An interesting observation

[ole]

Gary Gallagher made an interesting observation in a bit I caught on the History Channel over the weekend: "The Army of the Potomac was the equivalent of the 2nd largest city in the Confederacy (New Orleans being the first)."

So you have a large population larger than Richmond, most of which is encamped in Virginia. In the early days this population was largely supplied by RR and wagon trains -- itself a logistical nightmare of overwhelming proportions. Now consider that the riff-raff of this "city" is also scrounging in the fields, orchards, farmyards, and smokehouses. With the Confederates having at least an equal proportion of riff-raff, you can well imagine that Virginia farm production suffered.

Just an observation from a different perspective.
Ole

 

[blue_zouave]

An astute observation indeed, Ole. I always think of Georgia when I think of depredations on the countryside... though Virginians probably suffered more than any others, because the Eastern theater was their front yard.

On a personal note, there's a family story about my Virginia gggrandmother, Amanda Perkins, who was small but so feisty that no Yankee dared stand in her way when she was taking supplies to "her boys!"

Zou

 

[ewc]

To put Gallagher's statement in perspective a bit, it should be noted that the Confederacy's Armies of Northern Virginia and Tennessee were also larger than any Confederate city besides New Orleans. The South's next largest city, Richmond's 1860 nonslave population in 1860 was 40,500. And to put that statement into perspective, all the long standing Union Armies would easily outsize all Confederate cities but New Orleans. Prewar, New Orleans was 4 times larger than any Southern city, and was quickly lost to the Confederacy. Also during the war there was a general movement of Southerners into the cities; I remember reading somewhere that Richmond's population tripled during the war. That meant, as Ole points out, alot of scavenging by normal citizens and riffraff, and a severe taxing of the means of feeding the urban dwellers. Starvation was certainly a reality to the South throughout at least the last 3 years of the War.

What I find truly amazing is that throughout the War Northern troops in Southern territory did not suffer serious want as to rations and supplies except in certain situatuions when hard pressed by the Confederates (i.e.- at Chattanooga.) Those massive armies in northern Virginia and Tennessee always had plenty to eat and shiny guns and equipment and the horses had feed. This all mostly had to be shipped in by rail, water transport, and wagon train, sometimes by combination of all three. What this means is that the Federal industrial infrastructure, manpower, and ultimately superb technical management in keeping the troops in the pink is a primary factor in the North winning the War. At no time did Northern Armies have to disperse as Lee was compelled to do on several occasions so as to keep his men and animals in feed. A truly great, and unbeatable, feat- the Northern logistical machine.

 

[larry_cockerham]

Sir, I believe you have accurately outlined the Confederate problem. Have you considered how the South was able to sustain this doomed effort for about three and a half years?

With the very real limitations you stated, the only thing left was the human spirit of the Confederate soldier. N.B. Forrest, as an example, didn't call the quartermaster or the Confederate White House for supplies in the later part of the war. He 'borrowed' much from the U.S. Army who were very stubborn, but usually oblidging. Forrest had a way about making a request for supplies. Fighting on familiar ground with civilians who were for the most part sympathetic to the Confederate effort made the brutality last much longer than desired and probably necessary.

That element, though difficult to describe, is the key that needs to be communicated by those who champion the CSA and it's various armies and symbols, still under attack after 140 plus years.

 

[whitworth]

Logistics

Near the end of the war, the Army of the Potomac was making 100,000 loaves of bread a day for its troops laying up with the siege of Richmond and Petersburg. Names like Armour and Borden got their start in obtaining fortunes by supplying the Union's logistics system.

Richmond was in a bad place, as it was at the end of the Confederate supply line, served by an overworked railroad system, that remained in private control through the war.

Of course the war, with a large Confederate army getting supplied by Richmond, meant that the Union army had to be supplied by rail or water. It could never mount a serious assault from the west. That was one of Lee's great advantages. As long as the Army of Northern Virginia had 50,000 soldiers in the field, the Union could not supply any army from the west.

