Location and Timing of General Barlow's Wounding

Tom Elmore

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During the battle, Lieutenant Edward C. Culp of the 25th Ohio Infantry served first as an aide to Brig. Gen. Francis C. Barlow, then as an aide to his successor, Brig. Gen. Adelbert Ames. Culp wrote a history of his regiment in the war, which was published in 1885. Culp also wrote an article for the National Tribune, dated March 19, 1885 in which he provides sufficient detail to determine the location, timing and circumstances of Barlow's wounding on July 1. In his own words:

"During the hottest of the fight I was returning to Gen. Barlow from executing an order, and in passing over the field I caught a glimpse through an opening in the woods of moving troops. I rode back to get a fresh look from a little eminence, and became satisfied they were rebel re-enforcements. As I reached Gen. Barlow he exclaimed: 'What is that skirmish line stopping for?' The skirmishers, a very heavy line, had advanced to the edge of the woods into which I had seen the re-enforcements marching, and of course had discovered them. Barlow's Division was moving in rapid support of the cloud of skirmishers, and he struck his spurs into his horse and dashed forward to the skirmish line before I had time to give my information. I rode by his side, however, and told him what I had seen. By that time we had reached the skirmish line, and one glance showed that I was correct. Thousands of fresh troops were hurled against our weakened lines. Gen. Barlow directed me to inform Gen. Howard, and to request artillery support. Before I had ridden 20 rods Gen. Barlow was severely wounded, and all but one of his staff officers and orderlies killed or wounded."

My interpretation of Culp's remarks: I believe the moving troops that Culp saw was the brigade of John C. Gordon advancing to the attack on the west side of the Harrisburg Road. The only eminence in that vicinity was the knoll that would eventually be named after Barlow. At that moment, I suspect Barlow was near the point of woods down the northeastern slope of the knoll, and the skirmish line that he was observing was that of the 68th and 54th New York, which evidently had advanced to a fringe of woods bordering Rock Creek, just 100 yards away. It would take less than half a minute to traverse that distance on horseback, giving Culp just enough time to explain what he had seen. When Barlow reached the edge of the woods, the Confederate line was then plainly visible, which means it was close. Culp received his orders, turned about and headed to the rear, toward the town. But he only covered 20 rods (330 feet) before a Confederate volley erupted, felling Barlow, who might have been riding up the slope a short distance behind Culp at that same moment. It is presumed that Culp glanced back to see Barlow fall from his horse (which was killed by that volley), but continued on his mission. If this interpretation is accurate, and assuming Gordon began his advance at precisely 3:00 p.m., Gordon's men would have reached Rock Creek about 10 minutes later, when the firing commenced. I figure the Confederate line opposite the point of Barlow's wounding was held by the left wing of the 13th Georgia Regiment.

My conclusion is that Barlow was wounded about 3:10 p.m. on July 1, about 75 yards west of Rock Creek, on a line drawn from the creek to the summit of the knoll. Barlow was afterwards taken to the Josiah Benner place, north of the creek, about 300 yards distant direct from the location where he was wounded, or 500 yards by way of the bridge along the Harrisburg Road that crossed Rock Creek.
 
I knew that Barlow was hit early on but this scenario has him go down at the outset. That may explain why his division folded so quickly since they lost their leadership at the start. Of course, their deployment didn't help things.

Ryan

The speed at which Gordon's troops "rolled up" the Union flank is of great interest to me. There were a large body of Federals out as far as Barlow's Knoll. I can't see an immediate total collapse, even with the wounding of Barlow. Did they only fire a single volley and then run? Surely there was some resistance. It would take 5, 10, maybe 15 minutes for the word of Barlow's wounding to spread within the ranks, would it not? To run to the town would take another 10 minutes.......no?

Of course I'm trying to "buy time" for my less compressed timeline of the events involving Rodes Brigade on Oak Hill, that we discussed a couple of months ago..LOL.
 
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The speed at which Gordon's troops "rolled up" the Union flank is of great interest to me. There were a large body of Federals out as far as Barlow's Knoll. I can't see an immediate total collapse, even with the woundingf of Barlow. Did they only fire a single volley and then run? Surely there was some resistance. It wound take 5, 10, maybe 15 minutes for the word of Barlow's wounding to spread within the ranks, would it not? To run to the town would take another 10 minutes.......no?

Of course I'm trying to "buy time" for my less compressed timeline of the events involving Rodes Brigade on Oak Hill, that we discussed a couple of months ago..LOL.

I know organized resistance ended within just a few minutes and I can see small groups stalling the advance for another few minutes. In all, Barlow's men were gone within 15 minutes or so.

Ryan
 
Miles, you are absolutely right concerning the pace of the Confederate advance. Gordon and Doles advanced much slower than may be commonly perceived. A "slow walk" from the time of contact (3:10 p.m.) seems to be closest to reality, which I figure is less than 35 yards/minute. Gordon's veterans describe how difficult it was to move the Federals, and it also seems clear to me that Doles was held nearly stationary by Kryzanowski's brigade for perhaps 15-20 minutes, in fact until the time that Gordon's men cleared out the last Federal resistance at Barlow's knoll and were able to continue relatively unimpeded, which left Kryzanowski's right flank exposed and compelled his retreat. I am examining primary sources and working up battle maps for this area at the moment. I figure that Gordon was nearing the makeshift rally of the Federals along the lane running to the Almshouse by 3:30 p.m. Gordon also pushed that line back rather quickly, but then halted in a depression - there happens to be a depression defining a creek bed just south of the Almshouse. A few more minutes elapsed before Hays and Avery came up at a considerably faster pace, but even they were held up for a few minutes by Coster's brigade further on toward the town.

