An interesting observation

[trice]

Just a quick response, I really don't have a problem with anything that you're writing, but all things considered when you look at the Union's advantages I actually find it surprising that the South makes it beyond 1862.

A decisive victory for either side in 1861 is virtually impossible -- or more likely to have been a Rebel victory because of the vulnerability of Washington. The strategic depth of the Confederacy, the excellent defensive terrain in the East, and the primitive state of the western communications ensure that a Union victory will take much time.

Of course, in hindsight its easy to criticize leadership that ultimately fails in its objective, but really when you look at it, from the South's point of view, looking at their frontiers are large union armies, their response: put soldiers in their way and stop them. And the South actually does do this and from reading the accounts, I'd say up through Murfreesboro in 1862/1863, I can almost feel Lincoln's exasperation at his inability to project military force into the south. And yes, clearly there are major issues with Bragg, but even in 1864 the South still has the mettle to put a charge into Chickamauga (which is why I think he's better than Hood).

Lincoln was surely frustrated, but given the state of the US Army and Navy at the start, a long war was almost inevitable. Before reconquering the rebellious territory, they needed to build the Army and Navy to do it with. Personally, I think the Union would have been unable to do it with the technology level of ten years earlier.

Even if McClellan had fought and led as well as he organized, and someone other than Halleck was leading out in the West, the war would have gone on into 1863, IMHO.

Joe Johnston, OTOH, probably would have lost Richmond in 1862, IMHO, if he had not been wounded at Seven Pines. I think Lee truly did save that city and gain the Confederacy a new lease on life.

I think you meant 1863 for Chickamauga, BTW -- and Hood was wounded in the charge by Longstreet there, which had darn little to do with Braxton Bragg.

By November 1864, I think the Confederacy had done all that it pretty much had the capability of doing: 1. they definitely inflicted more casualties than they took and 2. they made the war exorbitently expensive. 45% of the voters actually DO vote for McClellan (I'm assuming that every vote for McClellan is of course an anti-war vote which is obviously an oversimplification)

Yes, and if the vote was in August McClellan might have won, but it wasn't. 55% is essentially a landslide in US politics, and it was higher than that in the Army.

I don't think the Confederacy did all that they could, however. Militarily, I think their performance in the West was sub-par, and their logistical/strategic performance uneven and sometimes excerable.

Now, we can say that the South failed to realize exactly what the Federals resolve was to continue the war effort, but resolve is a subjective quality which is difficult to measure, particularly in the pre-mass media days.

Here's my problem with that: Confederate resolve collapsed because they were beaten on the field of battle. Grant took Richmond, Sherman took Atlanta and marched through the heart of the Confederacy, Tennessee was conquered, the Mississippi turned into a Union conduit. Every major port in the Rebel lands fell. Every major Southern Army was beaten in battle.

Now that was tough. The Confederactes fought hard and made an honorable record. Soldiers like Lee, Jackson, Longstreet, Stuart, Cleburne and many others can stand with any. But in the end they were beaten time after time, forced back, outmaneuvered, until only surrender or death was left.

Numbers played a part in that -- but an attacker is generally required to have an advantage in numbers to wage a war like this at all. The defender gets all the advantages of terrain and fighting for his homeland.

While Lee is about as good as you can expect and it took Grant to beat him, that shows the weakness of the Confederacy. While Grant took on the best, the rest of the Union commanders totally outmatched the Confederates in 1864 -- so much so Grant could beat them while keeping people like Banks, Butler, and Siegel around.

I think Bragg's performance (the AoT performance) at Tullahoma and the approach to Chickamauga in 1863 is horrifying. I think the handling of that battle is absurd and the sub-commanders generally disgraceful in their actions. I think the failure to actually destroy Rosecrans then and there is the biggest missed opportunity of the war.

I think the Confederate command performance near Chattnooga-Knoxville in September-November 1863 is as horrifyingly bad as anything I recall in that century. Davis-Bragg-Polk-Longstreet-etc. should all have been ashamed of their failures here.

Joe Johnston was a good soldier, unflappable in a crisis -- and it is absolutely incredible that he could not hold Sherman North of Atlanta. I think if you put Grant or Thomas or Sherman in his place, the Rebels hold Atlanta. If they hold Atlanta, I think Lincoln may well lose, and I don't know what McClellan as President will do.

