Antietam: A Perspective

[Moe Daoust]

I've just realized that anyone looking for my Antietam: A Perspective article may have been having a hard time unless they knew how to navigate on my Blogspot site. For that reason, I'm now posting the wixsite version. Just click the following URL and it will take you right to it. May apologies if this caused any confusion. https://quasimodo.wixsite.com/mcclellanandhistory/single-post/2018/06/24/Antietam-A-Perspective

 

[Andy Cardinal]

Alpheus Williams: "If McClellan's plan had been carried out with more coolness by some of our commanding generals, we should have grabbed half their army."

I think this statement should be taken more seriously by those who study this battle. I don't want to imply by saying this that McClellan was not without his faults, and that his faults did not have a bearing on how things turned out -- they did. But McClellan was not well served by his commanders that day either.

The more I have studied it, the more I hace come to the conclusion the 9:00 was the crucial "tipping point" in this battle. For all intents and purposes, Jackson's command had been crushed. Jubal Early had the only organized force north of the modern visitor's center. Colonel Andrew Jackson Grigsby had collected a scratch force from his own division. Both forces were in the northern part of the West Woods. S. D. Lee, Stuart, Pelham were constructing a last ditch artillery line on Hauser's/Reel Ridge. This was tbe situation Sumner & Sedgwick walked into.

Lee knew how desperate the situation was and how close his army was to a catastrophic defeat at this point. It was unfortunate for Sumner and fortunate for the Confederates that McLaws, Walker, etc arrived at exactly the right place at exactly the right time to turn the tide. If they had not showed up exactly when they did, the result of the battle may have been much different.

This fact highlights the failure of Burnside's attack much more apparent. Lee had stripped his right to save his left. He should not have been able to get away with that.

 

[Moe Daoust]

Alpheus Williams: "If McClellan's plan had been carried out with more coolness by some of our commanding generals, we should have grabbed half their army."

I think this statement should be taken more seriously by those who study this battle. I don't want to imply by saying this that McClellan was not without his faults, and that his faults did not have a bearing on how things turned out -- they did. But McClellan was not well served by his commanders that day either.

The more I have studied it, the more I hace come to the conclusion the 9:00 was the crucial "tipping point" in this battle. For all intents and purposes, Jackson's command had been crushed. Jubal Early had the only organized force north of the modern visitor's center. Colonel Andrew Jackson Grigsby had collected a scratch force from his own division. Both forces were in the northern part of the West Woods. S. D. Lee, Stuart, Pelham were constructing a last ditch artillery line on Hauser's/Reel Ridge. This was tbe situation Sumner & Sedgwick walked into.

Lee knew how desperate the situation was and how close his army was to a catastrophic defeat at this point. It was unfortunate for Sumner and fortunate for the Confederates that McLaws, Walker, etc arrived at exactly the right place at exactly the right time to turn the tide. If they had not showed up exactly when they did, the result of the battle may have been much different.

This fact highlights the failure of Burnside's attack much more apparent. Lee had stripped his right to save his left. He should not have been able to get away with that.

Great points Andy. In many respects, however, Hooker should bear even more of the responsibility for the failure to annihilate Lee's army that day.

The Second Corps episode was just "one of those things" that can go wrong during a battle. Do I blame Sumner? Certainly but his intentions were good. Hooker's and Burnside's weren't

As for McClellan, it's my opinion that his greatest mistake that day was in not relieving Burnside as early as 10 a.m. that morning although I do question whether he could have done that. This would not have been an easy matter, in the midst of such a tumultuous battle. Then again and as someone in the group has already pointed out, he may not have had the authority to relieve Burnside of command. The Burnside issue is a very big can of worms that I hope to explore further one day soon. Whether McClellan could/should have sent Sumner in earlier is debatable and I say this in regards to crowding the field, in which event Sedgwick's and French's troops (this assumes both divisions had advanced together) would have conceivably been fodder for Lee's artillery. We can criticize McClellan all we want for failing to throw Franklin and Porter in but we do so with the benefit of hindsight. McClellan didn't have that luxury.

