C-SPAN Talk on Meade

Brown tends to take liberties like this, making his presentation problematic. He says at one point Meade had no topographic maps and at another point he says Meade looked at his map and saw that Pipe Creek would be a good place for a defensive line.

It's possible that Meade had topographic maps of parts of Maryland, but not of Pennsylvania.

Brown’s entire presentation smacks of someone who is trying to twist the evidence to fit what he wants to be true instead of having the evidence tell him what was true. One is best advised to corroborate everything he says with other sources.

Am I the only person who immediately thought of Tom Carhart's Lee's Lost Triumph? Especially both assume extensive knowledge of tactical thought from men whose pre-war talents lay predominately in engineering.

Have you read Brown's Retreat from Gettysburg: Lee, Logistics, and the Pennsylvania Campaign? Was "twist the evidence to fit what he wants to be true" an issue in that book?

I found it odd too that there were no questions. All the other talks I've seen had time for questions afterward.

I got the impression that there were computer difficulties at the beginning (perhaps that was just C-SPAN picking up coverage too soon?) and/or Brown ran long on his talk.

As @Bee knows, I spoke with a couple of historians after that talk, one of whom is writing a biography of Meade, and asked if they thought his claims about Meade remembering Mahan's words and using Clausewitz and Jomini held water. They were skeptical as well.

How many Meade biographies are in the works right now?

It's not insignificant that Meade graduated 19th of 56 cadets in 1835. In other words, 12 years before Mahan's book and as an unremarkable student (despite being a pretty good engineer and someone who I would not think got many demerits).

I have a vague recollection from a Lee biography about an extra-curricular military study club, presumably sponsored by Mahan (Lee graduated 6 years ahead of Meade).

If it hasn't happened already, someone definitely needs to write a book on what West Point soldiers actually studied from the 1820s to the 1850s as there seem to be some rather diverse ideas on the subject. Does Carol Reardon's With a Sword in One Hand and Jomini in the Other: The Problem of Military Thought in the Civil War North cover this?
 
It's possible that Meade had topographic maps of parts of Maryland, but not of Pennsylvania.

Brown claimed he didn't have any topographic maps.

Am I the only person who immediately thought of Tom Carhart's Lee's Lost Triumph? Especially both assume extensive knowledge of tactical thought from men whose pre-war talents lay predominately in engineering.

Have you read Brown's Retreat from Gettysburg: Lee, Logistics, and the Pennsylvania Campaign? Was "twist the evidence to fit what he wants to be true" an issue in that book?

I read "Retreat" many years ago, and as I recall I was very impressed and didn't get the idea he was trying to twist the evidence in that book.


I got the impression that there were computer difficulties at the beginning (perhaps that was just C-SPAN picking up coverage too soon?) and/or Brown ran long on his talk.

I don't recall his being delayed by technical difficulties.

How many Meade biographies are in the works right now?

Brooks Simpson made the comment that in a couple years he expected his bookshelves to be groaning from the weight of all the Meade biographies that are supposed to be coming out.

It's not insignificant that Meade graduated 19th of 56 cadets in 1835. In other words, 12 years before Mahan's book and as an unremarkable student (despite being a pretty good engineer and someone who I would not think got many demerits).
Not sure of the point here.

I have a vague recollection from a Lee biography about an extra-curricular military study club, presumably sponsored by Mahan (Lee graduated 6 years ahead of Meade).

That was the Napoleonic Club mentioned in my post.

If it hasn't happened already, someone definitely needs to write a book on what West Point soldiers actually studied from the 1820s to the 1850s as there seem to be some rather diverse ideas on the subject.

James L. Morrison, Jr., "The Best School in the World:" West Point, the Pre-Civil War Years, 1833-1866.

Does Carol Reardon's With a Sword in One Hand and Jomini in the Other: The Problem of Military Thought in the Civil War North cover this?

She points out that neither Grant, nor McClellan, nor "most other Civil War generals" gave Jomini much ink in their memoirs. I don't recall hearing of a letter from Meade or any other writing about what Meade ever said or wrote that mentioned Jomini.

"Simply put, "the Jomini whom [David] Donald and [T. Harry] Williams placed on a pedestal has not survived scholarly scrutiny unscathed. As James L. Morrison's detailed analysis of West Point's antebellum curriculum has shown, for instance, cadets studied military strategy for only eight class periods during the spring semester of first-class (senior) year, and, until at least 1854, they read only extracts of Jomini's work. No cadet had the opportunity, as Donald once suggested, to make 'Jomini's works his Bible.' Moreover, the effectiveness of influential West Point professor Dennis Hart Mahan to inculcate a lasting appreciation of 'Jominian' ideas into the minds of his cadets or the junior officers in his Napoleon Club has not been conclusively established." [p. 8]
 
It's not insignificant that Meade graduated 19th of 56 cadets in 1835. In other words, 12 years before Mahan's book and as an unremarkable student (despite being a pretty good engineer and someone who I would not think got many demerits).
Not sure of the point here.

