Attack on Baton Rouge August 6, 1862

Lubliner

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I have the disk set for the Official Records. Indiscriminately picking a volume I landed on Series 1, Volume 15 and began reading. I soon came upon the Baton Rouge attack by General Breckenridge against General Williams' forces that were convalescing there. The attack occurred in the early morning hours of August 6 and lasted 4 hours before the confederates retreated. Due to exhaustion and illness the Union soldiers did not pursue, also due to their General being shot in the contest toward the end and expiring.

These men were under General Butler in New Orleans, who sent then Lieutenant Weitzel, Chief of Engineers to inspect the battlefield and offer support, as it had been requested earlier on the 6th. Weitzel arrived early on the morning of the 7th, and made his report later that afternoon toward evening, after gathering intelligence of the battle, seeing to the burying of the dead on the field etc. This was the battle that the gunboat Essex blew up the confederate ram Arkansas. One of his communications to General Butler can be found on page 53 that I found intriguing and was curious as to the intentions of his statement about the small village of Baton Rouge.

[page 53, Volume 15, Series 1]- "The difficulty about burning this town is there is a large orphan asylum and a tremendous insane asylum, both of which humanity forbids us to destroy."

This one sentence was in its own paragraph with no relating context to any part of the communication, here or otherwise that I could find. Knowing that General Butler was in command under Halleck and Stanton in Washington, and communications existed between these men due to the 7th Vermont's reputation during the battle, I was dumbfounded to understand them alluding to some talk this early in the war toward such method. I believe it was kept within Butler's staff circle from whence Weitzel was sent, and something must have been mentioned for this statement out of context to all, to be made back to General Butler.

I am not posting this to cause debate but seek a balanced approach for understanding how early these seeds of revenge were sown. Butler was known to overstep the line and extend it further in Baltimore and in Hampton, Va. Is this something we should keep an eye on discussing his rule in New Orleans, and whether the Washington authorities knew and forbid, or condone by turning their head?

Lubliner.
[edited to correct the page #]
 
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https://64parishes.org/entry/battle-of-baton-rouge-2
Here's one view of the situation. Baton Rouge was a strategic location for the CSA to launch attacks on New Orleans, as well as to control the river, and the Confederates wanted it back in their hands. Perhaps Butler relented because Baton Rouge obviously was a good base for an attack on Port Hudson and places north, including the Red River.
 
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https://64parishes.org/entry/battle-of-baton-rouge-2
Here's one view of the situation. Baton Rouge was a strategic location for the CSA to launch attacks on New Orleans, as well as to control the river, and the Confederates wanted it back in their hands. Perhaps Butler relented because Baton Rouge obviously was a good base for an attack on Port Hudson and places north, including the Red River.
Baton Rouge also had a penitentiary and was the Capital of the State with a Courthouse and grounds located there. There were 5,500 residents that lived there during the Civil War. It appears General Williams, who took up command there with troops that had fallen sick due to the movements against Vicksburg after relocation was very considerate to the citizenry. One of the reports stated specifically that when he set up his troops to meet the confederate forces, he did so to keep the fighting away from the village and residents. General Williams was killed during the battle and Lieutenant Weitzel's message was sent back to Butler. Now I wonder too if Butler would have been so inclined to order burning of the town without official request from Stanton in Washington. I doubt he had discussed it, as twice he had been reprimanded by Lincoln for stepping beyond his authority. But it still sounds as though he held counsel with his own officers in New Orleans about possibly committing such an act if the confederates had persevered.
Lubliner.
 
This is a pretty interesting quotation from the OR considering the fighting that occurred within the city during the battle, Baton Rouge's importance as a port and its proximity to New Orleans, and the fact that the capital was eventually torched (albeit apparently accidentally on December 28, 1862).

I don't have really anything to add, but I did want to post a map of the battle since much of the battle site has been lost to development over the years.
1024px-Plan_de_Baton_Rouge_en_1862.jpg
 
On April 25, 1862, the day before New Orleans fell to the US Navy under Adm. David Farragut, the Louisiana Legislature decided to flee Baton Rouge and move to Opelousas. The 27th Legislature held its extra session in Opelousas. On May 9, Commander James S. Palmer of the USS Iroquois landed at the Baton Rouge town wharf and took possession, without resistance, of the Pentagon Barracks and the arsenal. Two weeks later, a party of guerrillas attacked a rowboat carrying a naval officer. In retaliation, Farragut's flagship, the Hartford, bombarded the town, causing civilian casualties and damaging St. Joseph's Church and other buildings. On May 29, Brig. Gen. Thomas R. Williams arrived with six regiments of infantry, two artillery batteries, and a troop of cavalry, and began the occupation of Baton Rouge.

