Would Grant Have Pursued Lee At Gettysburg

[TerryB]

Interesting point Ken. I'll have to think on that some but the pursuit of Pemberton from ChampionHill to the Big Black comes to mind. Also a Grant operation.

Also see Grant's capture of Forts Henry and Donelson plus Nashville in a winter campaign where the weather turned bitter. I believe Grant would have been more aggressive than Meade.

 

[BillO]

Grant would have tried to be the aggressor but with Jackson on the high ground covering his right flank I think Grant would have lost the battle of Cincinnati on the 2nd day. So there!

 

[wilber6150]

Grant pretty much bumbled his way through the Overland Campaign. Stalemated by a much smaller army in the Wilderness and at Spottsylvania, tricked into a trap at North Anna, and ordering the infamous slaughter at Cold Harbor.
How people can say with a straight face that this man could have competed with Lee when both were at their peak strength is beyond me. Like I said before, take away a Navy with its supply and support capability and Grant is pretty ordinary.

Umm you seem to be forgetting that Lee ordered the same style attack on entrenched forces that you keep laying on Grant, even after seeing what his entrenchments did to Union attacks he ordered the very same type of attack on Union troops after Longstreet went down and his men were mowed down...Lee was not very original tatically,Lees best ideas came from his generals, the attacks they planned garnered him the praise...His mindset was to attack attack attack...He didn't learn from his mistakes, and when he had the chance ordered the same style of attack. From Malvern Hill to Gettysburg, to various times in the Wilderness, when he directly planned the attack it was a simple frontal assault and was defeated..

 

[wilber6150]

I'm not sure there would have been a Gettysburg if Grant was in command, you have the AOP under Grant between Lee and Richmond, which is what he was aiming for during the whole Wilderness campaign.. I believe theres a good chance that he would have attacked South with a portion of his command and maneuvred with the rest..How long would have Lee stayed North if Richmond was being threatened? Grant could have maneuevered and forced Lee to try to attack him...

 

[tmh10]

I'm not sure there would have been a Gettysburg if Grant was in command, you have the AOP under Grant between Lee and Richmond, which is what he was aiming for during the whole Wilderness campaign.. I believe theres a good chance that he would have attacked South with a portion of his command and maneuvred with the rest..How long would have Lee stayed North if Richmond was being threatened? Grant could have maneuevered and forced Lee to try to attack him...

If Grant had been the choice instead of Meade and on the same short notice, he would not have too long to make plans. I like your thought and he could have taken a different path. The one good thing Hooker had done was compile good information on Lee's forces, their number and pretty much where they were.

 

[wilber6150]

He would have been pressured to do something about Lee in the North, but I just don't see Grant not doing anyting with the opportuinty that Lee in the North gives to him...

 

[OpnCoronet]

The Wilderness Campaign was a series of flanking movements by the AoP to cut off the ANV from Richmond. The ANV was Grant's target, not Richmond. Although it is entirely possible Grant would have used a threat to Richmond to draw Lee to him for battle, if he had time to plan.
But, in Pa. and with the time available, he was already further south than the ANV and between it and the Potomac, if Lee dosen't move fast and dosen't avoid major mistakes, he could easily have lose the war in Pa.



P.S. as an aside, Hooker had a better source of information, because he had reorganized his cavalry and had finally consolidated it into a corps of Divs, with proper cavalry assignments i.e., scouting and intelligence gathering, etc.. (For almost the first time, Union cavalry operated and fought as Div's rather than Reg'ts)

 

[oldpete63]

He would have been pressured to do something about Lee in the North, but I just don't see Grant not doing anyting with the opportuinty that Lee in the North gives to him...

I agree - but - Lincoln et al - wouldn't go for it - Lincoln said to Hooker "ANV is your target, not Richmond" to Hooker. Washington always wanted the AOP between DC and the ANV, throughout the war. Reason I agree - Lee would have come flying back if Richmond was actually threatened - as per leaving Hill here to see what Hooker was going to do.

 

[damYankee]

Grant pretty much bumbled his way through the Overland Campaign. Stalemated by a much smaller army in the Wilderness and at Spottsylvania, tricked into a trap at North Anna, and ordering the infamous slaughter at Cold Harbor.
How people can say with a straight face that this man could have competed with Lee when both were at their peak strength is beyond me. Like I said before, take away a Navy with its supply and support capability and Grant is pretty ordinary.

