The Tale Untwisted

[Jantzen64]

It's kind of a question of who else to use, really, given the positions that the corps are actually in and the operational terrain.

Basically you have two ways you can get troops past the Monocacy and the Catoctin passes to South Mountain - the northern route and the southern route.

The northern route is occupied by the troops heading to South Mountain. It's got a bottleneck at Frederick (only one road through town and no parallel route for several miles north or south) and is what most of the corps have converged upon, because Stuart retreated through the town late on September 12 and until that point there could have been Confederates there en masse for all McClellan could know - like there were until DH Hill left on the 11th.
Then there's another bottleneck which is the pass at Braddock Heights. It is, however, the route with the best roads, including the National Road and the Georgetown Pike (which merge at Frederick).


The other route, the southern route, is relatively unconstricted (as in, it's not a massive traffic jam with ~75,000 soldiers trying to fit down a single road) and that's what 6th Corps is taking, but the roads aren't as good, and it leads up to a single mountain pass (Jefferson Pass).


To get extra troops to Cramptons Gap, there are three possible ways to do this.

Way one: divert troops coming through the northern route.

This means having troops divert south after Braddock Heights (probably turning left at Middletown, between Braddock Heights and South Mountain). This means that you significantly delay the reinforcements for the column that's pressing up against South Mountain; if you divert 1st Corps then you're splitting up Burnside's wing and effectively expecting 9th Corps (which about the same sort of size as 6th Corps) to fight what - per SO 191 - might be Longstreet's whole force plus DH Hill's division, all of which are apparently at or around Boonsboro. 9th Corps has to handle that fight itself until all of 1st Corps has taken the turn at Middletown and 2nd Corps has come up behind 9th, which is a delay of several hours in the flow of reinforcements at Fox's and Turner's Gaps.


Way two: divert troops from the northern route to the southern route.

This means that you have 1st Corps (or whichever other unit) divert once they're through Frederick, and take Jefferson Pass instead. The result of this is that they end up stacked up behind 6th Corps, and can't begin to improve Franklin's situation until all of 6th Corps has arrived and closed up, as that's the earliest the reinforcement corps can provide a benefit. It also, again, means splitting up a wing, either Burnside's or Sumner's.


Way three: add extra troops to the southern route.

Again, they end up stacked up behind 6th Corps, and either you make the decision on the evening of the 12th (and if so you might actually avoid SO 191 being found in the first place - the whole reason it was found was that 2nd and 12th Corps were waiting for 9th and 1st to clear Frederick) or you have one of the 2nd/12th Corps detour around to become the tail end of the 6th Corps column.



Anything else means not merely splitting up wings but splitting up corps. As it was, 6th Corps had enough manpower once it had all arrived to take Cramptons Gap, so to make any kind of difference you need the same amount of men closed up sooner and so any solution that doesn't accelerate that is insufficient.

Franklin's job - according to McClellan's orders - wasn't simply to take Crampton's Gap, but to: 1) then act as an anvil for the Turner's Gap thrust should Longstreet/Hill retreat down Pleasant Valley AND/OR move into Sharpsburg to cut off Longstreet/Hill AND prevent Jackson from recrossing the Potomac; and 2) Try to relieve HF; and 3) serve as the operational force for effectively splitting Lee's army in two. That's a tall order for a single corps (plus one division), especially when McLaws/Anderson have 1/4 of Lee's Army. Plus, the amount of tactical judgment invested with the leader of this operation (given these multiple tasks) should have required either a different choice (given McClellan's view of Franklin) OR more active involvement and leadership from McClellan as events unfolded (other than telling Franklin to give it the 'ole college try).

With regard to other troops. of course there would be stacking up, but there was stacking up at Turner's as well. The point is to have troops available in the vicinity of Rohrersville to meet the multiple demands being made on the force. (Recall that Franlin had to detach some of his force on the morning of the 15th to face north).

