A three pronged attack on Day Three?

[FSPowers]

I just read Lost Triumph- Lee's real plan at Gettysburg and why it failed by Tom Cathart. In the book, he advances his theory of the plan for Day Three.

The Pickett-Pettygrew-Trimble charge on Cemetery Ridge was not supposed to be the only attack on that day. Why would Lee send 12,000 to 15,000 troops and leave the other 50-odd-thousand idle?

The theory was that in coordination with the attack on the Federal center, Ewell would launch a 10,000 man attack on Culp's Hill. At the same time Jeb stuart would take his troopers in a wide arc around the Federal right. After detaching 1000 mounted infantrymen, under Jenkins, to hit Culp's Hill from the rear, Stuart would then hit the Federal center from the rear, helping the main attack to split the Federal line. The Confederate forces at Culp's Hill would then roll up the northern half of the Federal line and then force the southern half to either retreat or face destruction.

This plan was stopped by Federal cavalry under Custer at what is now called East Cavalry Field.

This theory was endorsed by James McPherson, who wrote the Forward.

Any thoughts? I found this theory interesting.

 

[trice]

I just read Lost Triumph- Lee's real plan at Gettysburg and why it failed by Tom Cathart. In the book, he advances his theory of the plan for Day Three.
...
Any thoughts? I found this theory interesting.

Very early on the 3rd, the Union counter-attacked on Culp's Hill and drove the Rebels out. That ended any realistic hope that Ewell's Corps would do much that day.

Longstreet's Corps had 2 divisions on the right which had fought a brilliant action starting at 4 PM on the 2nd, with heavy casualties. Without reinforcement, it would be unrealistic to expect a major effort there without heavy reinforcement.

Lee had already used 8 of his 9 infantry divisions in the first 2 days. (The Federals knew this, and it was a major source of cheer to the council of war Meade held over the night of July 2-3.) Lee does not have very much strength for wide-ranging thrusts. He took his single fresh division and put it in for a thrust at the center, reinforced by 2 divisions that had (he thought) seen relatively light action on the 2nd.

Lee apparently did not realize how roughly those 2 divisions were treated in the battle. A. P. Hill is virtually missing from the records on those days and seems to play little part in running the battle. As a result, Pickett's Charge was probably not as strong as Lee intended.

Stuart's cavalry was not strong enough to have a decisive effect. Their movement is aimed for the Union retreat route, and has to be a deep movement because of the Union presence on Culp's Hill, behind it and over towards Wolf's Hill. There are plenty of batteries and Union infantry in this area, in addition to the cavalry Stuart did run into.

Lee's plan comes down to this: break the center, then order the rest of the line in. If this is successful, Stuart is in perfect position to slice into the chaos of the Union rear and cut their retreat in the chaos. If by some miracle Pickett's Charge had worked, I think a very large portion of the AoP would be destroyed.

But the odds of a successful penetration were very low, and there was no real reserve to reinforce the penetration if it occurred. This was normal in Confederate battles. When they could break the enemy, they usually had to put in their last men, and rarely had the reserve needed to exploit success.

Regards,
Tim

 

[FSPowers]

Carhart, in explaining his reasoning, suggested that both Lee and Stuart were implementing tactics from Napoleon's campaign. The "plan" for Day Three seemed to be derived from tactics used in the Battle of Castigilone, August 5, 1796. First a mass artillery attack, then a ground assault, followed by a cavalry sweep around the enemy right and into the rear. The theory here is that Lee wanted to recreate the same conditions at Gettysburg as Napoleon did at Castigilone. Both Lee and Stuart were at West Point and would have received heavy exposure to Napoleon.


An interesting theory.

 

[trice]

Carhart, in explaining his reasoning, suggested that both Lee and Stuart were implementing tactics from Napoleon's campaign. The "plan" for Day Three seemed to be derived from tactics used in the Battle of Castigilone, August 5, 1796. First a mass artillery attack, then a ground assault, followed by a cavalry sweep around the enemy right and into the rear. The theory here is that Lee wanted to recreate the same conditions at Gettysburg as Napoleon did at Castigilone. Both Lee and Stuart were at West Point and would have received heavy exposure to Napoleon.

