Would Grant Have Pursued Lee At Gettysburg

[Samuel.Sohm]

We don't know that. Grant was constantly under estimating the morale of Confederate armies. After easy victories at Fts. Donelson and Henry he believed the A.S. Johnston's army was ready to crumble, which goes a long way to explaining his unpreparedness at Shiloh. He did the same after his victory at Champion Hill, the only significant resistance on his campaign to Vicksburg. He again thought the Rebs were played out and ordered the disastrous May 19 assault to finish them off. After the Wilderness stalemate he was beaten to the crossroads at Spottsylvania but again felt that the Confederates were ready to give up and we know how that turned out. I guess he finally learned the lesson at Cold Harbor.

Remember that in all these cases he was facing an inferior army. It wouldn't have been the same against the ANV in 1863, but Grant would have carried the same attitude with him. He would have tried to press the issue against Lee, wanting to prove he was the better, and would have been beaten. There would be no gunboats in Maryland and Pennsylvania to bail him out.

In all fairness to Grant as well, maybe is paradigm shift would have come earlier if he had commanded earlier as well. And it wasn't like he was completely wrong in any of the situations he estimated the enemy's morale to be low right? The whole overland campaign was a giant suckfest for everyone involved and I think we can all agree for the contemporary accounts that the ANV didn't have much left at that point. Lee was a great commander, but his army could only sustain that kind of OPTEMPO (operational tempo, or how many operations they execute in how short a time) for so long before your force simply disintegrates.

IMO, I think grant would have performed much the same as he did at that time in his career. Assuming Buford takes everything as historically accurate and the only difference is Grant instead of Meade, I think Grant would have most likely started his turning movements on the spot rather than wait. Possibly even ended the war much earlier than it did in reality.

EDITED TO ADD

 

[wilber6150]

We don't know that. Grant was constantly under estimating the morale of Confederate armies. After easy victories at Fts. Donelson and Henry he believed the A.S. Johnston's army was ready to crumble, which goes a long way to explaining his unpreparedness at Shiloh. He did the same after his victory at Champion Hill, the only significant resistance on his campaign to Vicksburg. He again thought the Rebs were played out and ordered the disastrous May 19 assault to finish them off. After the Wilderness stalemate he was beaten to the crossroads at Spottsylvania but again felt that the Confederates were ready to give up and we know how that turned out. I guess he finally learned the lesson at Cold Harbor.

Remember that in all these cases he was facing an inferior army. It wouldn't have been the same against the ANV in 1863, but Grant would have carried the same attitude with him. He would have tried to press the issue against Lee, wanting to prove he was the better, and would have been beaten. There would be no gunboats in Maryland and Pennsylvania to bail him out.

Actually he wasn't beaten to the crossroads , if I remember correctly Union cavalry occupied the courthouse first, but were driven off....It was only good luck that allowed the Anv to move in their infantry first, if ( I believe it was Early) hadn't have had to move miles down the road to bed down his troops because of the smoke and the dead, he wouldn't have beat the Union infantry...Once again the luck of war favored the Confederacy...

 

[wilber6150]

I don't think that Grant underestimated the ANV, he just didn't overestimate them like everyone else...

 

[dvrmte]

I don't think Grant was trying to prove he was better than anyone. He displayed a keen tactical sense regardless of the quality of adversary. Remeber that Lee's army was stretched out for 40 miles. It would have been a race to consolidate, with the inside track and the common sense to take advantage of it Grant may have gained the upper hand.

He had the inside track, better roads and a head start going to Spotsylvania but was still beat there.

 

[wilber6150]

A lot of blame has to be put on Sheridan who failed in his orders to occupy and clear the interesections and roads, so that the infantry can use them...

 

[1SGDan]

A

He had the inside track, better roads and a head start going to Spotsylvania but was still beat there.

Actually Lee had the inside shorter track.

 

[wilber6150]

And Lee had a smaller force that could maneuver the country roads better then the much larger Union forces and its support wagons...

 

[kenjcruz]

The AoP had just suffered 23,000 casualties, lost 3 corps commanders, was short on ammo and rations .... I'm not sure even Grant could have conducted a more agressive pursuit.

Aside from the Appomatox Campaign which was a unique situation, when was there an agressive pursuit of a retreating Civil War Army? Ususally the victor was in the same sad shape as the defeated.

 

[1SGDan]

Interesting point Ken. I'll have to think on that some but the pursuit of Pemberton from ChampionHill to the Big Black comes to mind. Also a Grant operation.

 

[kenjcruz]

I think Pemberton was holding the Big Black Bridge mainly because he thought Loring's division might show up. In any case the agressive pursuit would have been to send McClernand immediately late in the day on May 16 as Pemberton's troops were retreating. But this does show the challenges of quickly re-organzing and moving Civil War armies.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Pure speculation that the ANV was a better army in 1863 than in 1864. The same for whether the AoP was better in 1864 than 1863.
The historical evidence of Grant's record in all the major theatre's of the war, with various armies, against the best commanders and all the major armies the confederacy could(or would) send against him, is clear. During that time when(or with what army) Grant assumed command seems to have had little bearing on his successes.
On the record, in the Wilderness campaign, it is arguable that the AoP did not suffer greater reverses with greater casualties than in all its other previous campaign. Yet in the end the AoP was on the James and the ANV(and the csa) under siege(the very event Lee predicted would spell the doom of the confederacy); with the campaign over(Appomattox) in less than a year after the campaign began.
The assumption that there was an army or commander in the csa that could defeat Grant, is speculation with little, if any, historical evidence to justify it.


P.S. what historical evidence is available suggests that Grant would have defeated Johnston in a siege of Petersburg in 1862, if he had acquired command that soon.

