-
Welcome to CivilWarTalk, a forum about the American Civil War! - Join today! It's fast, simple, and FREE!
Lee and the seven days campaign
- Thread starter atlantis
- Start date
Belfoured
Colonel
- Joined
- Aug 3, 2019
As always. So Lee did exactly what McClellan wanted him to do by routing Porter from Gaines's Mill, resulting in panicked messages from McClellan about "saving" the army if he could, and compelling McClellan - as he himself said in a momentary slip during his JCCW testimony in March 1863 - to "retreat" to the James so that he could actually gain the initiative.
And Robert E. Lee "failed" - outsmarted again by a true military "genius". It just proves that McClellan was right when he sagely told Lincoln on April 20, 1862 "I prefer Lee to Johnston...the former is too cautious & weak under grave responsibility - personally brave & energetic to a fault, he yet is wanting in moral firmness when pressed by heavy responsibility & is likely to be timid & irresolute in action"
I'll wager that on the evening of June 27 Fitz John Porter, with his battered corps and Slocum's bloodied division driven back to the north bank of the Chickahominy, would have disagreed with that assessment. Of course, if I'd been taken by surprise in Johnston's assault on my poorly-aligned forces south of the river on May 31, I might be more respectful of Joe ....
You probably should add Bobby Krick's excellent two-volume narrative of Gaines's Mill to your reading. Thirty years of study have given him some solid insights.
Saphroneth
Colonel
- Joined
- Feb 18, 2017
There is an extent to which the question of Lee's success or failure is arguable, and this is basically the extent to which you're looking long term.
If Lee succeeds by delaying the fall of Richmond, then - yes, Lee certainly succeeds! It's hard to argue otherwise.
However, if Lee's objective was to attack the Army of the Potomac such that it removed the threat to Richmond, then at that point his success becomes much more questionable. The situation before the Seven Days in terms of the strategic balance was that McClellan was arguing in favour of being reinforced, but willing to go on the offensive without it - how quickly he would have done the sequence of operations required to break up the Richmond defences is difficult to know, because of course after the first day or two his offensive concentration was first drawn off to respond to Lee's movement and then he was occupied in the move to the James.
And the situation after the Seven Days is that... McClellan is arguing in favour of being reinforced, but willing to go on the offensive without it (as he historically did more-or-less the moment that the situation was not "you are getting reinforced soon", though again the offensive movement was halted for outside reasons soon after it began). And the mass recruitment the Union is doing as of early July means that the Union's strategic constraint on deploying a very large force near Richmond is going to go away.
And while the Union has a large force near Richmond, the Army of Northern Virginia can't leave Richmond - not with the bulk of their force. Over two thirds of the Army of Northern Virginia has to stay in Richmond (it's about 150-160 regiments that Lee does not let the garrison drop below, he sends AP Hill north only when he's been reinforced to the extent that AP Hill leaving doesn't drop the garrison below that rough number) and so it's a stalemate while the Union is getting stronger on a strategic level.
To put it another way, from Lee's perspective the period between about June 15 (reinforcements arriving in Richmond, Jackson available) and August 30 (mass Union recruitment results in large extra troops in the Union armies in the East) represent a 75-day window of opportunity where the Confederates can deploy an army that is larger relative to the main Union field army than it will ever otherwise be. This window of opportunity probably peaks at the end of July.
And, as of July 15, or indeed August 1, what has Lee accomplished with it? Certainly more than nothing - at least if you accept that without the Seven Days Richmond would as of that date either be having its forts stripped away by artillery bombardment or have actually fallen - but has he achieved results equivalent to the chance that it gave him?
That is a good question. Of course, it's also very subjective.
If Lee succeeds by delaying the fall of Richmond, then - yes, Lee certainly succeeds! It's hard to argue otherwise.
However, if Lee's objective was to attack the Army of the Potomac such that it removed the threat to Richmond, then at that point his success becomes much more questionable. The situation before the Seven Days in terms of the strategic balance was that McClellan was arguing in favour of being reinforced, but willing to go on the offensive without it - how quickly he would have done the sequence of operations required to break up the Richmond defences is difficult to know, because of course after the first day or two his offensive concentration was first drawn off to respond to Lee's movement and then he was occupied in the move to the James.
And the situation after the Seven Days is that... McClellan is arguing in favour of being reinforced, but willing to go on the offensive without it (as he historically did more-or-less the moment that the situation was not "you are getting reinforced soon", though again the offensive movement was halted for outside reasons soon after it began). And the mass recruitment the Union is doing as of early July means that the Union's strategic constraint on deploying a very large force near Richmond is going to go away.
