Barlow on Day 1

I'd guess he was a brave soldier who usually did hie duty as most soldiers did. But the things you read about his personality and biases certainly put him in bad light and very difficult to like. Being liked isn't of paramount importance but it is necessary to have your men's respect.

The fact he was left on the field wounded, not dragged to the rear is revelatory!
There is no questioning Francis Barlow's personal bravery (or Howard's for that matter) which was demonstrated on field after field. But his leadership could be...inconsistent (again, like Howard).

To be fair, Barlow was shot down between his main line and skirmish line just as the skirmishers were being pushed back. He basically fell between the lines. But, as you rightly point out, no on was going out of their way to go and get him either.

Ryan
 
Look, I am as much a "apologist" for the fighting qualities of most units, including the 11th Corps. However, the fact of the matter is that a core of the 11th was derived from "Blenker's" division which, unfortunately, was a very flawed combat unit. To begin, it contained two vasty divergent officer materials; one, cast offs from the revolutions of 1848, intellectuals and free spirits, the other (and sometimes these overlapped) professional German soldiers, soldiers of fortune, etc., who never quite grasp the volunteer soldiering of America.

Most importantly was its service record. Blenker's Division was sent to Fremont's mountain command and proceeded after detraining without even a map. It blithered into a snowstorm before being found by Rosencrans who described them as a sorry lot of soldiers who had eaten all their dogs and most of their horses.

This set the tale. In the valley Blenker's men were notorious for plunder - even among the Federals - and were very undisciplined on the march. Tactically, their most famous and well drilled unit, the 8th New York, was destroyed in a single volley for failing to send out skirmishers. Their other regiments were defeated at Cross Key's by two demi brigades of Confederates (not a very good showing) who attacked them and drove them back over a mile.

At Second Bull Run, some of the men, now Sigel's Corps, fought well and fought ably, but still other's had the indiscipline stigma (earned or unearned).

I think it very plain that, even if you are a unit that starts as an exceptionally strong combat unit, well-disciplined and adapted in the art of war, if you are allowed a period, as were Blenker's men, starting in the snowstorms of WV, to get that little taste of, what I would call barbary military service, it is very difficult to take the stink of that indiscipline off. After all, you have guns, you take what you want and even your officers partake?

Was there something "wrong" with the 11th corps?

It has a mixed bag of combat record; I have approximately 8,500-8,700 casualties of which 3,000 are captured. It has elements at Chancellorsville and Gettysburg that fight magnificently; however, other elements fight, shall we say, poor. When combined with the 12th corps to form the 20th the men have a respectable combat record throughout the war.

My read, the core "Blenker" men started the war with an officer corps made up of a mixture of professors, intellectuals, and pirates, and didn't include enough professional soldiers not looking out for their own skins. Circumstance put them in a position where all discipline broke down. Habit, course of conduct, and leadership indifference allowed this indiscipline to fester in the valley. A series of weak leaders did nothing to fully break this habit (some, like Barlow, may have corrected it if given the time in his division, though besides Von Gilsa his men were mostly blue-blooded Yankees).

The history of the corps in the east is being led by Blenker, Sigel, and Howard. Howard, though being the best of the bunch, did not understand the material he was given to command (immediately canceled the lager beer ration, etc.).

As a result, the 11th corps was neither given a chance to establish some esprit de corps nor able to effectuate a battle honor, properly prided on as its own. The leadership structure and identify suffered by the constant transition, the weak leaders, the buffoons who served early, and the lack of support from the rest of the army (used by Hooker as a Chancellorsville scapegoat).

When molded into the 20th corps with 12 army leadership the men fought as well as any in the Chattanooga and Atlanta campaign and fought well across the Carolinas.

Just shows a huge lesson on leadership and culture. Also, you cannot ever let the mask of discipline slip or you end up with an armed mob.

So, did the 11th fight well on July 1st? With a few notable exceptions, NO.
I agree that a lot of the problems in the Eleventh Corps (and its predecessors) was the senior officers left a lot to be desired. There were some good regimental and brigade commanders but the commanders were shaky after that.

Again, I agree that the Eleventh Corps did not fight particularly effectively on July 1 but I would argue that they really weren't in a position to do so either. Between the terrain and the circumstances, only a handful of units were able to effectively engage the enemy (Battery I, 1st Ohio, 45th New York, and 157th New York for example). But a number of regiments were put into a very tough position (Ames, von Gilsa, and Coster come to mind).