If the capital had been at Philadelphia, the war might have ended a year or two earlier. The Union army had to attack and defend Washington at the same time. Without a need for defending a nearby capital, a large army could have been placed at Winchester and supplied by rail out of Harrisburg, Chambersburg and Hagerstown. It could then have pushed out like Sherman did between Chattanooga and Atlanta, squeezing Lee between two large armies. Because Washington was located,where it was, the Union could only supply one Army of the Potomac, as large as it was, where it was.

 

[JohnTaylor]

Whitworth, good points.
One has only to visit City Point to envision the magnitude of the logistics effort.
The AoP built a railroad directly from City Point, all along the rear of the Union lines around Petersburg, growing longer as the union lines stretched further and further to the southwest. A truly monumental undertaking.
I remember reading about a Confederate soldier who took part in the looting of the US Army logistics base at Manassas Junction in August 1862. Among other things, he found ice cream. In August. Now to us that doesn't sound too remarkable, but in an era before refrigeration, having ice cream at an Army depot in August was a huge effort.

On the Confederate side, feeding the ANV was a constant problem for Lee. After the war, Lee wrote a letter to Wm. M. McDonald April 15, 1868, about the Pennsylvania Campaign of 1863: "I did not propose to invade the North, for I did not believe that the Army of Northern Virginia was strong enough for the purpose, not was I in any degree influenced by popular expectation. My movement was simply intended to threaten Washington, call the Federal Army north of that river, relieve our territory, and enable me to subsist the army." Reminiscences of General Robert E. Lee, by edited by J. William Jones, page 245.

 

[whitworth]

Latrines, Outhouses and Sinks

When discussing these large unpermanent housing sites such as army camps and prisons, with a better review of latrines, outhouses and sinks(the more prevalent term for latrine), one would not wonder why disease killed more soldiers in the Civil War, than battle.

When I've read of the high death rates in prisons, one rarely ever sees a realistic mention of the use of sinks in those prisons.

 

[ole]

When I've read of the high death rates in prisons, one rarely ever sees a realistic mention of the use of sinks in those prisons.

Good point, whitworth. I suspect disease killed far more than starvation, although the inadquate diets might well have aided in the onset of disease.

I can understand ingnorance of sanitation; it boggles, 'though, that they thought nothing of drinking water downstream from the corral and sinks. That's not sanitation awareness, that just don't make sense.
Ole

 

[matthew mckeon]

When you see the photographs reproduced from Alexanders or brady's books you see giant camps and buildings, masses of wagons, streams of railroad cars, mountains of supplies. It's the American way of war, a precursor of the massive logistic effort of World War II, and so 2nd nature to us now, we ignore the achievement of supporting powerful forces in places like Iraq and are surprised and angered if our troops lack for anything.

On the Confederate side, consider Gorgias's success in arming and supplying CS forces with ammuntion. No CS army ever lost a battle for want of ammuntion. Contrast it with the spasmodic and less efficient effort to supply the army with food and fodder: in a territory that was mostly agricultural(if not always food crops).

 

[matthew mckeon]

When you see the photographs reproduced from Alexanders or brady's books you see giant camps and buildings, masses of wagons, streams of railroad cars, mountains of supplies. It's the American way of war, a precursor of the massive logistic effort of World War II, and so 2nd nature to us now, we ignore the achievement of supporting powerful forces in places like Iraq and are surprised and angered if our troops lack for anything.

On the Confederate side, consider Gorgias's success in arming and supplying CS forces with ammuntion. No CS army ever lost a battle for want of ammuntion. Contrast it with the spasmodic and less efficient effort to supply the army with food and fodder: in a territory that was mostly agricultural(if not always food crops).

 

[Dred]

When discussing these large unpermanent housing sites such as army camps and prisons, with a better review of latrines, outhouses and sinks(the more prevalent term for latrine), one would not wonder why disease killed more soldiers in the Civil War, than battle.

When I've read of the high death rates in prisons, one rarely ever sees a realistic mention of the use of sinks in those prisons.

