Antietam: A Perspective

[Moe Daoust]

Nothing exists in a vacuum. Have you read the message that McClellan directed be sent to Burnside on September 16? The message states "The general commanding has learned that, although your corps was ordered to be in a designated position at 12 m. to-day, at or near sunset only one division and four batteries had reached the ground intended for the troops".

It continues: "The general has also been advised that there was a delay of some four hours in the movement of your command yesterday. I am instructed to call upon you for explanations of these failures on your part to comply with the orders given you, and to add, in view of the important military operations now in hand, the commanding general cannot lightly regard such marked departure from the tenor of his instructions."

That's the very day before the events on September 17. I think there was a question previously about Burnside using up his "rope". He used it up in September 15-16. Was McClellan's intent on September 17 that Burnside merely take the bridge, and not the heights above it or the ground beyond to Lee's right flank? If his orders had been that absurd, then there would be another reason McClellan should be faulted for what happened. We know better. I know that it's awfully hard for you to find fault with anything McClellan ever did/did not do during the war, but this effort to justify his leaving Burnside in place is really strained. And the proof that McClellan should have relieved Burnside is the outcome. In actuality, while I cannot imagine that it's intended, you seem to be making the case that Burnside had been given one very challenging assignment that required hours just to cross the creek. So the fault is McClellan's for issuing bad orders? Let's at least agree that the failure on the Union left was not an Act of God.

According to Wilson, McClellan's intent was for Burnside, "to charge and take the bridge in front of him and the heights beyond." In his official report, McClellan states that he ordered Burnside "to carry the bridge, then to gain possession of the heights beyond, and to advance along their crest upon Sharpsburg and its rear." I'm at a loss as to what was so bad about either of these orders or am I missing something? Burnside was in command on the Union left and until someone can show that McClellan was authorized to relieve him as early as on the 16th, the failure there was Burnside's and his alone. According to 67th Tigers (and this is subject to confirmation) McClellan's hands were tied as he did not have the authority to relieve Burnside. If it turns out that he did, then that's a whole new ball game. My jury is still out in this regard.

 

[Belfoured]

According to Wilson, McClellan's intent was for Burnside, "to charge and take the bridge in front of him and the heights beyond." In his official report, McClellan states that he ordered Burnside "to carry the bridge, then to gain possession of the heights beyond, and to advance along their crest upon Sharpsburg and its rear." I'm at a loss as to what was so bad about either of these orders or am I missing something? Burnside was in command on the Union left and until someone can show that McClellan was authorized to relieve him as early as on the 16th, the failure there was Burnside's and his alone. According to 67th Tigers (and this is subject to confirmation) McClellan's hands were tied as he did not have the authority to relieve Burnside. If it turns out that he did, then that's a whole new ball game. My jury is still out in this regard.

I agree with your interpretation of McClellan's order - it was another poster who seemed to be suggesting that Burnside complied with McClellan's order simply by taking the bridge. I was merely stating that IF that were the order, it was incompetent. I eagerly await an explanation - based on text of the Articles of War and/or JAG opinions and not on contrived theories - as to how Burnside was immunized from his obligation to obey orders from his superior officer - and, of course, why McClellan suffered from the same understanding that I have. It appears that there is a theory that McClellan commanded an army in which his corps commanders did not have to obey his orders/in which he was effectively "neutered" from enforcing those orders. That is, to quote Captain Miller in SPR after the German loudspeaker announces the Statute of Liberty ist kaput, "disconcerting".

 

[Saphroneth]

I agree with your interpretation of McClellan's order - it was another poster who seemed to be suggesting that Burnside complied with McClellan's order simply by taking the bridge.

I'm not saying McClellan complied with Burnside's order simply by taking the bridge - I'm saying that for McClellan to show substantively that Burnside disobeyed his orders it is not sufficient to show that he is carrying them out a bit slowly (so long as he is in fact engaged with carrying them out).

