Ironclad Monitors 1863-1865

[Old Soldier]

A point I actually want to make is that the US basically... I think I would say overcommitted to the monitor concept. That is, the low-freeboard turret ship.

A monitor is a good way of getting an armoured vessel on the "cheap", in industrial terms. But they're not very effective ships at this time compared to a broadside ironclad, and their design is more exacting. The Casco class of twenty was an extremely expensive failure for that very reason (inches of freeboard really matter on a monitor class, and errors in the Casco procurement process ate up the tiny safety margin.)

The monitor was severly restricted in operation. It was a river, estuary or inlet vessel, basically incapable of working off-shore due to ultra-low freeboard. That is why USS Monitor met her end on 31 December 1862,off Cape Hatteras, NC. Given that, any posting of a monitor to San Francisco would only have been for the defence of the Bay and, as other have suggested, a visible reminder that there was a war on. For those in any doubt, look up what happened to HMS Captain - a masted turret ship inspired by US monitors - she lasted just 5 months before capsizing in a storm off Cape Finisterre.

 

[Saphroneth]

For those in any doubt, look up what happened to HMS Captain - a masted turret ship inspired by US monitors - she lasted just 5 months before capsizing in a storm off Cape Finisterre.

Captain is interesting because - it's not really the same problem, though the low freeboard was nonetheless involved. Captain's problem was the live load on her sails, she was literally blown over in a storm, while the masted turret ship Monarch with a higher freeboard and better curve of stability was just fine. The accident resulted in an extensive focus on what a righting moment is.

The monitors are obviously not going to be blown over by their sails because they don't have any. Not having sails severely restricts their operational and strategic mobility.

The real issues with the monitors, though, are mostly that their extremely low freeboard means they have water over the deck in basically any sea. Typical monitor freeboard is less than 2 feet and some had only about 1 foot of freeboard - and that's a problem because the turret rests on a cutout in the deck, with the ammunition transfer mechanism consisting of a cutout in the deck and in the turret floor. The turret had to be jacked up to fight so no monitor can deal with waves in a fighting configuration, and in addition they were very slow and quite vulnerable to slamming damage.

One late model monitor did cross the Atlantic, though she had to have her turret sealed (caulked I think) and a special wave break built up. It was an impressive stunt, but a stunt is what it was.

(the other issues are slow movement and poor rate of fire.)


The masted turret ships like Monarch and Captain were attempting to solve the problem of a turret ship that was able to transit strategically, and of not having a rigged ship blow away their rigging with the blast from the turrets. The second true solution was the breastwork monitors, which had a breastwork built up amidships that protected the intakes and things like that, giving a much higher effective freeboard.

But even ships like the Huascar (a non-breastwork monitor) had five feet of freeboard, which greatly simplified the sea-fighting problem!

 

[Santee1821]

While looking up an article and illustration on the 20-Inch Rodman gun in Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper for April 9th, 1864, I found an image and accompanying description of a monitor being beached at Port Royal for hull maintenance.

This little article is a reminder that to keep three or four monitors on station at Charleston, you need four or five in total. It is also an indication that it was considered better (easier, faster, cheaper, less dangerous?) to beach a monitor at Port Royal than to send the ship north around the North Carolina capes for drydocking.

The text of the article:

Beaching a Monitor in Port Royal Harbor, S.C.

The beaching of the monitors for the purpose of cleansing and repairing is not a task devoid of risk or unattended with difficulties. At Charleston it has been done chiefly, if not entirely, under the superintendence of Capt. Theodore E. Baldwin, whose success has justified his appointment.

After the monitor is moored submarine divers, a class with whom our readers are already familiar from the amusing sketch we gave some weeks since, help to clean the hulls. The beaching saves in this operation about $1,000, and enables the superintendent to give the vessel a coat of paint for about two feet below the overhang, which is impossible without the beaching. The water in the Southern harbor swarms with aquatic plants and fish, which, fastening on the side, soon, if neglected, destroy the vessel.

The image (Accessed via the Internet Archive: Frank Leslie's illustrated newspaper : Leslie, Frank, 1821-1880 : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive )

 

[Saphroneth]

This little article is a reminder that to keep three or four monitors on station at Charleston, you need four or five in total. It is also an indication that it was considered better (easier, faster, cheaper, less dangerous?) to beach a monitor at Port Royal than to send the ship north around the North Carolina capes for drydocking.

The US actually did have a pretty severe problem in the ACW with drydock availability - ships would sometimes spend months waiting, because they had drydocks sufficient to support a second-tier power navy at most.

Generally speaking a British frigate in the 1850s and 1860s took about 2-3 months to refit and corvettes and sloops less, while US ones could sometimes spend six months to a year out of service - most of it waiting for their chance. The USS Seminole was out of service for a year for example. This is because the Royal Navy had access to 31 permanent naval dry docks (plus any floating ones), while the USN had two permanent dry docks (NY and Boston), and floating docks at Philadelphia, Portsmouth and San Francisco.