Confederate Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn planned to retake Baton Rouge. Taking Baton Rouge was the key to driving the Union out of Louisiana, as rebels could then launch attacks along the Red River on Union occupied territory, and threaten Union control of New Orleans.

Gen. John C. Breckinridge's 5,000 men entrained from Vicksburg for Camp Moore, on July 27, consisting of two divisions with a total of five brigades. Simultaneously, the Confederate ironclad Arkansas was sailing down the Mississippi River, to engage Union ships near Baton Rouge. On August 4, after information was received of the imminent arrival of the enemy, Union troops were formed up a mile outside of Baton Rouge. The Union troops in Baton Rouge were inexperienced, and had been in training camp for only two weeks before being sent to Baton Rouge.

The Confederate attack was launched at daybreak on August 5. The action began with the Confederates pushing the Union men back toward the river. Bitter fighting took place, especially around Magnolia Cemetery. The Union commander, Gen. Thomas R. Williams, was killed in action. Colonel Thomas W. Cahill took over.

Col. Cahill led a Union retreat back to defensive lines under the protection of Union warships. The Confederates began coming under fire from the gunboats. The undermanned Confederate ironclad Arkansas arrived not long after to engage the Union ironclad USS Essex, but her engines failed just four miles above the city. Her commander ordered Arkansas set afire to prevent her capture. Without any prospect of naval support, Breckenridge was unable to further attack the Union positions and withdrew. The Confederates suffered some 383 casualties (84 killed, 266 wounded, 33 missing) while the Union had 453 (95 killed, 302 wounded, 56 missing).

Union troops evacuated the city a week later, concerned for the safety of New Orleans, but returned that autumn. Confederates occupied Port Hudson, which they held for almost another year.

Death of Gen. Thomas R. Williams at the Battle of Baton Rouge, August 5, 1862.

_Volume_II%2C_the_death_of_General_Thomas_Williams.png
 
I would presume the fact that a Confederate military and naval force had moved upon Baton Rouge, and fought a battle for it, suggested to Butler the Confederates wanted it. And since he was withdrawing from it, he considered burning the town fair game. He settled for the work of his subordinates in breaking up or carrying off that of particular importance. In the wake of the statements of Col. Paine and Lt. Weitzel about the orphanage and assylum, etc., Gen. Butler retracted his order to burn the town, subject to any requirement of those officers to do so...

1741795796906.png

(from P. 553 of the OR volume regarding these events).


From post-war, General Butler states that its abandonment was instead "leisurely" accomplished, with all useful public stuff taken off to New Orleans... So it seems Butler was ultimately satisfied that his subordinates made the right decision, etc.

1741784635206.png



An instruction by Gen. Butler to burn the town would not have been necessarily a surprise. In June, 1861, in Virginia, prior to the march resulting in the battle of Big Bethel, Butler had instructed his column to burn that place...

1741785011530.png


A short time later, the Confederate forces in Butler's front burned the town of Hampton, Virginia when contracting their lines.


The authorities in Washington were aware of General Butler's mode. They were operating against a general State of insurrection (as proclaimed by the President in August, 1861) on the scale of civil war, with territorial bounds, fluctuating front lines, etc. From a wartime legal case regarding some loss of private property at one time within Gen. Butler's lines in 1862, it was noted the General had given the common orders relative to the protection of private property WITHIN his lines... but not outside them...

1741786286356.png


So private property, relative the US forces, was inviolate, where the military viewed it subject to the laws of the United States.... In 1864, the US Supreme Court in the "Venice" case found that General Butler's meaning was consistent; that property outside the lines of the US forces was subject to the vicissitudes of insurrection and war, and the US forces under no particular bar relative to their confiscation or destruction where necessary...

1741786564225.png

1741786591296.png


So by withdrawing from, say Baton Rouge, and placing it exterior to his lines, General Butler was not necessarily constrained to consider the property inviolate, versus other military considerations.

On a smaller scale, during Butler's tenure in Louisiana, some US soldiers were killed and one captured near Houma by a bushwhack, and the prisoner lodged for a time in the town jail. Butler sent an expedition to the town, with the threat, which evidently everyone understood would be followed through with, to burn it should the people etc. remove the US flag it placed on the courthouse... (viz. as if placing the town exterior to US military protection).