If Burnside is arrested at 10 AM, or 11 AM, or noon, then in subsequent defence he can argue that he was following orders - he'd had to fight for the bridge, but he wasn't ignoring it and was pushing troops forwards. It wasn't possible to take the bridge quickly - or so he could argue - and disobedience of a lawful order (a death penalty offence) doesn't and shouldn't cover a situation where you're assigned a difficult task and haven't completed it straight off - so long as you're engaged with doing it, or have reached a point you can no longer do it.*

This is why Key was sent with the last-chance order - my understanding is that at that point it's "charge now or you're arrested". If Burnside is being dilatory about that (and doesn't charge) then he's clearly not obeying orders (it's open and shut); if he charges straight away then either he succeeds (and that's been accomplished) or he fails (and it was an impossible task, and arresting someone for failing at an impossible task is obviously not logical).

Certainly Key could have been sent at 11AM with the last-chance order - that might have made it work out, or it might have got Burnside arrested. 10AM is too soon because at that point Burnside has done "all he can do" (as in, the only regiment in position has charged and been repulsed, the next units are just reaching it and the bridge will then fend off two more regimental charges.)


Once the bridge is taken, the next step of the order to be followed is to push troops over the bridge, up onto the heights. There is, and has to be, some discretion in this one because of the old relationship between speed and mass - if Burnside pushes troops up onto the heights immediately then he's got a column of fours advancing with no weight or batteries behind it, which would be easily defeated. (This by the way is the same reason the Prussian relief column at Waterloo is delayed after crossing their stream, they need enough force on the far side of the river to advance a balanced force that can't just be crushed.)
Burnside thus (legitimately) needs to collect some troops on the far side of the Antietam before pushing up to gain the heights; the question is how many troops, which is why another order is sent over when McClellan thinks Burnside should have begun pushing troops up on to the heights by now.



* for example, if Commander Pseudonym is ordered to take a fortified enemy position and charges it and is repulsed, he has clearly followed the order even if he hasn't actually taken the position; certainly he doesn't deserve to be arrested over it. If Commander Pseudonym is ordered to take a fortified enemy position and begins moving troops around the flank to render the position untenable, then you can't take a snapshot half an hour into the process and say Commander Pseudonym is disobeying orders because he hasn't charged yet. This is because most orders have some latitude to them, as a commanding officer is meant to show at least some initiative.
If on the other hand Commander Pseudonym is ordered to take a fortified enemy position and does nothing, or if Commander Pseudonym is ordered to charge now and doesn't, he has disobeyed orders.

 

[67th Tigers]

as to how Burnside was immunized from his obligation to obey orders from his superior officer

That's a novel interpretation. You'd be well advised to actually read the order Burnside supposedly disobeyed before making pronouncements:

Simple question; did the 11th Connecticut etc. charge the bridge or not?

 

[Belfoured]

That's a novel interpretation. You'd be well advised to actually read the order Burnside supposedly disobeyed before making pronouncements:

View attachment 362173

Simple question; did the 11th Connecticut etc. charge the bridge or not?

You'd be well advised to understand the post before making pronouncements. The point was that under your theory McClellan was unable to relieve/arrest Burnside under Article 9 for disobeying an order because he'd be subject to arrest for violating Article 10. Instead of yet again moving the goal posts and ducking the issues; kindly: (1) show us how the text of Article 10 would support your proposition; and (2) (this is the third time it's been asked) why it was that McClellan had a different understanding and dispatched Key with an order that would have violated Article 10 underreported your theory. Then we can move on to the following questions: (1) When did Burnside "open [his] attack" and (2) what was Burnside supposed to do after he "uncovered" the bridge?

 

[Belfoured]

I'm not saying McClellan complied with Burnside's order simply by taking the bridge - I'm saying that for McClellan to show substantively that Burnside disobeyed his orders it is not sufficient to show that he is carrying them out a bit slowly (so long as he is in fact engaged with carrying them out).

If Burnside is arrested at 10 AM, or 11 AM, or noon, then in subsequent defence he can argue that he was following orders - he'd had to fight for the bridge, but he wasn't ignoring it and was pushing troops forwards. It wasn't possible to take the bridge quickly - or so he could argue - and disobedience of a lawful order (a death penalty offence) doesn't and shouldn't cover a situation where you're assigned a difficult task and haven't completed it straight off - so long as you're engaged with doing it, or have reached a point you can no longer do it.*

This is why Key was sent with the last-chance order - my understanding is that at that point it's "charge now or you're arrested". If Burnside is being dilatory about that (and doesn't charge) then he's clearly not obeying orders (it's open and shut); if he charges straight away then either he succeeds (and that's been accomplished) or he fails (and it was an impossible task, and arresting someone for failing at an impossible task is obviously not logical).

