Can John McClernand be redeemed

[tony_gunter]

Yeah, I'm definitely thinking Sherman meant "struggled":

This was about 10 1/2 a.m., at which time the enemy had made a furious attack on General McClernand's whole front. He straggled most determinedly, but, finding him pressed, I moved McDowell's brigade directly against the left flank of the enemy, forced him back some distance, and then directed the men to avail themselves of every cover-trees, fallen timber, and a wooded valley to our right. We held this position for four long hours, sometimes gaining and at others losing ground; General McClernand and myself acting in perfect concert, and struggling to maintain this line. While we were so hard pressed, two Iowa regiments approached from the rear, but could not be brought up to the severe fire that was raging in our front, and General Grant, who visited us on that ground, will remember our situation about 3 p.m.; but about 4 p.m. it was evident that Hurlbut's line had been driven back to the river; and knowing that General Lew Wallace was coming with reinforcements from Cramp's Landing, General McClernand and I, on consultation, selected a new line of defense, with its right covering a bridge by which General Wallace had to approach. We fell back as well as we could, gathering in addition to our own such scattered forces as we could find, and formed the new line.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

And really … as a division commander is it so terrible to seek guidance from someone more experienced in military matters? But I could see where Sherman would be uneasy with that quality in an army commander.

Sherman may have felt the deference represented a lack of leadership or self-confidence.

Sherman was also loyal to Grant, generally biased against non-academy generals, and disliked McClernand specifically. I wouldn't be surprised if Sherman was deliberately negative in his reports, especially if he sensed McClernand wanted Grant's spot.

 

[Belfoured]

Interestingly enough Sherman's Shiloh report was fairly kind to him. But after Shiloh, when it became obvious that McClernand was attempting to displace Grant at the head of the army, Sherman launched into the most slanderous critique of McClernand imaginable, claiming he "showed the white feather."

I've been trying to align this critique of McClernand with what Sherman wrote about him at Shiloh, and the only thing I can imagine to which Sherman was alluding is that McClernand chose to defer to Sherman during the defensive phase of the battle. Like, sure, he gave Sherman all the support he asked for … but Sherman had to request it and Sherman somewhat directed the defense once the two had joined lines? As senior officer on the field, McClernand should have been issuing orders to Sherman and not vice versa especially given that Sherman at that point in the battle was commanding a collection of remnants.

That would match up with what we know of McClernand from Donelson, right? With Grant absent and McClernand the senior officer on the field, he had the right to order whatever support he needed from CF Smith but didn't.

And really … as a division commander is it so terrible to seek guidance from someone more experienced in military matters? But I could see where Sherman would be uneasy with that quality in an army commander.

I'm also curious about the passage in Sherman's memoirs that say McClernand "straggled" a bit at Shiloh … did he mean struggle?

Those are fair points but I think it's fair to keep in mind that as of April 6 Sherman himself wasn't close to a demonstrably capable, experienced division commander (and played his own role in the Army of the T being surprised by the attack). I've seen nothing about McClernand's handling of his division which was incompetent and the point about McClernand deferring and cooperating becomes a bit of a "**** if you do and **** if you don't" issue. As pointed out, McClernand's chief fault may have been his inability to "play with others". Here he actually was able to do that.

No idea what Sherman meant in the Memoirs but I take those with a heavy dose of salt anyway.

 

[Belfoured]

Sherman may have felt the deference represented a lack of leadership or self-confidence.

Sherman was also loyal to Grant, generally biased against non-academy generals, and disliked McClernand specifically. I wouldn't be surprised if Sherman was deliberately negative in his reports, especially if he sensed McClernand wanted Grant's spot.

And, to follow up, let's speculate on what Cump would have written had McClernand not deferred.

 

[tony_gunter]

Those are fair points but I think it's fair to keep in mind that as of April 6 Sherman himself wasn't close to a demonstrably capable, experienced division commander (and played his own role in the Army of the T being surprised by the attack). I've seen nothing about McClernand's handling of his division which was incompetent and the point about McClernand deferring and cooperating becomes a bit of a "**** if you do and **** if you don't" issue. As pointed out, McClernand's chief fault may have been his inability to "play with others". Here he actually was able to do that.

No idea what Sherman meant in the Memoirs but I take those with a heavy dose of salt anyway.

But that's kinda my point. McClernand was the senior officer on the field, and had two battles under his belt (which was two more than Sherman). The fact that he let Sherman take the lead may have unnerved Sherman with regard to McClernand commanding a corps much less an army, and maybe explains Sherman's otherwise absolutely unwarranted "showed the white feather" remarks.

 

[Belfoured]

But that's kinda my point. McClernand was the senior officer on the field, and had two battles under his belt (which was two more than Sherman). The fact that he let Sherman take the lead may have unnerved Sherman with regard to McClernand commanding a corps much less an army, and maybe explains Sherman's otherwise absolutely unwarranted "showed the white feather" remarks.

I understood but my point is that he was deferring to the "military professional" and doing that is hardly "showing the white feather". As I posted, what do we think Sherman would have written if McClernand had told him to "bugger off" and insisted on rank? The objective fact is that McClernand and Sherman worked effectively in concert on April 6, as they should have given circumstances and location, rather than debating seniority, etc (such as Longstreet and Huger did on the way to the attack at Seven Pines). Sherman, of course, had already gone though his own "white feather" moment elsewhere as reported in the media. I really think that this particular issue is a "no win" for McClernand and I think it matters very little in assessing his performance at Shiloh.

 

[wausaubob]

I understood but my point is that he was deferring to the "military professional" and doing that is hardly "showing the white feather". As I posted, what do we think Sherman would have written if McClernand had told him to "bugger off" and insisted on rank? The objective fact is that McClernand and Sherman worked effectively in concert on April 6, as they should have given circumstances and location, rather than debating seniority, etc (such as Longstreet and Huger did on the way to the attack at Seven Pines). Sherman, of course, had already gone though his own "white feather" moment elsewhere as reported in the media. I really think that this particular issue is a "no win" for McClernand and I think it matters very little in assessing his performance at Shiloh.

I think it was later during operations in Arkansas and Mississippi when McClernand began to realize he wasn't cut out for combat command. I think that may have colored Sherman's hindsight appraisals. They also became competitors for promotion. If McClernand had played his hand differently he might have gotten a better command.

 

[wausaubob]

Sherman short changed the other political general, John Logan, too. But Logan got the Il senate seat anyway.

 

[tony_gunter]

Sherman short changed the other political general, John Logan, too. But Logan got the Il senate seat anyway.

True, but after Hood got rocked at Atlanta Sherman could afford to appoint a potato to army command.