It's quite possible that sending the ship to drydock would have entailed a wait of nearly a year just to get a slot!

 

[Rhea Cole]

That the Confederates had any warships, much less ironclads, at Charleston is easy to overlook. That may be the answer.



Yes, but my question was why not more. All 4 came from the James Rivet Squadron; none from the Charleston blockade.



Albemarle first attacked in April 1864, but was not sunk by Cushing until late October.

1855 Albemarle Sound North Carolina NC Antique Coast Chart Map

Preliminary Chart of Albemarle Sound North Carolina, Genuine Antique Coast Survey Chart from 1855

mapsofantiquity.com

As this period map clearly indicates, the Albermerle was blockaded by nature. It wasn't capable of blue water sailing. It only carried enough fuel for a few day's steaming… assuming its engines could last that long.

As was demonstrated, local assets were capable of neutralizing the Albermerle.

 

[Rhea Cole]

While looking up an article and illustration on the 20-Inch Rodman gun in Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper for April 9th, 1864, I found an image and accompanying description of a monitor being beached at Port Royal for hull maintenance.

This little article is a reminder that to keep three or four monitors on station at Charleston, you need four or five in total. It is also an indication that it was considered better (easier, faster, cheaper, less dangerous?) to beach a monitor at Port Royal than to send the ship north around the North Carolina capes for drydocking.

The text of the article:

Beaching a Monitor in Port Royal Harbor, S.C.

The beaching of the monitors for the purpose of cleansing and repairing is not a task devoid of risk or unattended with difficulties. At Charleston it has been done chiefly, if not entirely, under the superintendence of Capt. Theodore E. Baldwin, whose success has justified his appointment.

After the monitor is moored submarine divers, a class with whom our readers are already familiar from the amusing sketch we gave some weeks since, help to clean the hulls. The beaching saves in this operation about $1,000, and enables the superintendent to give the vessel a coat of paint for about two feet below the overhang, which is impossible without the beaching. The water in the Southern harbor swarms with aquatic plants and fish, which, fastening on the side, soon, if neglected, destroy the vessel.

The image (Accessed via the Internet Archive: Frank Leslie's illustrated newspaper : Leslie, Frank, 1821-1880 : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive )

View attachment 522943

Careening ships in order to clean & repair the hull was a centuries long tradition.

 

[Saphroneth]

As this period map clearly indicates, the Albermerle was blockaded by nature. It wasn't capable of blue water sailing. It only carried enough fuel for a few day's steaming… assuming its engines could last that long.

The Albemarle's purpose was to fight in the North Carolina sounds.

Of course, if you downcheck the Albemarle for being incapable of blue water sailing, you also have to downcheck basically every monitor!

 

[USS ALASKA]

...while the USN had two permanent dry docks (NY and Boston)...

...and Drydock Number One, Norfolk Naval Shipyard in Portsmouth, Virginia.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[Saphroneth]

...and Drydock Number One, Norfolk Naval Shipyard in Portsmouth, Virginia.

Certainly true at the start of the war! I wasn't sure if it had been demolished by the retreating Confederates (my list is from the context of a Trent war).

 

[Rhea Cole]

The Albemarle's purpose was to fight in the North Carolina sounds.

Of course, if you downcheck the Albemarle for being incapable of blue water sailing, you also have to downcheck basically every monitor!

Indeed, Monitors were littoral & brown water designs. There was no blue water threat or force projection role for them. Of course Monitors operated as fleet elements. Colliers, barges, ordinance carriers, supply vessels & depots kept the Monitors in active service.

Fundamentally, CSA ironclads acted independently. There was no unifying doctrine or strategy underpinning the operations. Single vessels here & there scored tactical successes. However, to USN flotillas advancing up rivers & in littoral waters they could not be anything but an annoyance strategically.

Note: it was researching gunboat quilts that alerted me to the futility of the CSA ironclads.

I am preprogrammed to differ to the collective wisdom of Southern ladies. Early on the quilt making ladies realized that contributing to the construction of gunboats was a waste of money. Sale of their exquisite handwork contributed incalculably to the heath & comfort of Southern casualties.

Links:

The Gunboat Quilts

One of the "Gunboat Quilts" attributed to Martha Jane Singleton Hatter Bullock (1815-1896). 66" x 66" Collection of the Birmin...

civilwarquilts.blogspot.com

Ladies Of The Confederacy Genius Plan- The Gunboat Quilts | Ladies Tea - War from a Feminine Perspective

It's been a little hard finding long articles on this topic, no idea why. Given the twin subjects, ' Quilts' and ' Gunboats', well triplet really, ' The Confederacy', you'd have thought someone would have really put out something lengthy on this. I'm quoting pieces from various places, plus pics...

civilwartalk.com

 

[Saphroneth]

Fundamentally, CSA ironclads acted independently. There was no unifying doctrine or strategy underpinning the operations. Single vessels here & there scored tactical successes. However, to USN flotillas advancing up rivers & in littoral waters they could not be anything but an annoyance strategically.

