Army Life And Marksmanship

[yulzari]

Regarding the general conversation here. It is dangerous to apply the practices of European armies at the time to the American Difference of Opinion. They were either conscript troops or long term volunteers. In both cases there was time and the administration to teach and practice rifle skills.

The American armies were, perforce, amateurs under amateur officers thrust into a negligible system of administration that did well to feed, clothe and arm them at all. The use of Napoleonic and earlier mass close range infantry was a correct response to manage them tactically at all. With exceptions, the rifle musket was wasted upon most of them and a smooth bore musket would have served then nearly as well. In time lessons were learned and efforts made to educate both officers and men. The greatest advance was in logistics and communications with the railways allowing both supplies and men to move great distances at threat speeds even if it was a foot slog for most. And allied to the railways was the telegraph which could communicate in real time.

Eventually the comparative industries made the result certain.

Within reason, the quality of the small arms made little difference. The best could take advantage of the rifle musket but they were few and diluted to minimal effect at the campaign level amongst the general mass in major engagements.

 

[DoctorKingSchultz]

The simple fact is that few of the city and town volunteers had ever held a rifle, never mind fired it. Yes, there were some natural marksmen, but most hadn't a clue what to do. Neither had their instructors. There were simply not enough instructors to go around, so they used the old guys. Most would have been familiar with the percussion musket - there were plenty available - but they were not trained in the military use of the rifle for line regiments. Yes, rifles had been issued before, but how many who had used them in the Mexican Wars were still around?

BTW, I don't think we were a nation of riflemen in 1775. We were a nation of shooters. Rifles were a rare thing in New England and most New Englanders used buck 'n ball. Where the Swiss/Germans settled there were a lot of rifes: Pennsyvlania & Virginia and going south from there they spread to the Carolinas. Privately owned rifles were more common post-Revolution.

I'm well aware of this; I am stating the fact of easily the most widely-believed misconception of the war, not implying or claiming say, that the 13 colonies were indeed crack shots but it wasn't up to them alone; they weren't at all.

Misconceptions are often wrong at their core. Take any war; the Great War, or World War One - How easily is it to find a post anywhere online about that war and find a top reply or comment doing something along the lines of talking about how "Napoleonic tactics" were used in 1914 and how magical it is that it all changed by 1918. Or blaming some infantry lieutenant for their perceptibly "stupid tactics" as if, even if they were stupid, that a little officer was the one who decided fundamental infantry doctrine?

Could just be interpreting this wrong but 2 is quite a few. I will presume we are all just contributing to solidifying the main point here; it isn't like most (or anyone really) was shooting Minié rifles in America, and in general, despite what people would want to believe about the Old West, or of the 19th century, of the US through history in general, it was not a gun-slinging nation.
I think the vastly made more important, on the individual level, focus on the 2nd Amendment is a whole other conversation, made much greater of a deal today than just about ever, but yeah - not a nation of sharpshooters, or shooters in general. (I mention it because the modern state of the US around gun culture, and living memory probably contributes greatly to the whole misconception, it would make sense.)

There are things like men's recreational shooting clubs set up by German immigrants @gary alludes to, and I know I have seen threads at least mention before, more common around the 1850s onwards but that is nothing like the institutionalized Corps of the British Army dedicated to training rifle marksmanship to an army that is 220,000 strong in regulars in 1861; nor is it like having a nationalized rifle-shooting association, nor a culture already familiar with rifles like the Norwegian, Swiss or Germanic states all benefit from that affects their own focuses on marksmanship (though none quite like the British Army in these waning years of Minié rifle supremacy).

Oh, and:

Yes, rifles had been issued before, but how many who had used them in the Mexican Wars were still around?