Certainly Key could have been sent at 11AM with the last-chance order - that might have made it work out, or it might have got Burnside arrested. 10AM is too soon because at that point Burnside has done "all he can do" (as in, the only regiment in position has charged and been repulsed, the next units are just reaching it and the bridge will then fend off two more regimental charges.)


Once the bridge is taken, the next step of the order to be followed is to push troops over the bridge, up onto the heights. There is, and has to be, some discretion in this one because of the old relationship between speed and mass - if Burnside pushes troops up onto the heights immediately then he's got a column of fours advancing with no weight or batteries behind it, which would be easily defeated. (This by the way is the same reason the Prussian relief column at Waterloo is delayed after crossing their stream, they need enough force on the far side of the river to advance a balanced force that can't just be crushed.)
Burnside thus (legitimately) needs to collect some troops on the far side of the Antietam before pushing up to gain the heights; the question is how many troops, which is why another order is sent over when McClellan thinks Burnside should have begun pushing troops up on to the heights by now.



* for example, if Commander Pseudonym is ordered to take a fortified enemy position and charges it and is repulsed, he has clearly followed the order even if he hasn't actually taken the position; certainly he doesn't deserve to be arrested over it. If Commander Pseudonym is ordered to take a fortified enemy position and begins moving troops around the flank to render the position untenable, then you can't take a snapshot half an hour into the process and say Commander Pseudonym is disobeying orders because he hasn't charged yet. This is because most orders have some latitude to them, as a commanding officer is meant to show at least some initiative.
If on the other hand Commander Pseudonym is ordered to take a fortified enemy position and does nothing, or if Commander Pseudonym is ordered to charge now and doesn't, he has disobeyed orders.

So Burnside complied with McClellan's orders, resulting in his taking at least 6 hours to get moving on Lee's right flank? I guess the defect was in the orders, because somebody on the Union left blew it..

 

[Moe Daoust]

You'd be well advised to understand the post before making pronouncements. The point was that under your theory McClellan was unable to relieve/arrest Burnside under Article 9 for disobeying an order because he'd be subject to arrest for violating Article 10. Instead of yet again moving the goal posts and ducking the issues; kindly: (1) show us how the text of Article 10 would support your proposition; and (2) (this is the third time it's been asked) why it was that McClellan had a different understanding and dispatched Key with an order that would have violated Article 10 underreported your theory. Then we can move on to the following questions: (1) When did Burnside "open [his] attack" and (2) what was Burnside supposed to do after he "uncovered" the bridge?

To answer your question (1) Burnside opened his attack at "about 9 a.m." See https://www.historynet.com/burnside-bridge in this regard. As for your question (2) That depends on what you read. In his preliminary report, McClellan writes, "Burnside's corps . . . was entrusted with the difficult task of carrying the bridge . . . and assaulting the enemy's right. In the 9:10 document Ruggles writes, "General McClellan desires you to open your attack. As soon as you shall have uncovered the upper Stone bridge you will be supported, and, if necessary, on your line of attack." In his Official Report McClellan writes, "At 8 o'clock an order was sent to him [Burnside] by Lieutenant Wilson, to carry the bridge, then to gain possession of the heights beyond, and to advance along their crest upon Sharpsburg and its rear." According to John, M. Wilson, the man who carried that order which was likely a verbal one, McClellan ordered Burnside "to charge and take the bridge in front of him and the heights beyond . . ." There you have it.

 

[Moe Daoust]

You'd be well advised to understand the post before making pronouncements. The point was that under your theory McClellan was unable to relieve/arrest Burnside under Article 9 for disobeying an order because he'd be subject to arrest for violating Article 10. Instead of yet again moving the goal posts and ducking the issues; kindly: (1) show us how the text of Article 10 would support your proposition; and (2) (this is the third time it's been asked) why it was that McClellan had a different understanding and dispatched Key with an order that would have violated Article 10 underreported your theory. Then we can move on to the following questions: (1) When did Burnside "open [his] attack" and (2) what was Burnside supposed to do after he "uncovered" the bridge?