Ewww... I did not realize "sink" was another name for a latrine or outhouse. This makes all those journals and diaries I just read about Andersonville in a whole new lite! They constantly talked about sinks lining one end of the stream that ran through the center. It was already the most disgusting place I had heard of, but this new knowledge makes it even worse! They drank from that water and bathed in it... i can't begin to imagine what it was alike in there.

 

[gary]

Dred, you've not read J. Billing's Hardtack & Coffee or Irving Bell Wiley's two books, The Life of Johnny Reb and The Life of Billy Yank?

 

[Dred]

No, I have not... altho I had hardtack and coffee at one time but lost it before I ever got around to reading it

 

[ole]

Dred, my compliments, sir. Seems you've read back in the posts some and that, to me, marks a man as one who looks before he leaps. (My apologies if I should have said, Miss Dred. Do not respond--makes no nevermind.)

Ask. Tell. It's all good. Welcome. (Seems I've done that already but can't be entirely certain without more research.) And so it goes.

Ole

 

[cw1865]

Third World

Just reading through some of the economic history of the nation, particularly that of the 19th century, its pretty clear that the US was what we would consider today to be a Third World country. Typhoid, Yellow fever, malaria, and from our Civil War reading dysentery were major maladies, the average life span was something like 40 (though if you made it to 15 you would obviously live longer), definitely some rough times, and in many cases people really didn't know what to do about it, the scientific knowledge just wasn't there yet.

 

[trice]

Just reading through some of the economic history of the nation, particularly that of the 19th century, its pretty clear that the US was what we would consider today to be a Third World country. Typhoid, Yellow fever, malaria, and from our Civil War reading dysentery were major maladies, the average life span was something like 40 (though if you made it to 15 you would obviously live longer), definitely some rough times, and in many cases people really didn't know what to do about it, the scientific knowledge just wasn't there yet.

Yes, that is true. But at the time the US was one of the most advanced nations in the world, and very similar numbers would be found for France, Britain, etc.

Also, when the French Army finally sent official observers here in 1864 (two officers, only one of whom spoke English), they spent the Summer with Grant's force outside Richmond. One of their recommendations was that the French Army adopt AoP sanitary and hygene procedures, so imagine what the French were like at the time.

Regards,
Tim

 

[matthew mckeon]

Thomas Wentworth Higginson, a clergyman, editor, novelist and radical abolitionist became a colonel of black troops during the war. You would think he would be unsuited to such a responsibility, but in fact he demanded the most careful discipline, both in maneuvers and in camp.

The old regular army had acquired some practical sanitary procedures that Higginson thought were often neglected by the volunteer troops, which let to disease. Higginson followed these regulations, and wrote an essay about the importance of strong leadership by noncoms and junior officers in mundane camp regulations.

 

[whitworth]

Confederate Ammunition

"No CS army ever lost a battle for want of ammunition."

I'm not sure that is 100% acceptable.

Confederate artillery did run out of long-range ammunition at Gettysburg, just prior to Pickett's Charge. So it did affect any possible follow-up by Lee's Army, and probably was the reason Lee made his move directly back to Virginia, with no large intermediate defense position planned, just south of Gettysburg.

E.P. Alexander did note that conservation of ammunition was the watchword in the Confederate artillery, and that would affect tactics. I've wondered how much ammunition, the Confederates had on hand after the battles of Fredricksburg and Chancellorsville, to counter-attack or continue an attack.

Did the Army of Northern Virginia have enough ammunition left to continue these battles? The battle at Chancellorsville had a time line. Could the Confederate army renew the fight - another day - two days?

We do have the Seven Days Battle. But that was within seeing distance of Confederate supplies in Richmond, more easily moved by mules and wagon.

Were their any instances of the Confederate armies breaking off the fight because ammunition, though not completely expended, was running low?

Of course, most historians never seemed to look at inherent Confederate weaknesses too closely. I think this is one of the great short-comings in studying the Civil War.

 

[trice]

"No CS army ever lost a battle for want of ammunition."

I'm not sure that is 100% acceptable.