Obviously rhetorical, and there is the fact that their rifle knowledge would be useless anyway - but giving it a thought - with the scales the US and Confederate Armies work with to begin with in the war, it would be a complete disservice to say they dwarf Mexican war numbers. Without any disrespect to the men of that conflict - if every Mexican war veteran (who shouldered something with rifled grooves) stepped up, it still wouldn't be enough.
What the US needed was at very least was a few years of a particularly popular earlier NRA, and more importantly institutional training of any kind. Austrians spent a lot less time than British on distance position, aim drill etc. training; their soldiers didn't learn to judge distance - which perhaps makes the 1859 British manuals a little prophetic; they were officially adopted in March 1859, just a month before the 2nd Italian War of Independence, & my Field Exercise printed in June, the very month of Solferino.
Both manuals complement each other in many ways, and among the main themes it repeats, as I showed in an earlier post, i.e. 1st page for training, page 10 of the Musketry Instruction - distance judging drill is claimed as the singular most important skill of the soldier. Keeping in mind the Austrian infantrymen are all taught to fire at known distances; just not judge distance themselves. Their officers' main role is to do it for them. Austrians are still, with this, lightyears beyond US practice are considered woefully inept in practice. (This doesn't come down to how difficult rifle training is, but just as comparison. The lack of judging drill for the individual made a huge difference.)

Was distance judgment institutionalized among all infantrymen in any sort of way, how to simply aim properly at different elevations? No. Nevermind the fact that guns of the Civil War may range from a Springfield M1861 with a maximum of 500-yard sights to an Enfield P56 short rifle with the 1100-yard sight, a Spencer's 800-yard sight or hell, a Maynard carbine and whatever its rear sight is graduated for (think about 200 yards at most generous); Nevermind how a unit might be issued various weapons that defeat having knowledge of exactly how to aim and hit necessarily with one of them; a Lorenz M1854 and Springfield M1861 do not shoot the same.

There is plenty to point out. You don't just "learn to shoot" with these. As @Old Soldier put, marksmen take time. They also need the resources; what they got was the old fashioned "Leave it to your officers" that is recognizable to any older armies.

Let's make it clear. There were NOT regular - full-time professional - soldiers. Many instructors will have come from the State Militias - still using smoothbore muskets. They were teaching the DRILLS, to ensure the recruits could match their fire with regular soldiers - but they were not teaching them how to shoot. The percussion musket could fire three rounds, perhaps four, a minute and had an effective range of no more than 150 yards. The new Minie rifles had the same rate of fire, but an effective range of 400 yards, 600 in trained hands, and up to 1,000 for unit area fire, but these guys were not being trained how to make use of that technical advance. It takes time to produce a marksman (or even a decent shot) and they were not given that time. The generals wanted troops in the field, ready to go, so the instructors made it so. What they didn't get was marksmen.

The generals too, did not appreciate what a trained rifleman could do, should do, and deployed their troops as they always used to - as musket armed infantry. They expected nothing more. Even the trained Sharpshooter battalions, with accurate Sharps rifles, were deployed as line infantry! The concept of unit (company) fire and the 'beaten zone' at long range seems to have been totally ignored - and left to artillery.

A company firing at a battery in the field at 600-1000 yards was perfectly feasible and would have effectively caused the battery to cease fire and move away. Was that ever done?

The generals too, did not appreciate what a trained rifleman could do, should do, and deployed their troops as they always used to - as musket armed infantry. They expected nothing more.

This statement actually brings up quite an interesting thought; it is almost as though they did think the way so many others think about this. As before stated, the US Army's dress and fatigue uniform are collectively based upon French and Austrian influence; namely inspired by their light infantry; Chasseurs and Jägers. This is even more apparent at the time Hardee's was initially adopted, itself named Rifle & Light Infantry tactics for a reason. Copied from the 1846 French drill as we all know, for light infantry and the Tige system. The hunter's horn for light infantry now denotes all infantrymen, who all ideally carry rifle-muskets. Point being; the US Army models its uniform and official manuals off of light infantry dress; they follow the trend of copying the main basic idea in the 1850s of the change brought by the rifle-musket - the universal infantryman. The ideal US infantryman would have been perfectly flexible between skirmish and line formation, even if Hardee's is barebones compared to say, the 400~ total pages, possibly more (I'd have to count_ for the British manuals.
They go out of their way to ensure acceptably modern arms, especially that of the Enfield, Lorenz etc. are armed in number; the US Government has 1,200,000 Springfield M1861 and derivatives ordered, goes as far as purchasing 106,667 total Spencer rifles and carbines from 1862-63, delivered until 1866; while that is bit out there for the topic - nobody is doing that; the US is going out of their way to both get acceptably modern weapons and perceptibly advanced arms to equip their armies - the point, they armies feel that simply equipping themselves with rifle-muskets and the general best the day has to offer will make them... better, perhaps. Maybe, they think... they will "learn to shoot" practically in the field? Flawed idea but it seems to be what they are doing.

