Was Grant insubordinate?

[DanSBHawk]

Yes, it is selective, because you select to ignore the fact that Grant did not move on Fort Donelson (which would have been in response to Halleck's orders), and when he did it was in response to Halleck's orders.

Halleck's orders to Grant were:

"You will immediately prepare to send forward to Fort Henry, on the Tennessee river, all your available forces from Smithland, Paducah, Cairo, Fort Holt, Birds Point, &c. Sufficient garrisons must be left to hold these places against an attack from Columbus. As the roads are now almost impassable for large forces, and, as your command is very deficient in transportation, the troops will be taken in steamers up the Tennessee river, as far as practicable: supplies will also be taken up in steamers as far as possible. Flag Officer Foote will protect the transports with his Gunboats. The Benton & perhaps some others should be left for the defense of Cairo.

Fort Henry should be taken & held at all hazards. I shall immediately send you three additional companies of artillery from this place. The river front of the fort is armed with 32 pdrs., & it may be necessary for you to take some Guns of large calibre, and establish a battery on the opposite side of the river.

It is believed that the guns on the land side are of small calibre, & can be silenced by our field artillery. It is said that the north side of the river below the fort is favorable for landing. If so you land, & rapidly occupy the road to Dover, & fully invest the place, so as to cut off the retreat of the garrison . Lt Col. McPherson U. S. Engrs will immediately report to you, to act as chf. engineer of the expedition. It is very probable that an attempt will be made from Fort Columbus, to reinforce Fort Henry; also from Fort Donelson at Dover. If you can occupy the road to Dover you can prevent the latter.

The steamers will give you the means of crossing from one side of the river to the other. It is said that there is a masked battery opposite the island below Fort Henry. If this cannot be avoided or turned, it must be taken. Having invested Fort Henry, a cavalry force will be sent forward to break up the rail-road from Paris to Dover. The bridges should be rendered impassible, but not destroyed.

A telegram from Washington, says, that Beauregard left Manassas four days ago with fifteen regiments, for the line of Columbus & Bowling Green. It is therefore of the greatest importance that we cut that line before he arrives. You will move with the least
delay possible You will furnish Com. Foote with a copy of this letter

P . S. A telegraph line will be extended as rapidly as possible from Paducah cast of the Tennessee river to Fort Henry. Wire & operatives will be sent from St Louis."

Grant followed the orders, although he failed to cut the road preventing the garrison esacping. He then sent his cavalry forward as Halleck order, but they found Fort Donelson and Dover well fortified and didn't cut the bridges. He then did not move on Fort Donelson with infantry.

Grant had expected to cooperate with the gunboats and send a force of infantry and cavalry, without artillery or transportation, to occupy Ft Donelson, as per his instructions from Halleck.

"I shall take and destroy Fort Donaldson on the 8th returning and return to Fort Henry with the forces employed unless it looks
feasable to occupy that place with a small force th at could retreat easily to the main body.7

I shall regard it more in the light of an advance grand guard than as a perminant post. For the character of the works at Fort Henry I will refer you to reports of the Engineers which will be required.11

Owing to the intolerable state of the roads no transportation will be taken to Fort Donaldson, and but little Artillery, and that with double teams."

The expectation was the Navy was going to overwhelm Donelson as easily as Ft Henry, and he was simply going to send a force to occupy the abandoned fort, destroy the guns etc. and then withdraw back to Ft Henry. However, the Navy was too beat up to move, the cavalry reported a strong force at Dover, and Grant had to furnish large working parties to save Ft Henry from flooding. Halleck pushed the Navy to make the move, but they did not believe they were strong enough. Grant's force was simply meant to follow the Navy.

Then, Halleck got Foote to move on Ft Donelson with 3 gunboats. He ordered Buell's forces plus some additional regiments to move by the river to cooperate with the Navy. Grant would push towards Clarksville past Ft Donelson.

As happened, the Navy took a beating and Grant settled down for a long siege, believing there were 40,000 defenders and he was outnumbered. More forces were on their way from Buell and Halleck (notably Nelson's whole division), and it was intended the newly minted MG(V) Hitchcock would assume command of the expedition. Suddenly, the rebels broke out, but McClernand and Wallace refused Grant's order to retreat, and CF Smith was protesting Grant's orders not to attack. The rebels then suddenly, without reason, offered to surrender and CF Smith refused terms and had Grant endorse his decision.

