Grant Grant v Lee

[wausaubob]

I'm not really sure how that in some sense precludes Fuller's argument about the use of artillery?

If Grant pushes the Confederate army out of Richmond, before he has taught his own army to move, is Grant really going to get a surrender, or just another battle at another place. Grant was very concerned about a guerilla war evolving. The south did deploy a rural insurgency, so that fear was not misplaced.

 

[Saphroneth]

If Grant pushes the Confederate army out of Richmond, before he has taught his own army to move, is Grant really going to get a surrender, or just another battle at another place. Grant was very concerned about a guerilla war evolving. The south did deploy a rural insurgency, so that fear was not misplaced.

There are two avenues here.

The first is about whether Grant "taught his own army to move". If that was a precondition for Grant launching an offensive, his writing in the summer of 1864 shows no indication for it; Grant wants 6th Corps back over the summer because he considers their manpower to be a necessary component of his launching an offensive, and implicit in that is that he wants to launch an offensive then (rather than waiting for some process over the winter).
That's a process (teaching the army to move) which I am skeptical actually happened.

The second is that, if Grant pushes Lee's army out of Richmond, he gains immediate benefits. One of these is that he can now cut off the supply lines radiating out of Richmond and use them himself, which means in turn that he can now supply an offensive down the rail lines to wherever it is that Lee has retreated, unless of course Lee wrecks the rail lines behind him (which is a process that would slow his own army down, significantly if he does it properly). The Confederates meanwhile lose the benefit of one of their last remaining cities of any significance, their premier artillery foundary and most of the resources they could gain from Richmond in general.

On top of that there's not really anywhere Lee can go safely - historically he was pulling back towards Lynchburg, and the only rail connection Lynchburg has is a long route through North Carolina which connects with Chattanooga (a city in Union hands). Going directly for Danville is an option but one which Grant can cut him off from; going for Lynchburg and then Danville just makes that easier, and wherever it is that Lee goes Grant can then follow him and just repeat the process.

 

[Piedone]

Regular approaches had worked for hundreds of years, and the trench was not exactly a brand new innovation just come up with in 1863.

The thing that has to be realized is that:
1) A lot of the benefit that the defender has in a fight in the 1860s is the defensive support of the artillery (meaning cannister) - basically dug-in artillery is a lot harder to eliminate during the fighting, so the attackers eat cannister as they close in. Notice that the attack at Spotsylvania which goes particularly well is the one where the artillery has been withdrawn.
2) To bring up light/field artillery to eliminate dug in artillery during the attack itself is likely to fail because the dug-in artillery has the protection of its works, and will thus win.
3) You therefore need your own artillery to be able to engage in counter-battery fire and overcome the enemy artillery from beyond the range at which the defending artillery can eliminate your own - thus, long ranged rifles using dominating ground. (In the Union's case this would be 6.4", 8" and 10" Parrott guns.)
4) These guns also fire big heavy shells which can tear up the parapets of the enemy by putting (timed fuze) shell into them (and having them detonate underground) or if the parapets aren't thick enough the shells can go through and burst inside the trenches themselves. Percussion fuzes are better for this, but it's not necessary (though with percussion fuze you can do it even with field artillery to some extent,like the 12lber Armstrong)

Between them, these points mean that by using heavy long-range artillery you can more-or-less remove the advantage the defensive gives, at least over the area the guns can cover. This means you can use what's basically bite-and-hold - eliminate the enemy defensive advantage in a sector, capture the sector, either fend off an enemy counterattack (for which you have the defensive advantage now) or build up your works on the captured sector, then move your heavy guns to somewhere else and repeat.

For the defender, there are two options:

(1) They can contest each attack by turning it into a fight, which means you are fighting the enemy outside the advantage of their defensive entrenchments (and can win the attritional fight)
or
(2) They can not contest each attack heavily, which means that you are gaining ground.

This is a system which is kind of "inexorable" - it's hard as all get out to stop. It's why Lee said in 1862 that "McClellan will make this a battle of Posts. He will take position from position, under cover of his heavy guns, & we cannot get at him without storming his works".

Lee was obliged to make costly attacks to force McClellan away from Richmond rather than let him conduct these regular approaches. In 1864, he doesn't have the assets or position to do such a flanking attack on Grant's supply line.

Whew, I must admit that I never realized how decisive long range artillery had become already in the Civil War. I always thought it was the invention of the Prussians in 1870.

