Reevaluation of Burnside

[kevikens]

I just finished a biography of Ambrose Burnside by William Marvel. Like most biographers he has become sympathetic to his subject and has presented a more favorable image of the man and the commander than most historians, and certainly, the general public have accorded him.

The author presents an image of a most decent person and one of the least vindictive or back stabbing Union generals of the war. Perhaps no surprise there. But he also points out that Burnside could be and on occasion was a downright capable commander such as in the North Carolina costal campaign early in the war. When it comes to Antietam the author claims he was set up by McClellan to take the fall for the failure to destroy Lee. I must admit that I am somewhat sympathetic to the claim that Burnside's performance at the bridge was as a good as anyone could make it. I, too, used to wonder how any commander could fail to ford a stream or rush a bridge that on a map looks insignificant. When I actually got there and saw the steep banks and the bluff occupied by Confederate troops I understood why that was a tough nut to crack.

The author also was easier on Burnside at Fredericksburg than one might otherwise think. He presents a good case for the failure of the Union left wing to aggressively pursue its flanking attack leaving the assault on Marye's Heights to effectively be the only assault. A few years ago I had a NPS ranger tell a tour the same thing and that if that assault had been more aggressively pursued by Meade, Lee would have been in big trouble.

He thinks Burnside did a credible job in the Ohio valley riding herd on Confederate sympathizers and defends Burnside from most blame, not all of it, for the Crater attack.

All in all he paints a sympathetic portrait of the man, warts and all, but claims that the image of Burnside that is the popular one, both them and now, of an incompetent bungler, in over his head, is a caricature of what kind of person and commander he actually was. Snake bit and star crossed he may have been, but no fool or incompetent. Now, the question is, is this depiction of Ambrose Burnside an accurate one?

 

[Elennsar]

Burnside seems to be have been well over his head with the Army of the Potomac, but at around corps level, he seems to have been reasonably proficient - nothing amazing, but competent. I don't know much about his career with the (second) Army of the Ohio, so I don't feel comfortable judging it.

Although blaming Meade for not being aggressive enough at Fredericksburg is unfair. Meade and his division did fine, its the lack of support there that was a problem.

 

[Pat Answer]

This one probably won't be as controversial as the McClellan thread.
"Snake bit and star crossed he may have been, but no fool or incompetent." True. He handled smaller forces in North Carolina and east Tennessee well enough. Nice guy, too.
I'm one for giving any general the benefit of the doubt in the fog of war, but I would say his track record includes some unfortunate lapses when supervising crucial events like the Rohrsbach (?) bridge (some pre-battle reconnaissance might have done some good), Fredericksburg (giving Franklin some definite orders to get off his *** might have done some good), or the Crater (making sure the last-minute replacement units had firm directions going in might have done some good).

And knowing that Mother Nature is even less to be trifled with than the enemy (Jan 1863)...

 

[Rebforever]

This one probably won't be as controversial as the McClellan thread.
"Snake bit and star crossed he may have been, but no fool or incompetent." True. He handled smaller forces in North Carolina and east Tennessee well enough. Nice guy, too.
I'm one for giving any general the benefit of the doubt in the fog of war, but I would say his track record includes some unfortunate lapses when supervising crucial events like the Rohrsbach (?) bridge (some pre-battle reconnaissance might have done some good), Fredericksburg (giving Franklin some definite orders to get off his *** might have done some good), or the Crater (making sure the last-minute replacement units had firm directions going in might have done some good).

And knowing that Mother Nature is even less to be trifled with than the enemy (Jan 1863)...

Burnside would tend to be a foot dragger bordering on insubordination in the Overland Campaign.

 

[brass napoleon]

I just finished reading two books about the Battle of the Crater, and I have to say my opinion now of Burnside is lower than it's ever been. He really comes across as a bungling, insubordinate buffoon. I agree he doesn't deserve much blame for Antietam, but I think he definitely deserves a good deal of the blame for Fredericksburg too. And the Crater proves that he was at least as incompetent at Corps command as he was at Army command.