1741787519175.png

1741787573339.png


In mid-1862 the USA sent a military governor to take charge over affairs in New Orleans from General Butler, who was the military department commander. This was made necessary due to some complaints by the foreign consuls in the city relative to their treatment under Butler's military authority. At that time, Secretary of State Seward observed that the President was otherwise satisfied with General Butler's command and restoration of law, order and peace over a region lately under the rule of anarchy, insurrection, and ruin (the legal view of the Confederacy's governmental operation by the USA):

1741790450351.png


In US General Orders no. 100 of 1863, such modes were generally classed under the laws of "retaliation" which visited severity upon the citizens of districts in revolt by placing the full burden of the conflict upon them (including where necessary the destruction of their private property). However "mere revenge" was classed out of order. The work had to have some ulterior military purpose relative to damaging the enemy. That was besides the strategic considerations of destruction.

1741792560465.png


1741792615442.png


Although Col. Payne's and Lt. Weitzel's decision in late 1862 to appeal orders to burn Baton Rouge according to Butler's instructions pre-dates the above general order, it meets its spirit, viz. Paine and Weitzel considered the destruction of the city would have been a cruelty to the insane and the orphans without any family or other means of providing for themselves, and General Butler agreed and issued his orders to spare the city unless circumstances warranted its destruction by his subordinates prior to their evacuation.
 
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I was curious to know who brought this up for a ruling in 1864. Also, where these decisions can be found concerning other Civil War incidents. I have most of the Military court cases in the OR but I haven't seen one from the Supreme Court.
Thanks,
Lubliner.

Clipped from case of the "Venice" in 1864....
1741834760210.png


Here's some more...

See also the Prize Cases, 1862: which declared the existence of a civil war, etc.

1741833521492.png

1741832582769.png

1741832979048.png



Dow v. Johnson, 1879, and Coleman v. Tennessee, 1878:
1741832776366.png



Ford v. Surget, 1878:
1741832871750.png


Lamar v. Browne, regarding Georgia cotton, at the close of the war... from 1875:

1741832843329.png




Freeborn v. the Protector, 1869-70:

1741833604878.png




Texas v. White, 1868:


1741834047896.png


A few relative to actions under confederate jurisdiction...
1741833857897.png

1741833915717.png



President Lincoln's various orders, proclamations, etc. can be read here:

 
The report of the battle states that the gunboats fired in support of the Union infantry.

IMG_2617.jpeg

Note that the town, quite sensibly, was built atop a bluff. You might ask how the gunners on the Hartford's deck could have laid their guns when their line of sight was blocked by the bluff face & town buildings?

IMG_2617.jpeg

The answer is here on Church Street between North & Main Street.

NH 1312.jpeg

USS Hartford as she appeared after returning from Hong Kong in 1861. Naval Heritage

Unlike the purpose built riverine "Pook's Turtles" heavy gunboats that were box shaped, the Hartford had masts with fighting tops.

IMG_2619.jpeg

From there naval signalmen were on line of sight with signalists stationed high up on the church.

IMG_2620.jpeg

Using this cypher disc, the church station of observation could send & receive secure messages such as:

212__2__2__33

212__2__2122__33

F-L-L

F-L-R

Fire a little to the left.

Fire a little to the right.

The number 33 is a ( . ) period.

A set of simple standardized signals for use between gunboats & army units was utilized all throughout the Mississippi Valley.

Breckinridge's men must have been disconcerted, to use a contemporary word, when shells from the big guns started going off over their heads.

Note: The inner circle with the letters could be turned to change the cypher / code to maintain security. The letter "R" would indicate the position on the numbers. The outer disc with the numbers itself came in several versions.

The number wheel & position of the R were changed according to printed schedules. A station of observation could write out the "contrabands," as intercepted messages were called, but without wheel & R setting, the contrabands were useless.

Code & cypher were synonymous then, unlike our modern usage.

Thanks to delta__rifles for the map.
 
