Ironclad Monitors 1863-1865

[USS ALASKA]

To me the question is, did the resources expended for each of the navies produce ships which were capable combatants for the war. The CSN mostly did not do this.

Please see @DaveBrt 's thread...

Were Confederate Ironclads Worth The Effort/Cost?

Brass Napoleon Award - Were Confederate Ironclads Worth The Effort/Cost? | Naval War - At Sea & Along Inland Waterways

It could be said that the great cost to create and maintain these great ironclad warships was never recouperated by their actions.

civilwartalk.com

Might take a while to read through.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[Bryce]

This thread illustrates the same problems that the land war had - no one had really taken into account the changes in technology and had sufficient trained men to man them all. The Union had most of the 'big ship' shipyards and were making large seaworthy frigates. The Confederacy's few shipyards were still making seaworthy merchant vessels and used them for blockade running - but they still had to buy from abroad. The other shipyards were for river traffic - very important considering the lack of a railroad network like the North - relatively small vessels and more easily converted to counter the monitors.

The term 'ironclad' in Europe was associated with a seagoing vessel, usually made with a wooden hull, and clad in iron plate, but not unlike earlier wooden warships. Indeed, the Royal Navy had HMS Warrior, the first iron-hulled, armored warship in service in 1861 Yes, it was steam powered with screws, but it looked like any other full-rigged warship of the time. It was basically a broadside warship 26 x 64pdr SBML on the gundeck with 10 x 110pdr RBL top deck mounted - no reliance on barbettes and turrets.

View attachment 523088
The nearest to the monitor-type was the French (and British) floating battery used to hit shore fortifications and used in the Baltic and Crimea. These were basically ironclad broadside vessels, generally towed any distance, unlike the original bomb ketches, however, compare freeboard of the French Lave with the USS Mahopac:
View attachment 523089View attachment 523090
Both did a similar job, but different designs for different environments.

I have an important question. I don't really understand the warrior and it sister ships. I read somewhere that the vessel had an inner casement that protected the engines and the guns. It was like a second bulwork inside the outer Bulwork of the vessel itself. The weakness, I have read, was, the fore and aft ends of the vessel which were not protected viable work. Can somebody please addresses

 

[Bryce]

1865
Canonicus, Saugus, Mahopac, and Monadnock (all from the James River Flotilla) participated in the attacks on Fort Fisher.

Montauk shifted from Charleston to the Cape Fear River after the fall of Fort Fisher.

Patapsco was sunk at Charleston by a mine in January. Passiac, Nahant, Catskill, and Nantucket remained off Charleston until after its fall. They were joined by Canonicus, presumably as a replacement for Patapsco.

Milwaukee, Winnebago, Chickasaw, and Kickapoo blockaded Mobile and supported Canby's operations against it. They were joined by Osage. Milwaukee and Osage both fell victim to mines.

Neosho and Ozark remained on the Mississippi River or its tributaries.

In January 1865, there was only one monitor left on the James River. This was the Onondaga, a twin turreted monitor. The Confederates were aware of this, so they launched an attack with their squadron. I believe Raphael Semmes was newly in charge of the squadron. They were trying to get to city point. There was a great deal of firing, and the Confederates had to retreat.

I believe there is information on this attack in volume two of Henrico county field of honor, written by Manarin.

Around June 22 or 23rd there was another battle between the opposing fleets at trench reach. John Horn has written about it and I believe it has appeared on a site called the emerging Civil War.

 

[Saphroneth]

I have an important question. I don't really understand the warrior and it sister ships. I read somewhere that the vessel had an inner casement that protected the engines and the guns. It was like a second bulwork inside the outer Bulwork of the vessel itself. The weakness, I have read, was, the fore and aft ends of the vessel which were not protected viable work. Can somebody please addresses

Okay, so here's how the Warrior works.


The ship's hull is made of iron, not wood. Consequently she doesn't need to be armoured along her whole length because her hull can't be set on fire by hot-shot.

The central battery (the middle section of the vessel) is armoured. The armour is 4.5" iron over a thick wooden backing, which is attached to the hull (specifically to the outside of the hull). This goes down to below the waterline.
The same kind of armour forms a bulkhead closing off the front and rear of the central battery. This means that the central battery, which includes most of the guns and the engine, is protected by the armour.

The central battery section has enough bouyancy by itself to float the entire ship, and there are no entrances into the central battery section below the waterline. Damage to the unarmoured front and rear cannot sink the ship by itself, even if they're completely open to the sea and completely flooded.

