Barlow on Day 1

[neyankee61]

Of all the battlefield of Gettysburg the part I have the least knowledge are the actions of the XI Corps esp. Barlow's Division. Barlow's Division advanced out of the town past the Almshouse and onto Barlow's Knoll. By doing so he extended the right of the XI Corps' line. Gen. Schurz expressed surprise at this and shuffled his regiments to maintain contact with Barlow. At this time XI Corps' artillery and infantry were engaged with Rodes on Oak Hill.
Did Barlow advance with an eye on threatening Rodes? Perhaps getting on Rodes' flank?
Or did he become focused on the high ground to his front, much like Sickles did on Day 2? Did he want to deny the high ground to the enemy?
What did he know about Ewell's advance from Harrisburg?
Devin's Brigade was positioned off Barlow's right near Rock Creek. Did he know they were there? And was he counting on their support and information?
Finally did he know that Devin's Brigade was withdrawn about the same time Early approached? If so, did he make any adjustments in his line?
I know, a lot of questions and most likely one will lead to another.

 

[6thMichCav]

How long were these units deployed before they were overrun?

 

[Tom Elmore]

In the days ahead I will be posting a map series showing the deployment of Barlow's division (two brigades under Von Gilsa and Ames) on July 1. But at this time it's not clear to me why he initially took his division to the Almshouse vicinity. The original plan was to extend the Eleventh Corps to the right of the First Corps, but Rodes' arrival put an end to that plan. Devin must have warned of the advance of Rodes from the north. Doles' brigade arrived around 1 p.m., extending Rodes' left and apparently immediately sent out his sharpshooter battalion, some of whom (maybe a company or two) moved to the knoll (that later bore Barlow's name) about the same time Barlow's men took position near the Almshouse, and Barlow wasted no time in pushing ahead to secure the knoll. Others have studied this subject more thoroughly, but my initial thought is that Barlow was likely focused on denying Rodes an opportunity to turn the open right flank of the Eleventh Corps by taking the high ground (the knoll) and anchoring his right on Rock Creek. I hope to learn more about Devin's role on that flank, which for me is a large missing piece to this puzzle. There is no indication Barlow bothered to consult Schurz, who was then acting commander of the Eleventh Corps, although Schurz was absent looking into the gap with the First Corps and the advance of O'Neal when Barlow arrived north of the town. But I have wondered why Barlow did not halt at the edge of the town and await orders; instead, he marched his division right up the Harrisburg road to the Alms House, and quickly pushed further out to the knoll without apparently any concern for the over-extension of his force. Clearly he was not expecting the arrival of Early's division (or at least an enemy force of that size). The only thing that would cover Barlow's right flank was a line of skirmishers.

 

[neyankee61]

Thanks Tom. Like I said each question begins to raise others.

 

[repman66]

It was a manifestly bad place to be. Higher, sure? But it was nothing more than a quasi-brigade masked as a division holding ground in front of the army and quickly attacked on three sides and shot to pieces.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

The entire XI Corps was in a world of trouble on July 1. Too few men to cover too much ground against too much opposition. Almost no good defensible terrain north of Gettysburg on which to set a defensive line against a foe approaching from the north.

 

[repman66]

The entire XI Corps was in a world of trouble on July 1. Too few men to cover too much ground against too much opposition. Almost no good defensible terrain north of Gettysburg on which to set a defensive line against a foe approaching from the north.

I've always thought, as 11th Corps commander, I would have evacuated the town, and loop holed the outer buildings ala Fredericksburg. Still, you have the 1st corps right dangled way out towards Oak Hill ..... luckily Rodes attack was negligent or the battle would have been even more of a rout for the Federals.

Everyone talks about Jackson being dead, the 11th Corps breaking, yadda yadda. The real question is - what if Rodes had actually had a good day on July 1st? The 1st Corps would have been swept from the field before the 11th corps was in a position to effectuate a defense.

 

[bayonet]

Clearly he was not expecting the arrival of Early's division (or at least an enemy force of that size).

Anyone that served in any capacity in the Military knows about reconnaissance, to try and figure out what maybe ahead of you. All Barlow had to do is send a few Officers on horse ahead to scout out the area ahead of them. Then they would of known about Gordon & Early's massive formation. Barlow was arrogant and had no respect for the 11th Corp or the troops he was newly assigned too. He treated them poorly and even had some Officers arrested (like the 17th Connecticut) on the march to Gettysburg. That Knucklehead could of led to my never being since my GG Grandfather was in the 17th Connecticut and was wounded. The 11th Corp had a bad day on the 1st day of Gettysburg but redeemed themselves on the 2nd day when Barlow was no longer there!

 

[neyankee61]

Devin told Buford that Ewell were coming in from Harrisburg and he was positioned near Rock Creek on Barlow's right. Someone in the XI Corps must have had an idea there was a force coming down the Harrisburg Rd.

 

[Tom Elmore]

I see where Devin's troopers were mistakenly bombarded by Eleventh Corps guns posted on Cemetery Hill, which may have hastened his departure. Before Devin was posted on Barlow's right, he evidently confronted Doles' skirmishers (per Doles), but it would be nice to find a corroborating Federal account of that encounter.