Yes, I'm aware of Halleck's Jan 30 orders, because I already posted them in full. They support my point: Halleck ordered Grant to take and hold Fort Henry. Period. Nothing about moving on to Donelson.

And I'm aware that after Grant took Fort Henry, Grant immediately messaged Halleck that he was going to continue on to Fort Donelson. He wasn't waiting for Halleck to order him to move on Fort Donelson. Grant announced to Halleck that he was moving on Fort Donelson.

Exactly as I stated in my original point. I supported my point with an excerpt from Tim Smith's book, and with the original sources. So I stand by my original point, and you can continue to flail around as much as you like. It shows you can't admit when you were wrong.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Supposedly, I think it's in Shelby foote, it was Buell who originally came up with taking the forts.

It's possible. It may have been thought about by several people, but it was Halleck who ordered the operation to begin.

 

[rbasin]

It's possible. It may have been thought about by several people, but it was Halleck who ordered the operation to begin.

For sure. Maybe the most important "little" campaign of the war.

 

[67th Tigers]

Yes, I'm aware of Halleck's Jan 30 orders, because I already posted them in full. They support my point: Halleck ordered Grant to take and hold Fort Henry. Period. Nothing about moving on to Donelson.

No, they related to moving past Dover (Ft Donelson)to Clarksville, 38 miles past Dover. The assumption was Donelson, which had not been recce'd would be abandoned and easily dealt with by the gunboats, plus a small expedition. Hence Halleck stated he was operating against Ft Henry and Dover. It was not expected that there would be major resistance at Dover.

When Grant's Corps occupied Ft Henry, the gunboats went off on the "timberclad raid"as illustrated on the wiki:

Observe the main body of the enemy, the Army of Central Kentucky, are at Bowling Green. Observe that Clarksville and Dansville are railroad bridges, set by Halleck as the principle objectives for Grant. Meanwhile, Buell was advancing on the main body at Bowling Green, and was sending Nelson's division round to Paducah etc. to reinforce Grant.

AS Johnston, also keenly aware of the threat to the RR bridges moved forces to Donelson to cover the movement from Bowling Green. There was disagreement between Halleck and Buell/McClellan on whether they'd fall back to Clarkesville and reinforce there to counterattack Grant, or on Nashville. Halleck's entire reasoning was that if the Bowling Green forces moved to Donelson, they could counterattack, hence he pushed Grant on to cut the bridge at Clarksville. Dover and Ft Donelson were not a major objective, but really only a position in the way of the objective.

Halleck, of course, considered the order to move on Fort Henry to include an order to take Dover. He said it at the time. Your objection seems to be that Dover/Donelson is not specifically mentioned in Halleck's instructions of the 30th. However, a few days before this Grant had travelled to St. Louis and received his instructions directly from Halleck.

Grant misremembered this as lobbying for a movement against Ft Henry, but as Feis (and others) note, he was actually lobbying for a direct movement against Columbus. Halleck was receiving instructions from McClellan to operate against Ft henry etc. to cooperate with Buell in a movement against Nashville. Grant returns from this meeting on the 28th, and then signals that he will instead move on Ft Henry. Halleck states he is still preparing the movement (since preparations began weeks earlier, when Grant was still eying Columbus), and then on the 30th gives instructions. He later order Grant to destroy the bridges past Dover, in cooperation with a separate force of troops and gunboats he was sending down from Paducah.

Of course, what happened here is the gunboats and troops Halleck sent from Paducah failed to secure the fort, and then Grant has a siege on his hands that no-one expected or prepared for...

And I'm aware that after Grant took Fort Henry, Grant immediately messaged Halleck that he was going to continue on to Fort Donelson. He wasn't waiting for Halleck to order him to move on Fort Donelson. Grant announced to Halleck that he was moving on Fort Donelson.