Someone please tell me where I can read these articles 9 and 10.

 

[Moe Daoust]

That's a novel interpretation. You'd be well advised to actually read the order Burnside supposedly disobeyed before making pronouncements:

View attachment 362173

Simple question; did the 11th Connecticut etc. charge the bridge or not?

@67th Tigers @Belfoured @Saphroneth In fact there are at least three versions of McClellan's orders to Burnside. In his preliminary report, McClellan writes, "Burnside's corps . . . was entrusted with the difficult task of carrying the bridge . . . and assaulting the enemy's right." In the 9:10 document Ruggles writes, "General McClellan desires you to open your attack. As soon as you shall have uncovered the upper Stone bridge you will be supported, and, if necessary, on your line of attack." In his Official Report McClellan writes, "At 8 o'clock an order was sent to him [Burnside] by Lieutenant Wilson, to carry the bridge, then to gain possession of the heights beyond, and to advance along their crest upon Sharpsburg and its rear." According to John, M. Wilson, the man who carried that order which was likely a verbal one, McClellan ordered Burnside "to charge and take the bridge in front of him and the heights beyond . . ." As for the 9:10 document, it was found in McClellan's papers after his death. Interestingly, Burnside's copy has never surfaced.

 

[Moe Daoust]

That's a novel interpretation. You'd be well advised to actually read the order Burnside supposedly disobeyed before making pronouncements:

View attachment 362173

Simple question; did the 11th Connecticut etc. charge the bridge or not?

@67th Tigers @Belfoured @Saphroneth In fact there are at least three versions of McClellan's orders to Burnside. In his preliminary report, McClellan writes, "Burnside's corps . . . was entrusted with the difficult task of carrying the bridge . . . and assaulting the enemy's right." In the 9:10 document Ruggles writes, "General McClellan desires you to open your attack. As soon as you shall have uncovered the upper Stone bridge you will be supported, and, if necessary, on your line of attack." In his Official Report McClellan writes, "At 8 o'clock an order was sent to him [Burnside] by Lieutenant Wilson, to carry the bridge, then to gain possession of the heights beyond, and to advance along their crest upon Sharpsburg and its rear." According to John, M. Wilson, the man who carried that order which was likely a verbal one, McClellan ordered Burnside "to charge and take the bridge in front of him and the heights beyond . . ." As for the 9:10 document, it was found in McClellan's papers after his death. Interestingly, Burnside's copy has never surfaced.

 

[Belfoured]

@67th Tigers @Belfoured @Saphroneth In fact there are at least three versions of McClellan's orders to Burnside. In his preliminary report, McClellan writes, "Burnside's corps . . . was entrusted with the difficult task of carrying the bridge . . . and assaulting the enemy's right." In the 9:10 document Ruggles writes, "General McClellan desires you to open your attack. As soon as you shall have uncovered the upper Stone bridge you will be supported, and, if necessary, on your line of attack." In his Official Report McClellan writes, "At 8 o'clock an order was sent to him [Burnside] by Lieutenant Wilson, to carry the bridge, then to gain possession of the heights beyond, and to advance along their crest upon Sharpsburg and its rear." According to John, M. Wilson, the man who carried that order which was likely a verbal one, McClellan ordered Burnside "to charge and take the bridge in front of him and the heights beyond . . ." As for the 9:10 document, it was found in McClellan's papers after his death. Interestingly, Burnside's copy has never surfaced.

Thanks for providing that. The notion that Burnside was to do less than carry the heights and continue against Lee's right flank makes no sense - nor would/should Burnside have reasonably thought that.

Separately, I note that regarding McClellan's stern message to Burnside on September 16, Porter made his own notation stridently complaining about Burnside's failure to act expeditiously.

 

[Belfoured]

Someone please tell me where I can read these articles 9 and 10.

There is a modern reprint of The 1863 Laws of War available from Stackpole. The Articles are in Part I. I have not come across a digital version. The Articles were renumbered after the War but many (including these) remained without any material change. For example, I believe that at one point Article 9 became Article 22. They were substantially revised in 1920 but, again, what was once Article 9 remained in substance. Ultimately they were replaced in 1951 by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) but despite significant restructuring and expansion several of the core principles remained. I've handled a couple of matters involving the UCMJ and some of the JAG opinions under the Articles can still shed light.