Grant did not "bumble". His intent was clearly stated, to engage Lee and the ANV and prevent any possibility of reinforcement being sent to oppose Sherman's campaign, and to deplete Lee's forces and supplies till he could no longer field an effective force.
As for Cold Harbor, as terrible as it was, it has been overblown by many, the total KIA was 1,905, wounded were 10,570, the result of the victory was that Lee still had to fall back. (total casualties=14,931)
Let's compare Cold Harbor to Stone's River, total Union loss (KIA, MIA and wounded) 11,575. CSA losses 25,560.
Or Nashville? Union's total loss= 2,140. CSA=15,000.
Or Ft. Donelson? Union loss= 2,231. CSA= 15,067.
Or Pea Ridge? USA losses= 1,349. CSA=5,210.
Or Vicksburg? USA losses= 4,536. CSA= 31,277.
But all we ever hear about is the huge losses at Cold Harbor, and how cold hearted Grant was, he was such a butcher blah blah blah...So if he was all those things, what were the CSA leaders that continued to fight a war that they knew was lost in 1863?

 

[ExNavyPilot]

Grant did not "bumble". His intent was clearly stated, to engage Lee and the ANV and prevent any possibility of reinforcement being sent to oppose Sherman's campaign, and to deplete Lee's forces and supplies till he could no longer field an effective force.
As for Cold Harbor, as terrible as it was, it has been overblown by many, the total KIA was 1,905, wounded were 10,570, the result of the victory was that Lee still had to fall back. (total casualties=14,931)
Let's compare Cold Harbor to Stone's River, total Union loss (KIA, MIA and wounded) 11,575. CSA losses 25,560.
Or Nashville? Union's total loss= 2,140. CSA=15,000.
Or Ft. Donelson? Union loss= 2,231. CSA= 15,067.
Or Pea Ridge? USA losses= 1,349. CSA=5,210.
Or Vicksburg? USA losses= 4,536. CSA= 31,277.
But all we ever hear about is the huge losses at Cold Harbor, and how cold hearted Grant was, he was such a butcher blah blah blah...So if he was all those things, what were the CSA leaders that continued to fight a war that they knew was lost in 1863?

damYankee--

I agree with you that Grant performed well in the Overland Campaign, continually maneuvering Lee out of his lines while attriting Lee's forces, bottling him up in Petersburg and putting a strangle-hold on the AoNV, then adroitly pursuing Lee toward Appomattox while cutting off any chance of the AoNV joining up with the remnants of the AoT in NC. I also agree that while Cold Harbor was a bloody defeat for the AotP, it wasn't the worst defeat in the Civil War.

I disagree, however, with your contention that the CSA leaders knew the war was lost in 1863. Although they truly valued the offensive and loved battlefield victories, the Confederate leaders knew that they didn't need to defeat the Union armies in total military victory to win the war. All they had to do was keep maintain an active defense, keep bleeding the North, keep driving down the North's morale, encourage the political oppposition (Copperheads), and then they could get a political victory. All through 1863 the South saw its chances for a political victory building, and believed that it was quite possible that the Democrats would win the election of 1864, propose a cease fire, and then agree on a peace treaty which would give the Confederacy its independence. The leaders' writings, the newspapers, diaries of civilians and soldiers all expressed a hopeful optimism for victory during that period, well after the supposed "high water mark of the Confederacy" at Gettysburg. It was at the end of 1864, when the Union Army was able to show it could keep Lee trapped near Richmond while winning victories in the Valley and at Atlanta, that Northern morale was sustained, Lincoln was reelected, and the South had its hopes dashed. Any optimism expressed by the South after the election often seemed born of desperation, and its at this time and beyond that you start picking up pessimistic attitudes in southerners.

 

[damYankee]

damYankee--

I agree with you that Grant performed well in the Overland Campaign, continually maneuvering Lee out of his lines while attriting Lee's forces, bottling him up in Petersburg and putting a strangle-hold on the AoNV, then adroitly pursuing Lee toward Appomattox while cutting off any chance of the AoNV joining up with the remnants of the AoT in NC. I also agree that while Cold Harbor was a bloody defeat for the AotP, it wasn't the worst defeat in the Civil War.

I disagree, however, with your contention that the CSA leaders knew the war was lost in 1863. Although they truly valued the offensive and loved battlefield victories, the Confederate leaders knew that they didn't need to defeat the Union armies in total military victory to win the war. All they had to do was keep maintain an active defense, keep bleeding the North, keep driving down the North's morale, encourage the political oppposition (Copperheads), and then they could get a political victory. All through 1863 the South saw its chances for a political victory building, and believed that it was quite possible that the Democrats would win the election of 1864, propose a cease fire, and then agree on a peace treaty which would give the Confederacy its independence. The leaders' writings, the newspapers, diaries of civilians and soldiers all expressed a hopeful optimism for victory during that period, well after the supposed "high water mark of the Confederacy" at Gettysburg. It was at the end of 1864, when the Union Army was able to show it could keep Lee trapped near Richmond while winning victories in the Valley and at Atlanta, that Northern morale was sustained, Lincoln was reelected, and the South had its hopes dashed. Any optimism expressed by the South after the election often seemed born of desperation, and its at this time and beyond that you start picking up pessimistic attitudes in southerners.

