Longstreet Longstreet was right.

A defensive strategy is only good if you want to do a decisive counter attack. Let the enemy beat themselves up, then hit them at the appropriate time. I think Longstreet understood that, and how far the ANV was from they're supply base and home turf.

That is a viable strategy, but it doesn't seem to be what Longstreet was suggesting. I've never seen the "Longstreet strategy" described any further than taking a defensive position. Has it been misrepresented? Was Longstreet suggesting a defensive stance to be followed by attack, and if so, wouldn't we know of it?
 
I think he was right regarding Pickett's charge being a failure. I think Lee was right to fight the Union where they were instead of going around them. Going around them wasn't a favorable idea. Lee most likely didn't want to do that for several reasons:
1. He didn't have intel on the Union's strength and position.
2. It would have put him between the Union and South Mountain (further away from it too) and away from his supply line and means of retreat.
e. He didn't want to give up ground gained on the first day, (Ewell argued this point with Lee when Lee suggested that his Corps go to the right of the line in preparation for the second day attack).

I think Longstreet lost favor primarily because of his political leanings after the war.
 
There were two ways to address the situation of June 1863. It was becoming a war of attrition and there was not a sufficient Confederate force to divert Grant from the success of the Vicksburg campaign.
One solution was to throw everything the Confederacy had at the US army in Pennsylvania, and win a battle the Confederacy did not deserve to win. But after George Meade took command, the Army of the Potomac was never strung out with exposed flanks and an unprotected logistics train. Every Confederate attack after Meade was in command, was a grim affair with high casualties involved.
The other response was to fight defensively and at least conserve Confederate manhood, even if the US advances could not be stopped.
General Lee failed in Pennsylvania, but Longstreet's response would have failed too, in the long run.
 
There were two ways to address the situation of June 1863. It was becoming a war of attrition and there was not a sufficient Confederate force to divert Grant from the success of the Vicksburg campaign.
One solution was to throw everything the Confederacy had at the US army in Pennsylvania, and win a battle the Confederacy did not deserve to win. But after George Meade took command, the Army of the Potomac was never strung out with exposed flanks and an unprotected logistics train. Every Confederate attack after Meade was in command, was a grim affair with high casualties involved.
The other response was to fight defensively and at least conserve Confederate manhood, even if the US advances could not be stopped.
General Lee failed in Pennsylvania, but Longstreet's response would have failed too, in the long run.
I'd say pretty much every attack in the Civil War was a grim affair with high casualties involved - given the tactics and armament of the time.
 
Both of those "mistakes" implicitly criticize Lee's leadership, so it's no wonder that Lee's post-war personality cult was offended by Longstreet's views. As a senior Corps commander, Longstreet had every right to "argue" (or more properly "advocate"), his military opinion to his chief during the decision making phase. Indeed, Lee was used to Longstreet's counsel, regardless as to whether Lee accepted Longstreet's views in the end. I'm surprised that the website did not actually consider the mistake to have been Longstreet's alleged reluctance in carrying out Lee's orders for the 2nd day assault rather than in actually arguing with Lee. Anyway, as far as No. 2 is concerned, I would say that Longstreet was "right" in a general sense in that he advised fighting a defensive battle from a fixed position, similar to that at Fredericksburg. Longstreet's plan to flank the Union left probably falls into the category of wishful thinking, rather than a rational military plan based on circumstances and logistics. But no matter what, from an historical view, Lee botched the battle of Gettysburg but has never suffered a serious hit to his reputation, in part because folks like Longstreet (and Stuart, Ewell, Hill) were around to take the fall.
You make a good point.... because the "reluctance" is where Longstreet took the hardest hit to his reputation.

Lee was given a pass. The Anti-Longstreet faction claimed that by Lee saying "it's all my fault" he was showing his true character by taking the blame for Longstreet's "errors". Lee confesses, and still walked away unscathed.
 
As I always say when this comes up, a defensive strategy assumes that the enemy will do what you want, helpfully beat himself up against your position. Lee himself said "General Meade will make no mistake in my front."

Nor is a defensive stance likely to be decisive. It may inflict more casualties on the day, as at Fredericksburg, but it is unlikely to totally destroy the enemy army, let alone turn the tide of the war, as the Confederates needed in July 1863.
I think no matter where Lee ended up... as long as it was on Northern soil, Lincoln would have made Meade attack him. Longstreet actually agreed with Lee on a Northern invasion...and thus put his western plans on hold.
 
I think Lee mentioned he couldn't remain long in his position without the Union posing a bigger threat. He didn't want to retreat and lose any advantage already won. And he lost a lot of his inner confidence by that last charge. If he had been given an acceptance for his letter of resignation, and claimed it, the morale of the southern army and people would have plummeted. His main objective was to move the Union army away from his home soil of Virginia. That is all Lee ever fought for.
Lubliner.
 