The steering gear is not protected by the armour. But this isn't actually of any major concern - the steering gear is inside the ship and it's impossible for someone outside to target it. They can't see it. It would be shooting at about a hundred feet of warship trying to get a lucky hit on something inside the iron hull that you can't see; during the days of wooden ships, even vessels that were pounded to complete wrecks could still steer, and nobody ever really tried to deliberately disable the steering of a target. Sometimes the steering of a wooden ship kept moving until the stern literally fell off because it had been shot to pieces.

AIUI the Warrior's steering gear is also below the waterline, which makes it even harder to damage. There are some parts that are above water, but you'd do better trying to shoot the gunports - those, at least, you can see!

The rudder is also not protected by the armour. This isn't of any major concern either. It's underwater. That's how a rudder works.



There is an exaggeration of the extent to which the rear of the Warrior is vulnerable, probably because the Monitor literally cannot harm the central battery and because people assume that this is a flaw that makes Warrior uniquely vulnerable. Instead it's merely a place where the Warrior is on par with ships for hundreds of years that did not have that as a problem.

(For a sense of scale, the Redoutable at Trafalgar was basically fired on continuously from the rear by Tonnant for something more than half an hour, and she did lose her rudder, but her stern was so damaged that later that day it collapsed outright - she'd been literally shot to pieces. This is not the normal fate for a warship; ask yourself how often a US vessel in the Civil War loses steering from gunfire.)

 

[Old Soldier]

I have an important question. I don't really understand the warrior and it sister ships. I read somewhere that the vessel had an inner casement that protected the engines and the guns. It was like a second bulwork inside the outer Bulwork of the vessel itself. The weakness, I have read, was, the fore and aft ends of the vessel which were not protected viable work. Can somebody please addresses

This was true even of battleships in WW2. The main armour just protects the magazines, turrets and engines.

HMS Warrior was also the first iron ship - hull sides and frame - for the Royal Navy and the two layers of iron for the hull were separated by - teak wood. That was to dampen shock waves and protect from splinters. It had transverse bulkheads on the gundeck to protect it from raking fire along the gundeck. It was a broadside ironclad so all of the gundeck was included, there was no 'central battery' That came later. The sides were armored to 6' below the waterline (no torpedoes!) and 16' above IOW it was an armoured box with a rounded stern and a pointed bow.

 

[Saphroneth]

HMS Warrior was also the first iron ship - hull sides and frame - for the Royal Navy and the two layers of iron for the hull were separated by - teak wood. That was to dampen shock waves and protect from splinters. It had transverse bulkheads on the gundeck to protect it from raking fire along the gundeck. It was a broadside ironclad so all of the gundeck was included, there was no 'central battery' That came later. The sides were armored to 6' below the waterline (no torpedoes!) and 16' above IOW it was an armoured box with a rounded stern and a pointed bow.

I've used the term "central battery" to refer to the fact that there was no complete waterline belt. The battery was a large % of the ship, but the ends had no armour.

I should point out that to my understanding the hull was a single thickness of iron - not two separated by teak - though that's from memory. The armour was backed by teak and fastened to the hull.

 

[Old Soldier]

I've used the term "central battery" to refer to the fact that there was no complete waterline belt. The battery was a large % of the ship, but the ends had no armour.

I should point out that to my understanding the hull was a single thickness of iron - not two separated by teak - though that's from memory. The armour was backed by teak and fastened to the hull.

I'll let you off this time!

 

[Saphroneth]

I'll let you off this time!

Fair enough - I do think it's valuable to bring up that Central Battery was a technical term not yet in use. However, like applying "ironclad" to HMS Aetna (which predated the term) I still think it has explanatory value.

 

[Saphroneth]

As a technical note on development, the meaning of a central-battery ironclad in the Royal Navy involves a few particulars if it is to be distinguished from a broadside ironclad or any other type. Those are:

1) The armour of the ship should largely, or entirely, be concentrated in a single central battery. This armoured box contains the battery and important machinery.
2) This battery is concentrated over a relatively short length, which permits the armour to be heavier and also means that the ship can have a shorter length relative to her beam - which aids turning, though it reduces speed.
3) This battery fires through gun ports, rather than via a rotating turret or barbette mount.