 

[Moe Daoust]

I messed up a response to one of Saphroneth's posts and have re-posted it below.

 

[Moe Daoust]

There is a modern reprint of The 1863 Laws of War available from Stackpole. The Articles are in Part I. I have not come across a digital version. The Articles were renumbered after the War but many (including these) remained without any material change. For example, I believe that at one point Article 9 became Article 22. They were substantially revised in 1920 but, again, what was once Article 9 remained in substance. Ultimately they were replaced in 1951 by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) but despite significant restructuring and expansion several of the core principles remained. I've handled a couple of matters involving the UCMJ and some of the JAG opinions under the Articles can still shed light.

Thanks for the info!

 

[Moe Daoust]

I'm not saying McClellan complied with Burnside's order simply by taking the bridge - I'm saying that for McClellan to show substantively that Burnside disobeyed his orders it is not sufficient to show that he is carrying them out a bit slowly (so long as he is in fact engaged with carrying them out).

If Burnside is arrested at 10 AM, or 11 AM, or noon, then in subsequent defence he can argue that he was following orders - he'd had to fight for the bridge, but he wasn't ignoring it and was pushing troops forwards. It wasn't possible to take the bridge quickly - or so he could argue - and disobedience of a lawful order (a death penalty offence) doesn't and shouldn't cover a situation where you're assigned a difficult task and haven't completed it straight off - so long as you're engaged with doing it, or have reached a point you can no longer do it.*

This is why Key was sent with the last-chance order - my understanding is that at that point it's "charge now or you're arrested". If Burnside is being dilatory about that (and doesn't charge) then he's clearly not obeying orders (it's open and shut); if he charges straight away then either he succeeds (and that's been accomplished) or he fails (and it was an impossible task, and arresting someone for failing at an impossible task is obviously not logical).

Certainly Key could have been sent at 11AM with the last-chance order - that might have made it work out, or it might have got Burnside arrested. 10AM is too soon because at that point Burnside has done "all he can do" (as in, the only regiment in position has charged and been repulsed, the next units are just reaching it and the bridge will then fend off two more regimental charges.)


Once the bridge is taken, the next step of the order to be followed is to push troops over the bridge, up onto the heights. There is, and has to be, some discretion in this one because of the old relationship between speed and mass - if Burnside pushes troops up onto the heights immediately then he's got a column of fours advancing with no weight or batteries behind it, which would be easily defeated. (This by the way is the same reason the Prussian relief column at Waterloo is delayed after crossing their stream, they need enough force on the far side of the river to advance a balanced force that can't just be crushed.)
Burnside thus (legitimately) needs to collect some troops on the far side of the Antietam before pushing up to gain the heights; the question is how many troops, which is why another order is sent over when McClellan thinks Burnside should have begun pushing troops up on to the heights by now.



* for example, if Commander Pseudonym is ordered to take a fortified enemy position and charges it and is repulsed, he has clearly followed the order even if he hasn't actually taken the position; certainly he doesn't deserve to be arrested over it. If Commander Pseudonym is ordered to take a fortified enemy position and begins moving troops around the flank to render the position untenable, then you can't take a snapshot half an hour into the process and say Commander Pseudonym is disobeying orders because he hasn't charged yet. This is because most orders have some latitude to them, as a commanding officer is meant to show at least some initiative.
If on the other hand Commander Pseudonym is ordered to take a fortified enemy position and does nothing, or if Commander Pseudonym is ordered to charge now and doesn't, he has disobeyed orders.

This post got me thinking last night. It would strike me that Burnside disobeying a direct order at 8 a.m. would have been a Courts Martial offense (Cox was have been attending to his dispositions and would not have been present when an 8 a.m. order arrived.) It's one thing to act slowly but this would have been out and out disobedience. At 7 a.m. McClellan had ordered Burnside "to advance the Ninth Corps to a ridge overlooking Antietam Creek and to hold it there, in readiness to make the assault." This we know was accomplished. On that basis, there would be no excuse for Burnside not commencing his attack immediately upon receipt of an 8 a.m. order, whether it was in verbal or written form (insisting upon a confirming written order in the midst of such a tumultuous battle would have been ludicrous, if not outright negligence.) It's only at "about 9 a.m." when another rider comes up and delivers the order that finally prompts Burnside to start moving (Cox was present to witness that rider's arrival.) Any thoughts?