After Aug. of 1863 it was pretty much case closed. The south was not going to get any help from abroad. The southern people may have thought the "political tide would turn", but we know how that turned out, they were wrong and that mistake cost the nation (it was still one nation) a terrible price for pride.
But if we are to judge by the number of desertions and the trouble the South was having filling rosters there were a few that agreed with me in 1863.

 

[coltshooter1]

damYankee--

I agree with you that Grant performed well in the Overland Campaign, continually maneuvering Lee out of his lines while attriting Lee's forces, bottling him up in Petersburg and putting a strangle-hold on the AoNV, then adroitly pursuing Lee toward Appomattox while cutting off any chance of the AoNV joining up with the remnants of the AoT in NC. I also agree that while Cold Harbor was a bloody defeat for the AotP, it wasn't the worst defeat in the Civil War.

I disagree, however, with your contention that the CSA leaders knew the war was lost in 1863. Although they truly valued the offensive and loved battlefield victories, the Confederate leaders knew that they didn't need to defeat the Union armies in total military victory to win the war. All they had to do was keep maintain an active defense, keep bleeding the North, keep driving down the North's morale, encourage the political oppposition (Copperheads), and then they could get a political victory. All through 1863 the South saw its chances for a political victory building, and believed that it was quite possible that the Democrats would win the election of 1864, propose a cease fire, and then agree on a peace treaty which would give the Confederacy its independence. The leaders' writings, the newspapers, diaries of civilians and soldiers all expressed a hopeful optimism for victory during that period, well after the supposed "high water mark of the Confederacy" at Gettysburg. It was at the end of 1864, when the Union Army was able to show it could keep Lee trapped near Richmond while winning victories in the Valley and at Atlanta, that Northern morale was sustained, Lincoln was reelected, and the South had its hopes dashed. Any optimism expressed by the South after the election often seemed born of desperation, and its at this time and beyond that you start picking up pessimistic attitudes in southerners.

Grant's idea was to hold onto Lee and allow the ANV no chance to rest and refit. The idea of continuous pressure on all fronts was to bleed the CS armies. It was an extended war of attrition, but unlike WW 1 it was not fought on a single front. Even Sigel, Crook and Hunter's failures in the Valley of Virginia assisted in the overall reduction of strength of the ANV destroying Lee's ability to wage an offensive campaign and forced him to be on the defensive. This allowed Grant to force Lee into the Siege of Petersburg that Lee knew would lead to the ANV's defeat. Even Early's drive on Washington was too little and too late to give the ANV the offensive edge it had demonstrated before Grant's campaign.

 

[ExNavyPilot]

...The southern people may have thought the "political tide would turn", but we know how that turned out, they were wrong and that mistake cost the nation (it was still one nation) a terrible price for pride.

Yes, its easy with hindsight, knowing what happened in late 1864 and in 1865, to say that the southern people were wrong in 1863 to think the political tide would turn....but you can't insinuate that they knew what was going to happen. If you read the writings of the times, not those of people writing much later and looking back on those times, you'll see a lot more optimism for a negotiated political settlement. Sure there was a lot of frustration in the South over the course of the war, and Confederate soldiers were tired of fighting and many deserted to try to help take care of their suffering families back home (often behind the advancing Union lines.) But read what was going on in the North from writings of the period and you'll see the same frustrations, the same exasperation over the huge casualty lists without justifying victories, and great political turmoil. The Copperheads were pressing their message hard and there were real possibilities that the Democrats would win the northern elections with a platform that called for negotiating an end to the war. Check out Gary Gallagher's The Confederate War to read a compelling analysis of this topic. Gallagher stresses that the popular myth of Gettyburg/Vicksburg being a highly evident turning point and of southerners seeing the writing on the wall but continuing to fight out of sheer frustration or stubbornness is just that, a myth. The Confederacy still had much support from its soldiers and citizens throughout 1863 and most of 1864, and people still believed in ultimate victory. Of course, they turned out to be wrong, but they didn't know they were going to be wrong.

 

[IronBrigadeMick]

Wasn't Stuart's cavalry pretty active on the Union left after Pickett's Charge? I seem to recall a pretty sharp engagement which might have played into Meade's reluctance to launch an immediate counterblow.