 

[Saphroneth]

Franklin's job - according to McClellan's orders - wasn't simply to take Crampton's Gap, but to: 1) then act as an anvil for the Turner's Gap thrust should Longstreet/Hill retreat down Pleasant Valley AND/OR move into Sharpsburg to cut off Longstreet/Hill AND prevent Jackson from recrossing the Potomac; and 2) Try to relieve HF; and 3) serve as the operational force for effectively splitting Lee's army in two. That's a tall order for a single corps (plus one division), especially when McLaws/Anderson have 1/4 of Lee's Army. Plus, the amount of tactical judgment invested with the leader of this operation (given these multiple tasks) should have required either a different choice (given McClellan's view of Franklin) OR more active involvement and leadership from McClellan as events unfolded (other than telling Franklin to give it the 'ole college try).

6th Corps plus the division of 4th Corps amount to about a quarter of what McClellan had on hand, though*, and McClellan has the option to divert more troops there (from the main body) if events seem to require it; in the event, of course, they did not.

The worst-case for Franklin is that he has to fight all of McLaws and Anderson, and Longstreet coming from the other direction, but this isn't something that can come about instantly and so McClellan can respond to it. With the size of Franklin's force* (it's on par with a typical European-style corps, if a bit on the small side for that) he can be expected to fight independently for most of a day - it's why the corps as a size actually exists.


As for McClellan's view of Franklin, he has to have someone operating independently and it's not like the options are great - Franklin screwed up on the Peninsula, but so did Sumner. The alternative to having one of his columns acting independently is to spend all his time riding back and forth between them.

With regard to other troops. of course there would be stacking up, but there was stacking up at Turner's as well. The point is to have troops available in the vicinity of Rohrersville to meet the multiple demands being made on the force. (Recall that Franlin had to detach some of his force on the morning of the 15th to face north).

Yes, there's stacking up, but when exactly do the extra troops come to result in a benefit? The earliest they can benefit is late on the 14th (after all of Franklin's force has arrived) or early on the 15th, and in fact in his message at 2PM on the 14th McClellan did let Franklin know that he could send troops to support Franklin if needed; if Franklin was facing too much opposition he was to let McClellan know and switch to a holding operation, and McClellan would make his main effort on the National Road.

It would perhaps benefit to highlight a specific unit (to be clear about where it's starting from/what point in the march it's being split off) and which route it should take to join Franklin, so as to benefit him? Historically of course 9th Corps was ordered to go and support Franklin after they'd gained one of the main gaps, they were just really slow in following that order.



* what McClellan has on hand changes over time, but 6th and the division of 4th put together amount to about 20,000 men PFD given the strengths in the 20th September report and adding back of casualties. Morell and Humphreys haven't joined yet so McClellan's on-hand infantry is somewhere around 80,000-85,000 PFD, and a lot of that is in the traffic jam.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I also don't understand how McClellan planned the strategy for the 14th. According to his order to Franklin, his intent was to break Lee in two, and yet, he only assigns one corps (plus one late-arriving division) to that key task? And the corps he selects is lead by a general who McClellan as slow and having "little energy"? If we are to believe McClellan's order to Franklin, then it's hard not to conclude that he did not give appropriate attention to what should have been the focus of the effort (Crampton's, not Turner's).

This is a valid question and one Timothy Reese raises in his studies of Crampton's Gap. As @Saphroneth points out, roads gave something to so with it, but McClellan also asked Franklin more than once if he needed more troops. Also, McClellan could have gone to Crampton's Gap himself to oversee the operation.

 

[Jantzen64]

As for McClellan's view of Franklin, he has to have someone operating independently and it's not like the options are great - Franklin screwed up on the Peninsula, but so did Sumner. The alternative to having one of his columns acting independently is to spend all his time riding back and forth between them.

All the more reason for McClellan to have been more actively involved in monitoring Franklin's progress, such as actually making his headquarters in the vicinity of Cramptons, instead of Turners/Fox. His stated goal of pitching in to Lee's center and cutting Lee's army in two is best achieved by devoting maximum effort at that point. Instead, he relegates it to a lieutenant, with whom he has voiced concern about being slow and having "little energy". And, given that the Second and Twelfth Corps played practicially no role in forcing Turners/Fox, one of those could have been routed to reinforce Franklin for purposes of satisfying all of the elements of his mission. They weren't needed to force Cramptons, but would have been in a great position by the evening of the 14th/morning of the 15th to help achieve McClellan's stated goals of pitching into Lee's center, attempting to relieve HF and potentially cutting off Longstreet/Hill.

