I thought his talk was self-contradictory, taking liberties with the facts, and fanciful.
He misstated the circumstances of Meade's being ordered to command the Army of the Potomac. He claims that in his letter to his wife, Meade said, "Margaret, I am going straight at them." That's not quite what he wrote. Here's what he wrote:
"To Mrs. George G. Meade:
Headquarters army of the Potomac, June 29, 1863.
It has pleased Almighty God to place me in the trying position that for some time past we have been talking about. Yesterday morning, at 3 A. M., I was aroused from my sleep by an officer from Washington entering my tent, and after waking me up, saying he had come to give me trouble. At first I thought that it was either to relieve or arrest me, and promptly replied to him, that my conscience was clear, void of offense towards any man; I was prepared for his bad news. He then handed me a communication to read; which I found was an order relieving Hooker from the command and assigning me to it. As, dearest, you know how reluctant we both have been to see me placed in this position, and as it appears to be God's will for some good purpose—at any rate, as a soldier, I had nothing to do but accept and exert my utmost abilities to command success. This, so help me God, I will do, and trusting to Him, who in his good pleasure has thought it proper to place me where I am, I shall pray for strength and power to get through with the task assigned me. I cannot write you all I would like. I am moving at once against Lee, whom I am in hopes Couch will at least check for a few days; if so, a battle will decide the fate of our country and our cause. Pray earnestly, pray for the success of my country, (for it is my success besides). Love to all. I will try and write often, but must depend on George."
Brown tends to take liberties like this, making his presentation problematic. He says at one point Meade had no topographic maps and at another point he says Meade looked at his map and saw that Pipe Creek would be a good place for a defensive line. Such would not be the case if Meade had no topographic maps. He gives a fairly lengthy account of what he claims Dennis Hart Mahan taught at West Point over twenty years earlier. He claims Mahan was a disciple of Carl von Clausewitz. He quotes from an 1847 book by Mahan. Then he assumes all the commanders had read this and had remembered what Mahan had said at West Point more than twenty years previous to the battle. Of course he brings in Jomini, claiming the commanders had read and digested Clausewitz, Jomini, and Mahan. Well, that's poppycock. First of all, Clausewitz wasn't translated into English until 1873, well after the Civil War. West Point was not a school for generals. It was an engineering school, turning out not general officers but lieutenants who would, if they led anyone at all, would lead only small detachments. Nineteenth Century officers prior to the Civil War generally didn't spend their time reading military treatises. Henry W. Halleck was the exception, not the rule. They learned how to be company grade officers.
"The study of generalship was also lacking at the Military Academy, with the sole sources of exposure to these complex concepts the brief period of instruction from Professor Mahan and individual fascination with the legacy of Napoleon and his conquests, which were held as the epitome of military skill. In the midst of an educational experience dominated by practical engineering and drill, Professor Mahan offered a nine-hour seminar on 'The Science of War,' which appeared as only a small part of the course on fortifications and military engineering. Yet for the cadets at antebellum West Point, this class was not a foundation for further study but their only formal exposure to the study of military history, and it fell short of inspiring intellectual growth by any measure. The brief course actually could afford very little time spent on the study of military history and fostered no follow-on program for self-study be[sides the often small Napoleon Club of faculty and cadets that focused on the principles of the Corsican master of war. Mahan deserves credit as the author of one of the first American contributions to the study of war, yet his seminal work, Outpost, was more a text on field fortifications and minor tactics than a practical guide on strategy, military policy, or operational art." [Thomas J. Goss, The War Within the Union High Command: Politics and Generalship During the Civil War, p. 10
Brown's entire presentation smacks of someone who is trying to twist the evidence to fit what he wants to be true instead of having the evidence tell him what was true. One is best advised to corroborate everything he says with other sources.
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Bringing the