Not quite. Halleck had ordered him to support the Navy's move against Ft Donelson, and push on to Clarksville to cut the bridge. Grant was considering sending only some infantry without artillery and only carrying 2 days rations to occupy the fort and destroy it after the Navy had bombarded it into submission. Per Halleck's orders he intended to support the Navy. On the 6th-8th he had no intention of actually attacking the fort. Grant did not move because the gunboats went down the Tennessee river, and hence there were no gunboats to support.

On the 11th, Halleck got the Navy to move against Donelson, and so Grant followed them. Now, Grant had also been lobbying the Navy, but that doesn't make it a movement "without orders." Rather it means Grant agreed with Halleck's orders.

Of course, on reaching Ft Donelson Grant believes it is too strong, and protected by 40,000 men. Hence he does not invest it, and nor does he even try entrenching. He literally has no idea what to do, other than await for Buell's men and for Halleck to come and take over in person. Hence when Pillow's force pushes out, Grant orders a retreat. It's only a quiet mutiny by his division commanders and then the rebels surrendering without reason that prevents disaster.

 

[DanSBHawk]

No, they related to moving past Dover (Ft Donelson)to Clarksville, 38 miles past Dover. The assumption was Donelson, which had not been recce'd would be abandoned and easily dealt with by the gunboats, plus a small expedition. Hence Halleck stated he was operating against Ft Henry and Dover. It was not expected that there would be major resistance at Dover.

When Grant's Corps occupied Ft Henry, the gunboats went off on the "timberclad raid"as illustrated on the wiki:

View attachment 538132

Observe the main body of the enemy, the Army of Central Kentucky, are at Bowling Green. Observe that Clarksville and Dansville are railroad bridges, set by Halleck as the principle objectives for Grant. Meanwhile, Buell was advancing on the main body at Bowling Green, and was sending Nelson's division round to Paducah etc. to reinforce Grant.

AS Johnston, also keenly aware of the threat to the RR bridges moved forces to Donelson to cover the movement from Bowling Green. There was disagreement between Halleck and Buell/McClellan on whether they'd fall back to Clarkesville and reinforce there to counterattack Grant, or on Nashville. Halleck's entire reasoning was that if the Bowling Green forces moved to Donelson, they could counterattack, hence he pushed Grant on to cut the bridge at Clarksville. Dover and Ft Donelson were not a major objective, but really only a position in the way of the objective.

Halleck, of course, considered the order to move on Fort Henry to include an order to take Dover. He said it at the time. Your objection seems to be that Dover/Donelson is not specifically mentioned in Halleck's instructions of the 30th. However, a few days before this Grant had travelled to St. Louis and received his instructions directly from Halleck.

Grant misremembered this as lobbying for a movement against Ft Henry, but as Feis (and others) note, he was actually lobbying for a direct movement against Columbus. Halleck was receiving instructions from McClellan to operate against Ft henry etc. to cooperate with Buell in a movement against Nashville. Grant returns from this meeting on the 28th, and then signals that he will instead move on Ft Henry. Halleck states he is still preparing the movement (since preparations began weeks earlier, when Grant was still eying Columbus), and then on the 30th gives instructions. He later order Grant to destroy the bridges past Dover, in cooperation with a separate force of troops and gunboats he was sending down from Paducah.

Of course, what happened here is the gunboats and troops Halleck sent from Paducah failed to secure the fort, and then Grant has a siege on his hands that no-one expected or prepared for...




Not quite. Halleck had ordered him to support the Navy's move against Ft Donelson, and push on to Clarksville to cut the bridge. Grant was considering sending only some infantry without artillery and only carrying 2 days rations to occupy the fort and destroy it after the Navy had bombarded it into submission. Per Halleck's orders he intended to support the Navy. On the 6th-8th he had no intention of actually attacking the fort. Grant did not move because the gunboats went down the Tennessee river, and hence there were no gunboats to support.

On the 11th, Halleck got the Navy to move against Donelson, and so Grant followed them. Now, Grant had also been lobbying the Navy, but that doesn't make it a movement "without orders." Rather it means Grant agreed with Halleck's orders.

Of course, on reaching Ft Donelson Grant believes it is too strong, and protected by 40,000 men. Hence he does not invest it, and nor does he even try entrenching. He literally has no idea what to do, other than await for Buell's men and for Halleck to come and take over in person. Hence when Pillow's force pushes out, Grant orders a retreat. It's only a quiet mutiny by his division commanders and then the rebels surrendering without reason that prevents disaster.