 

[67th Tigers]

The more I have studied it, the more I hace come to the conclusion the 9:00 was the crucial "tipping point" in this battle.

By this point Lee has already committed his reserves to this sector, which he did about 0800. McLaws, Anderson and Walker are already en route and at 0920 McLaws and Walker are hitting Sedgwick in the flank.

Lee's decision was made at 0800. This is about the same time as McClellan sent an order to Burnside. Unless there is a missing order (i.e. a pre-0700 attack order) then Walker would still have been sent to the rebel left, along with McLaws and Anderson.

At 0830 McClellan sent orders to Hooker and Sumner, the latter now formed up with the two 2nd Corps divisions in/ by the Miller Woods (tracking the movements of these two divisions I found they were both formed up at the Miller Woods by 2030, significantly in advance of where Carman's map places them).

"Gen[eral] Hooker appears to be driving the enemy rapidly. If he does not require your assistance on his right, please push left through the ravine at the head of which house was burned this morning, getting possession of the woods to the right as soon as possible & push on towards Sharpsburg. Use your artillery freely." 0830 orders to Sumner

"Gen[era]l Sumner has been directed (if you do not require him to assist you on the right) to move up on your left and push forward toward Sharpsburg. P.S. Keep the Genl. fully posted by means of his aides." - 0830 orders to Hooker

These orders kick off the next phase of the battle. McClellan defines the right as Hooker's TAOR (Tactical Area of Responsibility). McClellan has ordered Sumner's 4 divisions (minus any detached to aid Hooker) to drive through the sunken road position towards Sharpsburg, getting possession of the Dunker Church plateau as soon as possible.

McClellan told Hooker to keep sending him SitReps because Hooker was failing to do so, and McClellan was working on partial information. After the Seven Days McClellan had had to reiterate that all corps commanders in battle were obliged to sending reports every 30 minutes, because the corps commanders tended to get absorbed in their own actions. The same thing happened at Antietam it appears.

We of course know what Sumner did in response to this order. What McClellan's picture and intent was seems to be:

 

[Moe Daoust]

By this point Lee has already committed his reserves to this sector, which he did about 0800. McLaws, Anderson and Walker are already en route and at 0920 McLaws and Walker are hitting Sedgwick in the flank.

Lee's decision was made at 0800. This is about the same time as McClellan sent an order to Burnside. Unless there is a missing order (i.e. a pre-0700 attack order) then Walker would still have been sent to the rebel left, along with McLaws and Anderson.

At 0830 McClellan sent orders to Hooker and Sumner, the latter now formed up with the two 2nd Corps divisions in/ by the Miller Woods (tracking the movements of these two divisions I found they were both formed up at the Miller Woods by 2030, significantly in advance of where Carman's map places them).

"Gen[eral] Hooker appears to be driving the enemy rapidly. If he does not require your assistance on his right, please push left through the ravine at the head of which house was burned this morning, getting possession of the woods to the right as soon as possible & push on towards Sharpsburg. Use your artillery freely." 0830 orders to Sumner

"Gen[era]l Sumner has been directed (if you do not require him to assist you on the right) to move up on your left and push forward toward Sharpsburg. P.S. Keep the Genl. fully posted by means of his aides." - 0830 orders to Hooker

These orders kick off the next phase of the battle. McClellan defines the right as Hooker's TAOR (Tactical Area of Responsibility). McClellan has ordered Sumner's 4 divisions (minus any detached to aid Hooker) to drive through the sunken road position towards Sharpsburg, getting possession of the Dunker Church plateau as soon as possible.

McClellan told Hooker to keep sending him SitReps because Hooker was failing to do so, and McClellan was working on partial information. After the Seven Days McClellan had had to reiterate that all corps commanders in battle were obliged to sending reports every 30 minutes, because the corps commanders tended to get absorbed in their own actions. The same thing happened at Antietam it appears.