Pondering about it I'd ask if this was one of the factors that led to Lee's favouring of offensive and maneuver warfare - which is often criticized as something the South couldn't afford.

Another question: @wausabob wrote once that Grant refrained from using the full power of his artillery as he regarded (very understandably) the Confederates as fellow Americans he just didn't want to bomb into oblivion. Is there any source that documents this - such a piece would be highly impressive I think.

 

[Piedone]

Lee as commander must own the responsibility for failure from the May to June response to the offensive of Grant.

Well...maybe it suffices to just repeat what Pickett said about the loss at Gettysburg: he always thought that the Yankees had something to do with it.

 

[Piedone]

If Grant pushes the Confederate army out of Richmond, before he has taught his own army to move, is Grant really going to get a surrender, or just another battle at another place. Grant was very concerned about a guerilla war evolving. The south did deploy a rural insurgency, so that fear was not misplaced.

I'd always thought that those ideas about a southern guerilla war were never more than just wishful thinking of some and that in reality there were neither preparations nor concrete plans for it?

 

[Saphroneth]

Whew, I must admit that I never realized how decisive long range artillery had become already in the Civil War. I always thought it was the invention of the Prussians in 1870.

The big improvements of that period were basically in field artillery becoming accurate, long ranged and powerful enough to do this (as opposed to heavy/positional/siege guns). The Armstrong RBL 12 lber and the Krupp breechloaders were the first which could do that.

Pondering about it I'd ask if this was one of the factors that led to Lee's favouring of offensive and maneuver warfare - which is often criticized as something the South couldn't afford.

He wanted to avoid regular approaches being conducted on Richmond, so there's that; aside from that, a war of manoeuvre is the better option for the weaker power, because it is the type of warfare where you're not basically seeing who runs out of something (men, explosives) first.

 

[Piedone]

The big improvements of that period were basically in field artillery becoming accurate, long ranged and powerful enough to do this (as opposed to heavy/positional/siege guns). The Armstrong RBL 12 lber and the Krupp breechloaders were the first which could do that.


He wanted to avoid regular approaches being conducted on Richmond, so there's that; aside from that, a war of manoeuvre is the better option for the weaker power, because it is the type of warfare where you're not basically seeing who runs out of something (men, explosives) first.

Thank you for the clarification.

Regarding my second point I was trying to address a criticism that is often levelled at Lee: being unnecessarily aggressive hence doing more harm than good to the South. There is the idea that he somehow failed as a general because of that and that he should have relied more on defensive tactics.

Regarding everything you told me about the impact of heavy field artillery I am of the opinion that in reality he just could not choose such a stance. I think he HAD to try to catch the Union army on the move and in territory where they could not bring their superior artillery to bear.

Hence I'd conclude that the a verdict of Lee following an outdated napoleonic approach and Grant more embracing modern tactics (than Lee) seems to be not that convincing (as it may look on a first glance).

If it could be shown that Lee's tactics were influenced by the availability of the (then brandnew) Armstrong gun to the Union (and I am recalling that he tried to reorganize the confederate artillery to include more of the rifled guns) he shouldn't be assessed as being out-dated - and a verdict of being overly aggressive would also to have be reconsidered.

 

[67th Tigers]

Whew, I must admit that I never realized how decisive long range artillery had become already in the Civil War. I always thought it was the invention of the Prussians in 1870.

One should look to the Siege of Sevastapol (1854-5) to see the emergence of long ranged, rifled artillery. The major issues were that there simply wasn't very much of it.

The British RA (and Naval Brigade) expended 253,042 rounds during the siege, which broke down as:

68 pdr: 5,159 of all natures (mostly solid shot)
32 pdr: 41,915 ditto
24 pdr: 32,937 ditto
10 inch shell gun: 3,592 (ca. 60/40 hollow shot/ shell)
8 inch shell gun: 43,522 ditto
Lancaster rifles: 224
9 pdr field guns: 520
24 pdr rockets: 382
13" mortar: 39,214
10" mortar: 38,988
8" mortar: 4,181
5.5" mortar: 5,319
Naval Brigade expenditure: 38,388 of unknown nature

The Lancaster gun was extremely effective, but only available in small numbers and with little ammunition. By 1859 munitions factories had grown up to supply large numbers of guns and ammunition.