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Order of battle for Baton Rouge:
US:
2nd Brigade, Department of the Gulf: Brig. Gen. Thomas Williams (k), Col. Thomas W. Cahill (9th CT)
- Right Wing: Col. Nathan A. M. Dudley (30th MA)
  • 30th MA: Maj. Horace O. Whittemore
  • 6th MI: Capt./Actg. Col. Charles E. Clarke
  • 7th VT: Col. George T. Roberts (k), Lt. Col. Volney S. Fullam
  • 2nd MA Battery: Capt. Ormand Nims (sick), Lt. George G. Trull
  • 4th MA Battery: Capt. Charles H. Manning
  • 1 section, 6th MA Battery: Lt. John F. Phelps (sick), Lt. William W. Carruth
  • Provisional Battery (3 guns; manned by detachment 21st IN and attached to 4th MA Battery): Lt. James Brown (c)
- Left Wing: Col. Thomas W. Cahill (9th CT), Col. Franklin S. Nickerson (14th ME)
  • 9 companies, 9th CT (in reserve): Lt. Col. Richard Fitzgibbons
  • 21st IN: Lt. Col. John A. Keith (w), Capt. James Grimsley
  • 14th ME: Col. Franklin S. Nickerson, Lt. Col. Thomas W. Porter
  • 4th WI (in reserve): Lt. Col. Sidney A. Bean
  • B, 2nd MAC Battalion: Capt. James M. Magee
  • 2 sections, 6th MA Battery: 2nd Lt. Frank Bruce
CS:
Breckinridge's Command: Maj. Gen. John Breckinridge
1st Provisional Division (from Vicksburg): Brig. Gen. Charles Clark (w/c), Col. Thomas B. Smith (20th TN)
- 2nd Brigade: Brig. Gen. Benjamin H. Helm (w), Col. Thomas H. Hunt (9th KY; w), Capt. John A. Buckner (Command Staff AAG)
  • 4th AL Battalion: Lt. Col. John Snodgrass
  • 31st AL: Col. Jeptha Edwards
  • 4th KY: Capt. John H. Millett
  • 9th KY: Col. Thomas H. Hunt, Lt. Col. John W. Caldwell (injured), Maj. John C. Wickliffe
  • 31st MS: Maj. Harvey E. Topp
  • Pettus (MS) Flying Artillery: Lt. John R. Sweaney
- 4th Brigade: Col. Thomas B. Smith (20th TN)
  • 15th MS (in reserve): Maj. James R. Binford
  • 22nd MS: Capt. Felix Hughes (mw)
  • 19th, 20th, 28th, and 45th TNs (temporarily consolidated into a battalion): Lt. Col. Beriah F. Moore (19th TN)
  • Detachment Cobb's KY Battery: Capt. Robert Cobb
2nd Provisional Division: Brig. Gen. Daniel Ruggles
- 1st Brigade: Col. Albert P. Thompson (3rd KY; w), Col. James W. Robertson (35th AL)
  • 4 (temporary) companies, 35th AL: Col. James W. Robertson, Lt. Col. Edward Goodwin
  • 3rd KY: Capt. James W. Bowman
  • 6th KY: Lt. Col. Martin H. Cofer
  • 7th KY: Col. Edward Crossland
  • Scott's LAC Squadron (from Camp Moore, La.): Capt. Augustus Scott
  • Provisional KYSS Company: Lt. F. G. Terry (8th KY) and Thompson's Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen./Lt. George C. Hubbard
- 2nd Brigade: Col. Henry W. Allen (4th LA; w), Col. Gustavus A. Breaux (30th LA)
  • 4th LA (from Vicksburg, Miss.): Lt. Col. Samuel E. Hunter
  • 30th LA (from Camp Moore, La.; Company K absent on furlough): Col. Gustavus A. Breaux, Lt. Col. Thomas Shields
  • 9th LA Battalion (from Camp Moore, La.): Lt. Col. Samuel Boyd (w), Maj. Thomas Bynum
  • I, 39th MS (attached to 4th LA): Capt. James Randal
  • 2 sections, 1st CS Battery (from Camp Moore, La.): Capt. Oliver J. Semmes
Unattached:
  • 9th LAPR Battalion: Maj. James De Baun
  • Detachments LAPR: Col. Preston Pond, Jr.
  • Clinton LASM (200 men): Col. D. C. Hardee
 
I absolutely had a lapse of memory, when I now remember the fighting along the Ohio River and Kentucky banks. Clearing our sharpshooters that would ambush the boats brought action against them, and a few places got burnt down. It was something unusual for me to read, as I have delved very little into the Louisiana conflicts beyond the battle for New Orleans. Thanks @RedRover for the reference site, and please keep the comments coming in. It was an interesting battle and appears to have been very important to both sides. Special notice for @Rhea Cole with his input on the gunboats.
Lubliner.
 
I have the disk set for the Official Records. Indiscriminately picking a volume I landed on Series 1, Volume 15 and began reading. I soon came upon the Baton Rouge attack by General Breckenridge against General Williams' forces that were convalescing there. The attack occurred in the early morning hours of August 6 and lasted 4 hours before the confederates retreated. Due to exhaustion and illness the Union soldiers did not pursue, also due to their General being shot in the contest toward the end and expiring.

