Blue water navy

CSS Arkansas scuttled 1863, CSS Virginia scuttled 1862, CSS Tennessee scuttled 1864 and on and on. CSS Shenandoah raider surrenders November 1865 in UK. The iron used on the ironclads would have better put to use with the railroads.
Way too often we see the CS ironclads and gunboats being destroyed, captured or scuttled.
You can use raiders not only against merchant ships but whaling and fishing vessels also.
Northern grain went to Europe, force captured grain ships to divert to southern ports for example.
Commerce raiding is one of the few ways the confederacy can apply economic pressure to the union.
 
No because during the ACW a significant amount of US registered ships were registered under the flags of European nations with large navies.
The most fundamental duty and task of any navy is to protect its nation's coastline. If a navy cant protect its own coastline its not going to win a war.
Leftyhunter
Tell that to the 13 colonies.
 
CSS Arkansas scuttled 1863, CSS Virginia scuttled 1862, CSS Tennessee scuttled 1864 and on and on. CSS Shenandoah raider surrenders November 1865 in UK. The iron used on the ironclads would have better put to use with the railroads.
Way too often we see the CS ironclads and gunboats being destroyed, captured or scuttled.
You can use raiders not only against merchant ships but whaling and fishing vessels also.
Northern grain went to Europe, force captured grain ships to divert to southern ports for example.
Commerce raiding is one of the few ways the confederacy can apply economic pressure to the union.

Fine. More British ship yards, British ships, British arms, British crews, Confederate officers… exactly how does that, which HM government paid reparations for, fit into your scenario?

You really need to do some homework & see how Adams & the U.S. intel service was sniffing out CSA financed ships & ratting them out to HM government agents. The U.S. was not just looking on in bemused toleration, there was extremely active counter surveillance & contact with screw-sloop-men-o-war that tracked down any escaped vessels. You seem to blithely assume that only one side gets to play. In this case, the brains were very much on the other side. Look it up.
 
CSS Arkansas scuttled 1863, CSS Virginia scuttled 1862, CSS Tennessee scuttled 1864 and on and on. CSS Shenandoah raider surrenders November 1865 in UK. The iron used on the ironclads would have better put to use with the railroads.
Way too often we see the CS ironclads and gunboats being destroyed, captured or scuttled.
You can use raiders not only against merchant ships but whaling and fishing vessels also.
Northern grain went to Europe, force captured grain ships to divert to southern ports for example.
Commerce raiding is one of the few ways the confederacy can apply economic pressure to the union.
Maybe you should have a closer look on the individual ironclads and see WHY they were scuttled.
CSS "Virginia" for example was scuttled just because she lost her base Norfolk - and had nowhere to go.

I'd also like to refer once again on what Mallory said (see above):
Ironclads weren't meant as some kind of extraterrestial superweapon - it was just the only idea they could come around with to solve the problem that each and every single southern ship would be confronted by many USN ships
(presumably to be sunk - if not clad with iron).

Of course it would have been highly desirable for the Confederacy to lift the blockade.
As far as I know it would have sufficed to lift the blockade for just a very limited timespan - to declare it as lifted.
This was VERY relevant - and could have produced positive reactions by Britain and France.

And of course some seagoing Ironclads would have done that trick
(as most blockading ships were not armoured
and the monitors were very slow and ran into problems as soon as the swell got rough).

I am also suggesting that (IMO) even ships as the CSS "Stonewall" could have done that trick -
as they at least could live in a rough swell, were rather fast (enough to outrun the monitors) and armoured enough to confront the blockading ships (even if top-heavy etc. etc.)

But where should those ships come from if not from somewhere in Europe?
(the South would need 3 to 5 of them by no later than 1864 - to have them make any difference….) -
Do you have an idea?
 
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CSS Arkansas scuttled 1863, CSS Virginia scuttled 1862, CSS Tennessee scuttled 1864 and on and on. CSS Shenandoah raider surrenders November 1865 in UK. The iron used on the ironclads would have better put to use with the railroads.
Way too often we see the CS ironclads and gunboats being destroyed, captured or scuttled.
You can use raiders not only against merchant ships but whaling and fishing vessels also.
Northern grain went to Europe, force captured grain ships to divert to southern ports for example.
Commerce raiding is one of the few ways the confederacy can apply economic pressure to the union.
As an aside to your idea of long-range gunnery on wooden ships - offsetting the advantages of the USN:
the Confederates had that idea also (if memory serves Maury proposed it)….
 
