Antietam: A Perspective

[Saphroneth]

I disagree that he should have been on the right. His orders to Hooker and Sumner regarding Mansfield's role could not have been clearer. The result there had nothing to do with "friction," it was simply a matter of Hooker wanting all of the glory.

Should McClellan have been more hands on that day? Should he have been out there holding his subordinates by the hand in order to ensure they followed his relatively simple orders? In retrospect, yes but I don't think that is the normal function of an army commander, whether everyone was "used to working together" or not. These were trained military men, Corps and "Wing" commanders who, in their own right, were in charge of armies. McClellan was a professional soldier who expected his subordinates to act accordingly. Again, Sumner meant well but where it comes to Hooker and Burnside, there is no excuse.

The point about the normal function of an army commander is, I think, correct.
The thing is, though, that McClellan's orders to Hooker and Sumner were clear but so were his orders to Burnside. If the orders are clear means McClellan doesn't have to be there, then that applies to the left as much as it applies to the right; if people not following orders means McClellan should be there, then it applies to the right as much as to the left.

In the end an army is a team, and McClellan is not a one-in-a-thousand commander like Wellington who genuinely could handle every single divisional or even brigade movement individually.

 

[Moe Daoust]

The point about the normal function of an army commander is, I think, correct.
The thing is, though, that McClellan's orders to Hooker and Sumner were clear but so were his orders to Burnside. If the orders are clear means McClellan doesn't have to be there, then that applies to the left as much as it applies to the right; if people not following orders means McClellan should be there, then it applies to the right as much as to the left.

In the end an army is a team, and McClellan is not a one-in-a-thousand commander like Wellington who genuinely could handle every single divisional or even brigade movement individually.

The difference between Hooker, Sumner and Burnside is that Burnside had already given McClellan cause for concern and on that basis, McClellan would have been wise to be on that front so as to ensure Burnside acted with all due diligence on that very critical front. But again, I seriously doubt McClellan ever dreamed Burnside would mess up as much as he did and so did not feel the need to be there. I plan to add something on this issue in the article and I have you to thank for that insight (re where McClellan could/should have been.)

 

[Saphroneth]

The difference between Hooker, Sumner and Burnside is that Burnside had already given McClellan cause for concern and on that basis, McClellan would have been wise to be on that front so as to ensure Burnside acted with all due diligence on that very critical front. But again, I seriously doubt McClellan ever dreamed Burnside would mess up as much as he did and so did not feel the need to be there. I plan to add something on this issue in the article and I have you to thank for that insight (re where McClellan could/should have been.)

Again, this is tricky because you could also argue Sumner had given McClellan cause for concern (during the Seven Days) when he refused to pull back after Savage's Station (from memory it's the first time McClellan felt he had to send someone with a sealed order for the arrest of a corps commander, the second being Burnside at Antietam).
It is less recent, but there you go.

 

[Moe Daoust]

Again, this is tricky because you could also argue Sumner had given McClellan cause for concern (during the Seven Days) when he refused to pull back after Savage's Station (from memory it's the first time McClellan felt he had to send someone with a sealed order for the arrest of a corps commander, the second being Burnside at Antietam).
It is less recent, but there you go.

I'd forgotten all about that! But yes, less recent. As I mentioned earlier, it's almost as though McClellan should have been out there holding his commanders by the hand and Sumner is the best example of this. I still shake my head when I think of how badly Sumner botched that advance and I'm sure McClellan must have been shaking his head as well when he found out about it.

 

[Saphroneth]

I'd forgotten all about that! But yes, less recent. As I mentioned earlier, it's almost as though McClellan should have been out there holding his commanders by the hand and Sumner is the best example of this. I still shake my head when I think of how badly Sumner botched that advance and I'm sure McClellan must have been shaking his head as well when he found out about it.

Something else it's worth thinking about, in my opinion, is that if McClellan is over there with Burnside then there's some potentially serious consequences if the rest of the battle goes as it did historically. I'm not saying it would, but for example if the historical heavy punishment taken by 1st, 12th and 2nd Corps unfolds on the right of the battlefield and McClellan isn't where he can commit 6th Corps to the right (such as, for example, if he's gone to the right and left Porter in the middle to "push" with his corps and Franklin's corps when the flank attacks develop, as per his concept of operations) then the Union right flank is vulnerable to disintegration.

All those commanders (left wing commander, right wing commander, army commander) have their jobs to do, and they can't be neglected without possible adverse consequences. Perhaps if McClellan had been on the left then things would have gone fine (i.e. the 9th Corps attack pins the enemy, Hooker's attack breaks the Confederate left) but it's also possible that the lack of articulation could be if anything worse than historical.

