Barlow on Day 1

[neyankee61]

Of all the battlefield of Gettysburg the part I have the least knowledge are the actions of the XI Corps esp. Barlow's Division. Barlow's Division advanced out of the town past the Almshouse and onto Barlow's Knoll. By doing so he extended the right of the XI Corps' line. Gen. Schurz expressed surprise at this and shuffled his regiments to maintain contact with Barlow. At this time XI Corps' artillery and infantry were engaged with Rodes on Oak Hill.
Did Barlow advance with an eye on threatening Rodes? Perhaps getting on Rodes' flank?
Or did he become focused on the high ground to his front, much like Sickles did on Day 2? Did he want to deny the high ground to the enemy?
What did he know about Ewell's advance from Harrisburg?
Devin's Brigade was positioned off Barlow's right near Rock Creek. Did he know they were there? And was he counting on their support and information?
Finally did he know that Devin's Brigade was withdrawn about the same time Early approached? If so, did he make any adjustments in his line?
I know, a lot of questions and most likely one will lead to another.

 

[6thMichCav]

How long were these units deployed before they were overrun?

 

[Tom Elmore]

In the days ahead I will be posting a map series showing the deployment of Barlow's division (two brigades under Von Gilsa and Ames) on July 1. But at this time it's not clear to me why he initially took his division to the Almshouse vicinity. The original plan was to extend the Eleventh Corps to the right of the First Corps, but Rodes' arrival put an end to that plan. Devin must have warned of the advance of Rodes from the north. Doles' brigade arrived around 1 p.m., extending Rodes' left and apparently immediately sent out his sharpshooter battalion, some of whom (maybe a company or two) moved to the knoll (that later bore Barlow's name) about the same time Barlow's men took position near the Almshouse, and Barlow wasted no time in pushing ahead to secure the knoll. Others have studied this subject more thoroughly, but my initial thought is that Barlow was likely focused on denying Rodes an opportunity to turn the open right flank of the Eleventh Corps by taking the high ground (the knoll) and anchoring his right on Rock Creek. I hope to learn more about Devin's role on that flank, which for me is a large missing piece to this puzzle. There is no indication Barlow bothered to consult Schurz, who was then acting commander of the Eleventh Corps, although Schurz was absent looking into the gap with the First Corps and the advance of O'Neal when Barlow arrived north of the town. But I have wondered why Barlow did not halt at the edge of the town and await orders; instead, he marched his division right up the Harrisburg road to the Alms House, and quickly pushed further out to the knoll without apparently any concern for the over-extension of his force. Clearly he was not expecting the arrival of Early's division (or at least an enemy force of that size). The only thing that would cover Barlow's right flank was a line of skirmishers.

 

[neyankee61]

Thanks Tom. Like I said each question begins to raise others.

 

[repman66]

It was a manifestly bad place to be. Higher, sure? But it was nothing more than a quasi-brigade masked as a division holding ground in front of the army and quickly attacked on three sides and shot to pieces.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

The entire XI Corps was in a world of trouble on July 1. Too few men to cover too much ground against too much opposition. Almost no good defensible terrain north of Gettysburg on which to set a defensive line against a foe approaching from the north.