I think one of his big problems was that he would get completely flustered by changes of plan, like his pontoon boats not arriving at Fredericksburg and his black troops being taken out of the lead position at the Crater, and just basically throw up his hands and quit trying. That, and he just didn't know when to admit defeat, and would continue to pour more and more men into a losing cause until somebody stepped in and stopped him.

 

[Elennsar]

I think one of his big problems was that he would get completely flustered by changes of plan, like his pontoon boats not arriving at Fredericksburg and his black troops being taken out of the lead position at the Crater, and just basically throw up his hands and quit trying. That, and he just didn't know when to admit defeat, and would continue to pour more and more men into a losing cause until somebody stepped in and stopped him.

Not a healthy combination, that.

 

[Pat Answer]

I just finished reading two books about the Battle of the Crater, and I have to say my opinion now of Burnside is lower than it's ever been. He really comes across as a bungling, insubordinate buffoon. I agree he doesn't deserve much blame for Antietam, but I think he definitely deserves a good deal of the blame for Fredericksburg too. And the Crater proves that he was at least as incompetent at Corps command as he was at Army command.

I think one of his big problems was that he would get completely flustered by changes of plan, like his pontoon boats not arriving at Fredericksburg and his black troops being taken out of the lead position at the Crater, and just basically throw up his hands and quit trying. That, and he just didn't know when to admit defeat, and would continue to pour more and more men into a losing cause until somebody stepped in and stopped him.

Is that "drawing straws" story apocryphal? (Because if not, WHAT THE... ?!?...)

 

[brass napoleon]

Is that "drawing straws" story apocryphal? (Because if not, WHAT THE... ?!?...)

I wish I could say it was, but it was ABSOLUTELY TRUE.

 

[Elennsar]

I wish I could say it was, but it was ABSOLUTELY TRUE.

That goes past "flustered and unsure what to do" into criminally negligent in his responsibilities as a corps commander.

 

[Pat Answer]

Burnside would tend to be a foot dragger bordering on insubordination in the Overland Campaign.

One of many gaps in my knowledge. Was this throughout the campaign or after he was subordinate to Meade? I remember he is supposed to have not had hard feelings about that, but then again he was rather miffed at Antietam about being "reduced" to commanding the IX Corps.

I wish I could say it was, but it was ABSOLUTELY TRUE.

Wow. 4,000 casualty "joke" then. Yeah, I'm with Ellensar (post #9).

 

[brass napoleon]

That goes past "flustered and unsure what to do" into criminally negligent in his responsibilities as a corps commander.

Not only that, but he gave his division commanders muddled instructions as to what they were to do in the battle, he refused to cut down trees and remove impediments that blocked his artillery and his troops, he didn't provide ladders for his troops to get out of the 8 foot deep covered ways that they would use to approach the battlefield, he refused to answer Meade's telegraph inquiries as to the progress of the battle (for fear that Meade would realize what a fiasco it was and call it off). And probably a few more things that will come to mind the minute I hit the Post button.

 

[Rebforever]

One of many gaps in my knowledge. Was this throughout the campaign or after he was subordinate to Meade? I remember he is supposed to have not had hard feelings about that, but then again he was rather miffed at Antietam about being "reduced" to commanding the IX Corps.

I am taking it from the books of the overland and his activity. Lee had a mile wide gap between Ewell and Hill and was ordered to take that opening. He was late getting there because his men got tangled up in the trees which is nonsense.
I would have to check the books for the other battles. He was in some kind of a special situation that at the beginning
Grant used kid gloves with him.

 

[Brendan]

This isn't meant to negate his myriad screw-ups, but the Burnside Expedition of early 1862 was an extremely impressive series of operations that doesn't nearly get as much attention as it deserves. Roanoke Island, for example, was one of the first amphibious military ops in American military history. Not only did Burnside successfully coordinate his operations with the Navy (no simple task), the troops of his "Coastal Division" were units he specifically chose due to their Northeast, coastal roots, which he reasoned would make them ideal candidates for coastal campaigning. The logistics, planning, and spur-of-the-moment battlefield decision-making that went into operating against Confederate defensive positions in such a mercurial, hostile environment was nuts.