Italy for comparison; perhaps a poor example for being much shorter, but in the era surrounding the Expedition of the Thousand, 1860, it appears that the Garibaldi's forces - mass volunteer army - goes out of its way to predominantly use percussion smoothbores in that war. Not simply out of availability. They order for single-shot cavalry pistol-carbines to be made, some of their last real major use, and virtually as soon as the war ends and the Kingdom of Italy, for the most part, secured the new Army sets about getting itself proper uniforms and instantly in year 1 sets about getting a brand-new Fucello Model 1860/61 rifle-musket for the army, makes purchases from the likes of Lefaucheux, etc. all within a year of unification. Certain Italian political movements are known for their shirtsleeve uniforms - sure, but putting all of this into perspective it seems to all make sense, right? The Army that fought in 1860 seems to be led by men who consciously knew that between untrained mass volunteer armies, smoothbore percussion muskets were still relevant, and made little to no effort in procuring Minié rifles, got itself a good bunch of percussion smoothbores knowing it had no time nor point in attempting to train with the little time they gave themselves. Everything changes mere months after achieving their goals.

The US train of thought during the Civil War is, we need rifle-muskets. With time they start at least procuring quantities of things that nobody else has really done before. They are obsessed with quality and modernization yet simultaneously don't seem to want to - don't actively really have the means at all - to do it. It would be a different story if they really "wanted" troops of the smoothbore era, there was effort made to procure advanced arms. The basis being that, seemingly, "If we have advanced guns, our troops with eventually learn to shoot, and maybe our oldschool volleys will be deadlier and we will be more successful than the enemy."

 

[DoctorKingSchultz]

Regarding the general conversation here. It is dangerous to apply the practices of European armies at the time to the American Difference of Opinion. They were either conscript troops or long term volunteers. In both cases there was time and the administration to teach and practice rifle skills.

The American armies were, perforce, amateurs under amateur officers thrust into a negligible system of administration that did well to feed, clothe and arm them at all. The use of Napoleonic and earlier mass close range infantry was a correct response to manage them tactically at all. With exceptions, the rifle musket was wasted upon most of them and a smooth bore musket would have served then nearly as well. In time lessons were learned and efforts made to educate both officers and men. The greatest advance was in logistics and communications with the railways allowing both supplies and men to move great distances at threat speeds even if it was a foot slog for most. And allied to the railways was the telegraph which could communicate in real time.

Eventually the comparative industries made the result certain.

Within reason, the quality of the small arms made little difference. The best could take advantage of the rifle musket but they were few and diluted to minimal effect at the campaign level amongst the general mass in major engagements.