 

[K Hale]

No doubt in my mind Grant would have been on the retreating Cofederate forces like a hound dog. That was his style and would have probably ended the war sooner.

Mulejack

Seriously. Would Grant have pursued Lee? Does a one-armed Pope wear a funny hat while swimming in a circle in the woods? Or something...

 

[Lee]

I really don't believe Grant would have been any more effective than Meade in pursuing Lee after Gettysburg. The AOP was battered also after three days of hard fighting. As to the Overland campaign I am a tad disappointed not to have read anything regarding the rest of the war in Virginia during that time period. Remember Grant sent troops to sweep the Valley clean again, not to mention Butler at Bermuda Hundred and the raids in Southwestern Virginia. I believe Sheridan enjoyed the most success of any of the other campaigns/raids Grant launched while he was heavily engaged with the ANV from the Wilderness to Cold Harbor. Another sad situation Grant suffered was the treatment and movement of his wounded which surely added significantly to his losses and the AOP had a lot of wounded after the Wilderness and Spotsylvania CH.

 

[jgoodguy]

I really don't believe Grant would have been any more effective than Meade in pursuing Lee after Gettysburg. The AOP was battered also after three days of hard fighting. As to the Overland campaign I am a tad disappointed not to have read anything regarding the rest of the war in Virginia during that time period. Remember Grant sent troops to sweep the Valley clean again, not to mention Butler at Bermuda Hundred and the raids in Southwestern Virginia. I believe Sheridan enjoyed the most success of any of the other campaigns/raids Grant launched while he was heavily engaged with the ANV from the Wilderness to Cold Harbor. Another sad situation Grant suffered was the treatment and movement of his wounded which surely added significantly to his losses and the AOP had a lot of wounded after the Wilderness and Spotsylvania CH.

The most interesting fact regarding Meade's performance at Gettysburg was that he was not replaced.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Wasn't it Imboden who wrote a harrowing account of his command's movement of csa wounded in Lee's retreat from Gettysburg? Lee's movement of his wounded left much to be desired, even in comparison with Grant's.
Lincoln viewed Lee's invasion as a golden opportunity to decimate(if not actually destroy) the ANV on friendly solil. If Lincon saw it that way, you know Grant would. The odds were long, but ending of the war, would indeed be worth maximum effort.
The only reason Meade was retained in command after Lee made back to Va. was there was nobody in the AoP(or the East) better than Meade i.e., he could be counted on the keep in front of Washington and not get into any trouble until Grant could tidy things up in the West.

 

[Lee]

Wasn't it Imboden who wrote a harrowing account of his command's movement of csa wounded in Lee's retreat from Gettysburg? Lee's movement of his wounded left much to be desired, even in comparison with Grant's.
Lincoln viewed Lee's invasion as a golden opportunity to decimate(if not actually destroy) the ANV on friendly solil. If Lincon saw it that way, you know Grant would. The odds were long, but ending of the war, would indeed be worth maximum effort.
The only reason Meade was retained in command after Lee made back to Va. was there was nobody in the AoP(or the East) better than Meade i.e., he could be counted on the keep in front of Washington and not get into any trouble until Grant could tidy things up in the West.

Of course Lee experienced a terrible time transporting his wounded through Pa. Md. and back across the Potomac. He had wagons and little else as in a great distance to travel, no rail lines, or transport ships and surely many Confederate wounded perished while being transported aboard wagons over rough roads and terrain. I was speaking of Grant's huge problem moving and caring for his wounded during the Overland Campaign. Clara Barton reported that scores of Federal wounded lay in the open without even a tent for shelter. Lee and the ANV did a much better job of caring for and moving thier wounded back to Richmond. In fairness Lee with a smaller force on familiar ground and a shorter distance to travel enjoyed an advantage over Grant and the AOP in that regard during the Overland campaign.

I agree with your take on why Meade maintained command of the AOP. Lincoln suffered terribly in his quest for an effective General to command the AOP. I credit Lincoln with the vision to view the ANV's invasion of Pennsylvania as an opportunity to really hurt them. Lincoln must have spent many anxious hours hoping and praying for good news as he really hadn't experienced much of that in the eastern theatre. I really don't believe Lincoln could appreciate how difficult it would have been for the AOP to do more than they did post Gettysburg either. Remember I said difficult especially after three days of hard fighting not impossible. I consider contributers here to be well read and I ask all how many times have we read of costly time consumed just getting troops moving?

 

[OpnCoronet]

What set Grant apart from most senior Union commanders, was he acted and planned as though he had the bigger army.