The Tale Untwisted

[OpnCoronet]

Unfortunately they intel Meade got was from a system implemented by Hooker, well after McClellan had been relieved. McClellan's

I would agree that McClellan often fought more not to lose than to win.

I really like David Welker's analysis of McClellan on his book about the cornfield. He argues that McClellan was incapable of making decisions s on the fly, and so when things did not go as he has planned he could bot adjust.

I pretty much agree with this and I think it applies in particular Antietam. He drew up a simple frontal assault , sent into battle Corps by Corps in succession as they exhausted themselves one by one. I read a description that it was like McClellan wound up his army like a wind up toy and set it in motion and sat back and watched as it slowly ran down.

 

[trice]

I pretty much agree with this and I think it applies in particular Antietam. He drew up a simple frontal assault , sent into battle Corps by Corps in succession as they exhausted themselves one by one. I read a description that it was like McClellan wound up his army like a wind up toy and set it in motion and sat back and watched as it slowly ran down.

McClellan's plan looks like an attack en echelon starting on McClellan's right and continuing down the line to his left (start in the north and continue down the line to the south).

The basic idea of this type of attack is to strike one flank and try to win there while keeping the enemy's potential reinforcements for the defenders of the early attack tied up by the threat of the later attacks continuing down the line. If Lee pulls troops from his right to fight the early attack on his left, Lee's right may be too weak to resist when Burnside's attack finally kicks off against it. OTOH, if Lee does not send troops to help his left, the early attacks (Hooker, Mansfield, Sumner) may overwhelm Lee's right.

Unfortunately for McClellan this did not work out in the end. The reasons include excellent Confederate fighting performances, bad luck, some poor Union management and a bunch of other things.

An en echelon attack is a normal idea in the Civil War. The problem here is that it did not work out, although it showed signs of coming close. Perhaps it would have if McClellan had sent in a last attack with everything he had left. Perhaps not.

The first recorded example of an en echelon attack goes back to the battle of Leuctra in 371 BC (Thebes smashed the Spartans with it, a fascinating story in its own right). The basic idea is to create a local superiority early on and win with it before most of the enemy force can make itself felt.

 

[rpkennedy]

McClellan's plan looks like an attack en echelon starting on McClellan's right and continuing down the line to his left (start in the north and continue down the line to the south).

The basic idea of this type of attack is to strike one flank and try to win there while keeping the enemy's potential reinforcements for the defenders of the early attack tied up by the threat of the later attacks continuing down the line. If Lee pulls troops from his right to fight the early attack on his left, Lee's right may be too weak to resist when Burnside's attack finally kicks off against it. OTOH, if Lee does not send troops to help his left, the early attacks (Hooker, Mansfield, Sumner) may overwhelm Lee's right.

Unfortunately for McClellan this did not work out in the end. The reasons include excellent Confederate fighting performances, bad luck, some poor Union management and a bunch of other things.

An en echelon attack is a normal idea in the Civil War. The problem here is that it did not work out, although it showed signs of coming close. Perhaps it would have if McClellan had sent in a last attack with everything he had left. Perhaps not.

The first recorded example of an en echelon attack goes back to the battle of Leuctra in 371 BC (Thebes smashed the Spartans with it, a fascinating story in its own right). The basic idea is to create a local superiority early on and win with it before most of the enemy force can make itself felt.

I think that the en echelon attack was more a consequence of circumstances rather than any plan. McClellan clearly wanted Burnside to move much earlier than he did which would have led to both of Lee's wings being struck shortly after one another.

Ryan

 

[trice]

I think that the en echelon attack was more a consequence of circumstances rather than any plan. McClellan clearly wanted Burnside to move much earlier than he did which would have led to both of Lee's wings being struck shortly after one another.

Ryan

That might be very true. However, it is probably also true that Burnside should have moved earlier (at least in the sense of getting across the creek) and whoever is at fault, it should have been better managed. It is not necessary for there to be a very long delay between the first attacks and the last. You don't want it to be either too slow or too fast (risks exist for either). Timing is key, and the management of the parts of the attack crucial. I do not think McClellan managed it particularly well and Burnside just makes me shake my head. Somewhere in there the Union should have pulled a better result out.

OTOH, luck and Confederate performance played a big part. If Sumner's II Corps attack is better managed/led and supported, it might very well win the day for the Union -- but it wasn't and the moving pieces of Early, Walker and McLaws crumpled Sedgwick and broke Sumner. Sumner has some good aggressive signs early that might have worked, but looks stunned later; French going astray leaves me agog; and I think Richardson should have been pushed forward faster. Something better should have happened for the Union in the morning and it would have required better leadership -- but that did not happen.