 

[Jantzen64]

This is a valid question and one Timothy Reese raises in his studies of Crampton's Gap. As @Saphroneth points out, riads gave something to so with it, but McClellan also asked Franklin more than once if he needed more troops. Also, McClellan could have gone to Crampton's Gap himself to oversee the operation.

Exactly. Given McClellan's stated goal of cutting Lee's army in two, pitching into Lee's center, as well as the secondary goal of relieving HF (as well as his personal goal of eclipsing Napoleon's victory at Castiglione), one would expect him to devote maximum attention and resources to that opportunity.

 

[67th Tigers]

McClellan's intention was to organise the army into three wings, under his three best generals:

Burnside with 1st and 9th Corps
Sumner with 2th and 12th Corps
Porter with 5th and 6th Corps (inc. Couch)

Sadly, Porter didn't reach Frederick until the 14th close to midday. This left Franklin commanding the left wing.

This leaves the question "who do I trust more; Burnside or Franklin?" I'd argue that putting more trust in Franklin than Burnside may have been the right call.

It's a great shame Porter didn't arrive 24 hours earlier. This can be ultimately laid on Pope's machinations.

Note, the order of seniority in the AoP in the field was:

MG McClellan
MG(V) Burnside
MG(V) Reno
MG(V) Sumner
MG(V) FJ Porter
MG(V) Franklin
MG(V) Hooker
MG(V) Couch
MG(V) Richardson
MG(V) Slocum
MG(V) Morell
MG(V) Smith
MG(V) Sedgwick

 

[Andy Cardinal]

McClellan's intention was to organise the army into three wings, under his three best generals:

Burnside with 1st and 9th Corps
Sumner with 2th and 12th Corps
Porter with 5th and 6th Corps (inc. Couch)

Sadly, Porter didn't reach Frederick until the 14th close to midday. This left Franklin commanding the left wing.

This leaves the question "who do I trust more; Burnside or Franklin?" I'd argue that putting more trust in Franklin than Burnside may have been the right call.

It's a great shame Porter didn't arrive 24 hours earlier. This can be ultimately laid on Pope's machinations.

Note, the order of seniority in the AoP in the field was:

MG McClellan
MG(V) Burnside
MG(V) Reno
MG(V) Sumner
MG(V) FJ Porter
MG(V) Franklin
MG(V) Hooker
MG(V) Couch
MG(V) Richardson
MG(V) Slocum
MG(V) Morell
MG(V) Smith
MG(V) Sedgwick

I would have thought the opposite, but of course I am not McClellan. Burnside had experience as an independent commander and Franklin did not. Porter of course did too.

 

[Jantzen64]

McClellan's intention was to organise the army into three wings, under his three best generals:

Your response highlights why so many folks have an issue with McClellan. I'm sure that your statement reflects his intention and focus. But his primary duty was to defeat the enemy and find any way to make that happen, regardless of army bureacracies and formal orders of battle. That's what truly great generals do. For a moment on the 13th, McClellan seemed to recognize the opportunity he had - to cut Lee's army in two by pitching into his center (all McClellan's words). But then, he adopted an almost passive approach to managing the battle - whether it be in force selection, force size, timetables, personal supervision etc. - that didn't match the continuing urgency of the situation.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Note, the order of seniority in the AoP in the field was:

MG McClellan
MG(V) Burnside
MG(V) Reno
MG(V) Sumner
MG(V) FJ Porter
MG(V) Franklin
MG(V) Hooker
MG(V) Couch
MG(V) Richardson
MG(V) Slocum
MG(V) Morell
MG(V) Smith
MG(V) Sedgwick

This list is in error; Reno was behind Sedgwick.

 

[67th Tigers]

This list is in error; Reno was behind Sedgwick.

Reno was a MG(V) with seniority to 26th April 1862. Sedgwick was a MG(V) with seniority to 4th July 1862.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

Reno was a MG(V) with seniority to 26th April 1862. Sedgwick was a MG(V) with seniority to 4th July 1862.

Source?