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Fine. More British ship yards, British ships, British arms, British crews, Confederate officers… exactly how does that, which HM government paid reparations for, fit into your scenario?

You really need to do some homework & see how Adams & the U.S. intel service was sniffing out CSA financed ships & ratting them out to HM government agents. The U.S. was not just looking on in bemused toleration, there was extremely active counter surveillance & contact with screw-sloop-men-o-war that tracked down any escaped vessels. You seem to blithely assume that only one side gets to play. In this case, the brains were very much on the other side. Look it up.
Yes, that's a highly thrilling chapter of the war - reminds on spythrillers of the Cold War era.

On the other hand: the South would have needed just (about) 3 - 4 of those ships.
And the French could also deliver them…
Maybe even the Austrians?

One mistake, one unlucky moment of distraction might have sufficed….to make the deal somewhere and somewhen (see CSS "Stonewall"…)
 
Fine. More British ship yards, British ships, British arms, British crews, Confederate officers… exactly how does that, which HM government paid reparations for, fit into your scenario?

You really need to do some homework & see how Adams & the U.S. intel service was sniffing out CSA financed ships & ratting them out to HM government agents. The U.S. was not just looking on in bemused toleration, there was extremely active counter surveillance & contact with screw-sloop-men-o-war that tracked down any escaped vessels. You seem to blithely assume that only one side gets to play. In this case, the brains were very much on the other side. Look it up.
This is what everyone forgets. The British - and the French - governments were unable to go around examining every order - it would not have been tolerated in those days and would have required a large investigating team given the amount of Confederate contracts being issued. The thought of court actions against the government was also a real possibility given Confederate sympathy in some areas, although not generally. I am fairly certain that the reverse applied too - 'rumours' that were circulating were passed on to the US Embassy who then investigated. That is how the Laird Rams were 'discovered'.

In the case of the Laird Rams, it was a rather blatent act against the spirit of the terms of neutrality by a ship builder with Confederate sympathies in an area with Confederate sympathies (Liverpool). In January 1863 the Foreign Secretary, Lord Russell, after notification from the US ambassador, told James D. Bulloch, a naval agent for the Confederacy, who had ordered the ships in his own name, that the ships would be seized if they were doing so to form part of the fleet of a nation currently at war. Bulloch therefore had the Laird firm "sell" the rams to a French group called Bravay and Company and make it look like they were taking the ships in the name of the Pasha of Egypt in June 1863, nominally on behalf of the Egyptian government, with the intention of transferring them to the Confederate flag once they were at sea. The Khedive was attempting to acquire warships, so this was superficially plausible. In September 1863, one was about to start sea trials when instructions were issued to the Liverpool Collector of Customs that they were not to leave the graving dock (where a ship was fitted out) and a guard ship, HMS Majestic, posted to prevent any sea trials.

The language used in any description of these inter government communications are a little OTT with rumours of Lincoln determined to send the USN into British Waters to destroy them and the US Ambassador 'fuming' with government inactivity. I have to say it seems very anti-British, but that was the Union at the time. There is little said about the French contracts. The British government were well aware that it could have gone to civil court and their actions curtailed. The Confederates knew they were playing one against the other which could only be to their advantage.

The French were subject to the same excuses and reasoning but it was a little more devious. In June 1863 (remember?), John Slidell, the Confederate commissioner to France, asked Emperor Napoleon III in a private audience if it would be possible for the Confederate government to build ironclad warships in France. Arming ships of war for a recognized belligerent like the Confederate States would have been illegal under French law, but Slidell and his agent, James D. Bulloch (yes, the same one!), were confident that the Emperor of France would be able to circumvent his own laws more easily than other potential secret contractors. Napoleon III agreed to the building of ironclads in France on the condition that their destination remain a secret. Arman Brothers in Bordeaux (the company went bankrupt in 1868) were building the ships, but the government initially accepted that it really was for a foreign navy (Egypt) contract.