Hood's command failures around Atlanata July-August of 1864, and his even worse decisions and leadership later in the year only compound all of the above.

That is an incredible chain of incompetence and bad leadership, extending over a period of more than a year. Any commander should be able to do better than that, and if he does the Confederacy may survive.

IMHO, of course.

Regards,
Tim

 

[cw1865]

A decisive victory for either side in 1861 is virtually impossible -- or more likely to have been a Rebel victory because of the vulnerability of Washington. The strategic depth of the Confederacy, the excellent defensive terrain in the East, and the primitive state of the western communications ensure that a Union victory will take much time.

I agree, employing Anaconda will take time. but I still believe McClellan had the instrument to deliver a decisive blow during the Penisula Campaign - essentially in my opinion the Union SHOULD win right there and then, just that McClellan has some block in his head about being outnumbered.

Lincoln was surely frustrated, but given the state of the US Army and Navy at the start, a long war was almost inevitable. Before reconquering the rebellious territory, they needed to build the Army and Navy to do it with. Personally, I think the Union would have been unable to do it with the technology level of ten years earlier.

At the end of 1862, Union has 800,000 men in the field and the South between 400-500 (about a 2:1 advantage)

Even if McClellan had fought and led as well as he organized, and someone other than Halleck was leading out in the West, the war would have gone on into 1863, IMHO.

Ahhh, and this is just where we just have to agree to disagree, if McClellan leads as well as he organizes (and we all know the Army of the Potomac just loves McClellan), I feel the war ends in 1862.

Joe Johnston, OTOH, probably would have lost Richmond in 1862, IMHO, if he had not been wounded at Seven Pines. I think Lee truly did save that city and gain the Confederacy a new lease on life.

I agree, Lee does save the day, but frankly I think McClellan helps him out, the second Lee hits McClellan's right flank, I think McClellan already has it in his head to back out.

I think you meant 1863 for Chickamauga, BTW -- and Hood was wounded in the charge by Longstreet there, which had darn little to do with Braxton Bragg.

At the time I wrote it I was thinking election of 1864, my memory will do that to me. One of the unfortunate consequences of living in the information age is the veritable minutia of information that you need to retain on a daily basis and it plays tricks on my memory. I even have a little Radio Shack recording device on my keychain and I record things to remember for the morning and I even carry a second wallet with a pen and pad in it to write things down. 18, 19 years old, no problem, I'm only 34 and these memory lapses happen to me, so please send me some Gingkoba!

Yes, and if the vote was in August McClellan might have won, but it wasn't. 55% is essentially a landslide in US politics, and it was higher than that in the Army.

Of course that is true, winning 55% is in fact considered a landslide, I'm just pointing out that there are large segments of Northern society that are anti-war or are growing war weary.

I don't think the Confederacy did all that they could, however. Militarily, I think their performance in the West was sub-par, and their logistical/strategic performance uneven and sometimes excerable.

Here you say that the Confederate effort in the west is sub-par and compared to Lee's performance in the East, I would say that is accurate, but the Confederates do hold on to Vicksburg until July 1863 and I think the Union again SHOULD be able to close the Missississippi down in 1862.

Here's my problem with that: Confederate resolve collapsed because they were beaten on the field of battle. Grant took Richmond, Sherman took Atlanta and marched through the heart of the Confederacy, Tennessee was conquered, the Mississippi turned into a Union conduit. Every major port in the Rebel lands fell. Every major Southern Army was beaten in battle.

Well, yes, of course the Confederacy loses but they give it up in 1865. I think think the South performs very well in 1862, 1863 obviously not as good, but remember, Gettysburg is the mental turning point so to a certain extent the South loses it 'on their initiative'

Now that was tough. The Confederactes fought hard and made an honorable record. Soldiers like Lee, Jackson, Longstreet, Stuart, Cleburne and many others can stand with any. But in the end they were beaten time after time, forced back, outmaneuvered, until only surrender or death was left.

Numbers played a part in that -- but an attacker is generally required to have an advantage in numbers to wage a war like this at all. The defender gets all the advantages of terrain and fighting for his homeland.