I think Lee mentioned he couldn't remain long in his position without the Union posing a bigger threat. He didn't want to retreat and lose any advantage already won. And he lost a lot of his inner confidence by that last charge. If he had been given an acceptance for his letter of resignation, and claimed it, the morale of the southern army and people would have plummeted. His main objective was to move the Union army away from his home soil of Virginia. That is all Lee ever fought for.
Lubliner.
Whoa, I can actually hear the hounds begin to howl right now because of your last sentence.
Hence I'd like to add a slight relativization.
A short while ago I was reading Pryor "Reading the Man" - and I have to say it is everything but a comforting lecture to somebody helding Lee in high esteem as she is eg. insinuating that he maybe had children with one of the female servants of his mother and eg. is rather critical of his militarily achievements - but regarding that particular point she would most probably fully agree with you that this was his prime motivation.
With his two invasions of the North I think he also tried to influence public opinion there - an idea that rather thoroughly backfired....
 
Lee was given a pass
Lee was enough of a gentleman so that he would not publicly blame subordinates or engage in backbiting over who was responsible for what. I think Lee was sincere in his offer to Davis to resign his command after Gettysburg because he realized the severity of the defeat and the need for the top commander to accept responsibility. But it is fair to say that Lee's post-war defenders were the ones who gave him a pass.
 
Lee was enough of a gentleman so that he would not publicly blame subordinates or engage in backbiting over who was responsible for what. I think Lee was sincere in his offer to Davis to resign his command after Gettysburg because he realized the severity of the defeat and the need for the top commander to accept responsibility. But it is fair to say that Lee's post-war defenders were the ones who gave him a pass.
And, he could have simply been exhausted.
 
He most probably was, wasn't he already sick when closing in on Gettysburg? But his performance in 1864 was still quite impressive, maybe even better than in 1863?
Piedone that is my understanding from some readings and lectures, that Lee was possibly ill with dysentery at the time. If anything can take away your "A" game that would surely do it. We would all find it fascinating to be able to listen in on the conversations Lee had with Longstreet. Not only to hear what exactly what was discussed but also to capture the tone of the meeting and how forcefully Longstreet may have pushed back on the plans for the July 3rd attacks. Whenever I have stood at the angle on Cemetery Ridge I cannot help but think that there had to be better alternatives than attacking across a mile of wide open land such as they did. But it is easy for me to say with the always huge benefit of hindsight. To answer Pete Longstreet's original post I would say that James Longstreet was right to suggest some other alternative to attacking the Union center on July 3rd and he was in no way treasonous. We must also take into account, perhaps in Lee's defense, that swinging an entire Corps all the way around the Union left was no small undertaking in the presence of the enemy with very long supply trains being exposed to attack. It's doubtful that Lee ever seriously contemplated that maneuver. Interesting thread.

Bill
 
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He most probably was, wasn't he already sick when closing in on Gettysburg? But his performance in 1864 was still quite impressive, maybe even better than in 1863?
I believe that Lee was thought to have been suffering from angina, a heart condition that grew worse over time and that eventually led to his death in 1870.
 
Lee was enough of a gentleman so that he would not publicly blame subordinates or engage in backbiting over who was responsible for what. I think Lee was sincere in his offer to Davis to resign his command after Gettysburg because he realized the severity of the defeat and the need for the top commander to accept responsibility. But it is fair to say that Lee's post-war defenders were the ones who gave him a pass.
I was of the mind that he may have felt Longstreet deserved the promotion, realizing at once he had been out-generaled by Meade and Longstreet's advice as well. But he surely did have a thought toward his health, wouldn't you say?
Lubliner.
 
Instead of debating who had the better plan at Gettysburg, ( Lee or Longstreet )
Put yourself in Lee's boots on July 1 through 3,. Look at the positions of the Union forces, study the terrain, what would you do?
That is exactly the point. Of course we are all able to come up with more promising plans but this is just armchair-generalling.
I deem the most outstanding trait of a general was to be able at all to decide on anything.
Most of us (me too...) are ridiculing those officers that displayed ineptness, were slow to act and indecisive - but maybe most of us would just have been the very same people.

It takes some guts to look at an (in this case a Union) army of 70000 with their cannons primed and order anything (but pulling back) - because you very well know that any decision might be wrong and thousands of people would have to die because of your decision, there might be a rout, your plans might be too complex to succeed, some of your officers might misunderstand orders, some others might make hilarious blunders and that clockwork of your plan (even if it would have been just SO clever) might fall apart anytime changing the battle just in some kind of chaotic, incontrollable butchering.

I just don't know how they did it. I would have pulled back from Gettysburg anytime (if I had to decide) - or I would have been extremely relieved from that "old man" being present doing all of the deciding and having to take all of the blame....
 
I was of the mind that he may have felt Longstreet deserved the promotion, realizing at once he had been out-generaled by Meade and Longstreet's advice as well. But he surely did have a thought toward his health, wouldn't you say?
Lubliner.
Hard to say to what extent Lee's health issues affected his decision making, especially in regard to his offer to resign after Gettysburg. I'm not even sure whether Lee realized the severity of his heart problem, given the lack of medical knowledge of the time. But it certainly could have played a part in his decision.
 
Instead of debating who had the better plan at Gettysburg, ( Lee or Longstreet )
Put yourself in Lee's boots on July 1 through 3,. Look at the positions of the Union forces, study the terrain, what would you do?
Right. What if there is no big battle by July 9 or 10, and the news that Vicksburg and Port Hudson have surrendered spreads in the north? At that point does the Army of the Potomac realize that with some hard marching and stiff fighting they might be able to end the war?
 

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