 

[pattyjo]

Considering Grant's pursuit of Lee in 1864-65, I'd say yes. He would not have sat on his thumbs and let the ANV escape back to safety in Virginia. Might have been the "siege at the Potomac" that ended the war instead of the siege at Petersburg.

I think he also knew that Lincoln was counting on him to end this, He knew his reputation had been somewhat damaged due to his supposed drinking, He had seen other Union generals come and go, so he had that attitude of always looking like he was going to drive his head into a brick wall I think that was the look of determination.

 

[ole]

We seem to be assuming that Grant's aggressiveness might have altered the face of G'burg. He was always looking for a weakness, yes, but having the high ground with supply close at hand is not something he would ignore.

Lee had to attack. That was obvious to Meade and it would have been obvious to Grant. Grant's agressiveness would have given way to reason. No sense leaving the entrenchments when the opposition must throw itself against your works or go away. Practicable.

 

[dvrmte]

A


Actually Lee had the inside shorter track.

No Grant had the shortest route directly down the Brock Rd. whereas Lee, anticipating such a move by Grant, had a road cut to shorten Anderson's route to the Catharpin Rd. It's very easy to see on this map.

 

[dvrmte]

The AoP had just suffered 23,000 casualties, lost 3 corps commanders, was short on ammo and rations .... I'm not sure even Grant could have conducted a more agressive pursuit.

Aside from the Appomatox Campaign which was a unique situation, when was there an agressive pursuit of a retreating Civil War Army? Ususally the victor was in the same sad shape as the defeated.

Seven Days unless you consider that a "change of base" as McClellan did. Lee sent Jackson to cut off Pope after the victory at 2nd Manassas. I guess 2nd Winchester could be considered aggressive pursuit also.

 

[RobertP]

I don't think Grant was trying to prove he was better than anyone. He displayed a keen tactical sense regardless of the quality of adversary. Remeber that Lee's army was stretched out for 40 miles. It would have been a race to consolidate, with the inside track and the common sense to take advantage of it Grant may have gained the upper hand.

Didn't Grant say something regarding the Vicksburg campaign like 'I was more worried about Johnston than I ever was about Lee'? What a load. The praise of Lee obviously bothered Grant after the war and no doubt ate at him during it.

 

[RobertP]

Pure speculation that the ANV was a better army in 1863 than in 1864. The same for whether the AoP was better in 1864 than 1863.
The historical evidence of Grant's record in all the major theatre's of the war, with various armies, against the best commanders and all the major armies the confederacy could(or would) send against him, is clear. During that time when(or with what army) Grant assumed command seems to have had little bearing on his successes.
On the record, in the Wilderness campaign, it is arguable that the AoP did not suffer greater reverses with greater casualties than in all its other previous campaign. Yet in the end the AoP was on the James and the ANV(and the csa) under siege(the very event Lee predicted would spell the doom of the confederacy); with the campaign over(Appomattox) in less than a year after the campaign began.
The assumption that there was an army or commander in the csa that could defeat Grant, is speculation with little, if any, historical evidence to justify it.


P.S. what historical evidence is available suggests that Grant would have defeated Johnston in a siege of Petersburg in 1862, if he had acquired command that soon.

I think any reasonable person would conclude that the ANV of '63 was much healthier than a year later.

I do believe you are correct in saying that Grant would have defeated Johnston on the Peninsular in '62, as well as beaten Lee at Antietam later that year. The common element of course is McClellan who never saw an army he thought was small enough to whip. I suspect than any number of Union generals would have beaten the Confederates in those two battles, given the enormous advantage in men and materiel. The fact that Grant would likely have been included in that group doesn't make him special.

 

[RobertP]

No Grant had the shortest route directly down the Brock Rd. whereas Lee, anticipating such a move by Grant, had a road cut to shorten Anderson's route to the Catharpin Rd. It's very easy to see on this map.

Grant pretty much bumbled his way through the Overland Campaign. Stalemated by a much smaller army in the Wilderness and at Spottsylvania, tricked into a trap at North Anna, and ordering the infamous slaughter at Cold Harbor.
How people can say with a straight face that this man could have competed with Lee when both were at their peak strength is beyond me. Like I said before, take away a Navy with its supply and support capability and Grant is pretty ordinary.

 

[OpnCoronet]

While it is probably true that the CW produced no 'genius' among the military, it is also even more true that Grant was good enough to beat everyone, generals and armies, who could(or would) face him.

 

[ExNavyPilot]

Grant pretty much bumbled his way through the Overland Campaign. Stalemated by a much smaller army in the Wilderness and at Spottsylvania, tricked into a trap at North Anna, and ordering the infamous slaughter at Cold Harbor.
How people can say with a straight face that this man could have competed with Lee when both were at their peak strength is beyond me. Like I said before, take away a Navy with its supply and support capability and Grant is pretty ordinary.

RobertP--
You're looking at the tactical level, not the operational or strategic levels. You say Grant was stalemated? Stalemated means "a situation in which no further action can be taken." Throughout the Overland campaign, Grant maintained the initiative and kept Lee on the defensive, drove Lee out of his lines again and again through maneuver, and then trapped Lee at Petersburg/Richmond where Lee could do nothing except stay on the static defensive (other than little tactical offensive actions which did nothing to change the overall situation, and did not prevent Grant from extending his lines around the AoNV.) Meanwhile, Grant drained Lee of manpower and materiel, ensuring that the AoNV would never be able to take the offensive without linking up with Johnston down in NC. And Grant prevented that by maintaining his forces between the two Confederate armies. Based on this info, it was really Lee who was stalemated. And thus Lee surrendered to Grant, not the other way around.
Grant may be "ordinary", but as he defeated every Confederate General that he went against (as OpnCoronet said), that makes all those Confederate Generals even more mediocre.