Grant About Grant

[M E Wolf]

Longstreet was dead against Pickets charge and was one of the first in a command position to call it off.

Specster,

Agreed. General Longstreet wrote to his brother I belief, saying much the same, with the exception, if memory serves me correctly; that General Lee insisted on the charge. Being Longstreet's superior --one does not disobey. It became on Lee's shoulders --as he would later admit to his men "This was my fault." Longstreet did do his duty to make every effort to present to Lee why the charge was futile. He perhaps remember Marye's Heights and the similar disadvantage the Union had there and the slaughter.

I shall also mention that General Longstreet was an excellent equestrian as well.

Hero, his Irish Thoroughbred is the only one actually documented as being connected to General Longstreet. We do know through General Sorrel, in his memoirs` that General Longstreet had other horses--one being to slight for him, giving it to Sorrel.


M. E. Wolf

 

[Specster]

Specster,

Agreed. General Longstreet wrote to his brother I belief, saying much the same, with the exception, if memory serves me correctly; that General Lee insisted on the charge. Being Longstreet's superior --one does not disobey. It became on Lee's shoulders --as he would later admit to his men "This was my fault." Longstreet did do his duty to make every effort to present to Lee why the charge was futile. He perhaps remember Marye's Heights and the similar disadvantage the Union had there and the slaughter.

I shall also mention that General Longstreet was an excellent equestrian as well.

Hero, his Irish Thoroughbred is the only one actually documented as being connected to General Longstreet. We do know through General Sorrel, in his memoirs` that General Longstreet had other horses--one being to slight for him, giving it to Sorrel.


M. E. Wolf

I agree with you whole heatedly, I was not familar with the Marye's Heights but now I know, even prior to day #3, that soldiers were hinting that this battle could be "our Chancelorsville". Now that I looked it up Marye's Heights I see it was the critical part and parcel of that battle, basically the crutial part, perhaps as the angle was to Gettysburg.

 

[War Horse]

Specster,

Agreed. General Longstreet wrote to his brother I belief, saying much the same, with the exception, if memory serves me correctly; that General Lee insisted on the charge. Being Longstreet's superior --one does not disobey. It became on Lee's shoulders --as he would later admit to his men "This was my fault." Longstreet did do his duty to make every effort to present to Lee why the charge was futile. He perhaps remember Marye's Heights and the similar disadvantage the Union had there and the slaughter.

I shall also mention that General Longstreet was an excellent equestrian as well.

Hero, his Irish Thoroughbred is the only one actually documented as being connected to General Longstreet. We do know through General Sorrel, in his memoirs` that General Longstreet had other horses--one being to slight for him, giving it to Sorrel.


M. E. Wolf

Longstreet also made the statement that day 3 at Gettysburg he was the most depressed he had ever been in his life! This coming only a year after the death of his three children. I'd say that's a pretty strong statement.

 

[diane]

To me, the problem Longstreet had at Gettysburg was his method of handling Lee caused the opposite of what he wished. Lee was under as much pressure as Grant was in the Wilderness - he was in charge of huge stakes and he was not gambling with them so much as trying to get the best out of them. He was not all that modest - no successful general can be, really - and believed he could lead his great army to victory, that his men would fight for him. He had faith in them - they were arguably the best army of that size in the world. Longstreet must have felt like Cassandra! Lee was overconfident, and he said so later when he confessed that he believed his army could do anything he asked of it. He finally asked something it couldn't do and, to his credit, he recognized that. This overconfidence was what Longstreet was thinking of, imho, when he made the controversial remark that Lee was not himself that day. He wasn't. When Longstreet all but tried to take command from Lee by pointing to another route on the map for the attack, Lee was then in a position where he had to assert his authority and could not change his mind even if he had wanted to. (He didn't, of course.) That was where Longstreet's diplomacy failed him. But, and this is where I ding him, once he saw his commander was committed to making a mistake and there was nothing for it, he should have sucked it up and gone full bore obeying the order. Instead he got stubborn, became depressed and even tried to put the onus of giving the fatal command onto Porter, the artilleryman. He's been accused of dragging his feet but I don't think that was really what he did. It was just he was so very sure the thing would fail that he could put no heart into it.