And while the Union has a large force near Richmond, the Army of Northern Virginia can't leave Richmond - not with the bulk of their force. Over two thirds of the Army of Northern Virginia has to stay in Richmond (it's about 150-160 regiments that Lee does not let the garrison drop below, he sends AP Hill north only when he's been reinforced to the extent that AP Hill leaving doesn't drop the garrison below that rough number) and so it's a stalemate while the Union is getting stronger on a strategic level.
To put it another way, from Lee's perspective the period between about June 15 (reinforcements arriving in Richmond, Jackson available) and August 30 (mass Union recruitment results in large extra troops in the Union armies in the East) represent a 75-day window of opportunity where the Confederates can deploy an army that is larger relative to the main Union field army than it will ever otherwise be. This window of opportunity probably peaks at the end of July.
And, as of July 15, or indeed August 1, what has Lee accomplished with it? Certainly more than nothing - at least if you accept that without the Seven Days Richmond would as of that date either be having its forts stripped away by artillery bombardment or have actually fallen - but has he achieved results equivalent to the chance that it gave him?
That is a good question. Of course, it's also very subjective.
13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf
Captain
- Joined
- Jan 29, 2024
- Location
- Florida & Alabama (also GA & VA)
Well stated, or I should say "Magnificently" stated.
13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf
Captain
- Joined
- Jan 29, 2024
- Location
- Florida & Alabama (also GA & VA)
Amen!
So how exactly did Lee fail? Seems even in your world Lee was able to achieve his result by making Washington lose faith in Little Mac. Mac's feverish letter written as a result of Lee's attacks and driving him daily accusing Lincoln and Stanton of doing all they could to destroy the army probably had a lot to do with that. I don't see even a hint of failure on the part of Lee in your admittedly warped perspective.
Saphroneth
Colonel
- Joined
- Feb 18, 2017
I suspect that part of it is the way that the Seven Days is generally presented. I have seen writeups - and played games - which present the result of the Seven Days as being the evacuation of the Peninsula and the theatre of war shifting north.
If Lee's goal was to shift the theatre of the war north, then his actions are only tangentially connected to causing this outcome - after all, the order for the war to shift north doesn't come for another month and at that point it takes about another two weeks for the evacuation to happen - and that is driven by Halleck coming in and making a decision which Lincoln could have made but did not.
It all becomes a bit Rube-Goldberg to ascribe that to Lee rather than Lee getting fortunate - Lee pushes McClellan away from Richmond so Lincoln decides that himself running the war isn't working, so Lincoln calls on Halleck, so Halleck comes in and asks how many reinforcements McClellan needs, so there's a disagreement or misunderstanding on what is available*, so Halleck recalls McClellan. And that recall is in turn fundamentally predicated on a misunderstanding by Halleck of amphibious movements, not something Lee could in any way control or force!
* in the sense that Halleck at the Harrisons Landing meeting hadn't had time to check what was available and could only promise Burnside's corps; when he got back to Washington he seems to have not actually done a re-check and instead decided that not even Burnside's corps was going to be available. That latter information isn't communicated to McClellan until after Halleck has already begun the process of winding up the Union presence on the Peninsula.
Of course, at the same time it's certainly true that Lee succeeded in his short term goal. The long term goal is something that happens without him being much involved, but you have to survive for the short term in order for the long term to become available.
67th Tigers
Major
- Joined
- Nov 10, 2006
Lee's problem was that he didn't account for the independent will of the enemy. He expected to McClellan to do what he (Lee) wanted, and had not considered other options or built in ways to respond to them.
McClellan and Lee launched their offensives simultaneously. Lee's general plan was to sever McClellan's connect with his supply base. The fighting at Beaver Dam Creek and Gaines Mill were largely immaterial to this. As soon as Jackson's corps had crossed the Totopotomoy, Lee had effectively achieved this, and he did not need to attack McClellan's forces in their entrenchments. Indeed, McClellan's forces would have needed to come out of their entrenchments and attack Lee's to save their supply lines. This is what Lee wanted McClellan to do.
The day of Beaver Dam Creek was also the day of the attack at Garnett's Hill, which was planned to be preparatory for an attack on Old Tavern. Garnett's Hill was dominating ground for the key terrain of Old Tavern. I wonder if the fact that the Federals were literally days from taking Richmond weighed on the decision making processes of Federal generals. However, much of the attack force was transferred to Gaines Hill, which nixed any idea of continuing their attack. If you go through McClellan's communications with his commanders he was trying to lever everything he could into the fight at Gaines Mill.