 

[dlofting]

Is there evidence that Hooker received McClellan's order telling him to position Mansfield's corps ?

 

[Belfoured]

Again, this is tricky because you could also argue Sumner had given McClellan cause for concern (during the Seven Days) when he refused to pull back after Savage's Station (from memory it's the first time McClellan felt he had to send someone with a sealed order for the arrest of a corps commander, the second being Burnside at Antietam).
It is less recent, but there you go.

He didn't have to be physically present where Burnside was disobeying the order but that was certainly one option. The other was to follow through with the order relieving Burnside originally (if belatedly) dispatched via Key. Neither happened and the result squandered the significant opportunity on the left while several hours expired and A.P. Hill force marched to the field. That was a "fail".

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Regarding Sumner, McClellan's concerns about him went back at least to Williamsburg.

 

[Saphroneth]

He didn't have to be physically present where Burnside was disobeying the order but that was certainly one option. The other was to follow through with the order relieving Burnside originally (if belatedly) dispatched via Key. Neither happened and the result squandered the significant opportunity on the left while several hours expired and A.P. Hill force marched to the field. That was a "fail".

As of when the order relieving Burnside was dispatched, Burnside had (apparently) started moving.

The question here is at what point (in time) the relief should have taken place. Since relief in this case equates to arrest (no other way to legally do it, AIUI), there has to have been a sufficient case developed that Burnside has wilfully disobeyed orders rather than simply been lax in carrying them out.

At what point in time do you think the relief and arrest should have taken place, under that option?

 

[Moe Daoust]

Is there evidence that Hooker received McClellan's order telling him to position Mansfield's corps ?

Sometime on the 16th, possibly even that morning, McClellan gave Hooker his instructions for the next day. According to Hooker, McClellan also stipulated that any and all reinforcements as might be forwarded to him (Mansfield, Sumner etc.) would fall under his command. This is from Hooker's Official Report. Although that report may be laced with false statements, it's clear that this one is true.

At 5:50 p.m. on the 16th, Ruggles sends another order to Sumner in which he writes, "General McClellan desires you to move Mansfield's corps across the fords and bridge over the Antietam and to take such position as may be designated for it by General Hooker . . . [italics added]"

From all of this, it becomes clear that Hooker was fully aware that 1. Mansfield or other reinforcements were coming and 2. That it was his responsibility to position them. All of this and more is covered in the article that I posted at the beginning of this thread and I encourage you to read it. Here it is: https://quasimodo.wixsite.com/mcclellanandhistory/single-post/2018/06/24/Antietam-A-Perspective

 

[Saphroneth]

Hooker's official report is interesting because it's incomplete. It's also interesting because he estimates Lee's strength on the morning of the 16th to be on the order of 30,000 men (he also gives his own strength in the same report as between 12,000 and 13,000 - which is slightly less than PFD pre-straggling as his corps was about 14,000 by that measure).

The actual units of Lee's army on the field on the morning of the 16th were Jackson, Ewell, DH Hill, DR Jones, Hood and Evans' brigade, plus the reserve artillery and of course some of the cavalry. In PFD pre-straggle the infantry formations were on the order of 35,000 after South Mountain casualties are removed,so it looks like Hooker is estimating both sets in roughly the same way - a bit less than PFD pre-straggle.

 

[Belfoured]

As of when the order relieving Burnside was dispatched, Burnside had (apparently) started moving.

The question here is at what point (in time) the relief should have taken place. Since relief in this case equates to arrest (no other way to legally do it, AIUI), there has to have been a sufficient case developed that Burnside has wilfully disobeyed orders rather than simply been lax in carrying them out.

At what point in time do you think the relief and arrest should have taken place, under that option?

He was sent an attack order at 8 AM. It took until noon for the order relieving him to be dispatched. By that time, however, McClellan at least had clearly (and properly) decided that he had willfully disobeyed and should be relieved. "Start[ing] to mov[]" by that point doesn't cut it. The disobedience had already occurred and already compromised McClellan's plan. He should have been relieved. And we know what happened when Key pocketed the order - Burnside stopped again, fatally compromising the attack - a result that was eminently predictable given what had already taken place. "Fool me once ..." We can discuss legal niceties all day but the basis for arrest/relief already existed. One can analyze at length what happened on the Union right and center with Hooker, Mansfield, Sumner, etc but had Burnside complied with his order using any alacrity the ANV's circumstance still would likely have gone from orange on the "dire straits scale" to red. I cannot let McClellan off the hook for allowing Burnside to consume 6 or more hours just getting to the other side of the creek and leaving him in place to forfeit the attack. Maybe McClellan should have done this in person along about 11 AM (hardly too soon, under the circumstances) but at a minimum Key should not have had the (apparent) discretion at 12 PM - the exercise of which was a big mistake. In other words, a "sufficient case clearly had developed" by the time, and probably before, Key was sent over there.