You continue to be wrong.

Halleck's order to Grant reflected exactly what he wanted Grant to do. Take Fort Henry and hold it at all hazards. Halleck expected a confederate counter-attack to retake Fort Henry. But Grant announced that he was moving on against Donelson. That's the facts. No amount of flailing is going to change those facts.

Yes, there was a gunboat raid up the Tennessee. It's no more relevant to the basic points of this discussion than the January demonstration that you brought up earlier. You seem to think that posting maps and lengthy specious nonsense is going to mask your misrepresentation of Halleck's orders to Grant.

Yes, it took Grant a few days to start moving after he had informed Halleck of his intentions. The weather was horrible, and the roads were swamps around Fort Henry, and the cavalry and engineers were scouting the roads to Dover, and the navy was not yet ready. Grant was champing at the bit to get moving. And as soon as he was able, he began moving his army to Donelson.

Your characterizations of the battle have always been nonsense, because of your envy of Grant's success. You've always attempted to make Grant seem more like McClellan, and McClellan seem more like Grant. It's never going to work. People aren't that gullible.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Grant misremembered this as lobbying for a movement against Ft Henry, but as Feis (and others) note, he was actually lobbying for a direct movement against Columbus. Halleck was receiving instructions from McClellan to operate against Ft henry etc. to cooperate with Buell in a movement against Nashville. Grant returns from this meeting on the 28th, and then signals that he will instead move on Ft Henry. Halleck states he is still preparing the movement (since preparations began weeks earlier, when Grant was still eying Columbus), and then on the 30th gives instructions.

Also, in your effort to falsify the narrative, you misrepresented Feis. Although Feis writes of Grant's early January obsession with Columbus, by the time of the meeting with Halleck in late January, Grant had decided to push for taking Fort Henry. The meeting went badly, but Grant (and Foote) continued to push Halleck for taking Fort Henry. McClellan was not involved except that he provided the false intel about Beauregard which scared Halleck into finally approving Grant and Foote's requests. The excerpts below are from William Feis' Grant's Secret Service:

Feis also supports my point that the initiative to push on to Donelson came from Grant:

 

[TallTallMan]

 

[tony_gunter]

View attachment 538225

Given that words have meaning and insubordination has a legal definition, it would probably be helpful if someone who claimed Grant was insubordinate to post the exact order that Grant disobeyed.

The thread started with Vicksburg, and we've thoroughly debunked insubordination there. We are now on to Donelson, and I still have yet to see an affirmative order that Grant disobeyed.

I was reading through PUSG yesterday, and did see Halleck reprimand Grant for going over his head for funding after repeated requests for cash to support the needs of the army in the field went unanswered. Grant sent Baxter to Washington and Baxter came back with barrels of cash. Ballsy! E4 mafia worthy.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Given that words have meaning and insubordination has a legal definition, it would probably be helpful if someone who claimed Grant was insubordinate to post the exact order that Grant disobeyed.

The thread started with Vicksburg, and we've thoroughly debunked insubordination there. We are now on to Donelson, and I still have yet to see an affirmative order that Grant disobeyed.

I was reading through PUSG yesterday, and did see Halleck reprimand Grant for going over his head for funding after repeated requests for cash to support the needs of the army in the field went unanswered. Grant sent Baxter to Washington and Baxter came back with barrels of cash. Ballsy! E4 mafia worthy.

And even with Donelson, Grant didn't disobey an order. He simply decided on his own to keep the offensive moving ahead.

In general, I don't think Grant was insubordinate or a bad subordinate. He didn't bad-mouth his superiors like some top generals, and he knew his place in the chain of command.

 

[tony_gunter]

And even with Donelson, Grant didn't disobey an order. He simply decided on his own to keep the offensive moving ahead.

In general, I don't think Grant was insubordinate or a bad subordinate. He didn't bad-mouth his superiors like some top generals, and he knew his place in the chain of command.

But he apprised Halleck of his intentions, and Halleck at least tacitly approved by acknowledgement of the communications and continuing to forward reinforcements to Grant.