I think all of that most of us here understand, the revived discussion came from discussing some severe misconceptions and understanding from the start of the thread, and now active comparison and discussion of the armies of the Civil War relative to their counterparts.
It is essential in understanding the war, i.e. in the correct, basic analysis you have just given, to look at other armies.
There may be a person or two on the forum as a whole who may not get it, the discussion I see is talking about and contrasting armies, and moreover explaining why the American Civil War was fought in the way it was as oppose to an ideal. This stems from trying to rectify the idea that American tactics in the war were born from being the only that existed, or perhaps the best, part of a general misunderstanding that the war had anything really to do with "proving" rifle technology in any way or pioneering how to use it - which believe it or not, is a highly pervasive myth, I know many in real life and see online regularly who are wholly ignorant of external doctrine and believe it to be the only [that exists].
This implies an understanding, and the thread has gotten for the most part, various times now to the conclusions that the war was fought the way it was out of necessity; As I like to keep repeating, it is the best way to fight with mass untrained volunteer/conscript armies. The Civil War could have been fought with breechloaders being as prevalent as rifle-muskets instead, and still looking much the same in infantry tactics. Direct mention early in the conversation was about dislikes in how the 1870s-80s are discussed as regards the US Army; changing tactics responding to changing weaponry, which was not the case; because the Civil War was fought the way it was from lack of professionality in resource, institution or administration. It's not like they were on top of the game in the '60s and the trapdoor was changing warfare for them, they were both becoming more professional and implementing rifle training and that is why things were changing in the 1870s-80s. As I referred to myself just now, could've been fought with breechloaders and looked the same way.
The War of the Pacific is tactically, South America's direct example of that in 1879-84. Giant armies with weeks to prepare, armed with still ultimately single-shot arms - the best way to use them is the tried ways that work, ways designed to be learned very quickly and simply. That is the way we keep seeing throughout the whole era with again, largely untrained, mass volunteer armies. Nobody here is making any dangerous assumptions I can see.

Perhaps you aren't referring to me but I've directly said much of the same stuff, in a nutshell. TLR and all that, everyone talking recently all has. Explaining why the US Army did not have British, Prussian, French tactics =/= dangerous, it literally involves understanding both, comparing both and now we are actively talking about why the US Army was the way it was. Nevermind that we have already been doing that.

 

[Old Soldier]

OK. Some defense of US production and technology. Breech-loaders were 'new kit' Most are NOT suitable for line infantry- and they cost a fortune! The cased ammo did not have the power or range required and were not always reliable (Capping breechloaders were much more effective). They had not been used in line warfare before and were mostly issued to cavalry.

Many of the breechloaders used in the Civil War were trialled by the Brits from 1859 as they searched for a reliable breechloader very aware of the 'needle rifles' in Europe. Most were carbines but many were also trialled as infantry rifles alongside British and European weapons including Sharps and Westley Richards Monkey Tails. As most are aware they settled on the case breechloader, not the capping breechloader. The economic - and cheap - way was to convert new P53 using the Snider breech mechanism from 1866 onwards as well as it's associated centerfire ammunition. It equalled or bettered P53 accuracy.

The state arsenals and their sub-contractors were slow in producing any weapons initially and were well behind in production, particularly with rifles for the infantry. Production of the M1861 did not hit the required numbers until 1863. In the meanwhile Ordnance was in Europe buying anything available. - just as the Rebs were. The Rebs ordered 500,000 Enfield P53s from the private sector (no surviving records of how many were received) but the Union also ordered - and got - 400,000, not to mention the Lorenz from Austria.

The rifle's effectiveness was proved in the Crimean War (1854-55) and justified the rather comprehensive instruction in the British and French Armies. Was the USA interested? Were they learning those lessons too? No. They did things THEIR way*(still do). They saw no need to do it. It wasn't their sort of war. They relied on the experiences of the Mexican War. They only had a small regular army anyway, mostly in garrison troops and manning forts. They did not need a large army. Sure they conducted short patrols against native Americans, but that was about it. As for tactical awareness, the US Army was not alone as the Austro-Hungarian armies suffered the same disasters against the Prussians armed with Dreyse Rifles - breech-loaders effective only out to 400 yards, but with a higher rate of fire - especially the Battle of Königgrätz in 1866 (45,000 Aust. cas v 10,000 Prus.) so the US generals were not the only ones blind to the rifles of the opposition.

* This is an historical fact as we see the same problems in the re-equipping aftermath of the Spanish-American War. They seem to take no one's advice learned from experience that the US forces have not encountered. Pershing's tactics and re-equipping of the AEF in 1918, Kasserine Pass, Omaha Beach and early daylight bombing missions are further examples.