 

[Saphroneth]

If it could be shown that Lee's tactics were influenced by the availability of the (then brandnew) Armstrong gun to the Union (and I am recalling that he tried to reorganize the confederate artillery to include more of the rifled guns) he shouldn't be assessed as being out-dated - and a verdict of being overly aggressive would also to have be reconsidered.

They didn't have Armstrong guns, but remember that he took command of the AoNV during the period when McClellan was setting up for regular approaches to Richmond. McClellan only had one more tactical assault to make in the Seven Days period to gain Old Tavern, which would have put siege guns on the heights overlooking Richmond itself and all the defensive fortifications on that route in; in other words, Lee had been **** close to being shelled out of Richmond, and he knew it.


The war of manoeuvre is the principal alternative to the war of position/war of attrition. It has been for centuries - it was the way the Prussians rose to power - and it has continued to be for long after the Civil War (it's how the Germans defeated France in 1940, overcoming a nation which was economically and militarily stronger in sustained warfare.)

 

[Piedone]

They didn't have Armstrong guns, but remember that he took command of the AoNV during the period when McClellan was setting up for regular approaches to Richmond. McClellan only had one more tactical assault to make in the Seven Days period to gain Old Tavern, which would have put siege guns on the heights overlooking Richmond itself and all the defensive fortifications on that route in; in other words, Lee had been **** close to being shelled out of Richmond, and he knew it.


The war of manoeuvre is the principal alternative to the war of position/war of attrition. It has been for centuries - it was the way the Prussians rose to power - and it has continued to be for long after the Civil War (it's how the Germans defeated France in 1940, overcoming a nation which was economically and militarily stronger in sustained warfare.)

Alright. Regarding the Armstrong guns overcoming defensive artillery I reread your former posts: obviously I just overlooked that you told me of the Parrot guns which also could do the trick - and by the time of the Overland Campaign seem to have been pretty abundant particularly in the Union forces.
I did a little reading and found out that Lee called explicitly for stocking up confederate artillery with Parrot guns (wherever they were available).
Is it too far-fetched to assume that he intended them to provide battery-counterfire hence his fixed defensive artillery installed in the trenches could not be knocked out that easily?

Regarding McClellans performance I am closely following your thread about it - and deem it pretty revealing.

 

[Saphroneth]

Is it too far-fetched to assume that he intended them to provide battery-counterfire hence his fixed defensive artillery installed in the trenches could not be knocked out that easily?

No, the issue is that the Union had a monopoly on large Parrott guns. The smaller patterns or knock-offs thereof were made in Tregedar IIRC, but the large patterns like the 8" had not been developed before the war started and the man doing the dev work (Parrott) was a Union officer.


Lee would have been stocking up on Parrott field guns; the lack of larger guns in the Confederate artillery park was a pretty significant limit on their operations in e.g. 1862 (as they could not go after Washington with their own siege guns).


As far as I am aware Grant made no serious attempt at regular approaches.

 

[wausaubob]

A good deal had changed before the April 1865 attempt to cut the Confederate railroads that supplied Richmond. This is just one example:
https://www.nps.gov/apco/planyourvisit/upload/USCT-Site-Bulletin-Final.pdf

 

[wausaubob]

The United States, under Grant's leadership, formed large and expensive cavalry units. These units engaged in fighting and in raiding on a scale that eliminated any prospect of sustained warfare by the Confederate survivors.

 

[wausaubob]

No, the issue is that the Union had a monopoly on large Parrott guns. The smaller patterns or knock-offs thereof were made in Tregedar IIRC, but the large patterns like the 8" had not been developed before the war started and the man doing the dev work (Parrott) was a Union officer.


Lee would have been stocking up on Parrott field guns; the lack of larger guns in the Confederate artillery park was a pretty significant limit on their operations in e.g. 1862 (as they could not go after Washington with their own siege guns).


As far as I am aware Grant made no serious attempt at regular approaches.

Which is evidence neither Sherman nor Grant wanted to fight that way. They both wanted to severe the railroads and force the Confederates to abandon their prepared positions and fight in the open. Grant wrote repeatedly, that he expected US officers to pursue and annihilate any Confederate army that was away from its entrenchments.

 

[Saphroneth]

Which is evidence neither Sherman nor Grant wanted to fight that way. They both wanted to severe the railroads and force the Confederates to abandon their prepared positions and fight in the open. Grant wrote repeatedly, that he expected US officers to pursue and annihilate any Confederate army that was away from its entrenchments.