This list says promoted August, backdated to mid-July:

Private Site

 

[GilbertFarney]

I also don't understand how McClellan planned the strategy for the 14th. According to his order to Franklin, his intent was to break Lee in two, and yet, he only assigns one corps (plus one late-arriving division) to that key task? And the corps he selects is lead by a general who McClellan as slow and having "little energy"? If we are to believe McClellan's order to Franklin, then it's hard not to conclude that he did not give appropriate attention to what should have been the focus of the effort (Crampton's, not Turner's).

One thing to keep in mind is that McClellan ordered Sumner to be prepared to march in the morning on Sept. 14. I take that to mean McClellan used the Second Corps as a strategic reserve to be sent to whichever sector of the battlefield required reinforcements.

 

[Andy Cardinal]

One thing to keep in mind is that McClellan ordered Sumner to be prepared to march in the morning on Sept. 14. I take that to mean McClellan used the Second Corps as a strategic reserve to be sent to whichever sector of the battlefield required reinforcements.

I believe that is correct, and McClellan sent a message to Franklin asking if he needed more troops. The 2nd Corps (and/or I assume the 12th Corps too, also under Summer's command) could have moved to Crampton's Gap had Franklin requested it.

 

[67th Tigers]

Source?

This list says promoted August, backdated to mid-July:

Private Site

I was going by the September 1862 Army Register, which lists Reno as a MG(V) with said seniority. However, looking into the Senate records and general orders, he was appointed MG(V) (by Lincoln) on 20th August with a provisional seniority to 26th April (the date of recommendation from Burnside I assume). It worked it's way through the Senate until March '63, when the seniority was then set at 18th July '62 (along with Parke etc.).

Foster (simultaneously promoted) mentions receiving his MG(V) to date 26th April, and then having it withdrawn due to a mistake and a new date fixed. It would be useful to know when this was done. The final seniority is only sealed when Lincoln signs the Senate's confirmation.

On 14th September he is an provisional MG(V), with seniority to the 26th April (probably). The timeline, as best I can determine, is:

20th August '62: nominated by Lincoln to date from 26th April '62 (fall of Fort Macon)
19th January '63: referred to the Senate (in a huge batch)
12th February '63: the Senate rejects swathes of Lincoln's nominations before them as having no legal basis. The likes of Foster and Parke revert to BG(V), as does the dead Reno.
5th March '63: Six dead brigadier-generals (Kearny, Richardson, Reno and Terill in one nomination, Stevenson and Mansfield in another) are nominated to be MG(V) post-mortum.
6th March: referred to committee
7th March: committee recommends and the Senate confirms the appointments, but Reno's (and Parke's, Foster's and Stevenson's) to date 18th July (formation of 9th Corps) instead of 26th April.*

* The general speculation is that this was changed to stop Parke and Foster from ranking Hooker etc.

 

[trice]

I was going by the September 1862 Army Register, which lists Reno as a MG(V) with said seniority. However, looking into the Senate records and general orders, he was appointed MG(V) (by Lincoln) on 20th August with a provisional seniority to 26th April (the date of recommendation from Burnside I assume). It worked it's way through the Senate until March '63, when the seniority was then set at 18th July '62 (along with Parke etc.).

Foster (simultaneously promoted) mentions receiving his MG(V) to date 26th April, and then having it withdrawn due to a mistake and a new date fixed. It would be useful to know when this was done. The final seniority is only sealed when Lincoln signs the Senate's confirmation.

On 14th September he is an provisional MG(V), with seniority to the 26th April (probably). The timeline, as best I can determine, is:

20th August '62: nominated by Lincoln to date from 26th April '62 (fall of Fort Macon)
19th January '63: referred to the Senate (in a huge batch)
12th February '63: the Senate rejects swathes of Lincoln's nominations before them as having no legal basis. The likes of Foster and Parke revert to BG(V), as does the dead Reno.
5th March '63: Six dead brigadier-generals (Kearny, Richardson, Reno and Terill in one nomination, Stevenson and Mansfield in another) are nominated to be MG(V) post-mortum.
6th March: referred to committee
7th March: committee recommends and the Senate confirms the appointments, but Reno's (and Parke's, Foster's and Stevenson's) to date 18th July (formation of 9th Corps) instead of 26th April.*

* The general speculation is that this was changed to stop Parke and Foster from ranking Hooker etc.