The distinction between broadside and central battery is partly one that's... fluid? There's definitely cases that are mostly one or the other, but in a lot of ways it's a design philosophy thing rather than a ship trait thing.
It's also driven by the gun armour race.
First the increasing armour of the "threat" (possible enemy ships to battle) and the consequent reduction in the number of effective guns that can be carried - Warrior carried 26 AP guns that each had a tube weight of five tons (total main battery tube weight 130 tons), while the central battery ironclad Hercules carried 8 AP guns that each had a tube weight of 18 tons, plus two with a tube weight of 12 tons. (total main battery tube weight 168 tons).
Second, the increasing gun strength of the "threat" meant that armour had to be thicker and so could cover less of the ship. Warrior had a 4.5" backed strake along the whole of the broadside battery, which was 213 feet long, and had no waterline belt outside the battery; Hercules had armour 6" to 9" thick, and her box battery was only 83 feet long - she couldn't have enough bouyancy in the box alone to maintain flotation, so had to have a waterline belt outside the box battery as well.

These factors combined to mean that you armoured a smaller chunk of the ship above the waterline, and did so more heavily.

 

[Old Soldier]

Central battery = an armoured 'box' in the centre of the vessel with small number of large caliber guns on mounts with a firing angle of about 60% ie not in turrets or barbettes Similar to CSS Virginia, but with smaller 'box' and higher freeboard.

Broadside Ironclad = a large number of smaller caliber guns along each side of the ship, behind armor, firing directly sideways only, like HMS Victory or USS Constitution

 

[Saphroneth]

Central battery = an armoured 'box' in the centre of the vessel with small number of large caliber guns on mounts with a firing angle of about 60% ie not in turrets or barbettes Similar to CSS Virginia, but with smaller 'box' and higher freeboard.

I'm not sure how much the firing angle matters for the definition versus a broadside ironclad. Bellerophon, the first central-battery ironclad by most definitions, had her main battery mounted broadside.

 

[Old Soldier]

It's called 'technical development' - and also shows the resistance to new ideas - 'We have always done it that way!'. The development of guns, particularly muzzle-loaders was rather rapid as was the development of gun mountings, their weight and the effect on the seaworthiness of the ships. Most sea-going vessels were powered by steam and screw but were still fitted with masts and full-rigged which basically limited the traverse of any guns on board. Bellerophon was commissioned in 1865 using the guns available at the time and to conventional naval thinking. Alexandra in 1877 was a rather old-fashioned one-off - and the last of her kind. Both were full-rigged and steam powered. Large caliber breechloading guns were not adopted by the Royal Navy until the 1880s.

HMS Alexandra

A good comparison is the tactics and formations of the Civil War changing from smoothbore musket to rifle musket; from 'the line' to more loose formations - and the generals line of thought based on older technology and experience.

HMS Devasation (1873) was a mastless turret ship and a bit of a gamble since she had no sails. Both she and sister ship Thunderer (1877) were basically trial ships which set the pattern of capital ships - and naval practice - for the next 30 years. Thunderer was the first vessel to receive the 'new' 10" BL guns in 1881.

HMS Devastation

 

[Saphroneth]

I think that in the above post you might have a bit of a tendency to overly focus on the principle of resistance to new ideas being the reason why development isn't faster. For a ship with the ability to ship more than a dozen heavy guns (as Warrior) there's no real problem with broadside because it means you can actually use all of those guns; the reason for the odd arrangements in a central battery ironclad to get end-on fire come about because chase guns are a weight penalty not much preferred, and the retention of sails is important to ensure that ships can actually get to places - it's as engines become more efficient and coal supplies more abundant that sails recede in importance, because the alternative is that you have a battleship which you can't use in places where you might very much need to use a battleship.


It's true that masts and full-rigging limited where you could place guns (and was a primary obstacle to the turret) but it's not the case that the masts were an old fashioned hold-over no longer needed and it's not the case that the turret form was simply Better if only the constructors had had eyes to see it.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

I cringe at USS Roanoke's conversion which ruined a good ship and used enormous resources to produce a basically useless ship.

Based on my recent thread about frigates in the war, I think Roanoke underwent conversion specifically because the Navy viewed them as obsolescent, especially for this particular conflict. The result was a failure, but I can definitely understand the intent.

 

[Saphroneth]

Based on my recent thread about frigates in the war, I think Roanoke underwent conversion specifically because the Navy viewed them as obsolescent, especially for this particular conflict. The result was a failure, but I can definitely understand the intent.

It's possible, but the USN's heavy frigates are their only serious ships of force. Strong wooden frigates and liners didn't really stop being useful against ironclad battleships until the later part of the 1860s, assuming appropriate guns, and a 22-gun broadside that can move at ten knots under power isn't to be trifled with.