The only reprimand Grant received prior to his pleasure cruise up to Nashville was for sending Baxter to Washington to grovel for cash.

 

[67th Tigers]

But he apprised Halleck of his intentions, and Halleck at least tacitly approved by acknowledgement of the communications and continuing to forward reinforcements to Grant.

The only reprimand Grant received prior to his pleasure cruise up to Nashville was for sending Baxter to Washington to grovel for cash.

Indeed, although Halleck was arranging for Hitchcock to be appointed MG and take over Grant's district.

Halleck's instructions were clear, and the movement on Ft Donelson, which wasn't believed to be a major work needing investment, was simply part of Halleck's instructions for a movement on Clarksville. Dover simply wasn't considered to be a major obstacle, and perhaps it wasn't in mid-January. It was, in December, a small river battery manned by one regiment (30th TN) just formed from 4 older coys manning the position and 6 coys of new recruits, and had 751 "engaged". There was only hutted accommodation for a regiment. It was being used as a depot, and the 49th and 50th TN regiments were being raised there with 372 and 650 respectively engaged at Donelson. In January they'd be weaker.

Hence, no-one really considered Donelson an objective. It was just a small river battery that the Navy was expected to overcome and land ISTR 5,000 troops to occupy, whilst Grant was supposed to be going for Clarksville. However, the garrison of Clarksville and the garrison of Ft Henry concentrated there as Halleck expected. It appears from Grant's writings that he didn't expect to find this whole force there...

Grant was obeying Halleck's orders to move on Clarksville, supporting the Naval desant on Dover en route, but found an unexpectedly large force which prevented the desant and blocked his move on Clarksville...

 

[tony_gunter]

Indeed, although Halleck was arranging for Hitchcock to be appointed MG and take over Grant's district.

Halleck's instructions were clear, and the movement on Ft Donelson, which wasn't believed to be a major work needing investment, was simply part of Halleck's instructions for a movement on Clarksville. Dover simply wasn't considered to be a major obstacle, and perhaps it wasn't in mid-January. It was, in December, a small river battery manned by one regiment (30th TN) just formed from 4 older coys manning the position and 6 coys of new recruits, and had 751 "engaged". There was only hutted accommodation for a regiment. It was being used as a depot, and the 49th and 50th TN regiments were being raised there with 372 and 650 respectively engaged at Donelson. In January they'd be weaker.

Hence, no-one really considered Donelson an objective. It was just a small river battery that the Navy was expected to overcome and land ISTR 5,000 troops to occupy, whilst Grant was supposed to be going for Clarksville. However, the garrison of Clarksville and the garrison of Ft Henry concentrated there as Halleck expected. It appears from Grant's writings that he didn't expect to find this whole force there...

Grant was obeying Halleck's orders to move on Clarksville, supporting the Naval desant on Dover en route, but found an unexpectedly large force which prevented the desant and blocked his move on Clarksville...

I got the impression reading through PUSG that the railroad bridges were a matter for the gunboats, which would make sense. Clarksville was a good 50 miles away from Henry, and Grant didn't have the troops or train to support a force that far away.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Grant was obeying Halleck's orders to move on Clarksville, supporting the Naval desant on Dover en route, but found an unexpectedly large force which prevented the desant and blocked his move on Clarksville...

Simply false. The only reason that Clarksville even became a concern for Halleck was that Grant had informed him that he was moving on Donelson. Halleck was worried about confederate reinforcements arriving via the Clarksville bridge.

 

[DanSBHawk]

I got the impression reading through PUSG that the railroad bridges were a matter for the gunboats, which would make sense. Clarksville was a good 50 miles away from Henry, and Grant didn't have the troops or train to support a force that far away.

You're right. First Phelps, and then I believe Walke, went up the Tennessee and dealt with the railroad bridges.

Halleck wanted Grant and/or Foote to send gunboats up the Cumberland railroad bridges as well, but it was after Grant had already taken Fort Henry and had already announced he was moving on Fort Donelson. Halleck expected confederates to reinforce from Bowling Green and attack Grant, so he wanted the navy to destroy the railroad bridges.