Ryan
 
How long were these units deployed before they were overrun?
You may find this interesting:

 
I agree that a lot of the problems in the Eleventh Corps (and its predecessors) was the senior officers left a lot to be desired. There were some good regimental and brigade commanders but the commanders were shaky after that.

Again, I agree that the Eleventh Corps did not fight particularly effectively on July 1 but I would argue that they really weren't in a position to do so either. Between the terrain and the circumstances, only a handful of units were able to effectively engage the enemy (Battery I, 1st Ohio, 45th New York, and 157th New York for example). But a number of regiments were put into a very tough position (Ames, von Gilsa, and Coster come to mind).

Ryan
I think Barlow, in his very first divisional command, made some terrific errors in judgment and may have got tunnel vision (IE. go straight for Doles.) Before being folded into the 20th Corps the 11th really gets some plain bad luck as well.

There were some terrific fighting units but you can see the entire corps is, how should one say, a little woozy in the morale aspect going into Gettysburg.

I also think people discredit what a lack of discipline can do to a combat unit and what it takes to get it back on track. Blenker and Sigel didn't do much for the effectiveness of the original 8,000 men of the division.

I think to reform the 11th into a first-class fighting unit would have taken a magnetic leader and some time.
 
There is no questioning Francis Barlow's personal bravery (or Howard's for that matter) which was demonstrated on field after field. But his leadership could be...inconsistent (again, like Howard).

To be fair, Barlow was shot down between his main line and skirmish line just as the skirmishers were being pushed back. He basically fell between the lines. But, as you rightly point out, no on was going out of their way to go and get him either.

Ryan
The great thing about researching and reading is your statement of Barlow going down between the skirmish and main line is that tells you he went down relatively early in the battle.
And that's why we keep doing it. One piece of information often leads to another.
 
I don't think Barlow taking position on the knoll and being knocked off the knoll took all of 30 minutes (or less) so there wasn't really a "late" phase of the battle :)

If Barlow went down during the deployment phase (I think there was some combat with Dole you are glossing over when his artillery was setting up and Ames was fighting) between the skirmish line and main line of battle, that was, arguably, not the place for the division commander to be which added to the divisions struggle with command and control being attacked on three sides.
 
I don't think Barlow taking position on the knoll and being knocked off the knoll took all of 30 minutes (or less) so there wasn't really a "late" phase of the battle :)

If Barlow went down during the deployment phase (I think there was some combat with Dole you are glossing over when his artillery was setting up and Ames was fighting) between the skirmish line and main line of battle, that was, arguably, not the place for the division commander to be which added to the divisions struggle with command and control being attacked on three sides.
My interpretation is that he was hit as Gordon was reaching the Federal skirmish line around Rock Creek. The firing from that direction caused Barlow to go and see what was happening and he was hit as he was riding back to the main line on Blocher's Knoll. But his getting hit during the skirmish between Ames and Doles does offer an interesting scenario.

Ryan
 
I think Barlow, in his very first divisional command, made some terrific errors in judgment and may have got tunnel vision (IE. go straight for Doles.) Before being folded into the 20th Corps the 11th really gets some plain bad luck as well.

There were some terrific fighting units but you can see the entire corps is, how should one say, a little woozy in the morale aspect going into Gettysburg.

I also think people discredit what a lack of discipline can do to a combat unit and what it takes to get it back on track. Blenker and Sigel didn't do much for the effectiveness of the original 8,000 men of the division.

I think to reform the 11th into a first-class fighting unit would have taken a magnetic leader and some time.
The Eleventh definitely needed a win under their belt to help build some spirit, that's for sure. They went from one loss to another (including multiple routs) for over a year until they transferred to the West.

Ryan
 
I don't think Barlow taking position on the knoll and being knocked off the knoll took all of 30 minutes (or less) so there wasn't really a "late" phase of the battle :)

If Barlow went down during the deployment phase (I think there was some combat with Dole you are glossing over when his artillery was setting up and Ames was fighting) between the skirmish line and main line of battle, that was, arguably, not the place for the division commander to be which added to the divisions struggle with command and control being attacked on three sides.
I hear you repman66 on Barlow being where he wasn't supposed to be. But isn't that often where the solid commanders go? You likely know how it is in positions of responsibility and authority. You want to see (have to!) for yourself. Especially knowing all the high ranking men who have fallen at the front. It's quite a list!
In most cases we're talking A personalities, over the top aggressive men; many who got where they are by sticking their noses in places other men wouldn't, to know a thing for themselves instead of second hand information that was often misinformation given the structure and systems they had to work within.
 

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