Can John McClernand be redeemed

[tony_gunter]

Since we are discussing the redemption of terrible generals …

Was there anything redeeming about John McClernand? I don't have the Kiper biography with me, but my takeaway from McClernand's role in the Vicksburg Campaign is that he had the military prowess of a potato.

Sure, he could generally point in the direction of the enemy and order his men to fight, but beyond that he didn't seem to offer any tactical direction. His two major battles on the road to Vicksburg, Port Gibson and Champion Hill, devolved into static fronts despite heavy numerical advantages.

Maybe this could be chalked up to information overload, with so many units to manage. Did he fare any better as division commander or was it more of the same?

 

[Belfoured]

Since we are discussing the redemption of terrible generals …

Was there anything redeeming about John McClernand? I don't have the Kiper biography with me, but my takeaway from McClernand's role in the Vicksburg Campaign is that he had the military prowess of a potato.

Sure, he could generally point in the direction of the enemy and order his men to fight, but beyond that he didn't seem to offer any tactical direction. His two major battles on the road to Vicksburg, Port Gibson and Champion Hill, devolved into static fronts despite heavy numerical advantages.

Maybe this could be chalked up to information overload, with so many units to manage. Did he fare any better as division commander or was it more of the same?

I have Kiper and it's definitely worthwhile. I can't say I've read it cover to cover, but I've read large portions in detail. I think McClernand comes off in a higher category than "potato" but at best I'd say "mixed" in terms of his military skills. He probably did better at Belmont, Fort Donelson and Shiloh than he tends to get credit for, but after that it's mediocrity for the most part. I'll leave to you the assessment of him in the Vicksburg Campaign.

I think the bigger problem is that he was definitely a pol, had a higher estimate of the level of command he was suited for than the reality, and did not get along with others in the military context. As he showed repeatedly, he couldn't shut up and it finally got him sent to the back water once his political importance began to fade.

 

[bankerpapaw]

Grant was correct in firing McClernand.

 

[tony_gunter]

I have Kiper and it's definitely worthwhile. I can't say I've read it cover to cover, but I've read large portions in detail. I think McClernand comes off in a higher category than "potato" but at best I'd say "mixed" in terms of his military skills. He probably did better at Belmont, Fort Donelson and Shiloh than he tends to get credit for, but after that it's mediocrity for the most part. I'll leave to you the assessment of him in the Vicksburg Campaign.

I think the bigger problem is that he was definitely a pol, had a higher estimate of the level of command he was suited for than the reality, and did not get along with others in the military context. As he showed repeatedly, he couldn't shut up and it finally got him sent to the back water once his political importance began to fade.

I have the Kiper biography somewhere, but it's been a minute since I read it. I do remember thinking that the military aspects of the biography were derived from sources that were way too lenient with McClernand's incompetence.

I'm just curious if anyone has done a deep dive on McClernand's performance prior to Vicksburg and come to a different conclusion from those battles. Maybe he was ok as a division commander but over his head in corps command?

With regard to corps command, he was definitely a potato.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Tony, agreed. How one feels about what he did at Belmont, Donelson, and Shiloh depends on what one takes away from the authors you read - some are kinder to him than others and the source material is open to interpretation.

 

[breckod]

Whatever other qualities he may have possessed, McClernand was fundamentally not a good team player and thus the cause was probably better served without him.

 

[wausaubob]

He probably cannot be redeemed as a general. But he and George McClellan seem to have accepted McClellan's defeat in the 1864 election as men of honor. They mainly stayed away from criticizing Grant and McClernand honored his friend Lincoln by taking part in s the funeral train that returned Lincoln's remains to Illinois. Maybe McClernand got on with his life. As a man and human being, he might have taken care of it himself.

 

[wausaubob]

And as a recruiter he performed a tremendous service. The people he brought into the army were effective.

 

[Belfoured]

I have the Kiper biography somewhere, but it's been a minute since I read it. I do remember thinking that the military aspects of the biography were derived from sources that were way too lenient with McClernand's incompetence.

I'm just curious if anyone has done a deep dive on McClernand's performance prior to Vicksburg and come to a different conclusion from those battles. Maybe he was ok as a division commander but over his head in corps command?

With regard to corps command, he was definitely a potato.

I think that's a fair assessment of Kiper's approach - which is what tends to happen with about 90% of biographies. That said, my own impression is that there's more room for making a case for McClernand in those battles than for his performance in higher command. For example, his actions at Shiloh tend to get fogged up in hindsight by Sherman and Grant and colored by later developments.

