Iuka - Victory as Failure

[Nathan Towne]

The plan to catch the Army of the West before they could slip out from Iuka and move across Bear Creek to the east, which was deemed probably the most likely move, was extensively covered. The above was stated in light of the larger plan as another serious consideration which had to be accounted for if the At,6 of the West were assured to be trapped.

Anyways, thanks for providing your view………………….

 

[tony_gunter]

I still read Grant's message to Rosecrans as a dubious endorsement of the plan. Rosecrans had a grandiose and probably unworkable idea that he could capture Price. Grant just wanted to bloody Price and prevent him from moving towards Bragg.

Grant's lamentation that Price hadn't been captured seems like post-war shade thrown at Rosecrans, at the time he felt that the mission had been accomplished and was happy with the result. Rosecrans was the one angry at the outcome and casting about for someone to blame.

 

[Nathan Towne]

I still read Grant's message to Rosecrans as a dubious endorsement of the plan. Rosecrans had a grandiose and probably unworkable idea that he could capture Price. Grant just wanted to bloody Price and prevent him from moving towards Bragg.

Grant's lamentation that Price hadn't been captured seems like post-war shade thrown at Rosecrans, at the time he felt that the mission had been accomplished and was happy with the result. Rosecrans was the one angry at the outcome and casting about for someone to blame.

Would make for an interesting discussion. How much Grant liked the plan would make for an interesting topic that way. I think that it would be a very difficult one to come to any definitive position on that way. We do know that he approved it. To what degree he understood the situation pertaining to the ability of the Army of the West to pull back directly eastwards from Iuka is not wholly clear, but Rosecrans certainly kept him apprised of such in his correspondence regarding the conception of the plan.

 

[1SGDan]

As we know

No as you think we should all agree with you but that is not going to happen.

 

[Nathan Towne]

No as you think we should all agree with you bit that is not going to happen.

Well, the facts are the facts.

 

[DanSBHawk]

The plan to catch the Army of the West before they could slip out from Iuka and move across Bear Creek to the east, which was deemed probably the most likely move, was extensively covered. The above was stated in light of the larger plan as another serious consideration which had to be accounted for if the At,6 of the West were assured to be trapped.

Anyways, thanks for providing your view………………….

Obviously, I disagree.

 

[1SGDan]

As far as the above is concerned

Your concern is not everyone's concern. We have plenty of ability to judge these operations own our own merit.

 

[DanSBHawk]

I still read Grant's message to Rosecrans as a dubious endorsement of the plan. Rosecrans had a grandiose and probably unworkable idea that he could capture Price. Grant just wanted to bloody Price and prevent him from moving towards Bragg.

Well if there really were 5 different ways to escape from Iuka, then setting up a "pincer" that only blocks 3 of them probably was a dumb plan to begin with.

Perhaps the smartest plan would have been just to hit them hard from the west with a single concentrated force.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Your concern is not everyone's concern. We have plenty of ability to judge these operations own our own merit.

You should. I would highly suggest going back and reading carefully through the contemporary correspondence again. Would be a great exercise for you, as there is a tonne of good and really important stuff there.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Let's be clear about this. 1SGDan's study of this battle at the beginning of this thread accords with the views of the historians, and with the accounts of the major persons involved in the battle.

The revisionist view being expressed here by Nathan is one that is based on several pieces of correspondence, of which all but one have nothing to do with the battle, and even that one does not explicitly support the revisionist view. I've read the evidence and the argument for this revisionist view of a "likely" confederate escape directly to the east from Iuka, and I find it unconvincing. And it remains that a specific route heading directly east at the time has not even been identified yet, other than the railroad.

So there certainly isn't any grounds for insulting or denigrating 1SGDan's account. It remains the credible and accepted account of the battle.

 

[tony_gunter]

Well if there really were 5 different ways to escape from Iuka, then setting up a "pincer" that only blocks 3 of them probably was a dumb plan to begin with.

Perhaps the smartest plan would have been just to hit them hard from the west with a single concentrated force.

Moving up the Fulton Road blocks 2 of the three routes of escape, because the main stage road from Eastport to Fulton intersected with the road east a mile east of Iuka.