We of course know what Sumner did in response to this order. What McClellan's picture and intent was seems to be:

View attachment 362075

On the basis that McClellan did send an 8 a.m. order to Burnside, and the evidence supporting this is compelling, it must then be wondered what impact it might have had on matters had the 9th Corps immediately commenced its attack on the bridge, following the receipt of that order, specifically, that Lee might have had second thoughts about sending McLaws, Anderson and Walker to the left. Some might call this a "might have been" but if Burnside did ignore an 8 a.m. order, then it becomes a "should have been."

 

[Andy Cardinal]

By this point Lee has already committed his reserves to this sector, which he did about 0800. McLaws, Anderson and Walker are already en route and at 0920 McLaws and Walker are hitting Sedgwick in the flank.

Lee's decision was made at 0800. This is about the same time as McClellan sent an order to Burnside. Unless there is a missing order (i.e. a pre-0700 attack order) then Walker would still have been sent to the rebel left, along with McLaws and Anderson.

At 0830 McClellan sent orders to Hooker and Sumner, the latter now formed up with the two 2nd Corps divisions in/ by the Miller Woods (tracking the movements of these two divisions I found they were both formed up at the Miller Woods by 2030, significantly in advance of where Carman's map places them).

"Gen[eral] Hooker appears to be driving the enemy rapidly. If he does not require your assistance on his right, please push left through the ravine at the head of which house was burned this morning, getting possession of the woods to the right as soon as possible & push on towards Sharpsburg. Use your artillery freely." 0830 orders to Sumner

"Gen[era]l Sumner has been directed (if you do not require him to assist you on the right) to move up on your left and push forward toward Sharpsburg. P.S. Keep the Genl. fully posted by means of his aides." - 0830 orders to Hooker

These orders kick off the next phase of the battle. McClellan defines the right as Hooker's TAOR (Tactical Area of Responsibility). McClellan has ordered Sumner's 4 divisions (minus any detached to aid Hooker) to drive through the sunken road position towards Sharpsburg, getting possession of the Dunker Church plateau as soon as possible.

McClellan told Hooker to keep sending him SitReps because Hooker was failing to do so, and McClellan was working on partial information. After the Seven Days McClellan had had to reiterate that all corps commanders in battle were obliged to sending reports every 30 minutes, because the corps commanders tended to get absorbed in their own actions. The same thing happened at Antietam it appears.

We of course know what Sumner did in response to this order. What McClellan's picture and intent was seems to be:

View attachment 362075

By "tipping point" I'm referring to the situation on the field; I realize Lee has already ordered the troops to move in that direction. But if McLaws etc had been 10 minutes later they may well have been too late to do anything other that try to establish a fall back position on Reel Ridge. Instead they stabilized the West Woods position, at least temporarily, and not much changed after that -- although there was still plenty of fighting.

But as Moe points out, it brings into clear focus the failure on Burnside's front.

 

[Jamieva]

By "tipping point" I'm referring to the situation on the field; I realize Lee has already ordered the troops to move in that direction. But if McLaws etc had been 10 minutes later they may well have been too late to do anything other that try to establish a fall back position on Reel Ridge. Instead they stabilized the West Woods position, at least temporarily, and not much changed after that -- although there was still plenty of fighting.

But as Moe points out, it brings into clear focus the failure on Burnside's front.

And in the finality, that really falls on McClellan to administer his army to conform to his battle plan. The opportunity is there we all can see it, but he let's it slip from his grasp. I think everyone would agree if the roles were reversed, and Lee was in McClellan's position, he would not have let that happen.

 

[Moe Daoust]

And in the finality, that really falls on McClellan to administer his army to conform to his battle plan. The opportunity is there we all can see it, but he let's it slip from his grasp. I think everyone would agree if the roles were reversed, and Lee was in McClellan's position, he would not have let that happen.