 

[67th Tigers]

By 0800, 1st, 2nd(-), 9th and 12th Corps had orders committing them to the attack. McClellan only held back the two divisions in the centre (Sykes and Richardson).

A large part of the problem was that early evening on the 16th, Sumner returned to his tent at Keedysville. The 1750 order from McClellan was for Sumner to get the 12th Corps to Hooker immediately. This led to the 12th Corps, newly arrived on the field, getting lost because Sumner, the officer charged with getting them to where the army commander directed them, went back to his tent to sleep. Worse, the next morning Sumner went to the wrong place (Hooker's old HQ) and say there for an hour whilst McClellan's staff were searching everywhere for him. Fortunately, they'd started Sedgwick and French without him.

Sumner, at the head of Sedgwick's division, doesn't reach the area where 5 divisions under his nominal command have been fighting. Arriving at the East Woods ca. 0830-0900 he is met by Meade (by McClellan's order now commanding 1st Corps), a staff officer from 12th Corps (reporting Mansfield was dead and Williams in command), and a staff officer from McClellan with the orders:

"Gen. Hooker appears to be driving the enemy rapidly. If he does not require your assistance on his right, please push up on his left through the ravine at the head of which the house was burned this morning, getting possession of the woods to the right as soon as possible & push on towards Sharpsburg and a little to its rear as rapidly as possible. Use your artillery freely."

McClellan's orders told Sumner's 2nd Corps (distinguishing his roles) to do one of two things depending on the situation. He was either to form on the 1st and 12th Corps' right and push into the West Wood's if the 1st and 12th Corps lacked the combat power to do it, OR he was to form on their left and attack the Sunken Road position and the Dunker Church. He did the latter, forming his three available divisions (including a division of 12th Corps) in a line and advancing 3 divisions abreast in a SW direction.

Sadly, Sumner played division commander on his right flank, rather than hanging back to keep command of his wing. At 0910 McClellan, who'd seen McLaws moving to attack Sedgwick, sent a warning to Sumner. However, Sumner wasn't anywhere near the signals station, and it never got to him. No-one was available to react to the warning.

Essentially, I think Sumner thought he was entering a pursuit phase, whereas the enemy was just committing their reserves to counterattack.

 

[trice]

Long ago, a friend sent me a copy of a new book that was being published by Savas Woodbury called Leadership and Command in the Civil War. IIRR it contained an essay called A Reassessment of Edwin V. Sumner and the Federal II Corps at Antietam by Marion V. Armstrong. If I am right about that, he has now written two books on the subject called:

• Unfurl Those Colors: McClellan, Sumner, and the Second Army Corps in the Antietam Campaign
• Opposing the Second Corps at Antietam: The Fight for the Confederate Left and Center on America's Bloodiest Day

I found his premise and thoughts interesting and plausible. Certainly it was an intriguing look at a controversial point in history. The other essays in that book were on different men, but also interesting. I haven't read the two Armstrong books above, but maybe I should. It sure sounds like he must have put an awful lot of hard work and research into the fight of the II Corps.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

An en echelon attack is a normal idea in the Civil War. The problem here is that it did not work out, although it showed signs of coming close.

Echelon attacks are not normally executed on battlefield where the terrain separates the parts of the attacking army so much.

Franklin's VI Corps was essentially unused and did not continue the echelon attack i.e. didn't come in on Sumner's left.

Had McClellan been able to cross a corps over the middle bridge then Burnside would not be operating in isolation. Instead he only crossed Sykes' division and some cavalry, neither of which seem to have acted with any aggressiveness.

An echelon attack, or any attack really, probably should have included some kind of movement west of the West Woods. Instead Union attacks were in a deadly funnel.

 

[OpnCoronet]

McClellan's plan looks like an attack en echelon starting on McClellan's right and continuing down the line to his left (start in the north and continue down the line to the south).

The basic idea of this type of attack is to strike one flank and try to win there while keeping the enemy's potential reinforcements for the defenders of the early attack tied up by the threat of the later attacks continuing down the line. If Lee pulls troops from his right to fight the early attack on his left, Lee's right may be too weak to resist when Burnside's attack finally kicks off against it. OTOH, if Lee does not send troops to help his left, the early attacks (Hooker, Mansfield, Sumner) may overwhelm Lee's right.

Unfortunately for McClellan this did not work out in the end. The reasons include excellent Confederate fighting performances, bad luck, some poor Union management and a bunch of other things.

An en echelon attack is a normal idea in the Civil War. The problem here is that it did not work out, although it showed signs of coming close. Perhaps it would have if McClellan had sent in a last attack with everything he had left. Perhaps not.