 

[DoctorKingSchultz]

OK. Some defense of US production and technology. Breech-loaders were 'new kit' Most are NOT suitable for line infantry- and they cost a fortune! The cased ammo did not have the power or range required and were not always reliable (Capping breechloaders were much more effective). They had not been used in line warfare before and were mostly issued to cavalry.

Many of the breechloaders used in the Civil War were trialled by the Brits from 1859 as they searched for a reliable breechloader very aware of the 'needle rifles' in Europe. Most were carbines but many were also trialled as infantry rifles alongside British and European weapons including Sharps and Westley Richards Monkey Tails. As most are aware they settled on the case breechloader, not the capping breechloader. The economic - and cheap - way was to convert new P53 using the Snider breech mechanism from 1866 onwards as well as it's associated centerfire ammunition. It equalled or bettered P53 accuracy.

The state arsenals and their sub-contractors were slow in producing any weapons initially and were well behind in production, particularly with rifles for the infantry. Production of the M1861 did not hit the required numbers until 1863. In the meanwhile Ordnance was in Europe buying anything available. - just as the Rebs were. The Rebs ordered 500,000 Enfield P53s from the private sector (no surviving records of how many were received) but the Union also ordered - and got - 400,000, not to mention the Lorenz from Austria.

The rifle's effectiveness was proved in the Crimean War (1854-55) and justified the rather comprehensive instruction in the British and French Armies. Was the USA interested? Were they learning those lessons too? No. They did things THEIR way*(still do). They saw no need to do it. It wasn't their sort of war. They relied on the experiences of the Mexican War. They only had a small regular army anyway, mostly in garrison troops and manning forts. They did not need a large army. Sure they conducted short patrols against native Americans, but that was about it. As for tactical awareness, the US Army was not alone as the Austro-Hungarian armies suffered the same disasters against the Prussians armed with Dreyse Rifles - breech-loaders effective only out to 400 yards, but with a higher rate of fire - especially the Battle of Königgrätz in 1866 (45,000 Aust. cas v 10,000 Prus.) so the US generals were not the only ones blind to the rifles of the opposition.

* This is an historical fact as we see the same problems in the re-equipping aftermath of the Spanish-American War. They seem to take no one's advice learned from experience that the US forces have not encountered. Pershing's tactics and re-equipping of the AEF in 1918, Kasserine Pass, Omaha Beach and early daylight bombing missions are further examples.

Best message here. Sums everything up neatly. I'd only add to that "*" that such was certainly the case in 1917-18 as well. The US Army had to learn the hard way in all three wars and reform in their aftermaths. Nevermind, just seeing you mentioned that as well.. but yeah in any case, bringing it all full circle, I think this thread has done well to contrast the armies and as to why the US fought the way it did, how it did - my intention in reviving the thread was to share and contrast how other armies fought.
I at least speak for myself, but it seems, evidenced within this thread and for most of my relationship with study of the Civil War, that many of us are wholly ignorant of what foreign armies and individual developments contemporary to it looked like, and such a lack has led to widespread myths like that of the war being highly influential or changing in ordinary infantry combat, or that European powers took half a century to learn its infantry lessons.
These are things I have seen countless "Civil War buffs" believe. Even famous popularists of interest in the Civil War often talk about certain fairly un-unique practice or technology as heralding the future or making ground where it is not; from American revolver design to naval warfare. Other famous narrative myths along the lines of how the whole world cowered at Hampton Roads; yes, it is a significant moment in naval history and technology; but did not stay that way for long, and by the Overland Campaign the Royal Navy for instance had the four-turret HMS Prince Albert and HMS Royal Sovereign among other projects (Neverminding their prior ironclad development), with much higher freeboard than any monitors. USS Roanoke is the only similar design. If you plotted a map of countries building ironclads within a year of Hampton Roads and that of countries with launched ironclads within 24 it would be very revealing.
There's countless myths pertaining to the war; I've met people face to face who thought the CSS Virginia and the USS Monitor were the only two ironclads of the war and that the March of '62 was the only time ironclads were used during the whole war. Let's not even get into Naval as a general topic; I am partly just making a personal rant here, (and if you have lost focus; none of this is correction of anything you have said) but I guess my ultimate point is that study of the Civil War would do so well to see more interest in technology: nothing changed my opinion on the conflict more than my dive into that broad aspect more than any other and I was the kind of kid who already knew most of the quotes, chronology and information in Ken Burns's The Civil War when I first got it. Most are on that level. Used to be able to talk about seemingly any battle and the order of it and the command. Nothing was quite as liberating as seeing the technology in depth; I encourage and promote everyone to at least dip their toes into it. Make no mistake about the impressions the past few pages of thread might give; the Civil War does not need to have a pioneering or revolutionary infantry for the most part to be a very interesting conflict, and if anything I think the understanding shown here should make the era all the more interesting; when I saw how different the most professional armies of the time are, rather than leaving the US a hopeless mess it makes the conflict all the more interesting - it is such a ranging war in technology and aspects of it. The US Government ordered a grant total of 106,667 Spencers from the early naval contrast through no later than June 27th, 1864; I doubt they'd have complained if they received every last one within the next month. Such procurement is interesting as a decision considering all we have discussed (Even of procuring any rifle-musket as very recently discussed, begging the question of why when it was hardly possible to train to use them any better than smoothbores.) It is a very interesting conflict.