 

[Moe Daoust]

As of when the order relieving Burnside was dispatched, Burnside had (apparently) started moving.

The question here is at what point (in time) the relief should have taken place. Since relief in this case equates to arrest (no other way to legally do it, AIUI), there has to have been a sufficient case developed that Burnside has wilfully disobeyed orders rather than simply been lax in carrying them out.

At what point in time do you think the relief and arrest should have taken place, under that option?

Had McClellan been able to do so, no later than 10 a.m. but even then, this would have been too late. Personally and again, had McClellan been able to do so, I think he should have relieved Burnside on the 16th when he officially chastised him for failing to make proper dispositions.

 

[Saphroneth]

In other words, a "sufficient case clearly had developed" by the time, and probably before, Key was sent over there.

I think this is the problem - the issue is to show Burnside is disobeying orders, not being slow carrying them out. For example if Burnside had been relieved of command at, say, 10AM, he could point to how he'd ordered Kingsbury to attack the bridge immediately at ~8AM and ordered Crook to move to the bridge and attack it (Crook got lost) while Sturgis had been ordered to bring his division to the bridge.

As of 10AM the only regiment in position to assault the bridge (Kingsbury's 11th CT) had charged it and been repulsed, and Sturgis is just deploying.

As of 11AM there have been two more charges (2nd MD and 6th NH) and both repulsed. At this point Burnside can still argue that he has been ordered to attack the bridge and he has been attacking the bridge - in which case he's not disobeying orders.

When Key arrives around noon, there are Federal troops over the bridge (the 51st NY and 51st PA). Again, it's a difficult case to make to argue that Burnside has disobeyed the order to take the bridge when he's actually taken the bridge.

 

[Moe Daoust]

He was sent an attack order at 8 AM. It took until noon for the order relieving him to be dispatched. By that time, however, McClellan at least had clearly (and properly) decided that he had willfully disobeyed and should be relieved. "Start[ing] to mov[]" by that point doesn't cut it. The disobedience had already occurred and already compromised McClellan's plan. He should have been relieved. And we know what happened when Key pocketed the order - Burnside stopped again, fatally compromising the attack - a result that was eminently predictable given what had already taken place. "Fool me once ..." We can discuss legal niceties all day but the basis for arrest/relief already existed. One can analyze at length what happened on the Union right and center with Hooker, Mansfield, Sumner, etc but had Burnside complied with his order using any alacrity the ANV's circumstance still would likely have gone from orange on the "dire straits scale" to red. I cannot let McClellan off the hook for allowing Burnside to consume 6 or more hours just getting to the other side of the creek and leaving him in place to forfeit the attack. Maybe McClellan should have done this in person along about 11 AM (hardly too soon, under the circumstances) but at a minimum Key should not have had the (apparent) discretion at 12 PM - the exercise of which was a big mistake. In other words, a "sufficient case clearly had developed" by the time, and probably before, Key was sent over there.

Although I cover this in the article, it's you who've truly hammered the nail home regarding why McClellan didn't relieve Burnside sooner. Having said that, this is a much more complex issue than can be dealt with a forum environment. This is going to require a serious study, one that I plan to look into. Could McClellan have relieved Burnside on the 17th or even the 16th or were his hands tied by military regulations or other restrictions? Frankly, I don't know what the answer is but I intend to find out if I possibly can. Thanks for tweaking my interest in this aspect Belfoured!

 

[67th Tigers]

The question here is at what point (in time) the relief should have taken place. Since relief in this case equates to arrest (no other way to legally do it, AIUI), there has to have been a sufficient case developed that Burnside has wilfully disobeyed orders rather than simply been lax in carrying them out.

Indeed, and it is an arrestable offense for McClellan to arrest Burnside, since in doing so he is disobeying an order from POTUS placing Burnside in command of 9th Corps (and hence violating the 10th Article of War). It is not an action to be taken lightly.

Similarly, Sumner is GOC 2nd Corps by order of POTUS.

It's perhaps worth considering what McClellan's options were. The 2nd, 5th, 6th and 9th Corps have POTUS appointed commanders. McClellan had to fight to keep Porter with 5th Corps, but Sumner, Franklin and Burnside are a fait accompli. He gets to pick new acting leaders for 1st and 12th Corps. His picks are Hooker and Sedgwick, and this isn't just about seniority as Couch and Slocum are both senior to Sedgwick. Segdwick turned it down, hence we get Mansfield.