 

[Saphroneth]

On that basis, there would be no excuse for Burnside not commencing his attack immediately upon receipt of an 8 a.m. order, whether it was in verbal or written form (insisting upon a confirming written order in the midst of such a tumultuous battle would have been ludicrous, if not outright negligence.) It's only at "about 9 a.m." when another rider comes up and delivers the order that finally prompts Burnside to start moving (Cox was present to witness that rider's arrival.) Any thoughts?

I think what might cause trouble here would be the discretionary issue. Burnside might argue that what he's doing is going for the "Farm Ford" (the nearest ford to the bridge, which historically was considered untenable on the day for some reason that currently escapes me) to outflank rather than attacking the bridge directly.
This would be comparable to how the way the bridge was finally taken was substantively with artillery moved up onto the heights on the eastern side of the bridge, which won fire superiority and forced the Confederate defenders off the bridge - not by a direct charge against the bridge itself, as several charges failed until this was done.

Teasing out the difference between complying slowly and disobeying can be difficult, and (per Napoleonic warfare theory) a corps commander is supposed to have some discretion in how to carry out his order to allow for the conditions.


You can argue that Burnside should have put the artillery up on the nearby heights himself and sooner, and there was certainly time to allow for it, but "not thinking of something the senior officer doesn't mention" would be just one of those things that doesn't rise to sufficient grounds for courts-martial. Perhaps a brigade charge at 8AM would have worked, but the tricky thing there is that I think there was probably a reason for all those individual regimental charges - perhaps there wasn't space to get more than a regiment at a time trying to cross the bridge and anyone else would just be a target.

 

[Belfoured]

This post got me thinking last night. It would strike me that Burnside disobeying a direct order at 8 a.m. would have been a Courts Martial offense (Cox was have been attending to his dispositions and would not have been present when an 8 a.m. order arrived.) It's one thing to act slowly but this would have been out and out disobedience. At 7 a.m. McClellan had ordered Burnside "to advance the Ninth Corps to a ridge overlooking Antietam Creek and to hold it there, in readiness to make the assault." This we know was accomplished. On that basis, there would be no excuse for Burnside not commencing his attack immediately upon receipt of an 8 a.m. order, whether it was in verbal or written form (insisting upon a confirming written order in the midst of such a tumultuous battle would have been ludicrous, if not outright negligence.) It's only at "about 9 a.m." when another rider comes up and delivers the order that finally prompts Burnside to start moving (Cox was present to witness that rider's arrival.) Any thoughts?

In light of what happened on September 15 and 16 and McClellan's message on September 16 to Burnside, the latter's delay on September 17 was the highly plausible basis for McClellan sending Key with the relief order at noon. We have a conundrum. Either McClellan gave Burnside an order to take the bridge, carry the heights and move on Lee's right flank in the AM or he did not. Marvel's biography takes Burnside's version, buys the 10 AM timing, criticizes McClellan's orders, and concludes that McClellan cooked up a blame game after the battle. If he's correct, the failure on the Union left belongs to McClellan. On the other hand, if McClellan gave the requisite order, Burnside took an inordinate amount of time to comply (repeating what McClellan had accused him of doing on the 15th and the 16th), the blame lies primarily on Burnside and McClellan's failure was in not relieving him as his superior officer after having given him ample warning on September 16. What we know is that the Union attack on the left was a stew of fumbling around looking for fords, figuring out how to take the bridge, etc and while hours elapsed a golden opportunity to emerge on Lee's vulnerable right flank at a critical point was squandered. While one can point to Hooker's and Sumner's actions as having a detrimental effect on McClellan's apparent plan, what happened on the left was worse. That's the reason A.P. Hill became a dramatic hero.