 

[rpkennedy]

Here are my thoughts on Barlow:

After his division moves through Gettysburg, Barlow stops someplace between the Crawford house and the Almshouse complex, according to Adelbert Ames. At that time, Doles' skirmishers and some of Blackford's Sharpshooters had occupied Blocher's Knoll and started peppering Barlow's men. Around this time (IMO as the timeline is awfully fuzzy), Devin's men start to pull out after taking some friendly artillery fire. It is unclear if and how Devin communicated with anyone in the Eleventh Corps to report what he knew.

As far as Barlow knew, all he could see was a promising and lightly defended hill that could serve as a good stepping off position for an attack against Doles' left flank. So, he seized the moment and led his division forward, taking the hill, and prepared to use Ames' Brigade as an assault force with shunting the "unreliable" von Gilsa to watch his right flank. Barlow was thinking offensively (as he almost always did) when he advanced to the knoll.

His major sins were two-fold. First, he advanced without communicating his intentions to his superiors, or really anyone, which led to some major shuffling from an already undermanned line and all but guaranteed that he was on his own. Second, he had to understand that he was the flank of the army on the field and basically put himself into a position to get sucker punched if anyone was coming down the Harrisburg Road. His thin screen was not going to do it. And that doesn't even mention that he was commanding the smallest division in the AotP.

Ryan

 

[rpkennedy]

Devin told Buford that Ewell were coming in from Harrisburg and he was positioned near Rock Creek on Barlow's right. Someone in the XI Corps must have had an idea there was a force coming down the Harrisburg Rd.

Buford was in communication with Howard. I wonder how much information Howard was passing along to Schurz. Not that it would have mattered when Barlow put himself out on Blocher's Knoll. At that point, everything was moot as the Eleventh Corps was doomed.

Ryan

 

[rpkennedy]

As an addition:

We know of 2 times for certain that Buford and Howard were in contact. Around 1100, when Howard arrived on the field and took command, he dispatched his brother, Major Charles Howard to Buford who reported the current situation.

Early in the afternoon, Buford and Devin also warned Howard about the arrival of Rodes' Division which put the right flank of the First Corps in danger and prompted Howard to hurry Schurz's Division onto the plains north of Gettysburg.

Lastly, we also know from the reports and regimental histories that Devin's pickets were in contact with Early as his men approached and it wasn't until about the time that Early began deploying his division around the Benner farm that Devin pulled back after taking friendly fire from Wiedrich's Battery on Cemetery Hill (it is possible that Wiedrich spotted Jones' Battalion unlimbering which prompted him to open fire). By that time, Barlow was well on his way to Blocher's Knoll and his leading elements were possibly already on the hill which is even more damning of him. Report or not, it would have been clear that there was a Rebel force out the Harrisburg Road and was very close.

Ryan

 

[neyankee61]

Do you think Barlow knew of Devin's presence on his right? Did you know of Devin's withdraw? If he knew it was there but didn't know it withdrew, it would mean he believed his right was still protected.

 

[bayonet]

The 17th Connecticut volunteered to take 4 companies A,B,F,&K under Major Brady across Rock Creek to the Benner Farm/Orchard on Barlow's right flank. But the order apparently came from Ames not Barlow. So who knew what Barlow knew or was thinking about Devin.

 

[rpkennedy]

Do you think Barlow knew of Devin's presence on his right? Did you know of Devin's withdraw? If he knew it was there but didn't know it withdrew, it would mean he believed his right was still protected.

I would think that Devin's presence (and withdrawal) would be obvious. 1000 cavalrymen would be pretty conspicuous but Barlow seems to have been fixated on Doles rather than his right flank.

Ryan

 

[rpkennedy]

The 17th Connecticut volunteered to take 4 companies A,B,F,&K under Major Brady across Rock Creek to the Benner Farm/Orchard on Barlow's right flank. But the order apparently came from Ames not Barlow. So who knew what Barlow knew or was thinking about Devin.

The order coming from Ames makes sense since he was their brigade commander. The question is did the order originate from Barlow or did Ames take it upon himself to issue it. I'll have to look through the Batchelder Papers and see if we can demystify the situation a bit.

Ryan

 

[neyankee61]

In Eric Wittenberg's book on Buford he covers Devin and his brigade at Rock Creek. It starts on the bottom of p. 145 and continues through p. 147.

 

[Tom Elmore]

Devin writes in his official report that "one of our own batteries on Cemetery Hill" opened a heavy fire upon his command and compelled him to retire, then that same battery "turned its attention to my pickets on the road, and shelled them out" too. That battery would have to be Wiedrich's Battery I, 1st New York, ironically from the Eleventh Corps. There's no mention from Devin of ever having communicated/coordinated his activities (or withdrawal) with Barlow.

Meanwhile, after reading Confederate sources from Early's division my impression is they believed they had achieved the element of surprise. Of course, once the batteries of Hilary P. Jones opened up, there should have been no doubt among the Federals of a major enemy force approaching from that same direction, but by then it was only a short time before Gordon advanced.

 

[neyankee61]

"A battery of the Eleventh Corps, placed in the cemetery, shelled us so persistently that after sending them word that we were not the enemy, with no cessation of their firing at us, we were forced to fall back from our position to the town, being shelled all the way back." An officer of the 6th NY Cavalry (The Devil to Pay, John Buford at Gettysburg- Eric Wittenberg p. 146)