He was sent an attack order at 8 AM. It took until noon for the order relieving him to be dispatched. By that time, however, McClellan at least had clearly (and properly) decided that he had willfully disobeyed and should be relieved.

How has he disobeyed an order? He has launched several attacks in a reasonable timeframe. Of course, he appears to be doing to minimum possible within the scope of his orders, but is that sufficient grounds to challenge Lincoln's appointment?

We have two known cases where McClellan wrote an order relieving a corps commander (the other being Sumner on 29th June). In both cases the officer carrying the order (Key in both cases) had a peremptory order from McClellan to do something, and was carrying the order relieving Sumner/Burnside is this order was not obeyed.

Indeed, the difference between a "normal" order and a peremptory order is important. A "normal" order can be queried, interpreted according to the circumstances etc., but a peremptory order demands immediate obedience on penalty of arrest.

The consequences of peremptory orders are that commanders can order things that make no sense, but there is no room to query them. Burnside was on the receiving end of a whole bunch of nonsensical peremptory orders from Meade at the Crater demanding the men the two divisions trapped in the Crater move forward immediately and the exchange escalated to Burnside and Meade threatening each other. At 0800 one of Meade's staffers explained the situation and Meade realised he'd asked the impossible. Meade did not arrest Burnside.

 

[Moe Daoust]

Indeed, and it is an arrestable offense for McClellan to arrest Burnside, since in doing so he is disobeying an order from POTUS placing Burnside in command of 9th Corps (and hence violating the 10th Article of War). It is not an action to be taken lightly.

Similarly, Sumner is GOC 2nd Corps by order of POTUS.

It's perhaps worth considering what McClellan's options were. The 2nd, 5th, 6th and 9th Corps have POTUS appointed commanders. McClellan had to fight to keep Porter with 5th Corps, but Sumner, Franklin and Burnside are a fait accompli. He gets to pick new acting leaders for 1st and 12th Corps. His picks are Hooker and Sedgwick, and this isn't just about seniority as Couch and Slocum are both senior to Sedgwick. Segdwick turned it down, hence we get Mansfield.



How has he disobeyed an order? He has launched several attacks in a reasonable timeframe. Of course, he appears to be doing to minimum possible within the scope of his orders, but is that sufficient grounds to challenge Lincoln's appointment?

We have to known cases where McClellan wrote an order relieving a corps commander (the other being Sumner on 29th June). In both cases the officer carrying the order (Key in both cases) had a peremptory order from McClellan to do something, and was carrying the order relieving Sumner/Burnside is this order was not obeyed.

Indeed, the difference between a "normal" order and a peremptory order is important. A "normal" order can be queried, interpreted according to the circumstances etc., but a peremptory order demands immediate obedience on penalty of arrest.

The consequences of peremptory orders are that commanders can order things that make no sense, but there is no room to query them. Burnside was on the receiving end of a whole bunch of nonsensical peremptory orders from Meade at the Crater demanding the men the two divisions trapped in the Crater move forward immediately and the exchange escalated to Burnside and Meade threatening each other. At 0800 one of Meade's staffers explained the situation and Meade realised he'd asked the impossible. Meade did not arrest Burnside.

Thanks 67th. Can you provide some sources for the great information?

 

[Belfoured]

I think this is the problem - the issue is to show Burnside is disobeying orders, not being slow carrying them out. For example if Burnside had been relieved of command at, say, 10AM, he could point to how he'd ordered Kingsbury to attack the bridge immediately at ~8AM and ordered Crook to move to the bridge and attack it (Crook got lost) while Sturgis had been ordered to bring his division to the bridge.

As of 10AM the only regiment in position to assault the bridge (Kingsbury's 11th CT) had charged it and been repulsed, and Sturgis is just deploying.

As of 11AM there have been two more charges (2nd MD and 6th NH) and both repulsed. At this point Burnside can still argue that he has been ordered to attack the bridge and he has been attacking the bridge - in which case he's not disobeying orders.

When Key arrives around noon, there are Federal troops over the bridge (the 51st NY and 51st PA). Again, it's a difficult case to make to argue that Burnside has disobeyed the order to take the bridge when he's actually taken the bridge.

Nothing exists in a vacuum. Have you read the message that McClellan directed be sent to Burnside on September 16? The message states "The general commanding has learned that, although your corps was ordered to be in a designated position at 12 m. to-day, at or near sunset only one division and four batteries had reached the ground intended for the troops".