Grant's problems in that area were considerably buffered by Lincoln, Halleck and Meade. Grant ok'd some bad moves like Cold Harbor and the Mule Shoe but he didn't have to take it fully on the chin like Lee did. The re-construction of the Federal command chain was highly valuable to Grant and very much eased his way. The Confederate chain of command had become all but useless - there was no buffer between Lee and any disastrous decisions he made.

 

[Elennsar]

If the only way Longstreet fell short of "full bore obeying the order" is not having any enthusiasm about getting good men killed because Lee's vanity (and not just "my men are awesome' but "those people" are anything but), then I frankly have to admit I don't understand the logic for dinging him (No, really, I don't get it above and beyond disagreeing that's not a ding-worthy thing).

I'm iffy on his leaning on Alexander -"In your professional judgment, Colonel, as the one who is commanding a vital part of this operation, am I correct in assuming you have achieved all that the artillery can do at this range and that it is time for the infantry to advance?" is a perfectly legitimate thing, but the less its a matter of "Has the artillery finished? We're ready when you are." and the more it's "Do you think we should do this?", the less well it reflects on Longstreet.

 

[diane]

Sorry, I mixed Porter Alexander's first name with his last name!

Longstreet, in his defense although I personally think not, was perhaps trying to save lives by saving time - Alexander knew exactly when the bombardment was finished and when the infantry should push forward. Longstreet himself asserted that Alexander was in the capacity of an engineer rather than a battalion commander, therefore he would know better the conditions. However, that doesn't shift responsibility from Longstreet - Pickett asked him about advancing.

 

[War Horse]

The whole three days were a nightmare for Longstreet. After Jacksons death he and Lee conferenced for 3 straight days. Longsteet and Lee where in disagreement as to which way to go. Longsteet preferring to march to the west to try and relieve pressure on Vicksburg and Lee wanted to invade Pennsylvania. At the end Lee convinced Longstreet that Pennsylvania was best, although Longstreet left the confrence with the understanding that Lee was in an agreement with the missions goal was to fight a defensive fight. He felt Lee was going back on his words and what's worse not only was he going back on his word his offensive plan seemed obviously to accomplish nothing but the futher butchering of his men. Something he saw only to vividly. That's why I say it was a total nightmare. I don't think he ever viewed Lee the same after that day. Although Lee and his relationship continued and they consulted one another and still admired one another's abilities. IMO after Gettysburg they were not quite the same as before.

 

[Elennsar]

Sorry, I mixed Porter Alexander's first name with his last name!

Longstreet, in his defense although I personally think not, was perhaps trying to save lives by saving time - Alexander knew exactly when the bombardment was finished and when the infantry should push forward. Longstreet himself asserted that Alexander was in the capacity of an engineer rather than a battalion commander, therefore he would know better the conditions. However, that doesn't shift responsibility from Longstreet - Pickett asked him about advancing.

Middle, if we're gonna get fussy - Edward Porter Alexander.

Yeah, I think that assertion works up to a point, but Longstreet's behavior is hazy on if he acknowledged it at the time or not. I don't think its as bad as some of his detractors say, but he was leaning on the poor colonel to make a definitive statement that he only had to endorse rather than give his feedback as a respected subordinate.

I'm with War Horse. Nightmareish.

 

[diane]

Yes, I wouldn't have wanted to be in Longstreet's boots at that point! But, in fairness, Lee didn't know all he should have known and some of that was Longstreet's fault. For example, when Hood told him about the change in conditions - perhaps instead of dogmatically obeying orders right to the very letter, he should have sent someone back to Lee to let him know about the new situation. From our position of 20-20 hindsight, I don't expect it would have made a lot of difference. Would Lee have called it off then? He was fairly well committed and turning back was likely not an option.