 

[Greg Taylor]

Is that "drawing straws" story apocryphal? (Because if not, WHAT THE... ?!?...)

In fairness to Burnside there are some extenuating circumstances in his decision to draw straws at the Crater. According to Earl Hess in his recent book, Into the Crater: The Mine Attack at Petersburg Brig. Gen. Robert Potter, one of the three division commanders in the "drawing" claimed after the war that all division commanders were anxious to lead the attack. There did not seem to be any of the three white divisions that had a particular advantage over the others, so in fairness Burnside proposed the drawing saying "it will be fair to cast lots." Also, apparently Burnside had no knowledge of Ledlie's history of drunkenness on the battlefield. For some reason Ledlie's officers had quite a fondness for him and went to great lengths to cover up his drinking.

 

[brass napoleon]

In fairness to Burnside there are some extenuating circumstances in his decision to draw straws at the Crater. According to Earl Hess in his recent book, Into the Crater: The Mine Attack at Petersburg Brig. Gen. Robert Potter, one of the three division commanders in the "drawing" claimed after the war that all division commanders were anxious to lead the attack. There did not seem to be any of the three white divisions that had a particular advantage over the others, so in fairness Burnside proposed the drawing saying "it will be fair to cast lots." Also, apparently Burnside had no knowledge of Ledlie's history of drunkenness on the battlefield. For some reason Ledlie's officers had quite a fondness for him and went to great lengths to cover up his drinking.

But even if Burnside wasn't aware of Ledlie's drinking, Ledlie still had a general reputation of being incompetent. Burnside ought to have known that. His other two division commanders, Potter and Willcox, were known to be fairly trustworthy, on the other hand. Apparently the initial discussion only involved Burnside, Potter and Willcox, and they couldn't come to a consensus. According to Hess, "As a personal friend of Potter's, Burnside felt uncomfortable giving the honor to him and opted for drawing lots out of a sense of fairness to everyone." (p. 57) If they had even drawn lots then, it would certainly have been a lot better. But then Burnside called in Ledlie to make it "fair", and drew lots. And the rest is history...

 

[Deleted member 8452]

He invented his own carbine and was the First President of the National Rifle Association, thats cool!

He did well in smaller commands, and had some successful campaigns in North Carolina and Tennessee. The Crater was not his fault and he is wrongly blamed for it. At Antietam he probably could of been more active.

Fredericksburg is his big mistake.

Burnside was well aware of his inability to lead, and refused several bigger commands.

He was known to be a very friendly man in person, and was well respected by his peers. Unfortunately the Civil War ruined his reputation.

 

[Greg Taylor]

But even if Burnside wasn't aware of Ledlie's drinking, Ledlie still had a general reputation of being incompetent. Burnside ought to have known that. His other two division commanders, Potter and Willcox, were known to be fairly trustworthy, on the other hand. Apparently the initial discussion only involved Burnside, Potter and Willcox, and they couldn't come to a consensus. If they had even drawn lots then, it would certainly have been a lot better. But then Burnside called in Ledlie to make it "fair", and drew lots. And the rest is history...

It was felt that Ledlie's was the most rested of the available divisions. Still, I must agree with you that drunk or not Ledlie had demonstrated incompetence in battle, perhaps most notably at North Anna where an ill fated, unnecessary attack across the river nearly caused a catastrophe. I'm playing "devil's advocate" here. I believe that Burnside's original plan at the Crater was sound, but due to poor command at all levels, most notibly Ledlie's, and poor battlefield execution, the results were catastrophic.

 

[rbasin]

Burnside had some petty Corps and Division commanders: Hooker, Franklin, etc.

 

[Pat Answer]

He was in some kind of a special situation that at the beginning
Grant used kid gloves with him.

He did technically outrank Meade at that point.

 

[rpkennedy]

He did technically outrank Meade at that point.

Until after Spotsylvania (IIRC), Burnside and the IX Corps were attached to the Army of the Potomac but took orders only from Grant. It was a cumbersome situation where any of Meade's orders had to be routed through Grant's HQ before being sent to Burnside.

R