It continues: "The general has also been advised that there was a delay of some four hours in the movement of your command yesterday. I am instructed to call upon you for explanations of these failures on your part to comply with the orders given you, and to add, in view of the important military operations now in hand, the commanding general cannot lightly regard such marked departure from the tenor of his instructions."

That's the very day before the events on September 17. I think there was a question previously about Burnside using up his "rope". He used it up in September 15-16. Was McClellan's intent on September 17 that Burnside merely take the bridge, and not the heights above it or the ground beyond to Lee's right flank? If his orders had been that absurd, then there would be another reason McClellan should be faulted for what happened. We know better. I know that it's awfully hard for you to find fault with anything McClellan ever did/did not do during the war, but this effort to justify his leaving Burnside in place is really strained. And the proof that McClellan should have relieved Burnside is the outcome. In actuality, while I cannot imagine that it's intended, you seem to be making the case that Burnside had been given one very challenging assignment that required hours just to cross the creek. So the fault is McClellan's for issuing bad orders? Let's at least agree that the failure on the Union left was not an Act of God.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I think this is the problem - the issue is to show Burnside is disobeying orders, not being slow carrying them out. For example if Burnside had been relieved of command at, say, 10AM, he could point to how he'd ordered Kingsbury to attack the bridge immediately at ~8AM and ordered Crook to move to the bridge and attack it (Crook got lost) while Sturgis had been ordered to bring his division to the bridge.

As of 10AM the only regiment in position to assault the bridge (Kingsbury's 11th CT) had charged it and been repulsed, and Sturgis is just deploying.

As of 11AM there have been two more charges (2nd MD and 6th NH) and both repulsed. At this point Burnside can still argue that he has been ordered to attack the bridge and he has been attacking the bridge - in which case he's not disobeying orders.

When Key arrives around noon, there are Federal troops over the bridge (the 51st NY and 51st PA). Again, it's a difficult case to make to argue that Burnside has disobeyed the order to take the bridge when he's actually taken the bridge.

I thought 1 pm for when the two 51st were over the creek?

I haven't studied George Crook much, but his statements regarding the 9th Corps performance are pretty damning to Burnside/Cox/ et. al.

 

[Belfoured]

Indeed, and it is an arrestable offense for McClellan to arrest Burnside, since in doing so he is disobeying an order from POTUS placing Burnside in command of 9th Corps (and hence violating the 10th Article of War). It is not an action to be taken lightly.

Similarly, Sumner is GOC 2nd Corps by order of POTUS.

It's perhaps worth considering what McClellan's options were. The 2nd, 5th, 6th and 9th Corps have POTUS appointed commanders. McClellan had to fight to keep Porter with 5th Corps, but Sumner, Franklin and Burnside are a fait accompli. He gets to pick new acting leaders for 1st and 12th Corps. His picks are Hooker and Sedgwick, and this isn't just about seniority as Couch and Slocum are both senior to Sedgwick. Segdwick turned it down, hence we get Mansfield.



How has he disobeyed an order? He has launched several attacks in a reasonable timeframe. Of course, he appears to be doing to minimum possible within the scope of his orders, but is that sufficient grounds to challenge Lincoln's appointment?

We have two known cases where McClellan wrote an order relieving a corps commander (the other being Sumner on 29th June). In both cases the officer carrying the order (Key in both cases) had a peremptory order from McClellan to do something, and was carrying the order relieving Sumner/Burnside is this order was not obeyed.

Indeed, the difference between a "normal" order and a peremptory order is important. A "normal" order can be queried, interpreted according to the circumstances etc., but a peremptory order demands immediate obedience on penalty of arrest.

The consequences of peremptory orders are that commanders can order things that make no sense, but there is no room to query them. Burnside was on the receiving end of a whole bunch of nonsensical peremptory orders from Meade at the Crater demanding the men the two divisions trapped in the Crater move forward immediately and the exchange escalated to Burnside and Meade threatening each other. At 0800 one of Meade's staffers explained the situation and Meade realised he'd asked the impossible. Meade did not arrest Burnside.

You still don't understand the concept. Burnside was appointed by Lincoln but his arrest/relief on the battlefield for disobeying a lawful order by a superior officer is not "removal" from his appointment. Kindly show me something - anything - that states that:

1. Burnside was not subordinate to McClellan;

2. that McClellan had no authority to issue him an order; and

3. that McClellan had no authority to relieve him on the battlefield for disobeying an order.

And while you're at it let's have an answer the question you ducked previously - where did McClellan get the idea that he could issue the order he dispatched via Key?

Last, please explain how McClellan would have violated Article 10 by relieving his subordinate Burnside on the field for disobeying an order - using the text of Article 10, if you don't mind.