Halleck only started mentioning Clarksville after Grant informed him that he was moving on Donelson. So to try to diminish the importance of Fort Donelson and pretend the campaign was really about capturing Clarksville is nonsense.

 

[67th Tigers]

You're right. First Phelps, and then I believe Walke, went up the Tennessee and dealt with the railroad bridges.

Halleck wanted Grant and/or Foote to send gunboats up the Cumberland railroad bridges as well, but it was after Grant had already taken Fort Henry and had already announced he was moving on Fort Donelson. Halleck expected confederates to reinforce from Bowling Green and attack Grant, so he wanted the navy to destroy the railroad bridges.

Halleck only started mentioning Clarksville after Grant informed him that he was moving on Donelson. So to try to diminish the importance of Fort Donelson and pretend the campaign was really about capturing Clarksville is nonsense.

Herein you are mixing two different things.

On the 6th, Grant continued Halleck's plan with the idea that on the 8th he'd send a small infantry force with two days rations, without transport or artillery, as a working party to destroy Fort Donelson. He expected the Navy would have overwhelmed it. The Navy instead went down* the Tennessee and his cavalry scouts reported Dover was strongly defended. He didn't move.

On the 11th Halleck had arranged for 3 gunboats and a landing force consisting of 13th Brigade, Army of the Ohio (4 regts, sent by Buell to Paducah for just this purpose) plus 3 extra regiments to attack Fort Donelson. The expectation was the gunboats would overwhelm the fort, and the landing party occupy and destroy it. Meanwhile, Grant was ordered on an expedition past Dover to Clarksville, to destroy the bridges.

Yes, Grant also lobbied for the move, but in this he was supporting Halleck's intent.

Of course, the gunboats were repulsed, and Donelson/Dover had about 13,000 effectives defending it - about 5,000 men from Ft Henry and Ft Donelson, reinforced by 4 brigades from the Army of Central Kentucky from Clarkesville etc. Grant, with no idea what to do, placed his army in a loose arc and awaited reinforcements. Nelson's division was en route, and more forces from St. Louis etc. He expected to mount a regular siege once he had a large enough force, but didn't consider himself strong enough to make approaches yet. Then the breakout happens, exposing Grant's command paralysis, but to Grant's good fortune Pillow was a terrible general and didn't use his victory to escape. Instead, the enemy precipitously surrendered...

* Up and down river are defined by the direction of flow to the sea. The Tennessee is flowing south, and so south is downriver.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Herein you are mixing two different things.

On the 6th, Grant continued Halleck's plan with the idea that on the 8th he'd send a small infantry force with two days rations, without transport or artillery, as a working party to destroy Fort Donelson. He expected the Navy would have overwhelmed it. The Navy instead went down* the Tennessee and his cavalry scouts reported Dover was strongly defended. He didn't move.

On the 11th Halleck had arranged for 3 gunboats and a landing force consisting of 13th Brigade, Army of the Ohio (4 regts, sent by Buell to Paducah for just this purpose) plus 3 extra regiments to attack Fort Donelson. The expectation was the gunboats would overwhelm the fort, and the landing party occupy and destroy it. Meanwhile, Grant was ordered on an expedition past Dover to Clarksville, to destroy the bridges.

Yes, Grant also lobbied for the move, but in this he was supporting Halleck's intent.

Of course, the gunboats were repulsed, and Donelson/Dover had about 13,000 effectives defending it - about 5,000 men from Ft Henry and Ft Donelson, reinforced by 4 brigades from the Army of Central Kentucky from Clarkesville etc. Grant, with no idea what to do, placed his army in a loose arc and awaited reinforcements. Nelson's division was en route, and more forces from St. Louis etc. He expected to mount a regular siege once he had a large enough force, but didn't consider himself strong enough to make approaches yet. Then the breakout happens, exposing Grant's command paralysis, but to Grant's good fortune Pillow was a terrible general and didn't use his victory to escape. Instead, the enemy precipitously surrendered...

* Up and down river are defined by the direction of flow to the sea. The Tennessee is flowing south, and so south is downriver.