Yes, and I do feel that this was a defensive man's war, and one point we probably agree on (if I am putting words in your mouth just let me know) is that the Confederates do seem to envision doing twice as much on the attack as the forces available are able to accomplish. (How many times do you read statements to the extent - we will concentrate, defeat enemy in detail (of course looking for a Double Cannae if at all possible), destroy the rest of the opposition army and march on to New York City)

While Lee is about as good as you can expect and it took Grant to beat him, that shows the weakness of the Confederacy. While Grant took on the best, the rest of the Union commanders totally outmatched the Confederates in 1864 -- so much so Grant could beat them while keeping people like Banks, Butler, and Siegel around.

You're correct, but again look at the year, its 1864, the Union SHOULD be winning and of course, I opine, should've already won!

I think Bragg's performance (the AoT performance) at Tullahoma and the approach to Chickamauga in 1863 is horrifying. I think the handling of that battle is absurd and the sub-commanders generally disgraceful in their actions. I think the failure to actually destroy Rosecrans then and there is the biggest missed opportunity of the war.

I think the Confederate command performance near Chattnooga-Knoxville in September-November 1863 is as horrifyingly bad as anything I recall in that century. Davis-Bragg-Polk-Longstreet-etc. should all have been ashamed of their failures here.

On this we agree, and its also one of Grant's shining moments.

Joe Johnston was a good soldier, unflappable in a crisis -- and it is absolutely incredible that he could not hold Sherman North of Atlanta. I think if you put Grant or Thomas or Sherman in his place, the Rebels hold Atlanta. If they hold Atlanta, I think Lincoln may well lose, and I don't know what McClellan as President will do.

Hood's command failures around Atlanata July-August of 1864, and his even worse decisions and leadership later in the year only compound all of the above.

Well we both know Hood is a panzer general without tanks, and you're correct taking Atlanta is very important, but would Johnston have held Atlanta? Unfortunately I think he's a notorious retreater. But you're correct if Lincoln loses, McClellan will most likely end the war.

That is an incredible chain of incompetence and bad leadership, extending over a period of more than a year. Any commander should be able to do better than that, and if he does the Confederacy may survive.

IMHO, of course.

Regards,
Tim

And this is what's great about the Civil War as a topic, we can both read the same body of history and get a different 'feel' for it.

 

[cw1865]

Messed Up

Sorry, I seem to have messed up the quoting feature. I'm really not putting those words in your mouth!

 

[trice]

I agree, employing Anaconda will take time. but I still believe McClellan had the instrument to deliver a decisive blow during the Penisula Campaign - essentially in my opinion the Union SHOULD win right there and then, just that McClellan has some block in his head about being outnumbered.

A different general might have won a big victory there. I am pretty sure Lee would have done better.

At the end of 1862, Union has 800,000 men in the field and the South between 400-500 (about a 2:1 advantage)

Yes. An attacking army needs great superiority, because they will bleed troops to LOC security as they advance, and it took a long time to get this force built-up and trained.

Ahhh, and this is just where we just have to agree to disagree, if McClellan leads as well as he organizes (and we all know the Army of the Potomac just loves McClellan), I feel the war ends in 1862.

Well, a lot of people thought so, then and now. McClellan's own plan, BTW, was that after he took Richmond he would put an army aboard ship and move down the coast taking the Confederate ports until they gave up: Wilmington-Charleston-Savannah-etc. That would have taken some time, so even with McClellan's success the war would have gone on into 1863.

I agree, Lee does save the day, but frankly I think McClellan helps him out, the second Lee hits McClellan's right flank, I think McClellan already has it in his head to back out.

McClellan was a brave man, but I think he lacked middle-of-the-night courage, the sort a general needs when everything looks black. He saw too much, worried too much, and perhaps suffered from the too-much-easy-success-too-early-in-life syndrome. Grant, with a series of tough events in his life, seems to have had that extra when-the-going-gets-tough-the-tough-get-going gear.

Of course that is true, winning 55% is in fact considered a landslide, I'm just pointing out that there are large segments of Northern society that are anti-war or are growing war weary.

Sure thing. That was the last hope of the South, and Union battlefield victories (Sherman takes Atlanta, Farragut at Mobile Bay, Sheridan in the Shenandoah) put an end to the hope.

I don't think the Confederacy did all that they could, however. Militarily, I think their performance in the West was sub-par, and their logistical/strategic performance uneven and sometimes excerable.