These men were under General Butler in New Orleans, who sent then Lieutenant Weitzel, Chief of Engineers to inspect the battlefield and offer support, as it had been requested earlier on the 6th. Weitzel arrived early on the morning of the 7th, and made his report later that afternoon toward evening, after gathering intelligence of the battle, seeing to the burying of the dead on the field etc. This was the battle that the gunboat Essex blew up the confederate ram Arkansas. One of his communications to General Butler can be found on page 53 that I found intriguing and was curious as to the intentions of his statement about the small village of Baton Rouge.

[page 53, Volume 15, Series 1]- "The difficulty about burning this town is there is a large orphan asylum and a tremendous insane asylum, both of which humanity forbids us to destroy."

This one sentence was in its own paragraph with no relating context to any part of the communication, here or otherwise that I could find. Knowing that General Butler was in command under Halleck and Stanton in Washington, and communications existed between these men due to the 7th Vermont's reputation during the battle, I was dumbfounded to understand them alluding to some talk this early in the war toward such method. I believe it was kept within Butler's staff circle from whence Weitzel was sent, and something must have been mentioned for this statement out of context to all, to be made back to General Butler.

I am not posting this to cause debate but seek a balanced approach for understanding how early these seeds of revenge were sown. Butler was known to overstep the line and extend it further in Baltimore and in Hampton, Va. Is this something we should keep an eye on discussing his rule in New Orleans, and whether the Washington authorities knew and forbid, or condone by turning their head?

Lubliner.
[edited to correct the page #]
I, too am surprised at the thought of burning a town so early in the war. I have no explanation at this point.
 
I, too am surprised at the thought of burning a town so early in the war. I have no explanation at this point.

Frankly, I am having a hard time understanding the point of " … burning a town that early in the war…"

The shooting war had started in "Bleeding Kansas" circa 1854.

May 21st 1856 pro-slavery men attacked, sacked & burned much of Lawrence, Kansas. There was nothing new or novel about butchering people & burning a town in 1862.

Link:

 
Frankly, I am having a hard time understanding the point of " … burning a town that early in the war…"

The shooting war had started in "Bleeding Kansas" circa 1854.

May 21st 1856 pro-slavery men attacked, sacked & burned much of Lawrence, Kansas. There was nothing new or novel about butchering people & burning a town in 1862.

Link:

Not sure that Lawrence and Baton Rouge can be placed entirely in the same category.

Lawrence was sacked and burned by "border ruffian" guerillas. Not sure there was any military command and control present.

Had Baton Rouge been torched, that would have occurred under a direct order from a congressionally-commissioned US Army officer.

Just trying to maintain some perspective. The two episodes (one occurred- and the other averted), just seem very different to me.
 
It appears that besides guerillas, the Navy instigated this form of retaliation when ambushed along a river system. When fired into from the shoreline, they would immediately return fire and if possible land a crew to burn out whatever cover the rebels were using. It spread to burning out a whole village if the Navy commander was angry enough. At this point in the war, August of 1862, General Buell was approaching Chattanooga, and he had interpreted the policy for the Army to be lenient on citizenry and their dwellings unless it was established known confederates had a safe house there. They were also given permission to attack the guerillas along the rail line that tried to sabotage bridges etc. But the wholesale destruction of burning down a town, especially a capital city surprised me.
Lubliner.
 
It appears that besides guerillas, the Navy instigated this form of retaliation when ambushed along a river system. When fired into from the shoreline, they would immediately return fire and if possible land a crew to burn out whatever cover the rebels were using. It spread to burning out a whole village if the Navy commander was angry enough. At this point in the war, August of 1862, General Buell was approaching Chattanooga, and he had interpreted the policy for the Army to be lenient on citizenry and their dwellings unless it was established known confederates had a safe house there. They were also given permission to attack the guerillas along the rail line that tried to sabotage bridges etc. But the wholesale destruction of burning down a town, especially a capital city surprised me.
Lubliner.
 
Not sure that Lawrence and Baton Rouge can be placed entirely in the same category.

Lawrence was sacked and burned by "border ruffian" guerillas. Not sure there was any military command and control present.

Had Baton Rouge been torched, that would have occurred under a direct order from a congressionally-commissioned US Army officer.

Just trying to maintain some perspective. The two episodes (one occurred- and the other averted), just seem very different to me.

The question was the time line, not the intended target. The point being that burning barns, houses & settlements began in Kansas.

At roughly the same time as th Battle of Baton Rouge Buel abandoned Huntsville AL & marched across Middle Tennessee to confront Bragg in Kentucky.

The route was described as resembling Moses' crossing Sinai. There was a pilar of smoke in the day & fire at night. Buel was a proponent of the velvet glove treatment of slaveholders. His men were not.

Either officially sanctioned or not, the torching of Southern buildings was ubiquitous in 1862.
 

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