The first recorded example of an en echelon attack goes back to the battle of Leuctra in 371 BC (Thebes smashed the Spartans with it, a fascinating story in its own right). The basic idea is to create a local superiority early on and win with it before most of the enemy force can make itself felt.

I would not disagree that the battle was typical of McClellan. The reasons for failure you mention are, I think, fairly consistent with McClellan's time in command of the AoP.

As you indicate, an en echelon attack is simple in concept but not simple in operation. It is not clear to me that McClellan was aware of that fact. What, exactly was McClellan doing as the AoP floundered to another bloody stalemate(was he perhaps trying to keep tabs on Jackson's force at Harper's Ferry)?

 

[67th Tigers]

The problem is, by the time Burnside starts moving forward (1530), there simply isn't much at the Middle Bridge. Sykes' two regular brigades did support Burnside on his right, and conformed to Burnside's movements. The NY Zouave brigade had been sent directly to Burnside, who used them to guard his HQ.

As to Morell's division, two brigades had been sent to reinforce Sumner and Franklin to make a push there. This left only one brigade, Barnes', at the Middle Bridge.

It behooves us to look at what McClellan's plans were before adapting to circumstances and a changing situation.

McClellan expected the 12th Corps to be with the 1st at dawn, and the 2nd Corps (-) to be moving across the creek at dawn to support the 1st and 12th. He expected Burnside to be in a position to assault the bridge. Both Sumner and Burnside were slow and weren't ready at dawn. McClellan expected the 6th Corps to be marching to him, giving him 4 divisions in the centre in the early morning (after Richardson was relieved by Morell).

The fact that the 1st, then 12th, then 2nd and then 6th Corps became engaged essentially one at a time was due to the mismanagement of the wing commander - Sumner. Sumner was clearly massively out of his depth, but seniority meant he couldn't be superseded.

Similarly, Burnside was terribly slow at getting things moving, and tended to be hesitant.

Wargames don't need "McClellan rules." They need poor subordinates who don't do what they're told rules.

 

[trice]

I would not disagree that the battle was typical of McClellan. The reasons for failure you mention are, I think, fairly consistent with McClellan's time in command of the AoP.

My general feeling about McClellan might be expressed as "so close but no cigar". There are many times he almost achieves a big success but doesn't actually get what he is trying for.

As you indicate, an en echelon attack is simple in concept but not simple in operation. It is not clear to me that McClellan was aware of that fact. What, exactly was McClellan doing as the AoP floundered to another bloody stalemate(was he perhaps trying to keep tabs on Jackson's force at Harper's Ferry)?

One thing McClellan deserves credit for as the battle starts is his artillery deployment. He was very involved with that, and the Federal artillery was extremely effective in the center, deployed on excellent positions. McClellan deserves a pat on the back for that part of "Artillery Hell".

I do not know of anything specific or unusual that McClellan was doing to keep tabs on the Rebels at Harpers Ferry. He seems to have kept his cavalry concentrated as a reserve for the most part. Possibly a regiment or two sent to Burnside might have been useful in screening his flank to discover A. P. Hill's attack before it crashed into Burnside.

 

[67th Tigers]

I do not know of anything specific or unusual that McClellan was doing to keep tabs on the Rebels at Harpers Ferry. He seems to have kept his cavalry concentrated as a reserve for the most part. Possibly a regiment or two sent to Burnside might have been useful in screening his flank to discover A. P. Hill's attack before it crashed into Burnside.

AP Hill came from Burnside's front, not flank. Burnside was warned about them 90 minutes before they hit.

 

[Saphroneth]

I do not know of anything specific or unusual that McClellan was doing to keep tabs on the Rebels at Harpers Ferry. He seems to have kept his cavalry concentrated as a reserve for the most part. Possibly a regiment or two sent to Burnside might have been useful in screening his flank to discover A. P. Hill's attack before it crashed into Burnside.

The movement of AP Hill's force was already known information, as per:



"To General Burnside:

Look out well on your left; the enemy are moving a strong force in that direction.

Y. Y. Y." - Glokoshi's AAR
(This was 90 minutes before AP Hill hit Burnside.)


This is actually the second message reporting AP Hill.

The signallers on Elk Ridge sent a message to Burnside (in response to a query of his) that there were enemy troops moving up from Shepherdstown, and some time later (at 3 PM) sent him the warning quoted above.

 

[trice]

AP Hill came from Burnside's front, not flank. Burnside was warned about them 90 minutes before they hit.