Please take the time to read the article I posted at the beginning of this thread. It may prompt you to change you mind about McClellan at Antietam. Here it is: https://quasimodo.wixsite.com/mcclellanandhistory/single-post/2018/06/24/Antietam-A-Perspective

 

[Andy Cardinal]

And in the finality, that really falls on McClellan to administer his army to conform to his battle plan. The opportunity is there we all can see it, but he let's it slip from his grasp. I think everyone would agree if the roles were reversed, and Lee was in McClellan's position, he would not have let that happen.

I don't necessarily disagree, but I would argue that "we" are not very good at being consistent. Somewhat of a parallel to McClellan and Antietam is Lee and Gettysburg, in my opinion. Both attacks were unfulfilled by poor performances by subordinates. And yet Lee is by and large absolved of responsibility for Gettysburg by most people, and McClellan is almost always singled out as the sole reason for the problems with Antietam.

 

[Saphroneth]

Something that I think is interesting to contemplate with regard to the administration of the army at Antietam is where McClellan "should have been".

The usual argument is that the delay on the left (with Burnside) means that McClellan should have been basically acting "as Burnside" and commanding the troops in that area directly. But at the same time I've also seen the argument that things going askew on the right means McClellan should have been there, ensuring that the command structure was working correctly.
And then there are also things that have to be done in the centre (i.e. deciding when to push the troops at the Middle Bridge forwards, plus directing Morell/Franklin when they come up and releasing Richardson once Morell comes into view) which are an army-level responsibility and something only McClellan can really handle - and handle there, because that's where he can see as much of the field as possible.

The unfortunate fact of it is that to avoid any risk of the command structure suffering from friction McClellan should have been in three places at once.


Perhaps this is something that could have been fixed over time, with a better trained army or commanders more used to working together, but there is simply no time for this to be achieved. Most of McClellan's senior commanders at Antietam are not McClellan's selections - Porter is the most senior of his picks and he's ranked by Sumner and Burnside, and Porter has just the one division on the morning of the 17th - and the army is literally being reorganized en route to Antietam. That's why some reports call 12th Corps "2nd (Banks) Corps" or similar, quite apart from how a corps commander died at South Mountain.


This is an interesting parallel/difference with Gettysburg, because the AoNV as it fought at Gettysburg was largely Lee's creation and had been under his command for over a year (as compared to the Antietam AotP having been under McClellan's command for about a fortnight); the only major reorganization in the last several months was after the loss of Jackson and the shift to three corps, and as far as Lee getting his way on the desired structure that might actually be an improvement overall (as Lee wanted a three-corps structure but went with a two-corps one, basically AIUI to keep DH Hill out of a corps command).


But there's also a philosophical issue here. What went wrong at Antietam is basically "friction", and you can't really eliminate friction (though you can certainly try and reduce it); I tend to see the attacks at Antietam as like the attacks at Gettysburg, in that if things had gone according to plan (and their going according to plan was not a matter of too much being asked of the soldiers) the enemy army could have been severely wounded or destroyed. They didn't go according to plan, but that doesn't mean we should decry the attempt.

Interestingly in October and November in the Loudoun Valley campaign (after about a month of intense training) the articulation of the Army of the Potomac seems better. There wasn't a battle so we can't really evaluate how it might have done in one of those, but the army is managing much longer marches on some days and it handles the peel-off from the Blue Ridge and transfer to Warrenton quite smoothly.

 

[Rebforever]

I don't necessarily disagree, but I would argue that "we" are not very good at being consistent. Somewhat of a parallel to McClellan and Antietam is Lee and Gettysburg, in my opinion. Both attacks were unfulfilled by poor performances by subordinates. And yet Lee is by and large absolved of responsibility for Gettysburg by most people, and McClellan is almost always singled out as the sole reason for the problems with Antietam.

The difference is General Lee took responsibility for the lose at Gettysburg,
General McClellan makes excuses for not winning.

