Lee and the seven days campaign

Lee protected Richmond and repelled a much larger Federal army, so it has to be considered a success. It was, however, a very messy campaign with poor communication between commanders (ehem Jackson), poor tactics (Malvern Hill) and heavy losses. I'm not sure any other commander than McClellan could have been outfought that way, but that's immaterial since Mac was the guy of the moment to beat.

He pushed Mac off the peninsula but he failed to crush the Army of the Potomac and he really thought he had the opportunity to do it, an attitude that led to the disaster at Malvern Hill.

It was a success. But the losses incurred and the resources expended had the implication that General McClellan had been close to success. A position on the James River, fully manned and entrenched by the federal army must have been seen by Lee to have dangerous implications for the Confederate capital. If that was the correct inference, then Grant and Meade needed to study a way to achieve McClellan's results in a way that hid that plan from the administration. And of course, there had to be a commitment to never go back, once the Army of the Potomac headed south. Generals Grant and Meade most likely discussed that General Hooker had been confused after Chancellorsville.

Depends on what the desired end state was. According to Lee's report his desired end state was a destroyed Federal Army. So by his measure the answer would be a qualified "no". The qualification being that the "siege of Richmond" was raised.

Was the destruction of the Army of the Potomac a realistic objective? It's early in the war, and time and time again in the years following, a defeated enemy will be able to affect a retreat. Lee himself will do the same from Pennsylvania a little over a year later. Was the objective of destroying the Army of the Potomac a left-over piece of Napoleonic strategy, the searching for the single knock-out blow, "great battle" strategy?

7thWisconsin said:

Was the destruction of the Army of the Potomac a realistic objective? It's early in the war, and time and time again in the years following, a defeated enemy will be able to affect a retreat. Lee himself will do the same from Pennsylvania a little over a year later. Was the objective of destroying the Army of the Potomac a left-over piece of Napoleonic strategy, the searching for the single knock-out blow, "great battle" strategy?

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No and yes.

JohnG0609 said:

Depends on what the desired end state was. According to Lee's report his desired end state was a destroyed Federal Army. So by his measure the answer would be a qualified "no". The qualification being that the "siege of Richmond" was raised.

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Many have argued that this was one of Lee's greatest failings; he was always looking for another Cannae where he destroyed a field army in battle, which simply was not going to happen. By targeting such a result he took great risks and suffered great casualties, with little to no hope of actually succeeding.

Despite this, the Seven Days as a campaign was a success even though Lee lost most of the battles. He achieved an important objective of defending Richmond and ultimately (with some help from a skittish Lincoln), drove the AOP off the Peninsula.

JerryD said:

Many have argued that this was one of Lee's greatest failings; he was always looking for another Cannae where he destroyed a field army in battle, which simply was not going to happen. By targeting such a result he took great risks and suffered great casualties, with little to no hope of actually succeeding.

Despite this, the Seven Days as a campaign was a success even though Lee lost most of the battles. He achieved an important objective of defending Richmond and ultimately (with some help from a skittish Lincoln), drove the AOP off the Peninsula.

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Your excellent post reminded me that I/we may be operating in a cognitive bias. As a retired Air Force officer I learned that words have very specific meanings. All of us are nuclear war babies and I/we have learned to equate "destroy" with "annihilation". Remember MAD?

But that is not, nor was it ever, the military definition of the verb "destroy." Grant "destroyed" Pemberton's army, but he didn't annihilate them. The US military defines "destroy" as a tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat ineffective until it is reconstituted.

So that changes my thought about the question. Lee did not mean annihilation, he meant to render the enemy incapable of waging war.

So I suppose that reframes the question of whether Lee was successful (or not) according to his own stated objective.

Did Lee's campaign render the AoP ineffective?

I'm interested to hear y'alls thoughts on this.

JohnG0609 said:

Your excellent post reminded me that I/we may be operating in a cognitive bias. As a retired Air Force officer I learned that words have very specific meanings. All of us are nuclear war babies and I/we have learned to equate "destroy" with "annihilation". Remember MAD?

But that is not, nor was it ever, the military definition of the verb "destroy." Grant "destroyed" Pemberton's army, but he didn't annihilate them. The US military defines "destroy" as a tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat ineffective until it is reconstituted.

So that changes my thought about the question. Lee did not mean annihilation, he meant to render the enemy incapable of waging war.

So I suppose that reframes the question of whether Lee was successful (or not) according to his own stated objective.

Did Lee's campaign render the AoP ineffective?

I'm interested to hear y'alls thoughts on this.

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Well, based on that criteria, I'd say that for the short term, yes he did because McClellan for at least a short while was shell shocked and busy blaming anyone but himself for the loss. So since Mac had lost it, at least for awhile, I'd say yes. But the army itself was not disorganized ala the AOT after Nashville. That was probably the only time during the war that a major field army was rendered totally ineffective, and it took a special kind of stupid on Hood's part to effect that. But I think Malvern Hill shows the AOP was still in fighting trim.