I have also come to the conclusion that the 157th New York's flank attack against Doles must have occurred further south than their stone marker indicates on the Carlisle Road. I now think it occurred nearly due west or else west-northwest of the Almshouse buildings. Doles' entire brigade was diverted by the 157th New York and pursued that regiment in a south-southwesterly direction toward the Pennsylvania College, and in a vain pursuit to cut off the retreating First Corps, which was in full retreat just after 4 p.m. I haven't completed the timeline in this vicinity past 3:30 p.m., but I surmise that the puzzle pieces with regard to time are going to fit together quite nicely.
 
Miles, you are absolutely right concerning the pace of the Confederate advance. Gordon and Doles advanced much slower than may be commonly perceived. A "slow walk" from the time of contact (3:10 p.m.) seems to be closest to reality, which I figure is less than 35 yards/minute. Gordon's veterans describe how difficult it was to move the Federals, and it also seems clear to me that Doles was held nearly stationary by Kryzanowski's brigade for perhaps 15-20 minutes, in fact until the time that Gordon's men cleared out the last Federal resistance at Barlow's knoll and were able to continue relatively unimpeded, which left Kryzanowski's right flank exposed and compelled his retreat. I am examining primary sources and working up battle maps for this area at the moment. I figure that Gordon was nearing the makeshift rally of the Federals along the lane running to the Almshouse by 3:30 p.m. Gordon also pushed that line back rather quickly, but then halted in a depression - there happens to be a depression defining a creek bed just south of the Almshouse. A few more minutes elapsed before Hays and Avery came up at a considerably faster pace, but even they were held up for a few minutes by Coster's brigade further on toward the town.

I have also come to the conclusion that the 157th New York's flank attack against Doles must have occurred further south than their stone marker indicates on the Carlisle Road. I now think it occurred nearly due west or else west-northwest of the Almshouse buildings. Doles' entire brigade was diverted by the 157th New York and pursued that regiment in a south-southwesterly direction toward the Pennsylvania College, and in a vain pursuit to cut off the retreating First Corps, which was in full retreat just after 4 p.m. I haven't completed the timeline in this vicinity past 3:30 p.m., but I surmise that the puzzle pieces with regard to time are going to fit together quite nicely.

I agree with you about the 157th New York. Before settling on Wright's Brigade, I was looking at Krzyzanowki's Brigade and the traditional story about the New Yorkers just didn't sit right in regards to their position. I tend to believe that they didn't move as far forward as the normal story indicates.

Ryan
 
The 1st Minnesota receives regular accolades to this day for helping turn back a good part of Wilcox's brigade on the second day, but the 157th New York alone stopped and then diverted Doles' entire brigade and no one seems to know of their work, perhaps because the day ended in overall defeat, not to mention their association with the tainted Eleventh Corps.

On the other hand, the 107th Ohio, over 400 strong, accomplished nothing on Barlow's knoll. But that was only because their Colonel, Seraphim Meyer, completely lost his nerve, and by the time his replacement could take over, it was too late. A good article on Meyer appeared in the Winter 2016 issue of The Civil War Monitor.

One thing that surprises me was the apparent good effort made by the skirmishers of the 68th and 54th New York in holding back Gordon's brigade from the knoll to the Harrisburg Road. When the six companies of the 17th Connecticut made the final defense in the woods down slope from the knoll, an aide was sent across the field to the road to recall the other four skirmish companies and evidently did not encounter the enemy. Other circumstantial evidence of the slower pace of Gordon's brigade comes from accounts by a couple of wounded soldiers, including one limping from a leg wound, who still managed to make it back to the Almshouse barn ahead of the Confederate line. Also, Gordon's men must have been spent to have to halt half-way to the town. If they had initially rolled over the Union defenders so easily as some imagine, they should have had plenty of fight left to carry them the entire distance. There must be some merit in the comment made by one Eleventh Corps veteran, who complained that his corps never received any credit, only blame.
 
The 1st Minnesota receives regular accolades to this day for helping turn back a good part of Wilcox's brigade on the second day, but the 157th New York alone stopped and then diverted Doles' entire brigade and no one seems to know of their work, perhaps because the day ended in overall defeat, not to mention their association with the tainted Eleventh Corps.

On the other hand, the 107th Ohio, over 400 strong, accomplished nothing on Barlow's knoll. But that was only because their Colonel, Seraphim Meyer, completely lost his nerve, and by the time his replacement could take over, it was too late. A good article on Meyer appeared in the Winter 2016 issue of The Civil War Monitor.

One thing that surprises me was the apparent good effort made by the skirmishers of the 68th and 54th New York in holding back Gordon's brigade from the knoll to the Harrisburg Road. When the six companies of the 17th Connecticut made the final defense in the woods down slope from the knoll, an aide was sent across the field to the road to recall the other four skirmish companies and evidently did not encounter the enemy. Other circumstantial evidence of the slower pace of Gordon's brigade comes from accounts by a couple of wounded soldiers, including one limping from a leg wound, who still managed to make it back to the Almshouse barn ahead of the Confederate line. Also, Gordon's men must have been spent to have to halt half-way to the town. If they had initially rolled over the Union defenders so easily as some imagine, they should have had plenty of fight left to carry them the entire distance. There must be some merit in the comment made by one Eleventh Corps veteran, who complained that his corps never received any credit, only blame.

I anxiously await your assessment as to how this translates into "time on the field" for these Federal troops. Bear in mind, that the first hand account that I have from Major Eugene Blackford, who was leading the Sharpshooters of Rodes' Division, indicates that it was 6:00 P.M. before the rout of the Federals through the town began.
 
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