 

[Saphroneth]

The difference is General Lee took responsibility for the lose at Gettysburg,
General McClellan makes excuses for not winning.

So Lee takes responsibility and that absolves him, while McClellan points to the externalities and that condemns him?

Surely we should look at the situation in both cases and the degree of influence the respective commanders have, and what they subsequently said about them.
For example, which excuses does McClellan make? We can then see if they're valid, and if there's anything he's leaving off. (For example if he doesn't blame Burnside for the delayed movement over the bridge this is actually McClellan protecting Burnside if anything.)


As for what Lee said, I happened to have a quick look in the ORs for Lee taking responsibility.
In Lee's July 4 report he's strictly factual. In his July 7 report the first reason he gives is "Finding the position too strong to be carried..."

If that doesn't count as an excuse, then presumably if McClellan gives the strength of the enemy position as a reason for not destroying the enemy army that wouldn't qualify as an excuse either?

 

[Rebforever]

So Lee takes responsibility and that absolves him, while McClellan points to the externalities and that condemns him?

Surely we should look at the situation in both cases and the degree of influence the respective commanders have, and what they subsequently said about them.
For example, which excuses does McClellan make? We can then see if they're valid, and if there's anything he's leaving off. (For example if he doesn't blame Burnside for the delayed movement over the bridge this is actually McClellan protecting Burnside if anything.)


As for what Lee said, I happened to have a quick look in the ORs for Lee taking responsibility.
In Lee's July 4 report he's strictly factual. In his July 7 report the first reason he gives is "Finding the position too strong to be carried..."

If that doesn't count as an excuse, then presumably if McClellan gives the strength of the enemy position as a reason for not destroying the enemy army that wouldn't qualify as a success either?

You have proved my point. Thank you!

 

[Saphroneth]

You have proved my point. Thank you!

Really?

Your point was that Lee accepted blame while McClellan gave excuses.

The first thing I did was to ask about what excuses McClellan gave, but the second thing was to look to see where Lee accepted blame - and what I found was that Lee (sensibly) gave explanations for what happened. Or, in other words, excuses (if you label "the enemy was too strong" as an excuse).

 

[Moe Daoust]

The difference is General Lee took responsibility for the lose at Gettysburg,
General McClellan makes excuses for not winning.

What excuses are you referring to?

 

[dlofting]

So Lee takes responsibility and that absolves him, while McClellan points to the externalities and that condemns him?

Surely we should look at the situation in both cases and the degree of influence the respective commanders have, and what they subsequently said about them.
For example, which excuses does McClellan make? We can then see if they're valid, and if there's anything he's leaving off. (For example if he doesn't blame Burnside for the delayed movement over the bridge this is actually McClellan protecting Burnside if anything.)


As for what Lee said, I happened to have a quick look in the ORs for Lee taking responsibility.
In Lee's July 4 report he's strictly factual. In his July 7 report the first reason he gives is "Finding the position too strong to be carried..."

If that doesn't count as an excuse, then presumably if McClellan gives the strength of the enemy position as a reason for not destroying the enemy army that wouldn't qualify as an excuse either?

Lee took responsibility in a letter to Davis, in which he offered to resign.

 

[Belfoured]

On the basis that McClellan did send an 8 a.m. order to Burnside, and the evidence supporting this is compelling, it must then be wondered what impact it might have had on matters had the 9th Corps immediately commenced its attack on the bridge, following the receipt of that order, specifically, that Lee might have had second thoughts about sending McLaws, Anderson and Walker to the left. Some might call this a "might have been" but if Burnside did ignore an 8 a.m. order, then it becomes a "should have been."

"but if Burnside did ignore an 8 a.m. order, then it becomes a "should have been"

Actually, and as already pointed out, It becomes more than that - but that has already been discussed to death previously.

 

[Moe Daoust]

Something that I think is interesting to contemplate with regard to the administration of the army at Antietam is where McClellan "should have been".