The evening of the 27th, McClellan is faced with a choice. He still holds a lodgement north of the Chickahominy, and can throw everything he can spare into a counterattack, or he can move away from Richmond. He has a council-of-war and, whilst those reporting on the meeting thought McClellan might have preferred to counterattack, he was convinced to move to the James instead. Before this he'd had troops scouting the situation south of the White Oak (and obvious requirement to inform the decision*), and he had not yet ordered the abandonment of White House Landing, although he'd done all the preliminaries for it.
Staying put was simply not an option. There were only a few days food, and no new supplies of food or ammunition until the army was back in supply.
McClellan making for the James was a disaster for Lee. He'd hoped McClellan would either attack him or Richmond, or would have moved east towards Williamsburg. This would give Lee a chance to intercept and destroy McClellan's army. By heading south instead, Lee was stymied.
Despite some egregious failures by McClellan's subordinates (Sumner at Savage Station and Franklin retreating against his orders from the White Oak Swamp), McClellan placed his army on the James and in supply. However, these failures did give Lee one more chance to destroy McClellan's army when Franklin's error forced the army to take up a temporary position on Malvern Hill. The accidental attack started by Magruder caused Lee to abandon his planned envelopment of the hill, and allowed McClellan's army to escape the trap of Malvern Hill.
The Seven Days Battles ended with McClellan in a good position close to where he originally intended to go. Lee was forced to abandon his pursuit and await a fresh advance by McClellan, on one side of the James or the other. McClellan intended to follow his original plan of crossing the James and attacking Petersburg. This was nixed by Halleck.
* Imagine if there was another enemy force south of the White Oak, McClellan would have been forced to try and break through to White House Landing instead.
McClellan and Lee launched their offensives simultaneously. Lee's general plan was to sever McClellan's connect with his supply base. The fighting at Beaver Dam Creek and Gaines Mill were largely immaterial to this. As soon as Jackson's corps had crossed the Totopotomoy, Lee had effectively achieved this, and he did not need to attack McClellan's forces in their entrenchments. Indeed, McClellan's forces would have needed to come out of their entrenchments and attack Lee's to save their supply lines. This is what Lee wanted McClellan to do.
The day of Beaver Dam Creek was also the day of the attack at Garnett's Hill, which was planned to be preparatory for an attack on Old Tavern. Garnett's Hill was dominating ground for the key terrain of Old Tavern. I wonder if the fact that the Federals were literally days from taking Richmond weighed on the decision making processes of Federal generals. However, much of the attack force was transferred to Gaines Hill, which nixed any idea of continuing their attack. If you go through McClellan's communications with his commanders he was trying to lever everything he could into the fight at Gaines Mill.
The evening of the 27th, McClellan is faced with a choice. He still holds a lodgement north of the Chickahominy, and can throw everything he can spare into a counterattack, or he can move away from Richmond. He has a council-of-war and, whilst those reporting on the meeting thought McClellan might have preferred to counterattack, he was convinced to move to the James instead. Before this he'd had troops scouting the situation south of the White Oak (and obvious requirement to inform the decision*), and he had not yet ordered the abandonment of White House Landing, although he'd done all the preliminaries for it.
Staying put was simply not an option. There were only a few days food, and no new supplies of food or ammunition until the army was back in supply.
McClellan making for the James was a disaster for Lee. He'd hoped McClellan would either attack him or Richmond, or would have moved east towards Williamsburg. This would give Lee a chance to intercept and destroy McClellan's army. By heading south instead, Lee was stymied.
Despite some egregious failures by McClellan's subordinates (Sumner at Savage Station and Franklin retreating against his orders from the White Oak Swamp), McClellan placed his army on the James and in supply. However, these failures did give Lee one more chance to destroy McClellan's army when Franklin's error forced the army to take up a temporary position on Malvern Hill. The accidental attack started by Magruder caused Lee to abandon his planned envelopment of the hill, and allowed McClellan's army to escape the trap of Malvern Hill.
The Seven Days Battles ended with McClellan in a good position close to where he originally intended to go. Lee was forced to abandon his pursuit and await a fresh advance by McClellan, on one side of the James or the other. McClellan intended to follow his original plan of crossing the James and attacking Petersburg. This was nixed by Halleck.
* Imagine if there was another enemy force south of the White Oak, McClellan would have been forced to try and break through to White House Landing instead.
Saphroneth
Colonel
- Joined
- Feb 18, 2017
That is a fair point - that Lee's strategic goals could have been achieved without the Gaines Mill attack, and that therefore he could have removed (say) Longstreet from the north column and instead used his "corps" to cover the White Oak. That situation means that Lee has about six less brigades north of the Chickahominy for if McClellan comes out and fights north of the Chickahominy, but without a Gaines Mill attack then Lee doesn't need overwhelming numbers.