An interesting theory.

It is an interesting theory. It only works if Pickett's Charge penetrates through the Union center and a follow on attack breaks the Union line completely.

Stuart's force is simply not strong enough to have a decisive effect on its own. There are too many Union troops, including far too much artillery, on and behind Culp's Hill for a close-in flanking maneuver to work. If he had gotten around/past/trhough the Union cavalry, Stuart still can't get into the area immediately behind Culp's Hill/Cemetery Hill. He certainly doesn't have the force to take Culp's Hill, either.

Part of the problem there is that the Union had already retaken Culp's, driving Johnson off it early in the morning. If Ewell/Early had managed a different result up there, things might have been a bit better for Stuart. But there is a lot of excess Union artillery and infantry sitting back there on the 3rd, and any move to penetrate through it will be very bloody and likely fail.

OTOH, if you imagine a successful Pickett's Charge with a wavering Union center, you can then picture Lee acting like Wellington at Waterloo, waving the whole line forward in a do-or-die moment. Maybe the Union line cracks. Maybe, just maybe, they run for the rear.

That would be very bad for the Union. The wagons for all the Corps and the Artillery Reserve are out there behind the "fish-hook". They'll jam the roads and make retreat a disaster. If Stuart can come down on the Baltimore Pike, he's in perfect position to do what cavalry is supposed to do: ride over panic-stricken retreating enemies, cut their retreat, surround them. Most of the AoP might have ended up in the bag.

The problem isn't the theoretical possibility of that. The problem is that the Union position was too strong and the Confederate strength inadequate to make such an attack have a good likelihood of success.

Regards,
Tim

 

[whitworth]

Napoleon. . .

never had to face rifled muskets and rifled artillery.

Lee lost on the third day, because his artillery was unable to drive off AoP artillery and infantry on Cemetery Ridge.

Lee could not penetrate the AoP line.

Any penetration was going to get driven back, because the ANV was out of long-range artillery ammunition on Seminary Ridge and could not support any lodgment of its infantry.

Stuart's cavalry was spent on the long trip into Pennsylvania.

Lee totally underestimated the defensive ability of Meade's army on Cemetery Ridge and Cemetary Hill, plus his ability to support with the 6th Corps.

 

[FSPowers]

Which actually explains the view that modern weapons will overcome the tactics popular at the time.

At the time of Lee's time as a student at West Point, Napoleon had not been dead very long and his tactics were required reading. Students had to learn French in order to read the books available at the time.

When Stuart was a student, Lee was the Superintendent. The application of Napoleonic tactics was still en vogue.

The arrival of rifled muskets and cannon would force the change in tactics, but the commanders, most of then taught at West Point and learned in Napoleonic tactics, would be slow to adjust.

My intention is to present the theory, I'm not sure myself if this would have worked, even with the ANV at full strength.

 

[custersluck13]

The 2nd day

...then was the day the opportunity for victory was really lost? But if we decide Hood didnt have time to actually envelope the Union flank at LRT, and the outcome stayed as it was...perhaps then the 3rd day should have been one of manuever resulting in or 4th or 5th day? Sounds to me like the prevailing thought...and I agree...the odds of success on just about any attack option left to Lee on day 3 was simply a fanciful wish?(Sorry, Mr. Mod..I know this sounds like it should be in the what if, but I am still trying to galvanize years of research into this battle with this very topic! I cant let loose the idea the ANV should have one this one!)

 

[custersluck13]

If all that is so...Mr. McPherson endorses the idea, and actually, I have myself for sometime...would it not justify there was more than Custer's actions near Sailors Creek that day at Appomattox when Little Phil bought the surrender table for Libbie and said, "There are few men in this army who have done more to bring it to victory than your husband?" Sounds like perhaps the Union command thought this was the case! BTW...Great post, Sir!