Jesse Reno was appointed August 20 and died September 14, 1862.

His nomination to the Major General, US Volunteers rank was made on December 23rd, 1862. The US Senate did not act on it before the end of their term and the nomination expired. The new Congress from the election of 1862 met in March of 1863, so Lincoln was resubmitted the nomination on March 5th, 1863 and the Senate confirmed it on March 9th, 1863.

This means that Jesse Reno's nomination and confirmation to Major General (USV) are posthumous.

Sedgwick was appointed July 25, 1862. Like Reno, his nomination was not approved by the Senate before their term expired. Sedgwick's nomination was resubmitted March 7, 1863 and confirmed by the Senate on March 10, 1863.

Any arguments about the official date of rank will end up being moot. Sedgwick was still alive for his nomination and confirmation dates. Reno was six months in the grave.

 

[67th Tigers]

Any arguments about the official date of rank will end up being moot. Sedgwick was still alive for his nomination and confirmation dates. Reno was six months in the grave.

Thanks for repeating everything I said.

On 14th September, 1862, Reno was a major-general of volunteers with seniority to 26th April 1862 on Lincoln's executive authority. Sedgwick was a major-general of volunteers with seniority to 4th July 1862 on Lincoln's executive authority. Thus, on that day Reno ranked basically everyone bar McClellan and Burnside.

 

[trice]

Thanks for repeating everything I said.

On 14th September, 1862, Reno was a major-general of volunteers with seniority to 26th April 1862 on Lincoln's executive authority. Sedgwick was a major-general of volunteers with seniority to 4th July 1862 on Lincoln's executive authority. Thus, on that day Reno ranked basically everyone bar McClellan and Burnside.

Well, no. The date-of-rank you are giving for Reno is from his posthumous nomination in 1863

On September 14th, 1862 Reno's presumptive date-of-rank would have been July 18th, 1862 and Sedgwick's presumptive date-of-rank would have been July 4th, 1862. Very clearly, Sedgwick would have been regarded as ranking Reno on September 14th if anyone were bothering to compare the paperwork then. McClellan would have been particularly aware of it.

The appointment of new general officers for the last few months are listed in War Department General Order No. 181, dated November 1, 1862. Here are the new Major Generals (USV) with their date-of-ranks:

APPOINTMENTS MADE IN THE VOLUNTEER FORCE CALLED INTO SERVICE UNDER THE ACTS APPROVED JULY 22 AND 25, 1861, AND JULY 5, 1838.

General Officers.
To be Major Generals.​

Brigadier General William S. Rosecrans, of the United States Army, March 21, 1862.
Brigadier General Philip Kearny, of the ; United States Volunteers, July 4, 1862, (since killed in battle.)
Brigadier General Joseph Hooker, of the United States Volunteers, July 4, 1862.
Brigadier General Darius N. Couch, of the United States Volunteers, July 4, 1862.
Brigadier General Israel B. Richardson, of the United States Volunteers, July 4, 1862.
Brigadier General Henry W. Slocum, of the United State3 Volunteers, July 4, 1862.
Brigadier General John J. Peck, of the United States Volunteers, July 4, 1862.
Brigadier General George W. Morell, of the United States Volunteers, July 4, 1862.
Brigadier General William F. Smith, of the United States Volunteers, July 4, 1862.
Brigadier General John Sedgwick, of the United States Volunteers, July 4, 1862.
Brigadier General Horatio G. Wright, of the United States Volunteers, July 18, 1862.
Brigadier General John G. Foster, of the United States Volunteers, July 18, 1862.
Brigadier General Jesse L. Reno, of the United States Volunteers, July 18, 1862, (since killed in battle.)
Brigadier General John G. Parke, of the United States Volunteers, July 18, 1862.
Brigadier General Robert C. Schenck, of the United States Volunteers, August 30, 1862.
Brigadier General Stephen A. Hurlbut, of the United States Volunteers, September 17, 1862.
Brigadier General Schuyler Hamilton, of the United States Volunteers, September 17, 1862.
Brigadier General Gordon Granger, of the United States Volunteers, September 17, 1862.
Brigadier General J. D. Cox, of the United States Volunteers, October 6, 1862.
Brigadier General James B. McPherson, of the United States Volunteers, October 8, 1862.
Brigadier General Lovell H. Rousseau, of the United States Volunteers, October 8, 1862.