I'm not mixing anything. When Halleck assumed that Grant was merely going to defend Fort Henry against all hazards, Halleck was worried about confederate reinforcements coming from Dover. When Grant informed Halleck he was moving on Donelson/Dover, Halleck then began worrying about confederate reinforcements coming from across the Clarksville bridge. In both cases, Halleck was worried about confederate reinforcements arriving and defeating Grant.

No, Halleck didn't order a "working party" to destroy Fort Donelson, and no, Halleck didn't order Grant on an "expedition" to Clarksville before Donelson fell. You are simply attempting to fabricate a fake alternative history. Halleck expected the gunboats to destroy the bridges, which is why he was sending requests to the navy as well as to Grant about the bridges.

Your characterizations of Grant's actions at Fort Donelson have always been complete fiction. People can read any book on the battle, including Lew Wallace's autobiography, and get a far more accurate understanding of Grant's actions.

The Tennessee flows north at Fort Henry until it reaches the Ohio River. Going south is going up river. Going up river is to go against the flow of the stream. Going down river is to go the same direction as the current.

 

[67th Tigers]

I'm not mixing anything. When Halleck assumed that Grant was merely going to defend Fort Henry against all hazards, Halleck was worried about confederate reinforcements coming from Dover. When Grant informed Halleck he was moving on Donelson/Dover, Halleck then began worrying about confederate reinforcements coming from across the Clarksville bridge. In both cases, Halleck was worried about confederate reinforcements arriving and defeating Grant.

No, Halleck didn't order a "working party" to destroy Fort Donelson, and no, Halleck didn't order Grant on an "expedition" to Clarksville before Donelson fell. You are simply attempting to fabricate a fake alternative history. Halleck expected the gunboats to destroy the bridges, which is why he was sending requests to the navy as well as to Grant about the bridges.

I fully understand why you've committed to this, but you are ignoring Halleck's communications from before this, such as:

In Halleck's orders, Dover (Ft Donelson) isn't considered a separate objective. It is part of the Ft Henry objective.

Look, here's Halleck "not" asking for gunboats to be sent against Dover and Clarkeville

Here is him again trying to get the planned movement against Dover and Clarksville going:

Here is Halleck's order which initiated the movement against Clarksville which, en route, was blocked by Donelson:

Finally, Halleck initiates the operation:

Grant follows Foote, as per his orders.

Your characterizations of Grant's actions at Fort Donelson have always been complete fiction. People can read any book on the battle, including Lew Wallace's autobiography, and get a far more accurate understanding of Grant's actions.

Indeed, I'd highly recommend read Wallace, because Wallace states Grant wanted them to retreat, and reported he twice refused Grant's order.. I still remember you said Lew Wallace's account of the events at Donelson as "accurate and detailed", but then dismissed all the parts of Wallace's account that are damning for Grant (i.e. Grant issuing a retreat order) as "misrepresentations."

 

[DanSBHawk]

I fully understand why you've committed to this, but you are ignoring Halleck's communications from before this, such as:

View attachment 538436

In Halleck's orders, Dover (Ft Donelson) isn't considered a separate objective. It is part of the Ft Henry objective.

Look, here's Halleck "not" asking for gunboats to be sent against Dover and Clarkeville


View attachment 538438

Here is him again trying to get the planned movement against Dover and Clarksville going:

View attachment 538439

Here is Halleck's order which initiated the movement against Clarksville which, en route, was blocked by Donelson:

View attachment 538440

Finally, Halleck initiates the operation:
View attachment 538442

Grant follows Foote, as per his orders.



Indeed, I'd highly recommend read Wallace, because Wallace states Grant wanted them to retreat, and reported he twice refused Grant's order.. I still remember you said Lew Wallace's account of the events at Donelson as "accurate and detailed", but then dismissed all the parts of Wallace's account that are damning for Grant (i.e. Grant issuing a retreat order) as "misrepresentations."

I'm committed to the historical truth. You're committed to spin. You simply can't bear the thought of Grant showing initiative and succeeding during this operation.

I've already said that I have no doubt that Halleck intended to operate against Fort Donelson. At his own speed. However, Halleck's January 30th order to Grant was to take and hold Fort Henry, and to break the railroad upriver. That's it. Nothing about proceeding to Fort Donelson. This has been made explicitly clear to you but here are Halleck orders to Grant again:

Grant took Fort Henry and immediately sent this to Halleck:

Grant was informing Halleck that he was moving on to take Fort Donelson, even though Grant had not received any explicit order to do so.