I'm not sure what you would consider to qualify as a unifying doctrine or strategy. I'd say that it would be reasonable to view CS ironclads as acting to present threat and to amplify the extent to which USN resources needed to be committed to a blockade - a single CS ironclad means that the blockading forces need to be significantly stronger than that single CS ironclad so as to continuously be able to contain a sally by the ironclad.

What they don't do is act to combine forces, but that would be basically impossible. That would require the CSA to build ships that were not merely superior to US ironclads on an individual basis but able to break blockade outwards and then break blockade inwards to create a united squadron. It means being able to outfight a significant fraction of the US Navy.

The Albemarle for example meant that USN action on the Albemarle Sound had to be primarily naval and had to involve enough concentrated firepower to fight her off; she drove off US shipping, permitted Hoke to take Plymouth and the forts, and successfully controlled the mouth of the Roanoke river. Had the Union attempted an amphibious operation up the Chowan, then the Albemarle would have been able to cut it off (interfering with, or preventing, supply runs) which basically means that in 1864 such an amphibious operation can't seriously be contemplated.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

As this period map clearly indicates, the Albermerle was blockaded by nature. It wasn't capable of blue water sailing. It only carried enough fuel for a few day's steaming… assuming its engines could last that long.

Did the Union Navy know that?

 

[Rhea Cole]

Did the Union Navy know that?

By that do you mean that the Albermerle did not have logistical support? I would say yes.

By way of example; when a City Class ironclad of the Mississippi Flotilla steamed upstream it was quite a show.

In order to breast the 3 knot current a tug towed ahead. On either beam two or more coal barges were lashed on. The entire crew, officers included, moved a ton of coal / hour. All this effort achieved a relative motion of about the same as a furiously peddling girl on a trike.

What it required for an ironclad to go tactical for even short bursts was no mystery to USN officers.

The post war sea going Monitors were a different design from the littoral & riverine wartime Monitors.

Link to M2 USS Amphitrite seagoing Monitor.

Battleship Photo Index M-2 USS AMPHITRITE

 

[Saphroneth]

I would assume that the USN could guess that the Albemarle's voyaging distance was not great, but I should point out that the Virginia carried 150 tons of coal and had an estimated steaming range of about 600 nautical miles, which would be quite enough for it to travel from Norfolk clear down to Savannah.

In other words, the USN cannot know for sure that the Albemarle's radius of action is insufficient for it to interfere with the blockade on other stations. They can't just ignore it, and have to blockade it with ships.

 

[Saphroneth]

4. Were Neosho, Osage, and Ozark of any real use on the Mississippi River by the time they entered service? Were there any Confederate threats, real or imagined, that the rest of the brown water tinclad gunboat fleet couldn't handle?

To consider this question, I think there's a combination of a few factors going on.

1) These ships were ordered at a time when the issue was in doubt, so their completion followed naturally; once finished, the US had the ironclads and may as well use them.
2) Even with no permanent batteries left on the Mississippi itself, the Confederates could still set up temporary batteries to harrass US shipping. A monitor or other ironclad is more able to resist those batteries than an unarmoured gunboat - the kind of cannon you need to harm such a monitor is very difficult to transport in a "flying battery" and so the monitor can be sure of suppressing the battery.
3) There is always the risk of the Confederates building an ironclad of some description on a tributary and getting it onto the Mississippi itself.
4) Speaking of tributaries, the US can operate both defensively and offensively on those tributaries. The Red River for example - and in so operating they might well run into Confederate shore defences that would benefit the Union to shell.

 

[J.H. Moose]

Indeed, Monitors were littoral & brown water designs. There was no blue water threat or force projection role for them. Of course Monitors operated as fleet elements. Colliers, barges, ordinance carriers, supply vessels & depots kept the Monitors in active service.

Fundamentally, CSA ironclads acted independently. There was no unifying doctrine or strategy underpinning the operations. Single vessels here & there scored tactical successes. However, to USN flotillas advancing up rivers & in littoral waters they could not be anything but an annoyance strategically.

Note: it was researching gunboat quilts that alerted me to the futility of the CSA ironclads.

I am preprogrammed to differ to the collective wisdom of Southern ladies. Early on the quilt making ladies realized that contributing to the construction of gunboats was a waste of money. Sale of their exquisite handwork contributed incalculably to the heath & comfort of Southern casualties.