That forces worse decisions on McClellan than historical, and thus I think has to be considered a better or at least equivalent plan.
That forces worse decisions on McClellan than historical, and thus I think has to be considered a better or at least equivalent plan.
13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf
Captain
- Joined
- Jan 29, 2024
- Location
- Florida & Alabama (also GA & VA)
Ditto.
Belfoured
Colonel
- Joined
- Aug 3, 2019
"He has a council-of-war and, whilst those reporting on the meeting thought McClellan might have preferred to counterattack, he was convinced to move to the James instead."
The "council" was a charade and McClellan literally said nothing about it - ever - let alone challenging Heintzelman's accounts, one of which was made within an hour of the meeting ending, regarding Crazy Ivan McClellan's claimed "inclination" to stage an attack north of the river and when asked stating that if the battle were lost the army would be destroyed. All at a meeting that started after he had already messaged Goldsborough that he had to retreat. He was "convinced" of nothing at this sham council - it was all the usual posturing. Historians who have assessed this council have reached the same conclusion for ample reasons.
As for that "attack" you claim he began on June 26, the reports characterize it as essentially skirmishing. As always, you inflate it into something else. Of course, that simply emulates the guy you think was infallible. The trapper wth no furs. The genius with all sorts of brilliant, aggressive, war-changing plans that just ... never .... happened. Mac was the team that looks great getting off the bus.
To be fair, you haven't had the advantage of reading Bobby Krick's superb and definitive two-volume study of Gaines's Mill. He knows vastly more than we do. That means all of us. Rest assued that he addresses these issues.
- Joined
- Apr 4, 2017
- Location
- Denver, CO
It seems that General Lee's tactics delayed the fall of Richmond, indefinitely. He most likely delayed President Lincoln in issuing the EP for several months. Based on events in the western theater, and the news trickling in from the far west, President Lincoln could have issued the EP in July had events been more favorable for the US in Virginia. That delay kept alive the possibility of British intervention, and the cotton crisis was deepening as the 1861 crop could not be shipped easily overseas.
I think General Lee demonstrated in the east what the battle at Shiloh church demonstrated in Tennessee. The Civil War was going to be costly and bloody. That gave the Democrats in the US who opposed the war something to spin.
67th Tigers
Major
- Joined
- Nov 10, 2006
You retreated from the discussion last time this came up, but my point that "scare quotes don't an argument make" still stands.
Funny sort of skirmishing that results in over a thousand casualties. However, it was part of a multi-day operation directed todays capturing Old Tavern. Of course, you knew that, right...?
What evidence does Krick have that the rest of us have not? I know from this interview that Krick was of the opinion that Porter should have retreated across the Chickahominy immediately, rather than standing at Boatwain's Creek.
Belfoured
Colonel
- Joined
- Aug 3, 2019
Nobody "retreats from the discussion." You just dodge the actual facts and move past them with your own fact-barren arguments. It's similar to attempting a reasoned "discussion" with Baghdad Bob after he said "There is no presence of the American columns in the City of Baghdad at all. We besieged them and we killed most of them."
An attack late on June 27 north - or south - of the river was ridiculous. Even a rank amateur looking at a map of troop positions - especially in light of the absurd June 26 estimate of "180,000" that McClellan swallowed - could figure that out. The "council" could not possibly have "convinced" McClellan to make a decision he had already made and communicated to the USN. You have no answers so you rely instead on silly aphorisms like "scare quotes don't an argument make". So what's good ... "silly aphorisms don't an argument make".
As for Krick, sadly, I think that you might actually believe that you know as much as he does. You want his "evidence"? Spring for the books. I'll wager they can do the dollar/GBP exchange rate. Here's a preview: he relies on a massive number of primary sources from all over the place compiled during his three decades of work with Gaines's Mill. Not to mention his innumerable site visits.
67th Tigers
Major
- Joined
- Nov 10, 2006
Go on then, answer the question. What evidence does he have that isn't general knowledge? Why not scan the relevant section? Why not precis his arguments?
Does "I've got a witness but I won't put them on the stand, but trust me that they're great" work in American courts?
Saphroneth
Colonel
- Joined
- Feb 18, 2017
It is a basic dynamic of the operational sequence that what is going to happen is that the ground will dry, and at that point both commanders will launch their offensives effectively simultaneously - they are operating off the same basic time constraints.