Confederate artillery did run out of long-range ammunition at Gettysburg, just prior to Pickett's Charge. So it did affect any possible follow-up by Lee's Army, and probably was the reason Lee made his move directly back to Virginia, with no large intermediate defense position planned, just south of Gettysburg.

E.P. Alexander did note that conservation of ammunition was the watchword in the Confederate artillery, and that would affect tactics. ...

At the end of July 3, Lee's army seems to have had about enough artillery ammo for one more day of battle. That's a precarious position for an army to be in, particularly one so far from home.

The support for Pickett's charge was an issue of immediate supply to the batteries at the front, not of the army train running dry. Overall, it had an effect on the timing, but realistically the bombardment was not having a decisive effect anyway. (horrible enough if you happened to be in the area immediately behind the front, though.

... I've wondered how much ammunition, the Confederates had on hand after the battles of Fredricksburg and Chancellorsville, to counter-attack or continue an attack.
Did the Army of Northern Virginia have enough ammunition left to continue these battles? The battle at Chancellorsville had a time line. Could the Confederate army renew the fight - another day - two days?

I have never heard of a shortage at Fredericksburg, and the reason a counterattack was rejected had to do with the dominant effect of the Union artillery if the Confederates desceeded into the lower ground closer to them.

At Chancellorsville, Lee was preparing another assault when the Union withdrew across the river, so I'd have to say he thought he had enough.

We do have the Seven Days Battle. But that was within seeing distance of Confederate supplies in Richmond, more easily moved by mules and wagon.

Doesn't seem to have been a problem here, as you say.

Were their any instances of the Confederate armies breaking off the fight because ammunition, though not completely expended, was running low?

It was a factor at Gettysburg, but so were the 25,000+ casualties the ANV had. All nine of Lee's infantry divisions had been committed and the Union had held. Hard to argue with the decision to withdraw.

I can't recall any major battle where the Confederates pulled out over ammo shortages. The Arizona/New Mexico expedition did lose its train.

Of course, most historians never seemed to look at inherent Confederate weaknesses too closely. I think this is one of the great short-comings in studying the Civil War.

People don't like to think their people died in a helpless cause -- and the Confederacy probably could have done much better -- perhaps even won its independence -- with better leadership of the defense effort. Davis wasn't what was needed, and neither were the Johnstons, Beauregard, Bragg, etc. Lee was marvellous at what he did, but never applied his genius at the real needs outside of VA.

But what people really don't look at is that the Union crushed the Confederacy militarily. Conquest of the Confederacy was a daunting task. The Union managed it.

Regards,
Tim

 

[cw1865]

Opposite Conclusion?

"People don't like to think their people died in a helpless cause -- and the Confederacy probably could have done much better -- perhaps even won its independence -- with better leadership of the defense effort. Davis wasn't what was needed, and neither were the Johnstons, Beauregard, Bragg, etc. "

Just a quick response, I really don't have a problem with anything that you're writing, but all things considered when you look at the Union's advantages I actually find it surprising that the South makes it beyond 1862.

Of course, in hindsight its easy to criticize leadership that ultimately fails in its objective, but really when you look at it, from the South's point of view, looking at their frontiers are large union armies, their response: put soldiers in their way and stop them. And the South actually does do this and from reading the accounts, I'd say up through Murfreesboro in 1862/1863, I can almost feel Lincoln's exasperation at his inability to project military force into the south. And yes, clearly there are major issues with Bragg, but even in 1864 the South still has the mettle to put a charge into Chickamauga (which is why I think he's better than Hood).

By November 1864, I think the Confederacy had done all that it pretty much had the capability of doing: 1. they definitely inflicted more casualties than they took and 2. they made the war exorbitently expensive. 45% of the voters actually DO vote for McClellan (I'm assuming that every vote for McClellan is of course an anti-war vote which is obviously an oversimplification)

Now, we can say that the South failed to realize exactly what the Federals resolve was to continue the war effort, but resolve is a subjective quality which is difficult to measure, particularly in the pre-mass media days.