Links:

The Gunboat Quilts

One of the "Gunboat Quilts" attributed to Martha Jane Singleton Hatter Bullock (1815-1896). 66" x 66" Collection of the Birmin...

civilwarquilts.blogspot.com

Ladies Of The Confederacy Genius Plan- The Gunboat Quilts | Ladies Tea - War from a Feminine Perspective

It's been a little hard finding long articles on this topic, no idea why. Given the twin subjects, ' Quilts' and ' Gunboats', well triplet really, ' The Confederacy', you'd have thought someone would have really put out something lengthy on this. I'm quoting pieces from various places, plus pics...

civilwartalk.com

I mean, fundamentally every Confederate ironclad was constructed for a specific purpose. The CSS Arkansas and CSS Palmetto States didn't have a unifying doctrine because they were built under vastly different circumstances and for vastly different purposes. A lot of the early CS ironclads built for coastal operations were constructed in an eager frenzy to "break the blockade" which proved to be a futile endeavor as the war dragged on. Eventually, almost all of the ironclads in the large harbor cities (Mobile, Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah etc) would become powerful fleets in being which greatly aided harbor defense. Wether or not they would've actually been decisive in a naval assault was ultimately irrelevant due to the fact that their presence alone was enough of a deterrence to dissuade naval attacks without significant reinforcements and support being present for an attacker.

 

[Saphroneth]

I actually wonder if the "break the blockade" frenzy is parallel to the "monitor mania". If so, in both cases the idea of using the novel technology in a particular way resulted in the construction decisions.

Of the two I'd be inclined to mark the Union down somewhat because I think they ended up fixated on monitors when they could have built other classes of ships instead, or at least taken actions that would have resulted in overall better combatants down the line. Some monitors are a good decision because they exploit resources that aren't completely spoken for, but the very large number that were actually built saturated the available resources and resulted in a whole cascading chain of other sunk costs and decisions; the Passaic class for example were not very good at actually shooting straight because you couldn't aim the 15" gun.

The Confederates had less resources available and in some respects this kinda meant they were less likely to make an expensive error...

 

[Rhea Cole]

I mean, fundamentally every Confederate ironclad was constructed for a specific purpose. The CSS Arkansas and CSS Palmetto States didn't have a unifying doctrine because they were built under vastly different circumstances and for vastly different purposes. A lot of the early CS ironclads built for coastal operations were constructed in an eager frenzy to "break the blockade" which proved to be a futile endeavor as the war dragged on. Eventually, almost all of the ironclads in the large harbor cities (Mobile, Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah etc) would become powerful fleets in being which greatly aided harbor defense. Wether or not they would've actually been decisive in a naval assault was ultimately irrelevant due to the fact that their presence alone was enough of a deterrence to dissuade naval attacks without significant reinforcements and support being present for an attacker.

You have put your finger exactly on the point. The Union command of the Mississippi Valley was one United command. The CSA departmental system was broken up into NINE MUTUALLY HOSTILE FIEFDOMS. Some of the petite dictators had been social enemies since childhood. They were dedicated to the undoing of each other… Grant & Porter were hardly a passing thought.

The captains of the only organized flotilla on the Mississippi did not meet even once before charging, Don Quixote style, UPRIVER AGAINST THE CURRENT AT MEMPHIS. Fifteen minutes later it was all over & like Nashville, the city fell to a few men in a rowboat.

Building ironclads will-he-nil-he here & there consuming vast quantities of vital materials without even a ghost of a strategic or tactical doctrine was a formula for inevitable disaster. It was Clausewitz's worst nightmare.

No doubt the ladies at the quilting bee had some very pointed words to say on the subject.

 

[67th Tigers]

The post war sea going Monitors were a different design from the littoral & riverine wartime Monitors.

Link to M2 USS Amphitrite seagoing Monitor.

Battleship Photo Index M-2 USS AMPHITRITE

In fact, these were completely new ships, built in the style of British Breastwork Monitors.

The confrontation with Spain in the early 1870's was galling, as Adm. Evans noted:

"The force collected ... was the best, and indeed about all we had ... and if it had not been so serious it would have been laughable to see our condition. We remained several weeks, making faces at the Spaniards 90 miles away at Havana, while two modern vessels of war would have done us up in 30 minutes. We were dreadfully mortified over it all."

Congress would not fund new ships, but they would "repair" some older ships. In reality the 5 largest ACW monitors were dismantled and scrapped, and 5 new British-style ships were built. They came into Commission in the early 1890's, and were already 20 years out-of-date...

 

[Saphroneth]

Building ironclads will-he-nil-he here & there consuming vast quantities of vital materials without even a ghost of a strategic or tactical doctrine was a formula for inevitable disaster. It was Clausewitz's worst nightmare.

The question then is - what, in your view, would have been a unifying strategic doctrine that would have led to better utilization of resources, and what would it have achieved?