Coming to the "defense" of Battery I and its CO, that battery was ordered "into the breach" at Chinn Ridge on August 30, 1862 and met Longstreet's devastating assault on the Union left. They had to do so at 2/3 strength, however. Illustrating the tactical decisions that came up for mixed batteries, they were ordered to bring only their four rifles and had to leave their two M1841 12 lb howitzers behind because of the range at which they would have to fight.
Excellent! Good work and my apologies, for I had completely overlooked that comment and will have some revisions to make. In that case, to answer your previous question about who ordered Barlow to the knoll, since Howard commanded all Union forces at Gettysburg at that moment, it must have been Howard, who at the very least we can infer gave his tacit approval of that move, even if Barlow had been the one to suggest it. It also means the acting Eleventh Corps commander, Schurz, was completely cut out of the loop (and off the hook) for that fateful decision. It's also curious, since I figure there was a delay of perhaps half an hour between the time Barlow's men first arrived near the Alms House and when they actually took possession of the knoll, which in the meantime was occupied by a portion of Doles' sharpshooter battalion (skirmishers). Howard adds that he left Barlow to complete his deployment around the knoll before riding off to the First Corps, passing in rear of Robinson's Second Division on Oak Ridge to meet with Wadsworth and then Doubleday.
I find that hard to believe seeing he had a Regimental Commander arrested for allowing his men to fill their canteens with water at a stream along the hot march to Gettysburg!
Strict orders forbidding enlisted men or officers to stop along the march route for water were enforced by many Union commanders, even if just trying to partially fill a canteen, or reaching down to grab a gulp while walking through a stream or brook, or accepting a cup offered by a town resident. Von Gilsa's men were allowed a very brief halt adjacent to the Alms House facility which included time to store their knapsacks in one of the buildings, perhaps that large red barn.
Guess they were not very smart back then. Would your rather arrive 10 to 15 minutes late or have 1/4 or 1/3 or 1/2 your Regiment fall out due to heat casualties? Heck when I reenacted we had our daily heat stroke guy! I got tired of babysitting him, let him drop!
I see two possibilities, neither showing Howard in a positive light. First, he accompanies Barlow and at least gives tacit approval for the movement to Blocher's Knoll. This is particularly damning since we know that he had received reports of Confederate troops coming down the Harrisburg Road. Putting Barlow's Division out in front of the rest of the corps, exposed on the hill, with their flank in the air is a tactical blunder of immense proportions, especially considering what had happened at Chancellorsville. And to cut Schurz out of the loop is inexcusable. If this is accurate, Howard should be rightfully excoriated for his actions on July 1.
I don't recall reading this particular article myself. That said, I somewhat agree that the Eleventh Corps' posting made sense based on what their objectives were. Initially, they were to protect and extend the right flank of the First Corps and did a decent job of that. Even Barlow's advance to Blocher's Knoll makes sense if we understand that he was looking to hit Doles. The problem was that the plain north of Gettysburg provided little cover and few advantageous positions to anchor a defensive line. Blocher's Knoll had some potential if Barlow wasn't out there on his own with his flank just looking to get smacked.
IIRC, von Gilsa got in trouble because the order only allowed 1 man per company to get water and von Gilsa allowed more men to fill their canteens at once. Barlow, already having it out for von Gilsa, had him arrested for it.
IMHO, Barlow's right flank was not in the air until after Devins left his position. I also think that after Howard left Barlow to examine Doubleday's position at about 2:00, Barlow had not yet moved out as far as he ultimately did, which is what Howard told a deceased artillery man after the battle; i.e. that "Barlow got too far out." As for Schurz, I think he cut himself out of the loop by not paying attention to the right of his line. All of which is to say that I think that your criticism of Howard is too harsh.
Two things can be true at the same time. IIRC (and I have to check), Barlow made some very biased and unsupportable comments about German troops in his private letters. At the same time, von Gilsa's troops may in fact have needed a strong disciplinary hand - although Howard, Devens, et al screwed up at Chancellorsville and ignored warnings from the front, due in part to their disdain for German troops. Barlow as a division commander was not exactly a paragon of military competence himself.
A few days before the battle, Devens had been seriously wounded when his horse ran into a tree. On May 2, he was in such pain that he was in no condition to appreciate or respond to reports that his troops were in danger. The person who could have responded appropriately was McLean, who did nothing because he was miffed because Devens had replaced him. (After the battle, Howard had McLean transferred to Cincinnati.) Although many German Americans in the Eleventh Corps (mainly Schurz, and later historians partial to the German Americans) claimed that Howard ignored the warnings, he did not. He sent all the information he received to Hooker and, according to a letter he received from Theodore Dodge after the war, he had even requested permission to face a division, and possibly his entire corps, to the west, a request that Hooker either ignored or denied. That's when Howard gave Schurz permission to make a few changes in his line. Anyone who believes Howard was biased against German Americans simply doesn't know what kind of person he truly was.
I'll have what you're having. What on earth was Howard doing just forwarding information to Hooker? He was the corps commander on the scene, not some subaltern. Your excusal of Devens is bizarre. "he was in no condition to appreciate or respond to reports that his troops were in danger."????? That not only is inaccurate, but it makes no sense. You're claiming that his division was rudderless on May 2 (which it wasn't) and that a brigade commander was responsible for ordering the division to be properly aligned (which McLean had zero authority to do).
Bringing the