Prior to delivery, however, a shipyard clerk walked into the U.S. Minister's office in Paris and produced documents which revealed that Arman had fraudulently obtained authorization to arm the ships and was in contact with Confederate agents. The two French ships were nearing completion when the British ones were seized and the French government panicked and ordered their immediate sale to European Navies in early 1864 - the two obvious ones being Prussia and Denmark, then head-to-head in the 2nd Schlieswig War.
 
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Arguably the history of CSS blue water iron hulled rams begins & ends with the Danish Navy's Sphinx.

View attachment 579054

The CSS Stonewall is an example of an iron hulled Confederate Navy blue water combatant.

View attachment 579056

In dry dock ram made it looked a lot like a 1920's Buck Rogers space ship. The worker bottom center of the image provides a measure for scale.

The narrative of the ram Stonewall's design & construction is a testament to why such vessels could not have been laid down in any Confederate yard. The active service in the Imperial Japanese Navy validates the design & is well worth the read.

These images are from the NavSource Old Navy & Sail Index of USN & CSN [ Danish & Imperial Japanese ] commissioned vessels. Enjoy the story of the CSS Stonewall / Imperial Japanese Navy Kotetsu. Read more here about active service.

Link:

Negative, there were plans for both domestic and foreign built vessels predating the ones actually constructed.
 
This is what everyone forgets. The British - and the French - governments were unable to go around examining every order - it would not have been tolerated in those days and would have required a large investigating team given the amount of Confederate contracts being issued. The thought of court actions against the government was also a real possibility given Confederate sympathy in some areas, although not generally. I am fairly certain that the reverse applied too - 'rumours' that were circulating were passed on to the US Embassy who then investigated. That is how the Laird Rams were 'discovered'.

In the case of the Laird Rams, it was a rather blatent act against the spirit of the terms of neutrality by a ship builder with Confederate sympathies in an area with Confederate sympathies (Liverpool). In January 1863 the Foreign Secretary, Lord Russell, after notification from the US ambassador, told James D. Bulloch, a naval agent for the Confederacy, who had ordered the ships in his own name, that the ships would be seized if they were doing so to form part of the fleet of a nation currently at war. Bulloch therefore had the Laird firm "sell" the rams to a French group called Bravay and Company and make it look like they were taking the ships in the name of the Pasha of Egypt in June 1863, nominally on behalf of the Egyptian government, with the intention of transferring them to the Confederate flag once they were at sea. The Khedive was attempting to acquire warships, so this was superficially plausible. In September 1863, one was about to start sea trials when instructions were issued to the Liverpool Collector of Customs that they were not to leave the graving dock (where a ship was fitted out) and a guard ship, HMS Majestic, posted to prevent any sea trials.

The language used in any description of these inter government communications are a little OTT with rumours of Lincoln determined to send the USN into British Waters to destroy them and the US Ambassador 'fuming' with government incativity. I have to say it seems very anti-British, but that was the Union at the time. There is little said about the French contracts. The British government were well aware that it could have gone to civil court and their actions curtailed. The Confederates knew they were playing one against the other which could only be to their advantage.

The French were subject to the same excuses and reasoning but it was a little more devious. In June 1863 (remember?), John Slidell, the Confederate commissioner to France, asked Emperor Napoleon III in a private audience if it would be possible for the Confederate government to build ironclad warships in France. Arming ships of war for a recognized belligerent like the Confederate States would have been illegal under French law, but Slidell and his agent, James D. Bulloch (yes, the same one!), were confident that the Emperor of France would be able to circumvent his own laws more easily than other potential secret contractors. Napoleon III agreed to the building of ironclads in France on the condition that their destination remain a secret. Arman Brothers in Bordeaux (the company went bankrupt in 1868) were building the ships, but the government initially accepted that it really was for a foreign navy (Egypt) contract.

Prior to delivery, however, a shipyard clerk walked into the U.S. Minister's office in Paris and produced documents which revealed that Arman had fraudulently obtained authorization to arm the ships and was in contact with Confederate agents. The two French ships were nearing completion when the British ones were seized and the French government panicked and ordered their immediate sale to European Navies in early 1864 - the two obvious ones being Prussia and Denmark, then head-to-head in the 2nd Schlieswig War.
Unfortunately had the two "laird rams" been in a condition to put to sea, the majestic could not have stopped them. On passage through St George's Channel, a notorious section of the Irish Sea, she had run straight into one of that waterway's notorious "spats" and was badly damaged about the masts rfgging and upperworks.
Having experienced the same aboard a modern 16,000 ton ferry being forced to run for Milford Haven I can imagine what she must have gone through.
 