Even if Mahan's "Jominism" was real, Meade may not have been a good enough student at West Point to really absorb it and/or to voluntarily do the necessary extra study work on the subject (I don't think he was stupid - quite the contrary - but his class finish suggests he was a mediocre student). It would have been more likely someone like Lee would have picked up or other top students.
 
I was pretty impressed with his discussion of maps and what Reynolds would have planned to do. Brown never says in so many words that Reynolds was making a reconnaissance in force---something new to me. I would have liked to have seen more discussion of Day 2, but it took a long time to set the stage. I think Meade comes off well, but am not familiar with all the details the rest of you are. I can only watch that discussion. Is the problem that the death of Reynolds supposedly unhinged a good plan to fall back once the Confederates had deployed (as per Brown)?
Same here. I found it peculiar that there was no official order for what Reynolds was supposed to do - only that dispatch in Meade's handwriting that they pulled out of Reynolds' bag and handed over to Howard. How well is it known that Meade personally wrote Reynolds orders what to do?

I'm also now wondering where exactly Buford fits in and what exactly his orders were. Was he sent by Reynolds or Meade up to Gettysburg? According to this wonderful lecture about Buford's defense of Gettysburg by our own @Eric Wittenberg (around 19:00) Buford "is given orders to go to Gettysburg and hold the town." That sounds to me like Reynolds ordered Buford up to Gettysburg after the cavalry reported sightings of the Confederate army. But Meade's dispatch asked Reynolds to only interrupt the Confederate communications and then fall back to Emmitsburg once the Confederates are closing in. Holding Gettysburg was never the intention. So Buford by defending the town was violating orders. Or is my understanding wrong here?
 
Same here. I found it peculiar that there was no official order for what Reynolds was supposed to do - only that dispatch in Meade's handwriting that they pulled out of Reynolds' bag and handed over to Howard. How well is it known that Meade personally wrote Reynolds orders what to do?

I'm also now wondering where exactly Buford fits in and what exactly his orders were. Was he sent by Reynolds or Meade up to Gettysburg? According to this wonderful lecture about Buford's defense of Gettysburg by our own @Eric Wittenberg (around 19:00) Buford "is given orders to go to Gettysburg and hold the town." That sounds to me like Reynolds ordered Buford up to Gettysburg after the cavalry reported sightings of the Confederate army. But Meade's dispatch asked Reynolds to only interrupt the Confederate communications and then fall back to Emmitsburg once the Confederates are closing in. Holding Gettysburg was never the intention. So Buford by defending the town was violating orders. Or is my understanding wrong here?

PLEASONTON ordered Buford to go to Gettysburg, not Reynolds. Your assumption is incorrect.
 
If we're going by Brown's argument wouldn't Buford need to hold out long enough for infantry to arrive? Cavalry alone being insufficient for the intended purpose.
 
I thought his talk was self-contradictory, taking liberties with the facts, and fanciful.

He misstated the circumstances of Meade’s being ordered to command the Army of the Potomac. He claims that in his letter to his wife, Meade said, “Margaret, I am going straight at them.” That’s not quite what he wrote. Here’s what he wrote:

"To Mrs. George G. Meade:
Headquarters army of the Potomac, June 29, 1863.
It has pleased Almighty God to place me in the trying position that for some time past we have been talking about. Yesterday morning, at 3 A. M., I was aroused from my sleep by an officer from Washington entering my tent, and after waking me up, saying he had come to give me trouble. At first I thought that it was either to relieve or arrest me, and promptly replied to him, that my conscience was clear, void of offense towards any man; I was prepared for his bad news. He then handed me a communication to read; which I found was an order relieving Hooker from the command and assigning me to it. As, dearest, you know how reluctant we both have been to see me placed in this position, and as it appears to be God’s will for some good purpose—at any rate, as a soldier, I had nothing to do but accept and exert my utmost abilities to command success. This, so help me God, I will do, and trusting to Him, who in his good pleasure has thought it proper to place me where I am, I shall pray for strength and power to get through with the task assigned me. I cannot write you all I would like. I am moving at once against Lee, whom I am in hopes Couch will at least check for a few days; if so, a battle will decide the fate of our country and our cause. Pray earnestly, pray for the success of my country, (for it is my success besides). Love to all. I will try and write often, but must depend on George."