OK. Some defense of US production and technology. Breech-loaders were 'new kit' Most are NOT suitable for line infantry- and they cost a fortune! The cased ammo did not have the power or range required and were not always reliable (Capping breechloaders were much more effective). They had not been used in line warfare before and were mostly issued to cavalry.

Many of the breechloaders used in the Civil War were trialled by the Brits from 1859 as they searched for a reliable breechloader very aware of the 'needle rifles' in Europe. Most were carbines but many were also trialled as infantry rifles alongside British and European weapons including Sharps and Westley Richards Monkey Tails. As most are aware they settled on the case breechloader, not the capping breechloader. The economic - and cheap - way was to convert new P53 using the Snider breech mechanism from 1866 onwards as well as it's associated centerfire ammunition. It equalled or bettered P53 accuracy.

The state arsenals and their sub-contractors were slow in producing any weapons initially and were well behind in production, particularly with rifles for the infantry. Production of the M1861 did not hit the required numbers until 1863. In the meanwhile Ordnance was in Europe buying anything available. - just as the Rebs were. The Rebs ordered 500,000 Enfield P53s from the private sector (no surviving records of how many were received) but the Union also ordered - and got - 400,000, not to mention the Lorenz from Austria.

.

Production and Logistics again, such an interesting topic when it comes to the Civil War. Got plenty of threads bookmarked on them. Like I said, perfectly summarized everything here really, whole condensed point of the past few pages I've attempted to make.

 

[Will Carry]

I am reading it! Good stuff. Bayonet, here's something that may be more to your liking.

Don't get mad bayonet! I was just joking.

 

[PatW]

I read a soldier's account. He was in the line at Shiloh. The captain asked him why he was not firing. He said that he could not see anything (dense clouds of black powder smoke). The captain told him to just fire. In many situations visibility was so bad that aiming went out the window. Aimed fire did get involved in skirmishing.

 

[gary]

I read a soldier's account. He was in the line at Shiloh. The captain asked him why he was not firing. He said that he could not see anything (dense clouds of black powder smoke). The captain told him to just fire. In many situations visibility was so bad that aiming went out the window. Aimed fire did get involved in skirmishing.

That's a good point about warfare in the blackpowder era. If it's fire at will and you can see the muzzle flash, aim there.

 

[DoctorKingSchultz]

That's a good point about warfare in the blackpowder era. If it's fire at will and you can see the muzzle flash, aim there.

Also part of why the British prefer individual fire, why their "close order" is still at least a pace apart, why the skirmish line is more emphasized and why synchronized volleys do not actually exist any longer by 1859. Among other things it all functions to ensure there are not blankets of smoke, but constant and rapid firing at any one moment.