The usual argument is that the delay on the left (with Burnside) means that McClellan should have been basically acting "as Burnside" and commanding the troops in that area directly. But at the same time I've also seen the argument that things going askew on the right means McClellan should have been there, ensuring that the command structure was working correctly.
And then there are also things that have to be done in the centre (i.e. deciding when to push the troops at the Middle Bridge forwards, plus directing Morell/Franklin when they come up and releasing Richardson once Morell comes into view) which are an army-level responsibility and something only McClellan can really handle - and handle there, because that's where he can see as much of the field as possible.

The unfortunate fact of it is that to avoid any risk of the command structure suffering from friction McClellan should have been in three places at once.


Perhaps this is something that could have been fixed over time, with a better trained army or commanders more used to working together, but there is simply no time for this to be achieved. Most of McClellan's senior commanders at Antietam are not McClellan's selections - Porter is the most senior of his picks and he's ranked by Sumner and Burnside, and Porter has just the one division on the morning of the 17th - and the army is literally being reorganized en route to Antietam. That's why some reports call 12th Corps "2nd (Banks) Corps" or similar, quite apart from how a corps commander died at South Mountain.


This is an interesting parallel/difference with Gettysburg, because the AoNV as it fought at Gettysburg was largely Lee's creation and had been under his command for over a year (as compared to the Antietam AotP having been under McClellan's command for about a fortnight); the only major reorganization in the last several months was after the loss of Jackson and the shift to three corps, and as far as Lee getting his way on the desired structure that might actually be an improvement overall (as Lee wanted a three-corps structure but went with a two-corps one, basically AIUI to keep DH Hill out of a corps command).


But there's also a philosophical issue here. What went wrong at Antietam is basically "friction", and you can't really eliminate friction (though you can certainly try and reduce it); I tend to see the attacks at Antietam as like the attacks at Gettysburg, in that if things had gone according to plan (and their going according to plan was not a matter of too much being asked of the soldiers) the enemy army could have been severely wounded or destroyed. They didn't go according to plan, but that doesn't mean we should decry the attempt.

Interestingly in October and November in the Loudoun Valley campaign (after about a month of intense training) the articulation of the Army of the Potomac seems better. There wasn't a battle so we can't really evaluate how it might have done in one of those, but the army is managing much longer marches on some days and it handles the peel-off from the Blue Ridge and transfer to Warrenton quite smoothly.

If McClellan should have been anywhere, it would have been on the Union left so as to ensure Burnside didn't mess things up, as he had over the course of the previous days. Having said that, I very doubt McClellan would have ever envisioned that Burnside would botch things up to the extent that he did, which gives some credence to the possibility Burnside was purposely sabotaging matters that day. In fact, now that you have raised this issue, I've come to the conclusion that this was McClellan greatest error that day. He absolutely should have been there.

I disagree that he should have been on the right. His orders to Hooker and Sumner regarding Mansfield's role could not have been clearer. The result there had nothing to do with "friction," it was simply a matter of Hooker wanting all of the glory.

Should McClellan have been more hands on that day? Should he have been out there holding his subordinates by the hand in order to ensure they followed his relatively simple orders? In retrospect, yes but I don't think that is the normal function of an army commander, whether everyone was "used to working together" or not. These were trained military men, Corps and "Wing" commanders who, in their own right, were in charge of armies. McClellan was a professional soldier who expected his subordinates to act accordingly. Again, Sumner meant well but where it comes to Hooker and Burnside, there is no excuse.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

The difference is General Lee took responsibility for the lose at Gettysburg,
General McClellan makes excuses for not winning.

That's true, but I was not talking about how each general responded to what happened, I am talking about how we analyze and discuss their performance 160 years later.

 

[Moe Daoust]

That's true, but I was not talking about how each general responded to what happened, I am talking about how we analyze and discuss their performance 160 years later.

I'm still waiting to hear back from @Rebforever regarding what "excuses" he is referring to.