Escaping north would be wholly unworkable with an army in pursuit.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Moving up the Fulton Road blocks 2 of the three routes of escape, because the main stage road from Eastport to Fulton intersected with the road east a mile east of Iuka.

That is right. The Fulton road intersected with one of the roads running east of Iuka. How many other potential avenues there were is not wholly clear.

The trouble is that the Army of the Mississippi was going to have to get to the connecting road regardless in order for their forces to be able to mutually support one another and based on Rosecrans statements in his correspondence, he was of the view that the attack rolling forward and actually crushing in the Confederate left was essential for depriving the Army of the West of the ability to pull back to the east via Bear Creek.

The attack from the west would have/would be responsible for depriving the Army of the West of the ability to move northwards out of Iuka, per the relevant correspondence. Otherwise, if they were to pull out of Iuka moving north, such would have been done that night. It is typically very difficult to pursue an enemy at night.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Moving up the Fulton Road blocks 2 of the three routes of escape, because the main stage road from Eastport to Fulton intersected with the road east a mile east of Iuka.

Escaping north would be wholly unworkable with an army in pursuit.

I agree that escaping north would be very bad while being pursued. Grant acknowledged this in his report.

 

[lelliott19]

Gentlemen,

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Let's get this discussion back on track, please and thank you.

 

[Nathan Towne]

Moving up the Fulton Road blocks 2 of the three routes of escape, because the main stage road from Eastport to Fulton intersected with the road east a mile east of Iuka.

Escaping north would be wholly unworkable with an army in pursuit.

Yeah, if the Army of the West had pulled out moving northwards, they would have pulled out that night under the cover of darkness.

 

[tony_gunter]

Yeah, if the Army of the West had pulled out moving northwards, they would have pulled out that night under the cover of darkness.

You'd need boats to cross the Tennessee. I do think the fear about them fleeing east was well founded, and there was no way Rosecrans could place himself on the Fulton Road before dark. So he pitched in on the one road that would allow him to that day.

 

[DanSBHawk]

...and there was no way Rosecrans could place himself on the Fulton Road before dark. So he pitched in on the one road that would allow him to that day.

But as you've noted previously, hitting them so late in the day meant that Ord could not have participated. So what's the purpose of forcing the battle on the 19th?

 

[tony_gunter]

But as you've noted previously, hitting them so late in the day meant that Ord could not have participated. So what's the purpose of forcing the battle on the 19th?

<shrug/> Grant was happy that he got a lick in.

Operationally, it meant a frenetic and long retreat on exterior lines around Grant's army.

 

[Nathan Towne]

You'd need boats to cross the Tennessee. I do think the fear about them fleeing east was well founded, and there was no way Rosecrans could place himself on the Fulton Road before dark. So he pitched in on the one road that would allow him to that day.

Again, three divisions of the Army of the Mississippi had already crossed. There was no way of knowing that the Army of the West was not moving with temporary bridging and I am not convinced that all bridges were put along the Tennessee river, at all.

Regarding the comment from the other user, the entire point of pressing on on the 19th was that the Army of the West knew that they were coming, so, per the conception of the plan, as clearly articulated, they would have pulled back that night had they not been pressed. We know this. Everyone agreed with pushing the operation forward on the 19th if possible. Nothing in the record of Grant's conversations with Ord refutes that in any way. They merely record doubt as to whether the Army of the Mississippi would make it on the 19th.

As far as Ord's forces not being able to participate, that is wholly erroneous. They didn't participate because of the altered schedule of attack and their command not hearing the onset of the fighting. They would have pressed forward otherwise, although it probably would not have ultimately made much difference because the Army of the West had not been deprived of the avenues of escape to the east via Bear Creek and/or to the Fulton Road and it is not likely that the attack from the West would have enabled such.

 

[DanSBHawk]

Another point about the futility of forcing the battle so late in the day, is that even if the connecting road had been clear and open and Rosecrans could detach Hamilton over to the Fulton road... Hamilton still wouldn't have gotten over there until about dark.

So there is basically no way for Rosecrans to be in position on both roads in time for a battle on the 19th, regardless of whether he comes up one road or he comes up both roads.

The only chance of having all the forces in position for a simultaneous attack by the entire Union force would have been to defer the battle until the next morning.