 

[wausaubob]

I think that's a fair assessment of Kiper's approach - which is what tends to happen with about 90% of biographies. That said, my own impression is that there's more room for making a case for McClernand in those battles than for his performance in higher command. For example, his actions at Shiloh tend to get fogged up in hindsight by Sherman and Grant and colored by later developments.

Curt Field's General Grant agreed. In his impersonation of Grant he stated McClernand was a good general when he wanted to be.

 

[tony_gunter]

Speaking of Kiper, is he the one that relates the interchange between Grant and McClernand at Port Gibson where Grant suggests to McClernand that he conserve artillery ammunition because of the tenuous supply situation and McClernand snaps back "this is MY battle"?

 

[Belfoured]

Speaking of Kiper, is he the one that relates the interchange between Grant and McClernand at Port Gibson where Grant suggests to McClernand that he conserve artillery ammunition because of the tenuous supply situation and McClernand snaps back "this is MY battle"?

I'd have to check. That rings a bell but whether it was Kiper or not I don't recall offhand.

 

[General JJ]

Speaking of Kiper, is he the one that relates the interchange between Grant and McClernand at Port Gibson where Grant suggests to McClernand that he conserve artillery ammunition because of the tenuous supply situation and McClernand snaps back "this is MY battle"?

Haven't read Kiper, but I'm around 80% sure I read this in Grabau.

 

[ErnieMac]

McClernand's performances at Belmont and Fort Donelson were less than stellar.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Since we are discussing the redemption of terrible generals …

Was there anything redeeming about John McClernand? I don't have the Kiper biography with me, but my takeaway from McClernand's role in the Vicksburg Campaign is that he had the military prowess of a potato.

Sure, he could generally point in the direction of the enemy and order his men to fight, but beyond that he didn't seem to offer any tactical direction. His two major battles on the road to Vicksburg, Port Gibson and Champion Hill, devolved into static fronts despite heavy numerical advantages.

Maybe this could be chalked up to information overload, with so many units to manage. Did he fare any better as division commander or was it more of the same?

McClernand has always struck me as having been alright, not great. I think that he was probably a weaker Corps commander than division commander. There were better options out there, for sure.

 

[Belfoured]

McClernand's performances at Belmont and Fort Donelson were less than stellar.

Probably a fair point, although one certainly wouldn't get there for Belmont based on Grant's glowing report in the OR, Vol. III at 271.

 

[Belfoured]

McClernand has always struck me as having been alright, not great. I think that he was probably a weaker Corps commander than division commander. There were better options out there, for sure.

I think "alright, not great" is probably where I'd also land him as a division commander. Grant, for one, did praise his "coolness and judgment" at Belmont and his performance at Shiloh was competent.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

He would have done better, and gotten along much better with his fellow generals, if not for being a transparent gloryhound.

 

[Belfoured]

He would have done better, and gotten along much better with his fellow generals, if not for being a transparent gloryhound.

For one thing, he did an awful lot of post-battle "speechifying" - in large part about himself.

 

[tony_gunter]

I think "alright, not great" is probably where I'd also land him as a division commander. Grant, for one, did praise his "coolness and judgment" at Belmont and his performance at Shiloh was competent.

Interestingly enough Sherman's Shiloh report was fairly kind to him. But after Shiloh, when it became obvious that McClernand was attempting to displace Grant at the head of the army, Sherman launched into the most slanderous critique of McClernand imaginable, claiming he "showed the white feather."

I've been trying to align this critique of McClernand with what Sherman wrote about him at Shiloh, and the only thing I can imagine to which Sherman was alluding is that McClernand chose to defer to Sherman during the defensive phase of the battle. Like, sure, he gave Sherman all the support he asked for … but Sherman had to request it and Sherman somewhat directed the defense once the two had joined lines? As senior officer on the field, McClernand should have been issuing orders to Sherman and not vice versa especially given that Sherman at that point in the battle was commanding a collection of remnants.

That would match up with what we know of McClernand from Donelson, right? With Grant absent and McClernand the senior officer on the field, he had the right to order whatever support he needed from CF Smith but didn't.

And really … as a division commander is it so terrible to seek guidance from someone more experienced in military matters? But I could see where Sherman would be uneasy with that quality in an army commander.

I'm also curious about the passage in Sherman's memoirs that say McClernand "straggled" a bit at Shiloh … did he mean struggle?