JerryD said:

Well, based on that criteria, I'd say that for the short term, yes he did because McClellan for at least a short while was shell shocked and busy blaming anyone but himself for the loss. So since Mac had lost it, at least for awhile, I'd say yes. But the army itself was not disorganized ala the AOT after Nashville. That was probably the only time during the war that a major field army was rendered totally ineffective, and it took a special kind of stupid on Hood's part to effect that. But I think Malvern Hill shows the AOP was still in fighting trim.

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Yep, it becomes much more nuanced if you accept that definition of destroy. The phrase, "ineffective until it is reconstituted," creates a lot of subjectivity.

7thWisconsin said:

Lee protected Richmond and repelled a much larger Federal army, so it has to be considered a success. It was, however, a very messy campaign with poor communication between commanders (ehem Jackson), poor tactics (Malvern Hill) and heavy losses. I'm not sure any other commander than McClellan could have been outfought that way, but that's immaterial since Mac was the guy of the moment to beat.

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Your post is exactly on target, @7thWisconsin.

JerryD said:

Many have argued that this was one of Lee's greatest failings; he was always looking for another Cannae where he destroyed a field army in battle, which simply was not going to happen. By targeting such a result he took great risks and suffered great casualties, with little to no hope of actually succeeding.

Despite this, the Seven Days as a campaign was a success even though Lee lost most of the battles. He achieved an important objective of defending Richmond and ultimately (with some help from a skittish Lincoln), drove the AOP off the Peninsula.

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IMO, a decisive victory was Lee's goal because he saw that as the quickest way to end the war in the CSA's favor. Because of the manpower and industrial disadvantage that they were under, a military victory had to be gained on the offense and destroying the Army of the Potomac was the surest way to achieve it.

Now, whether that kind of victory was realistic is another question. Considering how rarely and how difficult it was to destroy an opponent in the Civil War, it was a very lofty goal to be sure.

Ryan

Perhaps Lee was looking for a "Retreat from Moscow" kind of destroy that would allow him to march unopposed on Washington. He would still need to deal with tens of thousands of Union soldiers around Richmond before turning north. The only practical way of doing that would be to kill them or ship them away somewhere. It seems unlikely that secure prisons could be established and maintained while Lee took his army north. Killing tens of thousands of defeated soldiers would be horrific and would immediately lose all sympathy for the Southern cause. So, he had them shipped away. Then what did he do? Did he march on Washington and capture the government?

The Seven Days was also very important in putting the 'kibosh' on a primarily amphibious campaign by the main Federal army in Virginia for the remainder of the War. But the specter of a renewed expedition on the York or James River always lingered in Confederate minds and rumor in camp and on the streets, even as they succeeded in holding the line of the Rapidan and Rappahannock for the balance of two years. Nonetheless, Federal command of the tidewater and present threat to Richmond's vital communications with the South required Lee to make detachments throughout Va. and in N.C., materially weakening the Army of Northern Virginia as a combat organization, most notably at Gettysburg, when it was compelled to make do without four or five good brigades, as @Wizard of Cozz can tell you.

JohnG0609 said:

Did Lee's campaign render the AoP ineffective?

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No. The AotP did suffer a grievous setback and was forced to abandon its own offensive against Richmond. But it retained almost all its capabilities and its combat power was not effectively diminished.

Shelby Foote said best: "He took long chances but he took them because he had to."

When assessing Lee at the Seven Days by itself, I see far more positive than negative. He did not "destroy" even part of the AoP but he:

• Drove it back from the gates of Richmond.
• Politically damaged McClellan, who was already on thin ice with Washington due to his slow pace that year.
• Ended the possibility of his opponent being reinforced or the offensive resuming.
• Earned trust for his name in the CSA after an unglamorous start with costal duty + the debacle in Western Virginia.

When assessing it with the remainder of 1862, it becomes more of a mixed bag. The unrelenting pace and hard fighting from June 25 - September 20, 1862 produced more results but shrank his army from both casualties and straggling. Meanwhile, parts of the federal forces he faced were sidelined/unengaged at different times and McClellan regained (then lost for a final time) capital with the Lincoln administration due to Pope's failure. Lee had eyes on Pennsylvania in September 1862 but would be denied that prize and the roots of it can partially be traced to the depletion in strength over the course of his months in command of the AoNV. In November 1862, despite being stalled by days of arguing with Halleck/Stanton/Lincoln, Burnside was able to steal a march on Lee and beat him to Fredericksburg (where no pontoons to be found nor any flexibility/desire to take risks) because Lee was still recovering.

In all assessments, it's impossible to underrate the role of good/bad luck; a general can only make a plan and things never go fully according to plan.

Lee failed. McClellan's campaign plan, as stated in February, was ultimately to reach the James and move on Petersburg. He had been stopped in this by government action, but Lee had relieved him of Stanton's edict by force majeure. As the late Joseph Harsh noted, by moving to the James, McClellan gained the initiative and was actually more threatening.