Since we're comparing Pickett's Charge to Grant's Cold Harbor/Mule Shoe - if Grant had been appraised sooner how the Angle was going, would he have stopped sooner? Probably not. He thought Upton's plan was a good one and he, too, believed his men would be able to do whatever he asked of them, although he didn't think of it in those terms per se. He did not have the 'personal cult' that Lee had, but he had a very good army and he knew it. Cold Harbor is a ways different - that we do have to put in Meade's account. Grant never enjoyed the reverence that Lee had among his men, but the pragmatic AoP knew a determined general when they saw one - and they saw one. That they did things like Cold Harbor without mutiny is an amazing thing in itself.

 

[Elennsar]

Frankly, neither day (Cold Harbor or Gettysburg) seems to have seen the top men at their best.

Meade may be at fault for a lot of what went wrong at Cold Harbor on the Union end, I won't argue with that (much as I wish I could), but it was still "Really, Grant? You think this can be done?"

The Mule Shoe was worth trying, but Cold Harbor doesn't quite make it to that point. That bit, at least, belongs on Grant - was any possible assault "reasonably" likely to produce a worthwhile result? He was the one who had to make that call before telling Meade that handling the assault was his job.

 

[diane]

True. Grant had a curious detachment from time to time, that doesn't get much mentioned. It's an integral part of his command character, however. At Vicksburg, he left his dead and wounded on the field until Pemberton finally said, jeez, let's bury these guys, ok? He did the same thing at Cold Harbor. Only Lee didn't play right. He said, buddy, them's your people out there. I won so I got mine. It took a while, but Grant finally asked for a truce. By then, most of the wounded were the dead. This is something I don't quite understand with Grant.

 

[War Horse]

I'm not very fermiliar with Cold Harbor. Didn't Grant ask in some unorthodox why and Lee refused to consent until asked properly?

 

[Elennsar]

Diane:
Especially given that we know suffering bothered him.

http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/HeroicSafeMode This taken too far?

Frankly, it just seems like a day of lapsed judgment. Not everyone is equally guilty, but it wasn't the kind of thing that wins wars.

 

[M E Wolf]

MODERATOR'S MENTION;

Let us please not get off topic too much, as much as the Longstreet situation about Gettysburg and those times before and after; this is about General U. S. Grant.

I urge folks to take any/all specific and lengthy postings on Longstreet to the Forum that has dedicated space for him and or the Battle of Gettysburg.

M. E. Wolf
POSTED IN THE CAPACITY OF MODERATOR
Dec. 27, 2014 11:46 p.m.

 

[hrobalabama]

Back to Grant. He was one of the best Generals and one of the worst Presidents.

 

[War Horse]

One thing I think Grant and Lee shared they did not seem to weight cost vs objective. They were all in. This may sound harsh, but Grant could be fairly certain he would get reinforcements. Lee knew Richmond had none to offer. So the laws of deminishing supply played itself out. Grant played the cards he had and played them well. His critics that call him a butcher don't consider the lives that he saved by shortening the war. Old Bobby Lee would have continued to rade havoc over the Union without such an aggressive General in charge.

 

[M E Wolf]

Back to Grant. He was one of the best Generals and one of the worst Presidents.

I agree that General Grant made a better Army General than a President yet, considering the work Lincoln left unfinished, the bend towards Andrew Johnson's Presidency from 1865 to 1869 was an assent to President after Lincoln's assassination; the assassination had Confederate veterans in a very fragile situation as a whole. As General, Grant stood firm up to President Johnson and this would be the time where Jefferson Davis was in prison and the investigation, trials and such for the assassination of Lincoln. The country wanted revenge. As President, Grant from 1869-1877 stepped into the breech, in my opinion, to use his name and reputation to jerk the Nation back into the hope of Lincoln as to bring the former Confederate states back into the Union and 'with malice towards none.' I suspect that Grant wasn't doing this for his political interests--but, I like to assume that he was going to "general" the Nation out of this crisis as Lincoln might have done--had he lived.