View attachment 452384

If I should have said front instead of flank, OK. The central point is that cavalry might have been useful to Burnside. and sending a bit would not have mattered much to McClellan's plans. Sent early enough, they might have done many things by merely patrolling.

 

[67th Tigers]

If I should have said front instead of flank, OK. The central point is that cavalry might have been useful to Burnside. and sending a bit would not have mattered much to McClellan's plans. Sent early enough, they might have done many things by merely patrolling.

How would more cavalry be useful for Burnside?

Burnside already has 11 coys of cavalry. What did he do with those?

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

How would more cavalry be useful for Burnside?

Burnside already has 11 coys of cavalry. What did he do with those?

Employment of cavalry at this point was pretty basic. I don't see Pleasanton conducting a delaying action, even with his entire force (less detachments for couriers, HQ guards, etc). Even if he could have gotten around the Confederate right to intercept Hill.

 

[67th Tigers]

There were about 5,000 cavalry with the AoP on 17th September. Of those about 1,000 were employed as escorts, couriers and as the "battle police," chasing down stragglers etc. This is a fairly low number.

Pleasonton's main force in the centre was about 3,000 men. The other 1,000 were roughly split as the two flank guards. The 3rd Pa Cav (ca. 500) were off the army's right flank, and the 6th NY Cav and some attachments (ca. 500) were off the army's left flank.

The problem is simply that compared to 1863, when the AoP had > 10,000 cavalry, the strength of the cavalry is simply quite low.

 

[OpnCoronet]

My general feeling about McClellan might be expressed as "so close but no cigar". There are many times he almost achieves a big success but doesn't actually get what he is trying for.


One thing McClellan deserves credit for as the battle starts is his artillery deployment. He was very involved with that, and the Federal artillery was extremely effective in the center, deployed on excellent positions. McClellan deserves a pat on the back for that part of "Artillery Hell".

I do not know of anything specific or unusual that McClellan was doing to keep tabs on the Rebels at Harpers Ferry. He seems to have kept his cavalry concentrated as a reserve for the most part. Possibly a regiment or two sent to Burnside might have been useful in screening his flank to discover A. P. Hill's attack before it crashed into Burnside.

I read somewhere that one of McClellan's faults as an army commander was a tendency to immerse himself in details of his command and to my untrained eyes that could be so.

At Yorktown he seem to be closely involved in the locating, the transporting and emplacement of his siege guns and during The Seven Days, I have always thought he should have been directing the battle rather than directing his retreat. Did he not trust his staff or Engineers? I thought they are there to take the burden of detailed management so he could better direct all the operations of the army and not just one aspect of it.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

At Yorktown he seem to be closely involved in the locating, the transporting and emplacement of his siege guns and during The Seven Days, I have always thought he should have been directing the battle rather than directing his retreat. Did he not trust his staff or Engineers? I thought they are there to take the burden of detailed management so he could better direct all the operations of the army and not just one aspect of it.

McClellan had not only been in the Corps of Engineers but had also been on the committee that studied Sebastopol.

When the best person for the job has bigger responsibilities that's a problem.

McClellan had Engineers on his staff.

 

[OpnCoronet]

McClellan had not only been in the Corps of Engineers but had also been on the committee that studied Sebastopol.

When the best person for the job has bigger responsibilities that's a problem.

McClellan had Engineers on his staff.

I agree completely, And he had a large staff to plan and conduct a change of base, while he conducted the battle for the AoP's life, i.e., Lee was not trying to make McClellan retreat he was trying desperately to force its surrender, or destroy it ... the battle was very important, but McClellan is behind the lines, tidying up.

 

[67th Tigers]

I read somewhere that one of McClellan's faults as an army commander was a tendency to immerse himself in details of his command and to my untrained eyes that could be so.

That becomes a bit Catch 22 - when McClellan pays something personal attention he is micromanaging, and when he delegates he isn't commanding enough.

At Yorktown he seem to be closely involved in the locating, the transporting and emplacement of his siege guns

That task was delegated to Barnard, who reported daily on the progress he was making.

and during The Seven Days, I have always thought he should have been directing the battle rather than directing his retreat.

He did direct all the fighting. Yes, he delegated tasks to his corps commanders, and expected regular updates. By standing orders, each corps commander was supposed to update McClellan's staff every half-hour on their situation. Some did, and there are regular updates from Keyes along the lines of "no change," but some corps commanders got slopy and stopped sending updates as they should. Hence just after the Seven Days McClellan had to reissue his fighting instructions to his corps commanders.

The major issue was the lack of staff for the army corps. Having no legal existence, the corps were running on staff borrowed from their divisions. Mostly the corps commanders simply borrowed their old division staff.