Here you say that the Confederate effort in the west is sub-par and compared to Lee's performance in the East, I would say that is accurate, but the Confederates do hold on to Vicksburg until July 1863 and I think the Union again SHOULD be able to close the Missississippi down in 1862.

Vicksburg is very difficult to approach from the North due to terrain restrictions. That is why Grant abandons the overland route in December 1862 after the Van Dorn/Forrest raids on his LOC -- but even then it was Sherman who was supposed to take Vicksburg with his amphibious move down the river.

That's about the earliest the Union could be expected to take it, and they failed. The next few months show Grant trying a few routes that had little chance. Spring comes, Grant moves in late April, Pemberton is outclassed, and by May Vicksburg is doomed.

Well, yes, of course the Confederacy loses but they give it up in 1865. I think think the South performs very well in 1862, 1863 obviously not as good, but remember, Gettysburg is the mental turning point so to a certain extent the South loses it 'on their initiative'

In the East, the Confederacy performed well. In the West, it is hard to find a victory for the Confederacy. They occasionally repulse an attack; they almost never succeed when they attack; they are often defeated. So we see the loss of New Orleans, Nashville, Chattanooga, Vicksburg, Port Hudson. When they do win a battle (Richmond, KY; Chickamauga) it accomplishes nothing and sometimes leads to worse destruction.

Yes, and I do feel that this was a defensive man's war, and one point we probably agree on (if I am putting words in your mouth just let me know) is that the Confederates do seem to envision doing twice as much on the attack as the forces available are able to accomplish. (How many times do you read statements to the extent - we will concentrate, defeat enemy in detail (of course looking for a Double Cannae if at all possible), destroy the rest of the opposition army and march on to New York City)

In VA, in 1864, the difference is probably Grant. At The Wilderness, Lee does to the AoP everything that was done at Chancellorsville. The difference is that Grant comes out of his tent on the third day ready to move South; all the previous commanders seem likely to have turned back there.

You're correct, but again look at the year, its 1864, the Union SHOULD be winning and of course, I opine, should've already won!

1864 is the last chance for the Confederacy, because they still have a shot at bleeding the Union into peace. Lee, essentially, came close to doing his part. The rest of the Confederacy failed.

On this we agree, and its also one of Grant's shining moments.

Yes, but we also need to see that Tullahoma, the Chickamauga failure, and Chattanooga are the average Confederate performance in the area. They fought bravely, they had opportunities -- and they consistently failed. Give the AoT a different command group (it isn't just Bragg: they have a half dozen senior generals who deserved to be replaced out-of-hand) and maybe the entire 1862-63-64 struggle in Tennessee-Ga is vastly different.

Well we both know Hood is a panzer general without tanks, and you're correct taking Atlanta is very important, but would Johnston have held Atlanta? Unfortunately I think he's a notorious retreater. But you're correct if Lincoln loses, McClellan will most likely end the war.

I think Joe Johnston is one of those people you have to admire while understanding he is essentially flawed. He is capable of any task -- and unlikely to ever be completely prepared. He is unflappable and clear-headed in a crisis -- and seems lacksadaisical at other times. He was a former US Quartermaster-General who seemed to be constantly losing large quantities of material in his retreats. He is a professional soldier who can't get along with his superiors, and seems to feel they have no right to know what he is planning.

His plans for the defense of Atlanta seem inadequate to me. He leaves too much to "we'll handle that if it comes up". He manages to be surprised by a flanking move when he has been in place for four months; his rear is not covered with prepared defensive positions or well-mapped. When he does retreat, he does it on the fly, relying on his ability to improvise -- and so is unable to destroy the great RR tunnel he has been sitting on for four months.

I think if Thomas or Sherman or Grant was running the AoT in 1864, the Union advance would have been nowhere near Atlanta in July of that year. I think Johnston's defense -- skillfully done -- was exactly what Sherman needed to get his legs under him and succeed in his first major command. If he was a football player, Joe Johnston would be the sort of athlete referred to as a "coach-killer", filled with promise and never quite winning for you. He did it to the Confederacy.

And this is what's great about the Civil War as a topic, we can both read the same body of history and get a different 'feel' for it.

Yep.

Regards,
Tim