 

[ole]

Just because you write a blurb or intro doesn't mean that you love the idea. Suspect if you read McPherson's intro, you'll see a lot of fluff and weasel words about how valuable such research is--never saying, "By George, this guy has nailed it!"

Carhart gets a lot of flack for flights of fancy. Haven't read it myself, and I might eventually get it, but haven't experienced serious cravings yet. Heard a bit too much about it from people I respect to get excited.

That said, Custer did turn in a pretty darned good performance as a battle leader that day. (Also heard that it wasn't his idea; nevertheless, you can't fault the man for that thundering charge.)

Ole

 

[gary]

Carhart, in explaining his reasoning, suggested that both Lee and Stuart were implementing tactics from Napoleon's campaign. The "plan" for Day Three seemed to be derived from tactics used in the Battle of Castigilone, August 5, 1796. First a mass artillery attack, then a ground assault, followed by a cavalry sweep around the enemy right and into the rear. The theory here is that Lee wanted to recreate the same conditions at Gettysburg as Napoleon did at Castigilone. Both Lee and Stuart were at West Point and would have received heavy exposure to Napoleon.

I'm under the impression that military history was not included in the cirriculum then as it is today. NPS Ranger Donald Pfanz (Fredericksburg-Spotsylvania National Battlefield Park) was the first one to tell me this. Then I read it in Jamieson's Attack and Die - about the only use I got out of that book too.

 

[whitworth]

Horses

Unfortunately this author never studied horses. Both rider and horse were spent by the time Stuart got his cavalry on the right flank of the AoP, on the third day.

Poor Stuart was left in Virginia, to move last of the large Confederate units. Stuart was blocked at the Bull Run Mountain gaps. He had to travel more and use up his cavalry's energy.

Stuart went to York and Carlisle, because that was where Lee intended to send his army in the original orders. Ewells Corps did arrive there. But orders were changed by Lee, and Stuart never learned of them until the battle in Gettysburg started.

Stuart did the best he could with what he had left and available. His horses and troopers were physically spent by July 3. And no Lee plan could overcome that fact.

 

[ole]

Whitworth is quite correct in bringing in the subject of horses. Horses were originally valued because they could run or do a fast walk for quite a while longer than a man could. But they do have limitations.

The horse needs food regularly. It can get as foot weary as the grunt. If he doesn't get it in adequate supplies, it, like the soldier, begins to get weaker. Keep on that course and the horse, becomes useless. Although you might get the soldier to march an extra mile, the horse would simply lie down and die.

Mounted infantry and cavalry were subordinated to their mount. You didn't eat until your horse had been cared for.

Riding or drafting, horses were very important to an army. It don't move without reasonably healthy horses.

And horses ain't rabbits. They didn't magically reappear annually. I've often wondered how in the billy blue world the forces could possibly find remounts.

ole

 

[cw1865]

Firepower Advantage

His horses and troopers were physically spent by July 3. And no Lee plan could overcome that fact.

Isn't Federal firepower the difference on the calvary battlefield?

 

[samgrant]

Isn't Federal firepower the difference on the calvary battlefield?

For me that suggests a new question:

Aside from the number of soldiers available on the respective sides, how did the number of weapons and ammunition available to each side compare? (Day 1, 2, and 3).

(I think I read somewhere that Herman Haupt, alert to the situation, quickly began preparing for a rail link to Gettysburg, in order to resupply, if necessary, and/or to efficiently evacuate the wounded.)

 

[ole]

For a try at an answer to your question, Sam:

Lee's supply was tenuous, at best. The Union supply although perhaps funneling through a bottleneck, was virtually unlimited. He could not have been without ammo for more than a few hours under an imaginable circumstance.

You mentioned Haupt. An unsung hero. If he'd have had to build a railroad to Gettysburg, he'd have done it within a few days. What an amazing asset!

ole

 

[J_Man0507]

Indeed, Haupt was amazing when it came to getting supplies to the AoP. His orchestration of a rail link was key I think.