 

[gary]

In the ACW units still did fire by platoons or fire by file.

I like feu de joie!

 

[Old Soldier]

In the ACW units still did fire by platoons or fire by file.

I like feu de joie!

That is volley fire. The Brits still did 'fire by platoon' but it was usually distant targets using individual fire. Volley fire was still used, but it was usually defensive or against 'mass targets' of tribal enemies like the Mahdi in Sudan basically for the effect on morale. This was replaced by 'rapid fire' with magazine rifles.

 

[Saphroneth]

The basic answer to the question is that there wasn't a doctrine for it in the US army; the concept of training everyone in musketry marksmanship, rather than merely specialists, was very new. It seems obvious to us but probably did not back then, and likely not worth the expense (to do the conceptually simplest bit, target shooting) while the more difficult theory work is, well, difficult and as such not easy to come up with offhand.

 

[Old Soldier]

I'm well aware of this; I am stating the fact of easily the most widely-believed misconception of the war, not implying or claiming say, that the 13 colonies were indeed crack shots but it wasn't up to them alone; they weren't at all.

Misconceptions are often wrong at their core. Take any war; the Great War, or World War One - How easily is it to find a post anywhere online about that war and find a top reply or comment doing something along the lines of talking about how "Napoleonic tactics" were used in 1914 and how magical it is that it all changed by 1918. Or blaming some infantry lieutenant for their perceptibly "stupid tactics" as if, even if they were stupid, that a little officer was the one who decided fundamental infantry doctrine?

Just an aside on that very point. In 1914 the Britiah Army went to war as a body of regular troop all trained in marksmanship and made a distict impression on the German opponents, hardly 'Napoleonic'. (The French still relied on the old 'Napoleonic' la grâce d'attaque and l'attaque à outrance (attack to the limit) it cost them dear.) By mid-1916, they were down to a majority of trained, but unpractised, conscripted infantrymen. The generals thought that their artillery bombardment would wipe out the opposition so organised a quite laid back advance (Napoleonic?) which got cut to pieces as the bombardment had NOT done the job properly. From there onwards the technique of 'Fire and Movement' was evolved where one half of a unit laid down fire and the other part moved then vice versa with an empasis on LMGs. It worked. Even the French started using it, except they moved AND fired at the same time. The AEF loved the French version and adopted it (hence the BAR). This was far more 'Napoleonic' - and cost far more casualties in the long run.

 

[Saphroneth]

The weird thing is, the tactical world arguably changes more in WW1 than it ever has before or since, in a social sense.


Right back as far as we can see, the person making actual meaningful battlefield decisions and coordinating with other arms is either the army commander himself (or, rarely, herself) or the commander of a large organized unit - a battalion, we might call it, or a regiment, or even a brigade (legion) for example. They may coordinate with a bit of cavalry or with an artillery battery. This applies all the way up through history to 1914.


By 1918 that's now happening at platoon level.

 

[repman66]

Just an aside on that very point. In 1914 the Britiah Army went to war as a body of regular troop all trained in marksmanship and made a distict impression on the German opponents, hardly 'Napoleonic'. (The French still relied on the old 'Napoleonic' la grâce d'attaque and l'attaque à outrance (attack to the limit) it cost them dear.) By mid-1916, they were down to a majority of trained, but unpractised, conscripted infantrymen. The generals thought that their artillery bombardment would wipe out the opposition so organised a quite laid back advance (Napoleonic?) which got cut to pieces as the bombardment had NOT done the job properly. From there onwards the technique of 'Fire and Movement' was evolved where one half of a unit laid down fire and the other part moved then vice versa with an empasis on LMGs. It worked. Even the French started using it, except they moved AND fired at the same time. The AEF loved the French version and adopted it (hence the BAR). This was far more 'Napoleonic' - and cost far more casualties in the long run.