I am of the belief that those around him that were professional politicians were the corrupt ones and since Grant had been a victim several times past and during, then after his Presidency--of 'deals' gone sour, to which he would be responsible--as the President owns the responsibilities. Yet, I am of the opinion, that as President, Grant was able to work as to get these former Confederates and those states back into the Government on a state as well as Federal level.

I am of the opinion, had Lincoln lived to fulfill his full term, that Grant wouldn't have run for President at all. Having spent quality time with Lincoln, Grant knew what Lincoln had intended.
Mainly, to restore the dignity and heal the relations with the former Confederacy. Reconstruction may have been totally different had Lincoln lived. Johnson as President, perhaps made it rougher than needed as he was a Southern man and his state was Confederate--suffered. But, I am seeing Grant as a peace maker. He did give good terms to Lee, those terms traveled the Confederate grape vine. I'm of the thought, that the Confederate veterans and the former Confederate States preferred Grant in office as they knew his code of honor on the battlefield.

Just some personal thoughts, observations, comments and opinions.

M. E. Wolf

 

[War Horse]

If we could have only seen how Lincoln would have guided the country through reconstruction. IMO he seemed to have a plan that was not followed (as M.E Wolf points out). Grant held no predidious toward the South or for that matter the southern soldiers.

 

[M E Wolf]

I have often wondered why Grant did train horses before the war. I wonder if there was no money in it, or there was some other reason. Seems like it would have been right up his alley! I have never heard the horse or the assault story. Paints a clear picture of a man who would stand up for the defenseless.

Jim

JKG3117/Jim;

Back in the days when Ulyssess Grant was a boy, he earned money training horse that were difficult and trained the horses his family owned.

Mainly, people trained their own horses and frequently brought the foal up after birth on their own property. Those in the city or big plantations would have grooms bring up their foals. The training mainly takes time. When you don't have time you might send it to a trainer but, even today--unless it is in the 'higher' schools of horse performance -- such as professional Dressage, Cross-country, Jumping, racing --you the rider train your own horse.

Having trained horses myself, the cost is mainly paying for my time with the horse and my knowledge of horses to to train it to the level the owner wishes. Some are slow to catch on, some are quick, some are quick on one area but, a bit dim on another area. Some horses aren't athletically inclined but, bought for athletics. Some are too athletic for their owner and the owner wants more of a laid back and quiet horse. Sometimes the trainer has to inform the owner that what they have won't perform as they wish. A training stable, where a minimum of five horses, there is an hour for each horse, assistant-trainers or grooms take care of them after I dismount. These grooms or assistant-trainers present the horse for me to mount and carry on where the assistant-trainer left off, usually the warm up and basics. As trainer I put more polish on the commands.

More times, than not -- I am a consultant and go with a buyer of horses, to find a horse that will suit the person and their needs. Its hard on horses and people to match up and then break apart. Teaching equitation, to see how a potential owner rides a horse, if there are slight corrections --its going to be a match. Driving, the hands are so very important and the light hand be it driving or riding is so important. Some breeds won't take a rough hand in the mouth and it would be a disaster in the making to have one in between the shafts.

Just my observations, comments and opinions,
M. E. Wolf

 

[M E Wolf]

I'm not very fermiliar with Cold Harbor. Didn't Grant ask in some unorthodox why and Lee refused to consent until asked properly?

War Horse,

I seem to recall, that the truces that took place between Grant and Lee, Lee refused as it wasn't written in the proper 'protocol.' The time of this back and forth though, Grant wasn't sitting still. If my memory serves me correctly, while this back and forth with Lee took place, there was a quiet shift in the rear lines closer to Petersburg/Richmond, thus --occupying Lee's attention as Grants Army slipped to a new position.

It reminds me of the Colonel "Swamp Fox" Marion(sp) of hanging lanterns and galloping horses there and there back and forth, as to create an illusion that he had more troops, thus tricked the British.

It seems somewhere in the movement when Grant finally is overall commander and headquarters with Meade's Army of the Potomac; that not only does he move to various places but, pulls men from Heavy Artillery fortifications into Infantry--they are also green when it comes to Infantry marching and fighting.

Just some thoughts and opinions,
M. E. Wolf