On the ammunition point, you are quite right that the supply of arms and ammunition was very important. Lee was operating far from his supply bases in Virginia. Meade was much better supplied, the closest rail head being Westminster, Maryland, if I remember right. Meade could have a constant stream of ammunition and other supplies coming to him, while Lee would eventually run out.

I think it is also a matter of the quality as well. Confederate ammunition, especially when it came to artillery, was vastly inferior. Their shells had a horrible tendency to go off too soon, too late, or not at all. Bad fuses makes for poor artillery support. Its a good part of the reason that E.A. Porter's artillery didn't do as much damage as it could have on the Third Day.

Also, interior lines. The AoP was set up so that it could move men and supplies rapidly to any endangered portion of the line. The AoNV had its supplies far back, and the artillery could not replenish their limbers without holding off for an hour or so on their suppressing fire. Hence the charge goes in without artillery support. Supply was very critical to the Union victory at Gettysburg.

 

[ole]

Aptly put, JMan. Although nothing can work out perfectly, Meade had a decided edge on the supply side. Lee had some rickety wagons; Meade had Haupt.

ole

 

[whitworth]

Quartermasters shipped the supplies

BG Rufus, chief quartermaster, Army of the Potomac was in charge of getting supplies to the AoP for the Battle of Gettysburg.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 1, 1863.
General M. C. MEIGS, (Received 7 P.M.)
Quartermaster- General, U. S. Army:
Since my last dispatch, the enemy has appeared in force near Gettysburg, and is driving in our cavalry pickets. It is presumed he will attack us in pitched battle very soon.
We have plenty of supplies, I think, to answer until after the bat-tle, and we can then better tell where we want to receive them. Our teams are now all ordered on the railroad between Union Bridge and Westminster. None go to Frederick. Please, therefore, send the forage to Union Bridge, but defer sending anything at present to
Frederick.
Matters will culminate here very quickly, and, we doubt not, vic-toriously for us. Do not regard me as undecided at all about sup-plies. I think we have enough until after a fight, but I make requi-sitions by orders.
RUFUS INGALLS,
Brig. Gen., Chief Quartermaster, Army of the Potomac.

 

[ole]

Thanks for that post, Whitworth. It certainly draws a sharp contrast between Federal, rear echelon competence, and the dolts who were in charge of CSA supply.

Who'da thunk, "don't send anything yet" would make such an impression?

ole

 

[whitworth]

Good Post Ole on horses

When I first started studying horses and the Civil War, I was surprised there were no large written accounts by any historian.
Horses were like the tanks and supply vehicles of WWII. Without them, your army could go nowhere.

Here is one rather obscure report from a Confederate artillery commander reporting on the Gettysburg campaign. Of course, it's not about the battle, but the condition of the horses due to the campaign. The campaign truly devastated the Confederate horse supply.


Artillery Battalion.
CAMP NEAR GORDONSViLLE, VA.,
August 2, 1863.
I regret to state that, owing to the jaded condition of the horses, which had been but scantily supplied with forage since July 1, dur-ing all of which time they had not received a single feed of corn, I was forced to abandon two rifled pieces belonging to Captain [J. W.] Lewis' battery on the night of the retreat from Maryland. Every effort was made to bring them off, but being the rear of the artillery, and before my arrangements could be completed, which were made with all possible dispatch, the enemy's cavalry charged and took them, together with 6 men and spare horses which had been sent back for the purpose of bringing them off.

I regret to state that the losses which my battalion has incurred during the recent campaign are especially heavy in horses, those now remaining being for the present almost totally unserviceable. It is my opinion, however, that with a short respite I will soon be able to
report them as serviceable. I would respectfully state that, at the time of leaving Fredericksburg, their condition was generally bad, in consequence of the hardships they had encountered during the past winter, together with what they had gone through during the spring campaign.

JNO. J. GARNETT,
Lieutenant- Colonel, Commanding Artillery Battalion.