may have performed well in command of an army against an enemy he knew well.

And if Sherman's tactics were the same as he used at the battle fo Chattanooga, though admittedly that was Grants strategies, he isn't going to make much ground against Cleburne in a battle situation.

But there are too many unkowns to say for cirtain whether or not Cleburne would have been able to reach better outcome than Hood or Johnston could have.

 

[OpnDownfall]

I agree that jumping from Division command to Army command is a big jump. An army commander rarely has his whole command under his eye or personal control.
Cleburne was a hard fighter as was the AoT, but the art of commanding is more than command under fire. It is logistics, intelligence (gathering and interpreting), knowing and getting along with your immediate subordinates (a necessity, for anyone wanting the command the balky senior officers of the AoT), etc.
From what little I know of him, Cleburne's main attributes was training his men and being a dogged, hard, fighter. As I noted, the AoT was already a dogged hard fighting army, I am not sure of any other qualities Cleburne had that would have made him a better Army commander than many another Division commander of the AoT.

 

[OpnDownfall]

P.S. In doing some research on Cleburne, I came accross the reminiscences of a Iriving A. Buck, former Asst.-Addjutant Gen. of Cleburne's Divison, when Cleburne read him his proposal. Gen. Buck remembers that he offered several objections to publicizing it at that time (although he himself approved). One of the reasons was that a Corps Command was open in the AoT with a Lt. Generalcy accompanying it and a public avowal of the proposal most probably would cost him his chance for a major promotion.
As we know, Cleburne chose necessity over promotion and went ahead with his plans.
If Mr. Buck's memory was accurate, Cleburne could have have been a Corps Commander And a Lt. General, but for circumstances and perhaps, fate.

 

[cw1865]

Foreign

We have to remember that he is of foreign origin. At most he's going to get a corps.

 

[EricJacobson]

As to the original question of Cleburne instead of Hood...Cleburne was NEVER considered because he had never even been a corps commander. Thus it's a question without an answer because no one has any facts upon which to judge Cleburne at corps command.

Part of the Cleburne myth is whether he could have commanded the army. No one in the 19th century ever really posed those questions because they knew Cleburne was never an option.

Same with Forrest. He was a cavalry commander, never an army commander. In fact, he never even commanded infantry in the true sense. I always get a giggle out of those who just blindly toss out the ol' Cleburne or Forrest could have done a better job than Hood. That is an opinion based on emotion, not fact. I don't think anyone today would suggest that if David Petraeus were to be replaced a division commander, no matter how could, should be given army command.


Hood's promotion is open to debate, but Cleburne, rightfully so, was never an option.