For McClellan, that means opening his regular approaches, a thing that happens on 25 June and which continues (to a lesser degree) on June 26 and 27. The character of these operations is, by their very nature, a sequence of assaulting to gain important ground FOLLOWED BY entrenching that ground to make sure it can be kept and bringing up the guns to support the next bound forwards.
This is what offensive operations look like against a strongly fortified enemy of like strength. The fact that Oak Grove sees a thousand casualties indicates that the fighting was sharp, but the objective is not to pile up casualties - the objective is to take ground.
For Lee, that means opening the attempt to strip McClellan away from Richmond, a thing that happens on June 26.
Now, BECAUSE Lee has begun this sequence, we only see the first couple of days of McClellan's own offensive sequence. His first day's actions are effectively unimpacted by Lee's plans, but the second day's actions may be and the third day's certainly are. After that he is no longer attacking Richmond at all because of the fundamental realignment of the army's situation and priorities.
It is not necessary for McClellan to pile up casualties simply to prove that he is making an offensive against Richmond. The casualties are not the point; the ground is the point.
And it is certainly not necessary for McClellan to continue attacking while Lee is hitting 5th Corps, as if one of the largest single attacking forces of the entire war was not in the middle of hitting him in the right rear.
The way in which what happens looks different if McClellan doesn't intend to attack Richmond is that the first day of the Seven Days is June 26 - or even 27 - with Lee's offensive opening.
For McClellan, that means opening his regular approaches, a thing that happens on 25 June and which continues (to a lesser degree) on June 26 and 27. The character of these operations is, by their very nature, a sequence of assaulting to gain important ground FOLLOWED BY entrenching that ground to make sure it can be kept and bringing up the guns to support the next bound forwards.
This is what offensive operations look like against a strongly fortified enemy of like strength. The fact that Oak Grove sees a thousand casualties indicates that the fighting was sharp, but the objective is not to pile up casualties - the objective is to take ground.
For Lee, that means opening the attempt to strip McClellan away from Richmond, a thing that happens on June 26.
Now, BECAUSE Lee has begun this sequence, we only see the first couple of days of McClellan's own offensive sequence. His first day's actions are effectively unimpacted by Lee's plans, but the second day's actions may be and the third day's certainly are. After that he is no longer attacking Richmond at all because of the fundamental realignment of the army's situation and priorities.
It is not necessary for McClellan to pile up casualties simply to prove that he is making an offensive against Richmond. The casualties are not the point; the ground is the point.
And it is certainly not necessary for McClellan to continue attacking while Lee is hitting 5th Corps, as if one of the largest single attacking forces of the entire war was not in the middle of hitting him in the right rear.
The way in which what happens looks different if McClellan doesn't intend to attack Richmond is that the first day of the Seven Days is June 26 - or even 27 - with Lee's offensive opening.
Belfoured
Colonel
- Joined
- Aug 3, 2019
You really do want the "free" version. Not happening. I'm not spending the effort to scan relevant portions of an 800+ pages study to save you a few doubloons in response to the equivalent of a toddler's sandbox taunt.
In case you haven't noticed, we're not in an "American" court. Shockingly, it appears you may not even know who he is. Party on.
Belfoured
Colonel
- Joined
- Aug 3, 2019
Much effort expended in proving nothing.
"The way in which what happens looks different if McClellan doesn't intend to attack Richmond is that the first day of the Seven Days is June 26 - or even 27 - with Lee's offensive opening."
The only thing about "what happens" that "looks different" is whether a scrivener wearing a green eye shade decides to label June 25 as 'the first day" or, instead, June 26. Otherwise, "what happens" that actually matters isn't - and doesn't even "look" - "different."
On the other hand, your views on an attack as posited by McClellan at the "council" late on June 27 would be intriguing.
67th Tigers
Major
- Joined
- Nov 10, 2006
You won't even send a precis? Like "Krick argues that xxx and yyy." So, I guess Krick doesn't support your assertions then?
Belfoured
Colonel
- Joined
- Aug 3, 2019
You can "guess" whatever you want. If you were really interested you'd have loosened the purse strings. You seem to labor under the impression that sandbox taunts work. They don't. The books exist, by the way. Just in case that's the next "guess" ....
Similar threads
- Question
- Question
Similar threads
- Question
- Learn About Us
- ►About CivilWarTalk
- ►Contact the Webmaster
- ►Meet the Staff
- ►Link to CivilWarTalk
- Join Our Community
- ►Register
- ►Browse Forums
- ►View Today's Discussions
- ►Search the Forum
- Get Help
- ►FAQ
- ►Student Guide
- ►Forum Rules & Etiquette
- ►Copyright / DMCA
Bringing the