Unfortunately had the two "laird rams" been in a condition to put to sea, the majestic could not have stopped them. On passage through St George's Channel, a notorious section of the Irish Sea, she had run straight into one of that waterway's notorious "spats" and was badly damaged about the masts rfgging and upperworks.
Having experienced the same aboard a modern 16,000 ton ferry being forced to run for Milford Haven I can imagine what she must have gone through.
But one of them was in a condition to put to sea - for sea trials. If she had, nothing more would have been seen of her - just like SS Enrica (unarmed pre-CSS Alabama). It was not just the Majestic stopping her! Her crew had boarded the ship afloat as well as the yard where the other was being readied for launch. A harbour guardship did not just sit there and watch! In addition, steam gunboats HMS Goshawk and Liverpool dropped anchor in the shipyards waters. There was also an ongoing court trial which tried to stop the seizure of both vessels.

Yup, it can be bad in the Irish Sea - in which case, neither of the Rams would have survived one either. They were notoriously bad seaboats. It is doubtful if they could have made it across the Atlantic.

Worth a read:
 
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Negative, there were plans for both domestic and foreign built vessels predating the ones actually constructed.

And these plans resulted in what?

John Ericsson made plans & launched the USS Monitor in 100 - 118 days. Rather than the typical man-o-war's compliment of hundreds of highly qualified crewmen, his brilliant design only required 49 men. Ten Monitors had roughly the same crew as two screw-sloop-men-of-war. That is the dictionary definition of a force multiplier. Monitors defeated every single one of the Confederate fort on a raft ironclads they engaged in part because they were always deployed in squadrons.

The squadrons of Monitors are an example of planning, execution & action that the hapless Confederates could only dream of.

Read about the USS Monitor's career & conservation here.

Link:

 
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And these plans resulted in what?

John Ericsson made plans & launched the USS Monitor in 100 - 118 days. Rather than the typical man-o-war's compliment of hundreds of highly qualified crewmen, his brilliant design only required 49 men. Ten Monitors had roughly the same crew as two screw-sloop-men-of-war. That is the dictionary definition of a force multiplier. Monitors defeated every single one of the Confederate fort on a raft ironclads they engaged in part because they were always deployed in squadrons.

The squadrons of Monitors are an example of planning, execution & action that the hapless Confederates could only dream of.

Read about the USS Monitor's career & conservation here.

Link:

You are comparing apples (sea-going vessels) with pears (littoral ironclads).

You know….confederate ironclads had also a complement of not more than 50 men?
You know…the CSS "Virginia" was also constructed in a very short timespan?
And the ship had even to be raised, damage from the burning had to be removed - before any construction work could have begun...

Does this make her a better ship?
Does this make her an "example of planning, execution & action"?

And your beloved blanket judgement of "hapless Confederates" is really getting tedious over time.
Why should Confederates be more or less hapless than other human beings?
Because some of them owned slaves?
Seriously?
 
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Atlantis, There is no need to discuss this topic. For good reason the commerce raiders were built in GB & manned with English crews.

The first link is to the NavSource Photo Archive "Old Navy Steam & Sail" index. It contains an alphabetical list of every commissioned vessel in both the USN & Confederate Navy. There are images & histories of each vessel. It is a fascinating source that is very easy to use. Frankly, just looking at the list of one navy vs the list of the other will speak volumes.

Link:



The Monitors, there is no Confederate counterpart, are listed here.

Link:


The Confederacy had three blue water ports on the East Coast. There were no ship yards or trained craftsmen who could have built a blue water navy to confront the USN. The same was true of littoral or brown water vessels.

There was no supply of cordage in the Confederacy. In the 1860's sailing ships required miles of rope of varying dimension from twine to 8" hawsers. Sails were made of woven hemp fiber. The cultivation of hemp was laborious in the extreme. Then the hemp stems had to be processed & converted to finished products on rope walks.

The Blue Grass region of Kentucky, adjacent to the Ohio River was the source of hemp products. 40% of the state's agricultural exports were hemp products. The vast inventory of hemp fiber products went north on the RR & eastward on the Erie Canal to shipyards & chandlers in New England & onwards. A shortage of cordage hampered CSA shipping throughout the war. No rope, no sails , no caulking, no ships.