But you can also force the Confederates to abandon their prepared positions with regular approaches. Both methods render the enemy position untenable.

The United States, under Grant's leadership, formed large and expensive cavalry units. These units engaged in fighting and in raiding on a scale that eliminated any prospect of sustained warfare by the Confederate survivors.

This process was going on well before Grant's leadership, and indeed Grant had little to do with the formation of large cavalry raiding units - the Army of the Potomac's cavalry corps for example actually gets slightly smaller over the period of Grant's takeover, as far as I can determine.

 

[Piedone]

The United States, under Grant's leadership, formed large and expensive cavalry units. These units engaged in fighting and in raiding on a scale that eliminated any prospect of sustained warfare by the Confederate survivors.

Is there any explanation why the Confederates could still handle US cavalry intrusions in 1864 (Second Reams Station, the Kautz Ride)?

 

[jackt62]

Defining who was the better general (Grant v. Lee) can sometimes be an exercise in futility. May I respectfully focus on the particular attribute of aggressiveness that guided both generals from their earliest days of major commands. Brigadier General Grant, commanding Southeast Missouri in August 1861, commenced a series of bold, offensive moves whose goal was to disrupt the Confederate defensive line in western Kentucky and gain a federal foothold between the Mississippi and Tennessee Rivers. To that aim, Grant quickly occupied Paducah without waiting for superior orders and attacked Belmont by stretching the boundaries of his orders to disrupt M. Jeff Thompson's Missouri State Guard in southeast Missouri. Similarly, Grant promoted an assault on Ft. Henry, which he quickly expanded to an attack on Ft. Donelson. The effect of these operations between September 1861 and February 1862 forced the Confederates to withdraw from Columbus, Bowling Green, and Nashville, thereby setting the stage for deep federal inroads into southwestern Tennessee and northern Mississippi. Yet, Grant's attacks on Belmont and Donelson, while strategically successful, were tactically flawed.

Similarly Lee, given command of the newly named Army of Northern Virginia in June 1862, commenced a series of aggressive assaults against McClellan's AotP. While Lee had broad discretion to undertake operations, his planning and execution had as its goal the relief of Richmond by deranging McClellan's force arrayed against it. But similar to Grant's early command, the Seven Days offensive, while strategically successful, was tactically flawed and executed.

So I would consider both commanders to have a lot more in common than not, particularly as their early commands seemed to suggest. Grant and Lee acted with laser sharp focus on their immediate objectives, regardless of either superior orders or fear of enemy intentions, and with the ability to pursue audacious maneuvers despite on-going battlefield setbacks.

 

[wausaubob]

Except Colonel Lee was not very successful, was he? He won a number of tactical battles. But his state was partitioned. The economy of the state of Virginia was ruined. The white, male population of Virginia and North Carolina suffered a high percentage of death and disability. The institution of chattel slavery disappeared in the USA.
On the other hand Grant became President, and served two complete consecutive complete terms. The 15th Amendment, which Grant favored at the time of ratification, but which later he regretted, was passed and ratified during his first term. And yet, a segment of Civil War denialists wants to argue about every detail of his operations and success in ending the US Civil War in a way which prevented the outbreak of a second war.

 

[Saphroneth]

Except Colonel Lee was not very successful, was he? He won a number of tactical battles. But his state was partitioned. The economy of the state of Virginia was ruined. The white, male population of Virginia and North Carolina suffered a high percentage of death and disability. The institution of chattel slavery disappeared in the USA.

This is an almost absurd way to evaluate how effective a commander is - we cannot simply look at the post-war outcome completely stripped of context, because otherwise we end up with the situation that a commander is automatically inferior if their side happens to lose.

It is quite possible for someone to make no mistakes and still be on the losing side in a war, especially if their side is much weaker in manpower and industrial terms.

 

[limberbox]

No, the issue is that the Union had a monopoly on large Parrott guns. The smaller patterns or knock-offs thereof were made in Tregedar IIRC, but the large patterns like the 8" had not been developed before the war started and the man doing the dev work (Parrott) was a Union officer.


Lee would have been stocking up on Parrott field guns; the lack of larger guns in the Confederate artillery park was a pretty significant limit on their operations in e.g. 1862 (as they could not go after Washington with their own siege guns).


As far as I am aware Grant made no serious attempt at regular approaches.

This forgets Vicksburg.