 

[Belfoured]

I think what might cause trouble here would be the discretionary issue. Burnside might argue that what he's doing is going for the "Farm Ford" (the nearest ford to the bridge, which historically was considered untenable on the day for some reason that currently escapes me) to outflank rather than attacking the bridge directly.
This would be comparable to how the way the bridge was finally taken was substantively with artillery moved up onto the heights on the eastern side of the bridge, which won fire superiority and forced the Confederate defenders off the bridge - not by a direct charge against the bridge itself, as several charges failed until this was done.

Teasing out the difference between complying slowly and disobeying can be difficult, and (per Napoleonic warfare theory) a corps commander is supposed to have some discretion in how to carry out his order to allow for the conditions.


You can argue that Burnside should have put the artillery up on the nearby heights himself and sooner, and there was certainly time to allow for it, but "not thinking of something the senior officer doesn't mention" would be just one of those things that doesn't rise to sufficient grounds for courts-martial. Perhaps a brigade charge at 8AM would have worked, but the tricky thing there is that I think there was probably a reason for all those individual regimental charges - perhaps there wasn't space to get more than a regiment at a time trying to cross the bridge and anyone else would just be a target.

That's all very nice had it not been for Burnside's delays on the 15th and 16th and McClellan's September 16 demand for an accounting and his warning. "Fool me once ..."

 

[Moe Daoust]

I think what might cause trouble here would be the discretionary issue. Burnside might argue that what he's doing is going for the "Farm Ford" (the nearest ford to the bridge, which historically was considered untenable on the day for some reason that currently escapes me) to outflank rather than attacking the bridge directly.
This would be comparable to how the way the bridge was finally taken was substantively with artillery moved up onto the heights on the eastern side of the bridge, which won fire superiority and forced the Confederate defenders off the bridge - not by a direct charge against the bridge itself, as several charges failed until this was done.

Teasing out the difference between complying slowly and disobeying can be difficult, and (per Napoleonic warfare theory) a corps commander is supposed to have some discretion in how to carry out his order to allow for the conditions.


You can argue that Burnside should have put the artillery up on the nearby heights himself and sooner, and there was certainly time to allow for it, but "not thinking of something the senior officer doesn't mention" would be just one of those things that doesn't rise to sufficient grounds for courts-martial. Perhaps a brigade charge at 8AM would have worked, but the tricky thing there is that I think there was probably a reason for all those individual regimental charges - perhaps there wasn't space to get more than a regiment at a time trying to cross the bridge and anyone else would just be a target.

McClellan's orders were quite clear, Burnside was to assault the bridge, something Burnside did not do until 9 a.m. when another in a series of orders arrived. These orders were not discretionary (ie going for the Farm Ford.) As I mentioned in an earlier post, the simple act of Burnside commencing an attack at 8 a.m. might well have given Lee pause when it came to sending reinforcements to his beleaguered left.

I've mulled over the artillery issue in the past and, yes, I do question why Burnside didn't place it much earlier but that is a whole other issue and if you are o.k. with it, I'd rather stick to the relieving of Burnside issue being that it is helping me gather up a lot of thoughts for a new article. Very much enjoying these discussions.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

In light of what happened on September 15 and 16 and McClellan's message on September 16 to Burnside, the latter's delay on September 17 was the highly plausible basis for McClellan sending Key with the relief order at noon. We have a conundrum. Either McClellan gave Burnside an order to take the bridge, carry the heights and move on Lee's right flank in the AM or he did not. Marvel's biography takes Burnside's version, buys the 10 AM timing, criticizes McClellan's orders, and concludes that McClellan cooked up a blame game after the battle. If he's correct, the failure on the Union left belongs to McClellan. On the other hand, if McClellan gave the requisite order, Burnside took an inordinate amount of time to comply (repeating what McClellan had accused him of doing on the 15th and the 16th), the blame lies primarily on Burnside and McClellan's failure was in not relieving him as his superior officer after having given him ample warning on September 16. What we know is that the Union attack on the left was a stew of fumbling around looking for fords, figuring out how to take the bridge, etc and while hours elapsed a golden opportunity to emerge on Lee's vulnerable right flank at a critical point was squandered. While one can point to Hooker's and Sumner's actions as having a detrimental effect on McClellan's apparent plan, what happened on the left was worse. That's the reason A.P. Hill became a dramatic hero.

Agree 100%.