Brown tends to take liberties like this, making his presentation problematic. He says at one point Meade had no topographic maps and at another point he says Meade looked at his map and saw that Pipe Creek would be a good place for a defensive line. Such would not be the case if Meade had no topographic maps. He gives a fairly lengthy account of what he claims Dennis Hart Mahan taught at West Point over twenty years earlier. He claims Mahan was a disciple of Carl von Clausewitz. He quotes from an 1847 book by Mahan. Then he assumes all the commanders had read this and had remembered what Mahan had said at West Point more than twenty years previous to the battle. Of course he brings in Jomini, claiming the commanders had read and digested Clausewitz, Jomini, and Mahan. Well, that’s poppycock. First of all, Clausewitz wasn’t translated into English until 1873, well after the Civil War. West Point was not a school for generals. It was an engineering school, turning out not general officers but lieutenants who would, if they led anyone at all, would lead only small detachments. Nineteenth Century officers prior to the Civil War generally didn’t spend their time reading military treatises. Henry W. Halleck was the exception, not the rule. They learned how to be company grade officers.

"The study of generalship was also lacking at the Military Academy, with the sole sources of exposure to these complex concepts the brief period of instruction from Professor Mahan and individual fascination with the legacy of Napoleon and his conquests, which were held as the epitome of military skill. In the midst of an educational experience dominated by practical engineering and drill, Professor Mahan offered a nine-hour seminar on 'The Science of War,' which appeared as only a small part of the course on fortifications and military engineering. Yet for the cadets at antebellum West Point, this class was not a foundation for further study but their only formal exposure to the study of military history, and it fell short of inspiring intellectual growth by any measure. The brief course actually could afford very little time spent on the study of military history and fostered no follow-on program for self-study be[sides the often small Napoleon Club of faculty and cadets that focused on the principles of the Corsican master of war. Mahan deserves credit as the author of one of the first American contributions to the study of war, yet his seminal work, Outpost, was more a text on field fortifications and minor tactics than a practical guide on strategy, military policy, or operational art." [Thomas J. Goss, The War Within the Union High Command: Politics and Generalship During the Civil War, p. 10

Brown’s entire presentation smacks of someone who is trying to twist the evidence to fit what he wants to be true instead of having the evidence tell him what was true. One is best advised to corroborate everything he says with other sources.
Well, the presentation was what the presentation was. The presentation was interesting and Brown got the big picture right i.e. Meade's performance at Gettysburg was nothing short of Stunning.
 
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Well, the presentation was what the presentation was. The presentation was interesting and Brown got the big picture right i.e. Meade's performance at Gettysburg was nothing short of Stunning.

Yeah, it was short of stunning. Meade ignored Sickles' concerns when he could have straightened him out pretty quickly. He figured the main attack on the 2nd would be on his right. Instead, it was on his left. Howard, Hancock, Warren, and a number of other officers saved the day over and over. This is not to say Meade didn't do well. He did. But stunning? Nah. Not stunning.
 
Yeah, it was short of stunning. Meade ignored Sickles' concerns when he could have straightened him out pretty quickly. He figured the main attack on the 2nd would be on his right. Instead, it was on his left. Howard, Hancock, Warren, and a number of other officers saved the day over and over. This is not to say Meade didn't do well. He did. But stunning? Nah. Not stunning.
Meade did not ignore Sickles "concerns". Meade gave Sickles clear orders, instructed Sickles on troop placement, and sent others to instruct Sickles. Meade instructs Sykes to take his 5th corps to the Left and "hold it at all hazards." As Meade rides toward Sickles,he sends Warren to Little Round Top. Meade then asks Hancock to send a division to the Left. Meade is orchestrating these moves to compensate for Sickles blunder. Meade was very active in this battle and quickly adjusts his troops to the changing conditions of the battle. Having been in command of 100,000 troops for only 3 days, successfully, countering and defeating every attack by Lee, Meade's performance was stunning.
 
Meade did not ignore Sickles "concerns". Meade gave Sickles clear orders, instructed Sickles on troop placement, and sent others to instruct Sickles. Meade instructs Sykes to take his 5th corps to the Left and "hold it at all hazards." As Meade rides toward Sickles,he sends Warren to Little Round Top. Meade then asks Hancock to send a division to the Left. Meade is orchestrating these moves to compensate for Sickles blunder. Meade was very active in this battle and quickly adjusts his troops to the changing conditions of the battle. Having been in command of 100,000 troops for only 3 days, successfully, countering and defeating every attack by Lee, Meade's performance was stunning.

Meade ignored Sickles and couldn't be bothered with him. His instructions were vague, and Sickles himself had to find Hunt to go with him.

Meade did well, but he was considerably less than stunning. Hyperbole is not helpful in understanding the battle.
 