These are the facts that you are so frantically trying to avoid. Every order, suggestion, plea, whatever, that came from Halleck after Grant's February 6th dispatch came in the context that Grant had announced that he was moving on Donelson. Halleck was in operational command of the operation. He had one set of considerations during the initial part of the campaign. When Grant announced he was moving on Donelson, those operational considerations changed and Hallecks orders or suggestions changed. This is basic stuff. All the stuff about Clarksville came after Grant had informed Halleck that he was moving on Donelson.

Do you understand that? Grant announced that he was moving on Fort Donelson, and Halleck then began worrying about confederate reinforcements arriving from across the Clarksville bridge to defeat Grant.

Yes I recommend that people read Lew Wallace's account of Fort Donelson. The full account. Not the parts that you cherry-pick and misrepresent. Yes, Grant thought that he would have to move his army into siege positions at Donelson, after the failure of the gunboats to reduce Fort Donelson. You call this a "retreat," even though Grant had no intention of leaving the area. Even more ludicrous, McClellan ordered this same exact movement in front of the Warwick line - to move his army back into siege positions - and you never refer to that as a retreat. That shows that you are unable to analyze these things in a consistent manner.

Reading the Lew Wallace account, in full, provides a first-hand account of Grant during this period. It shows that all your claims about imaginary mutinies and a timid Grant are complete fiction. It shows how Grant abandoned the thought of a siege when he learned that McClernand had failed to hold his position. It shows a determined Grant seeing an opportunity and seizing it.

I have no illusions about you learning anything from this discussion. I know you will continue to spout the exact same false information in the future, because that's what you do.

 

[Stryker65]

Looking over these sources, I would tend to agree with @DanSBHawk. This order, for instance:

Halleck orders Grant to "strengthen the land side of Fort Henry, and transfer guns to resist a land attack." This sounds like an order to stop, dig in, and await an attack. It doesn't sound like an order to continue on to Fort Donelson. Earlier, he says that the Confederates may send reinforcements to Fort Henry from Columbus and Fort Donelson. Destroying the Clarksville bridge would most likely prevent the Fort Donelson reinforcements from arriving.

Grant, however, takes the initiative, pursuing the Confederate troops back to Fort Donelson, which is still in a state of confusion. Halleck most likely feared that this move was a mistake, which resulted in his sending all available gunboats and troops to "save Grant," and worried about Confederate reinforcements enveloping Grant similar to at Belmont.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Looking over these sources, I would tend to agree with @DanSBHawk. This order, for instance:
View attachment 538479
Halleck orders Grant to "strengthen the land side of Fort Henry, and transfer guns to resist a land attack." This sounds like an order to stop, dig in, and await an attack. It doesn't sound like an order to continue on to Fort Donelson. Earlier, he says that the Confederates may send reinforcements to Fort Henry from Columbus and Fort Donelson. Destroying the Clarksville bridge would most likely prevent the Fort Donelson reinforcements from arriving.

Grant, however, takes the initiative, pursuing the Confederate troops back to Fort Donelson, which is still in a state of confusion. Halleck most likely feared that this move was a mistake, which resulted in his sending all available gunboats and troops to "save Grant," and worried about Confederate reinforcements enveloping Grant similar to at Belmont.

Reading through Halleck's communications, I get the sense that he became extremely anxious after Grant announced that he was going to keep moving after taking Fort Henry. If Halleck had been on the scene, in command, he almost certainly would have strengthened Fort Henry and waited for a confederate counterattack, and then when he felt ready, conducted a slow safe movement against Fort Donelson. Much like the siege approach to Corinth.

Halleck was extremely concerned that Grant was moving too fast and the confederates were going to hit Grant while Buell was too far away to help. Below, Halleck talks about it being a "crisis" and "peril." He asks McClellan to direct Buell to Clarksville, and it's obvious by the way he brings it up that Halleck is concerned about Clarksville being the route that the confederates will "come down in a day" and "attack Grant in the rear."