Because of an extraordinary deposit of copper in Michigan, there were almost no copper mills in the CSA. Only the serendipitous wreck of a ship supplied telegraph wire. Without copper to sheet wooden hulls, shipworm would make short work of any blue water vessel.


This American Battlefield Trust article begins with the massive build up initiated by the USN in the first months of the conflict. Not only were existing warships outfitted & numerous new vessels laid down hundreds of merchant vessels were acquired for conversion to blockading gunboats. The histories of these converted merchantmen are the Old Navy Steam & Sail index. In a phenomenally short period of time the active navy list increased exponentially. Anything like that was physically & financially impossible for the Confederacy. Read more here.

Link:


The NavSource Index includes every USN commissioned ship from the Revolution to today. You can look up & wonder where an entire afternoon has gone to. RC
I really struggle with finding Confederate Navy records of crewmen.
 
Another far more difficult option is to try and get the British and French navies to escort their flagged merchant ships thru the blockade.
As a blockade tightens insurers are less likely to insure unless vessels have an escort.
 
Another far more difficult option is to try and get the British and French navies to escort their flagged merchant ships thru the blockade.
As a blockade tightens insurers are less likely to insure unless vessels have an escort.

"Escorting through the blockade…" would be an act of war. Take a gander at the Straight of Hormuz today.

It was the British who established the international rules regarding blockades.

There were procedures in place to deal with neutral vessels.

Acquainting yourself with the facts is a useful predicate. Read more here.

Link:

 
And these plans resulted in what?

John Ericsson made plans & launched the USS Monitor in 100 - 118 days. Rather than the typical man-o-war's compliment of hundreds of highly qualified crewmen, his brilliant design only required 49 men. Ten Monitors had roughly the same crew as two screw-sloop-men-of-war. That is the dictionary definition of a force multiplier. Monitors defeated every single one of the Confederate fort on a raft ironclads they engaged in part because they were always deployed in squadrons.

The squadrons of Monitors are an example of planning, execution & action that the hapless Confederates could only dream of.

Read about the USS Monitor's career & conservation here.

Link:

His 'brilliant design' had been rejected in 1854 by the USN. It was a flawed design and a real dead-end in warships. It could not navigate in more than (modern) Sea State 3 (waves 0.5 to 1.25 metres (1 ft 8 in to 4 ft 1 in) as it only had a freeboard of 8" loaded (18" unloaded). The turret ring leaked like a sieve, as did the hull and because of the heavy turret it rolled like a barrel. It was strictly river and estuary ONLY. It's only advantage was that it could be completed in under 100 days. The other two (USS Galena and New Ironsides) were far better ships (turret rams) but needed more time on the slipway. Most turret ships were dire sea ships due to the weight of the armored turrets and surrounding armor.

Only one later monitor made it to Britain and Europe 'showing the flag' - on a calm ocean and escorted all the way there - and back - USS Miantonomoh a twin turret monitor commissioned in 1865. Top speed was 9 knots.
1776362392966.webp

USS Miantonomoh 1866 - decommisioned (finally) 1870

The final resolution for turret ships in the 1870s was the citadel ship which concentrated all machinery and armament in an armored 'box'. These also had more reliable and efficient engines and did away with any rigging. The hull was designed to hold this 'box' high enough to avoid flooding maintain buoyancy and make it a proper 'blue water vessel'. BTW - the Italian Navy had the first ones.
1776363093495.webp
 
Another far more difficult option is to try and get the British and French navies to escort their flagged merchant ships thru the blockade.
As a blockade tightens insurers are less likely to insure unless vessels have an escort.
Essentially an act of war by two countries not interested in engaging in an armed conflict that was against their own interests. By 1862 there was a drought in Czarist Russia causing a wheat shortage and more grains were exported to Western Europe then cotton. It wasn't in the interests of any military power to actively get involved in the ACW as it was much more profitable to trade with both sides.
Leftyhunter
 
"Escorting through the blockade…" would be an act of war. Take a gander at the Straight of Hormuz today.

It was the British who established the international rules regarding blockades.

There were procedures in place to deal with neutral vessels.

Acquainting yourself with the facts is a useful predicate. Read more here.

Link:

A good read, thanks
 

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