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Meade ignored Sickles and couldn't be bothered with him. His instructions were vague, and Sickles himself had to find Hunt to go with him.

Meade did well, but he was considerably less than stunning. Hyperbole is not helpful in understanding the battle.
Lol. "Vague instructions"? Really? Not too difficult to to connect your (Sickles) right brigade with Hancock's left brigade to extend and complete a line of brigades running the length of Cemetery Ridge to Little Round Top, is it? Btw, Sickles doesn't "have to find Hunt to go with him",as you state...... Meade sent Hunt to ride South with Sickles.
 
Lol. "Vague instructions"? Really? Not too difficult to to connect your (Sickles) right brigade with Hancock's left brigade to extend and complete a line of brigades running the length of Cemetery Ridge to Little Round Top, is it? Btw, Sickles doesn't "have to find Hunt to go with him",as you state...... Meade sent Hunt to ride South with Sickles.

He was told to occupy the area previously occupied by Geary's 12th Corps division. Geary didn't occupy a position. His men were massed in the vicinity of Little Round Top. Here's what the historian of the 141st PA said: "Geary had moved about five o'clock in the morning, and Sickles did not receive his orders until an hour later, when being ignorant of the position Geary had held, and no officer being left to direct him, the order was imperfectly carried out." [David Craft, History of the 141st Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, p. 118]

Sickles asked Meade to go with him to confirm the position. Meade refused. Sickles asked for Warren to go with him. He was told Warren was too busy. Sickles then asked Hunt to go, and Meade assented.
 
He was told to occupy the area previously occupied by Geary's 12th Corps division. Geary didn't occupy a position. His men were massed in the vicinity of Little Round Top. Here's what the historian of the 141st PA said: "Geary had moved about five o'clock in the morning, and Sickles did not receive his orders until an hour later, when being ignorant of the position Geary had held, and no officer being left to direct him, the order was imperfectly carried out." [David Craft, History of the 141st Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, p. 118]

Sickles asked Meade to go with him to confirm the position. Meade refused. Sickles asked for Warren to go with him. He was told Warren was too busy. Sickles then asked Hunt to go, and Meade assented.
Geary sent for Sickles to explain,in person, the importance of the lower CR and LRT position Sickles was to assume. Sickles didn't show up for the meeting. Nothing vague about" connect your right brigade to Hancock's left brigade in line of battle down to LRT." Sickles also disobeyed Hunt's refusal to let Sickles advance his position toward the Emmitsburg Road. It appears that Sickles did what he wanted to do regardless of his orders.
 
Geary sent for Sickles to explain,in person, the importance of the lower CR and LRT position Sickles was to assume. Sickles didn't show up for the meeting. Nothing vague about" connect your right brigade to Hancock's left brigade in line of battle down to LRT." Sickles also disobeyed Hunt's refusal to let Sickles advance his position toward the Emmitsburg Road. It appears that Sickles did what he wanted to do regardless of his orders.

"Meade left Sickles with no particular direction about how to deploy his two divisions, despite Sickles sending his chief of staff, Henry Tremain, to Meade's headquarters 'several times in the morning of that day, for the purpose of reporting the situation and of obtaining such instructions as might be necessary.' Meade had no such instructions; any battle worth fighting was going to take place over on Meade's right, and Tremain afterward thought that 'the actual situation never seemed to have been fully appreciated by General Meade.' " [Allen C. Guelzo, Gettysburg: The Last Invasion, p. 245] His source is a letter from Tremain to Sickles dated June 28, 1880, located in the Bachelder Papers, Vol. 1, pp. 670-671.
 
"Meade left Sickles with no particular direction about how to deploy his two divisions, despite Sickles sending his chief of staff, Henry Tremain, to Meade's headquarters 'several times in the morning of that day, for the purpose of reporting the situation and of obtaining such instructions as might be necessary.' Meade had no such instructions; any battle worth fighting was going to take place over on Meade's right, and Tremain afterward thought that 'the actual situation never seemed to have been fully appreciated by General Meade.' " [Allen C. Guelzo, Gettysburg: The Last Invasion, p. 245] His source is a letter from Tremain to Sickles dated June 28, 1880, located in the Bachelder Papers, Vol. 1, pp. 670-671.

You've cited this letter twice in defense of your position.
OK, but consider the source, and his relationship to the two generals in the discussion.
Imagine that...Sickles' chief of staff having his back, twenty-five years after the war, at the expense of Meade.
 
You've cited this letter twice in defense of your position.
OK, but consider the source, and his relationship to the two generals in the discussion.
Imagine that...Sickles' chief of staff having his back, twenty-five years after the war, at the expense of Meade.

And the source that opposes this is ... ?
 
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