You're skipping a step here -

The French had the best infantry rifle in the world in 1870, the Chassepot Needle-Rifle, and trained their men to fire at 1,000 meters. In battles of the Franco-Prussian war repeatedly French infantry, well trained in the use of their firearms, pinned down German infantry formations well in excess of 400 meters. But the Prussians kept the initiative and kept advancing.

The French drew their lessons from this context. They also weirdly avoided the fact that the dead German infantry populated the fields and the woods of Northeastern France - torn to bits by the Chassepot at extreme range where their needle-rifles could not respond French dead lined trenches, the canals, the sunken roads, everywhere their was cover and a lined was formed - blown to bits but accurate and modern shell fire from Krupp guns.

When you understand why the French officers saw why they lost 1870 - maneuver, dash, will - you understand why the French based their entire 1st World War doctrine on maneuver, attack, and aggression.

 

[Saphroneth]

The French drew their lessons from this context. They also weirdly avoided the fact that the dead German infantry populated the fields and the woods of Northeastern France - torn to bits by the Chassepot at extreme range where their needle-rifles could not respond French dead lined trenches, the canals, the sunken roads, everywhere their was cover and a lined was formed - blown to bits but accurate and modern shell fire from Krupp guns.

When you understand why the French officers saw why they lost 1870 - maneuver, dash, will - you understand why the French based their entire 1st World War doctrine on maneuver, attack, and aggression.

I think that's skipping the more relevant wars in this context, which is the wars of the early 20th century. Aggression works in 1905 and in the Balkan Wars!

 

[Old Soldier]

Vey True, but I was talking about the BRITISH army. The single sentence about the the French was merely (!) a brief comparison. However, it was exactly the same mentality used during the Napoleonic wars. It was the same tactic used by the Germans(Prussian) army in 1914 that caused the upset at Mons and Le Cateau

 

[Saphroneth]

There is a basic and fundamental tension going on which is the basis of why battles don't always go one way or the other, and that is psychological. A unit under fire that is advancing is under a lot of stress and the men in it want to go to ground and return fire; if it takes enough casualties from fire, then that urge overwhelms the drive forwards and the men take cover and the attack fails. If it has a sudden shock (such as an enemy unit appearing out of dead ground and suddenly opening fire, resulting in psychological shock, followed by being charged) then the men rout and the attack fails. This has been the case for hundreds of years as of 1914 and it doesn't really change even then - attacks often succeeded in reaching the enemy trenches. They often nearly worked, despite magazine rifles and machine guns; the ACW is not nearly as lethal, but because this is psychological attacks could fail in the ACW.

The difference in WW1 is not in being able to take the enemy trenches, but in being able to sustain the attack. The artillery necessary to suppress enemy trenches and destroy enemy defensive positions tore up the ground and meant that an attack couldn't be followed up on operationally.

 

[DoctorKingSchultz]

Just an aside on that very point. In 1914 the Britiah Army went to war as a body of regular troop all trained in marksmanship and made a distict impression on the German opponents, hardly 'Napoleonic'. (The French still relied on the old 'Napoleonic' la grâce d'attaque and l'attaque à outrance (attack to the limit) it cost them dear.) By mid-1916, they were down to a majority of trained, but unpractised, conscripted infantrymen. The generals thought that their artillery bombardment would wipe out the opposition so organised a quite laid back advance (Napoleonic?) which got cut to pieces as the bombardment had NOT done the job properly. From there onwards the technique of 'Fire and Movement' was evolved where one half of a unit laid down fire and the other part moved then vice versa with an empasis on LMGs. It worked. Even the French started using it, except they moved AND fired at the same time. The AEF loved the French version and adopted it (hence the BAR). This was far more 'Napoleonic' - and cost far more casualties in the long run.

The thing is, I highly doubt the people who purport such misconceptions online have thought remotely that far. I regularly see people - and indeed have met people - who sincerely believe that infantry tactics of 1914 look exactly like 1815, with minor change at very most. Tactics as basic as fire and maneuver being beyond them.

 

[gary]

Guderian: "Weapons affects tactics."

(my addition: only if the user knows how to use them.)