If what you want is ironclads and (for non ironclads) raw hull numbers, it's a reasonable approach, mind you.

 

[Old Soldier]

I think that in the above post you might have a bit of a tendency to overly focus on the principle of resistance to new ideas being the reason why development isn't faster. For a ship with the ability to ship more than a dozen heavy guns (as Warrior) there's no real problem with broadside because it means you can actually use all of those guns; the reason for the odd arrangements in a central battery ironclad to get end-on fire come about because chase guns are a weight penalty not much preferred, and the retention of sails is important to ensure that ships can actually get to places - it's as engines become more efficient and coal supplies more abundant that sails recede in importance, because the alternative is that you have a battleship which you can't use in places where you might very much need to use a battleship.


It's true that masts and full-rigging limited where you could place guns (and was a primary obstacle to the turret) but it's not the case that the masts were an old fashioned hold-over no longer needed and it's not the case that the turret form was simply Better if only the constructors had had eyes to see it.

There was a tendency to rely on the old mast-and-sails as a backup, but that was always going to go as steam engines became more reliable and more mechanically efficient and thus more powerful. Technological development.

The main problem was with the guns as RBLs were looked down on because, as the calibers increased, the adopted Armstrong screw breeches failed due to poor metal quality or failed to oburate - seal the breech - sufficiently and reduced the velocity and thus the range and penetration of shot, hence the survival of the rifled muzzleloader for main armament. However, loading was done by hydraulic machinery by this time.
*Note that most of the RMLs in the Civil War were of small calibre or small charge and had less breech failures.

It was the bursting of a 12" RML on HMS Thunderer in 1879, killing 11 men and injuring 35 others that prompted change. This was due to a suspected misfire and resulting double load that forced the introduction of RBLs. By now, advances in metallurgy and technology prompted the adoption of Welin's interrupted thread breech and, eventually, deBange's obduration method. No missfire would now go unnoticed.

** a note for the 'techies' - Krupps answer to obduration was the brass case which was adopted for their high quality steel sliding breech guns which was used as the basis for many smaller caliber QF (quick firing) guns later on.

 

[Saphroneth]

There was a tendency to rely on the old mast-and-sails as a backup, but that was always going to go as steam engines became more reliable and more mechanically efficient and thus more powerful. Technological development.

Quite - but you don't want to do away with the old method until the new one can verifiably work without it!

And yes, the RBL/RML thing is an interesting one, though I'd actually argue that the RBL 110 lber was actually a perfectly serviceable gun for all purposes aside from armour penetration. It'd be very effective against wooden ships.

It'd be more correct to say that the Brits went smoothbore -> RBL -> RML, and for a time had a parallel approach of high velocity smoothbore and Armstrong RBL, but ultimately went to the RMLs with the Shunt system and the world's first true AP shell (Palliser).

I'd also say that there's a period where RML is better than RBL for AP guns, then a period where they run alongside one another (the RBL's got issues with the extra points of failure in the breech, the RML has the risk of user error resulting in a double load, neither has all-aspect loading) and RBL finally becomes decisively superior with the introduction of all aspect loading in the 1890s.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

It's possible, but the USN's heavy frigates are their only serious ships of force. Strong wooden frigates and liners didn't really stop being useful against ironclad battleships until the later part of the 1860s, assuming appropriate guns, and a 22-gun broadside that can move at ten knots under power isn't to be trifled with.

The US Navy only ever dabbled with ships-of-the-line and wasn't even very committed to frigates by 1861. The Merrimack-class was clearly an attempt an a new generation of steam frigates and they were at best a mixed bag, due in no small part due to mechanical difficulties.

For ACW purposes, two sloops were much more useful than one frigate. In a fight with the Royal Navy or another serious fleet power the Roanoke would have been more useful in its original configuration, but the USN seems to have had little concern for such a contingency.

 

[Saphroneth]

Honestly, if your assessment is correct I do sort of wonder at how much the USN's planning made sense! Their not having many ships of force for funding reasons is one thing, but not having many ships of force because they don't think there's any point to having them is... risky. If the enemy has ships of force and you don't, then you don't have many options, and ships of force are also the main way of projecting power.

 

[Piedone]

. Strong wooden frigates and liners didn't really stop being useful against ironclad battleships until the later part of the 1860s,

The austrian ship-of-the-line "Kaiser" comes to one's mind - 1866 she bore the brunt of the action at Lissa against italian ironclads and fared reasonably well…