You will notice that this also drops Reno down below several others you listed ahead of him:

MG(V) Burnside
--> Remove MG(V) Reno here
MG(V) Sumner
MG(V) FJ Porter
MG(V) Franklin
MG(V) Hooker
MG(V) Couch
MG(V) Richardson
MG(V) Slocum
MG(V) Morell
MG(V) Smith
MG(V) Sedgwick
<-- insert Reno here

You are welcome to the correction, however.

 

[Saphroneth]

Well, no. The date-of-rank you are giving for Reno is from his posthumous nomination in 1863

The link 67th provided gives Reno's date of rank as April 26, 1862, and lists no general officers with a date of rank after 17 July 1862, though it has Chaplains as late as 31 July 1862 and (here) the document is given as the Army List for August 1862, specifically. There is no indication that it contains Reno's posthumous nomination, because as of the date of publication he was still alive. Similarly the document 67th provided gives Reynolds as a BG (date of rank 20 August 1861) because his MG promotion was in the future; ditto Hurlbut.

I think this actually qualifies as 67th having provided the army register which would have been the current one as of the Maryland Campaign. If there had been any questions about who ranked whom then the document 67th provided is the exact contemporary one that would have been checked.

 

[trice]

The link 67th provided gives Reno's date of rank as April 26, 1862, and lists no general officers with a date of rank after 17 July 1862, though it has Chaplains as late as 31 July 1862 and (here) the document is given as the Army List for August 1862, specifically. There is no indication that it contains Reno's posthumous nomination, because as of the date of publication he was still alive. Similarly the document 67th provided gives Reynolds as a BG (date of rank 20 August 1861) because his MG promotion was in the future; ditto Hurlbut.

I think this actually qualifies as 67th having provided the army register which would have been the current one as of the Maryland Campaign. If there had been any questions about who ranked whom then the document 67th provided is the exact contemporary one that would have been checked.

The date is wrong then, because quite obviously the War Department thought his date of rank was July 18th, 1862 and issued a formal order to that effect.

It might be worth checking to see what the issue was with the date-of-rank was for these four officers, all of whom share the same date of rank in the Army Register and share the same-but-different date-of-rank in the War Department order #181 of 1862.

• Brigadier General Horatio G. Wright, of the United States Volunteers, July 18, 1862. (not in the register)
• Brigadier General John G. Foster, of the United States Volunteers, July 18, 1862.
• Brigadier General Jesse L. Reno, of the United States Volunteers, July 18, 1862, (since killed in battle.)
• Brigadier General John G. Parke, of the United States Volunteers, July 18, 1862.

 

[67th Tigers]

The date is wrong then, because quite obviously the War Department thought his date of rank was July 18th, 1862 and issued a formal order to that effect.

No, if you read above, you'd know that the date of rank was changed between the original appointment, and the final Commission.

Reno's original date of rank (and Parke's and Foster's) was 26th April, 1862, that being the occasion of the fall of Fort Macon. The fall of said fort being the cause for the promotion. The surviving two (Parke and Foster) received a letter after the Maryland campaign stating a mistake had been made, and the date of rank was changed to the 18th July (the formation of 9th Corps).

Edit: Perhaps you don't understand how these promotions were awarded:

1. The President appoints the recipient to a higher rank, and has the appointment sent, along with the attestation papers for the office to sign and return. They now wear that rank insignia, and have seniority as the President stated.
2. The President later nominates the officer to the Senate, who may consider it, and either endorse or reject it. If they reject it, then the appointment ceases, and the officer reverts to their lower rank.
3. If endorsed by the Senate, the President signs the Commission, setting the date of rank as they wish and confirming the rank and seniority.

Once appointed, the officer holds that rank, in the stated seniority (which is still liable to be altered), until either confirmed or rejected by the Senate. Once seniority is set at confirmation, any changes must go through the Senate.