Lee's failure was compensated for by Halleck's decision to forbid the movement and then recall McClellan to defend Washington, as Lincoln had threatened to do so a few months earlier. This returned the initiative to Lee and allowed him to maneouvre. As Upton later put it:

"[T]he worst that could be said of the Peninsula campaign was that thus far it had not been successful. To make it a failure was reserved for the agency of General Halleck."

7thWisconsin said:

Lee protected Richmond and repelled a much larger Federal army, so it has to be considered a success. It was, however, a very messy campaign with poor communication between commanders (ehem Jackson), poor tactics (Malvern Hill) and heavy losses. I'm not sure any other commander than McClellan could have been outfought that way, but that's immaterial since Mac was the guy of the moment to beat.

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Lee not outnumbered at this battle.

The way that I tend to think about the Seven Days is this -

So firstly, the situation as of before the campaign. During June, when Lee takes command, the Army of the Potomac is large and close to Richmond; the Union is securing and regularizing their army's supply lines (sorting out the damage inflicted to the rail line) and aside from that is mostly just waiting for the ground to dry so that they can begin regular approaches. This will consist of a "battle of posts" - that is, a battle of fortifications and lunges supported by artillery bombardments, fights over good artillery terrain.

And the Union has better heavy artillery. If it is a battle of posts, then the Union is likely to win.


Lee thus has to do something to change the situation.

In order to do something to change the situation, he has the largest Confederate army that ever fought. Something like 45% of the entire Confederate muster by companies concentrates on Richmond for the Seven Days, either in the Army of Northern Virginia proper or in Jackson's army from the Valley which comes down on the flank, and there are more troops en route (another 26 regiments will arrive in Richmond by the end of July, giving Lee slightly more than half the entire Confederate muster by companies if he can wait until then) but Lee doesn't have the opportunity to wait until the end of July - that will be too long and McClellan's battle of posts will be too advanced by then. (Historically McClellan opens his regular approaches on 25 June.)

Lee's concept of operations is to attack McClellan's weaker flank, north of the Chickahominy. This is good operational theory. The flank north of the Chickahominy is weak precisely because McClellan's assault concentration is south of the Chickahominy, and it is a target that is worth attacking because McClellan's supply line is north of the Chickahominy - that rail supply line from White House Landing that the Union has spent the last month or so repairing can, if Lee is successful, be neutralized.

In order to defend Richmond, he leaves "merely" the equivalent of 5-6 Union divisions in Richmond and south of the Chickahominy (facing off against the eight divisions of McClellan's assault concentration). This is more than required for a strict defensive, but there's a good reason for this as well - the attack north of the Chickahominy will live or die on whether Lee can get all his strength deployed, and if he can't get Longstreet's corps-sized force, DH Hill's corps-sized force, AP Hill's corps-sized force and Jackson's three-division army into the fight then it won't do him good to have other troops stacked up behind them unable to get into the fight. But keeping a large force south of the Chickahominy means that he can exploit it if McClellan rushes everything north of the Chickahominy.

In addition, since Jackson is coming down from the north, Jackson can "unzip" the Union defensive position around Mechanicsville. This means the Confederate offensive isn't required to succeed on a frontal attack against well-dug-in Union works for it to succeed at its operational goals.


This part of the operational plan works fine, despite the various friction (like the delay in Jackson's arrival). By dint of deploying huge force, Lee levers McClellan away from White House Landing.


However, because the enemy (McClellan) gets a vote, Lee doesn't succeed in either destroying McClellan or in forcing McClellan as far from Richmond as he expects (and, to be clear, it's a reasonable expectation - the commander of McClellan's naval support tries to get him to retreat most of the way to Fort Monroe, since he suggests the force should fall back to Dancing Point). McClellan switches base to the James and manages some friction of his own on the way south, keeping his army intact; Lee tries to cut McClellan off by surrounding Malvern Hill, but a SNAFU involving a frontal attack on Malvern prevents this.


The end result of all this is that Lee has prevented the immediate fall of Richmond, and has done significant damage to both armies. He has, however, failed to create a situation where he can send his army away from Richmond, and the Union begins recruiting vast reinforcements with the express purpose (at the time) of reinforcing McClellan's army and using it to attack Richmond - or Petersburg - from the James.


The subsequent events of the Second Bull Run campaign are not caused by Lee's actions in the Seven Days, except very indirectly.



For this reason, I would say that the Seven Days is a victory for Lee - he intended to prevent the fall of the capital and if he had not conducted the Seven Days attacks then the capital would have been at risk of falling to regular approaches in July. There is also no clearly superior way to pry McClellan away from Richmond.


The Seven Days is somewhat clumsy and the articulation of the Army of Northern Virginia is not what it will later be, but this is because it's not had the drill and experience and (in particular) because there hasn't yet been a chance to winnow out the poor officers in high command positions and to get a better sense of how the other high ranking officers will act or have to be managed. This is not surprising. Lee has a few weeks at most to get the AoNV to meet his needs before the Seven Days; by Second Bull Run he's had almost another two months and has also had the chance to ditch the officers he doesn't like as much. He's also, of course, actually got the prestige of having saved Richmond which probably helped a lot in getting buy-in from his subordinates!